procuring　of　the　wealth　and　property　of　his　people。〃　And　again；　in　his
  speech　to　the　Parliament；　1609；　he　hath　these　words：　〃The　king　binds
  himself；　by　a　double　oath；　to　the　observation　of　the　fundamental
  laws　of　his　kingdom…　tacitly；　as　by　being　a　king；　and　so　bound　to
  protect；　as　well　the　people　as　the　laws　of　his　kingdom；　and
  expressly　by　his　oath　at　his　coronation；　so　as　every　just　king；　in　a
  settled　kingdom；　is　bound　to　observe　that　paction　made　to　his
  people；　by　his　laws；　in　framing　his　government　agreeable　thereunto；
  according　to　that　paction　which　God　made　with　Noah　after　the　deluge：
  'Hereafter；　seed…time；　and　harvest；　and　cold；　and　heat；　and　summer；
  and　winter；　and　day；　and　night；　shall　not　cease　while　the　earth
  remaineth。'　And　therefore　a　king；　governing　in　a　settled　kingdom；
  leaves　to　be　a　king；　and　degenerates　into　a　tyrant；　as　soon　as　he
  leaves　off　to　rule　according　to　his　laws。〃　And　a　little　after：
  〃Therefore；　all　kings　that　are　not　tyrants；　or　perjured；　will　be
  glad　to　bound　themselves　within　the　limits　of　their　laws；　and　they
  that　persuade　them　the　contrary　are　vipers；　pests；　both　against　them
  and　the　commonwealth。〃　Thus；　that　learned　king；　who　well　understood
  the　notions　of　things；　makes　the　difference　betwixt　a　king　and　a
  tyrant　to　consist　only　in　this：　that　one　makes　the　laws　the　bounds
  of　his　power　and　the　good　of　the　public　the　end　of　his　government；　the
  other　makes　all　give　way　to　his　own　will　and　appetite。
  201。　It　is　a　mistake　to　think　this　fault　is　proper　only　to
  monarchies。　Other　forms　of　government　are　liable　to　it　as　well　as
  that；　for　wherever　the　power　that　is　put　in　any　hands　for　the
  government　of　the　people　and　the　preservation　of　their　properties　is
  applied　to　other　ends；　and　made　use　of　to　impoverish；　harass；　or
  subdue　them　to　the　arbitrary　and　irregular　commands　of　those　that　have
  it；　there　it　presently　becomes　tyranny；　whether　those　that　thus　use　it
  are　one　or　many。　Thus　we　read　of　the　thirty　tyrants　at　Athens；　as　well
  as　one　at　Syracuse；　and　the　intolerable　dominion　of　the　Decemviri　at
  Rome　was　nothing　better。
  202。　Wherever　law　ends；　tyranny　begins；　if　the　law　be　transgressed
  to　another's　harm；　and　whosoever　in　authority　exceeds　the　power
  given　him　by　the　law；　and　makes　use　of　the　force　he　has　under　his
  command　to　compass　that　upon　the　subject　which　the　law　allows　not；
  ceases　in　that　to　be　a　magistrate；　and　acting　without　authority　may　be
  opposed；　as　any　other　man　who　by　force　invades　the　right　of　another。
  This　is　acknowledged　in　subordinate　magistrates。　He　that　hath
  authority　to　seize　my　person　in　the　street　may　be　opposed　as　a　thief
  and　a　robber　if　he　endeavours　to　break　into　my　house　to　execute　a
  writ；　notwithstanding　that　I　know　he　has　such　a　warrant　and　such　a
  legal　authority　as　will　empower　him　to　arrest　me　abroad。　And　why
  this　should　not　hold　in　the　highest；　as　well　as　in　the　most　inferior
  magistrate；　I　would　gladly　be　informed。　Is　it　reasonable　that　the
  eldest　brother；　because　he　has　the　greatest　part　of　his　father's
  estate；　should　thereby　have　a　right　to　take　away　any　of　his　younger
  brothers'　portions？　Or　that　a　rich　man；　who　possessed　a　whole　country；
  should　from　thence　have　a　right　to　seize；　when　he　pleased；　the　cottage
  and　garden　of　his　poor　neighbour？　The　being　rightfully　possessed　of
  great　power　and　riches；　exceedingly　beyond　the　greatest　part　of　the
  sons　of　Adam；　is　so　far　from　being　an　excuse；　much　less　a　reason　for
  rapine　and　oppression；　which　the　endamaging　another　without
  authority　is；　that　it　is　a　great　aggravation　of　it。　For　exceeding
  the　bounds　of　authority　is　no　more　a　right　in　a　great　than　a　petty
  officer；　no　more　justifiable　in　a　king　than　a　constable。　But　so　much
  the　worse　in　him　as　that　he　has　more　trust　put　in　him；　is　supposed；
  from　the　advantage　of　education　and　counsellors；　to　have　better
  knowledge　and　less　reason　to　do　it；　having　already　a　greater　share
  than　the　rest　of　his　brethren。
  203。　May　the　commands；　then；　of　a　prince　be　opposed？　May　he　be
  resisted；　as　often　as　any　one　shall　find　himself　aggrieved；　and　but
  imagine　he　has　not　right　done　him？　This　will　unhinge　and　overturn
  all　polities；　and　instead　of　government　and　order；　leave　nothing　but
  anarchy　and　confusion。
  204。　To　this　I　answer：　That　force　is　to　be　opposed　to　nothing　but　to
  unjust　and　unlawful　force。　Whoever　makes　any　opposition　in　any　other
  case　draws　on　himself　a　just　condemnation；　both　from　God　and　man；
  and　so　no　such　danger　or　confusion　will　follow；　as　is　often　suggested。
  For…
  205。　First。　As　in　some　countries　the　person　of　the　prince　by　the　law
  is　sacred；　and　so　whatever　he　commands　or　does；　his　person　is　still
  free　from　all　question　or　violence；　not　liable　to　force；　or　any
  judicial　censure　or　condemnation。　But　yet　opposition　may　be　made　to
  the　illegal　acts　of　any　inferior　officer　or　other　commissioned　by　him；
  unless　he　will；　by　actually　putting　himself　into　a　state　of　war　with
  his　people；　dissolve　the　government；　and　leave　them　to　that　defence；
  which　belongs　to　every　one　in　the　state　of　Nature。　For　of　such　things；
  who　can　tell　what　the　end　will　be？　And　a　neighbour　kingdom　has
  showed　the　world　an　odd　example。　In　all　other　cases　the　sacredness
  of　the　person　exempts　him　from　all　inconveniencies；　whereby　he　is
  secure；　whilst　the　government　stands；　from　all　violence　and　harm
  whatsoever；　than　which　there　cannot　be　a　wiser　constitution。　For　the
  harm　he　can　do　in　his　own　person　not　being　likely　to　happen　often；　nor
  to　extend　itself　far；　nor　being　able　by　his　single　strength　to　subvert
  the　laws　nor　oppress　the　body　of　the　people；　should　any　prince　have　so
  much　weakness　and　ill…nature　as　to　be　willing　to　do　it。　The
  inconveniency　of　some　particular　mischiefs　that　may　happen　sometimes
  when　a　heady　prince　comes　to　the　throne　are　well　recompensed　by　the
  peace　of　the　public　and　security　of　the　government　in　the　person　of
  the　chief　magistrate；　thus　set　out　of　the　reach　of　danger；　it　being
  safer　for　the　body　that　some　few　private　men　should　be　sometimes　in
  danger　to　suffer　than　that　the　head　of　the　republic　should　be　easily
  and　upon　slight　occasions　exposed。
  206。　Secondly。　But　this　privilege；　belonging　only　to　the　king's
  person；　hinders　not　but　they　may　be　questioned；　opposed；　and　resisted；
  who　use　unjust　force；　though　they　pretend　a　commission　from　him
  which　the　law　authorises　not；　as　is　plain　in　the　case　of　him　that
  has　the　king's　writ　to　arrest　a　man　which　is　a　full　commission　from
  the　king；　and　yet　he　that　has　it　cannot　break　open　a　man's　house　to　do
  it；　nor　execute　this　command　of　the　king　upon　certain　days　nor　in
  certain　places；　though　this　commission　have　no　such　exception　in　it；
  but　they　are　the　limitations　of　the　law；　which；　if　any　one　transgress；
  the　king's　commission　excuses　him　not。　For　the　king's　authority
  being　given　him　only　by　the　law；　he　cannot　empower　any　one　to　act
  against　the　law；　or　justify　him　by　his　commission　in　so　doing。　The
  commission　or　command　of　any　magistrate　where　he　has　no　authority；
  being　as　void　and　insignificant　as　that　of　any　private　man；　the
  difference　between　the　one　and　the　other　being　that　the　magistrate　has
  some　authority　so　far　and　to　such　ends；　and　the　private　man　has　none
  at　all；　for　it　is　not　the　commission　but　the　authority　that　gives
  the　right　of　acting；　and　against　the　laws　there　can　be　no　authority。
  But　notwithstanding　such　resistance；　the　king's　person　and　authority
  are　still　both　secured；　and　so　no　danger　to　governor　or　government。
  207。　Thirdly。　Supposing　a　government　wherein　the　person　of　the　chief
  magistrate　is　not　thus　sacred；　yet　this　doctrine　of　the　lawfulness
  of　resisting　all　unlawful　exercises　of　his　power　will　not；　upon
  every　slight　occasion；　endanger　him　or　embroil　the　government；　for
  where　the　injured　party　may　be　relieved　and　his　damages　repaired　by
  appeal　to　the　law；　there　can　be　no　pretence　for　force；　which　is　only
  to　be　used　where　a　man　is　intercepted　from　appealing　to　the　law。　For
  nothing　is　to　be　accounted　hostile　force　but　where　it　leaves　not　the
  remedy　of　such　an　appeal。　and　it　is　such　force　alone　that　puts　him
  that　uses　it　into　a　state　of　war；　and　makes　it　lawful　to　resist　him。　A
  man　with　a　sword　in　his　hand　demands　my　purse　on　the　highway；　when
  perhaps　I　have　not　12d。　in　my　pocket。　This　man　I　may　lawfully　kill。　To
  another　I　deliver　L100　to　hold　only　whilst　I　alight；　which　he
  refuses　to　restore　me　when　I　am　got　up　again；　but　draws　his　sword　to
  defend　the　possession　of　it　by　force。　I　endeavour　to　retake　it。　The
  mischief　this　man　does　me　is　a　hundred；　or　possibly　a　thousand　times
  more　than　the　other　perhaps　intended　me　（whom　I　killed　before　he
  really　did　me　any）；　and　yet　I　might　lawfully　kill　the　one　and　cannot
  so　much　as　hurt　the　other　lawfully。　The　reason　whereof　is　plain；
  because　the　one　using　force　which　threatened　my　life；　I　could　not　have
  time　to　appeal　to　the　law　to　secure　it；　and　when　it　was　gone　it　was
  too　late　to　appeal。　The　law　could　not　restore　life　to　my　dead　carcass。
  The　loss　was　irreparable；　which　to　prevent　the　law　of　Nature　gave　me　a
  right　to　destroy　him　who