156。　The　power　of　assembling　and　dismissing　the　legislative；
  placed　in　the　executive；　gives　not　the　executive　a　superiority　over
  it；　but　is　a　fiduciary　trust　placed　in　him　for　the　safety　of　the
  people　in　a　case　where　the　uncertainty　and　variableness　of　human
  affairs　could　not　bear　a　steady　fixed　rule。　For　it　not　being
  possible　that　the　first　framers　of　the　government　should　by　any
  foresight　be　so　much　masters　of　future　events　as　to　be　able　to
  prefix　so　just　periods　of　return　and　duration　to　the　assemblies　of　the
  legislative；　in　all　times　to　come；　that　might　exactly　answer　all　the
  exigencies　of　the　commonwealth；　the　best　remedy　could　be　found　for
  this　defect　was　to　trust　this　to　the　prudence　of　one　who　was　always　to
  be　present；　and　whose　business　it　was　to　watch　over　the　public　good。
  Constant；　frequent　meetings　of　the　legislative；　and　long　continuations
  of　their　assemblies；　without　necessary　occasion；　could　not　but　be
  burdensome　to　the　people；　and　must　necessarily　in　time　produce　more
  dangerous　inconveniencies；　and　yet　the　quick　turn　of　affairs　might
  be　sometimes　such　as　to　need　their　present　help；　any　delay　of　their
  convening　might　endanger　the　public；　and　sometimes；　too；　their
  business　might　be　so　great　that　the　limited　time　of　their　sitting
  might　be　too　short　for　their　work；　and　rob　the　public　of　that
  benefit　which　could　be　had　only　from　their　mature　deliberation。
  What；　then；　could　be　done　in　this　case　to　prevent　the　community　from
  being　exposed　some　time　or　other　to　imminent　hazard　on　one　side　or　the
  other；　by　fixed　intervals　and　periods　set　to　the　meeting　and　acting　of
  the　legislative；　but　to　entrust　it　to　the　prudence　of　some　who；
  being　present　and　acquainted　with　the　state　of　public　affairs；　might
  make　use　of　this　prerogative　for　the　public　good？　And　where　else　could
  this　be　so　well　placed　as　in　his　hands　who　was　entrusted　with　the
  execution　of　the　laws　for　the　same　end？　Thus；　supposing　the　regulation
  of　times　for　the　assembling　and　sitting　of　the　legislative　not　settled
  by　the　original　constitution；　it　naturally　fell　into　the　hands　of
  the　executive；　not　as　an　arbitrary　power　depending　on　his　good
  pleasure；　but　with　this　trust　always　to　have　it　exercised　only　for　the
  public　weal；　as　the　occurrences　of　times　and　change　of　affairs　might
  require。　Whether　settled　periods　of　their　convening；　or　a　liberty　left
  to　the　prince　for　convoking　the　legislative；　or　perhaps　a　mixture　of
  both；　hath　the　least　inconvenience　attending　it；　it　is　not　my　business
  here　to　inquire；　but　only　to　show　that；　though　the　executive　power　may
  have　the　prerogative　of　convoking　and　dissolving　such　conventions　of
  the　legislative；　yet　it　is　not　thereby　superior　to　it。
  157。　Things　of　this　world　are　in　so　constant　a　flux　that　nothing
  remains　long　in　the　same　state。　Thus　people；　riches；　trade；　power；
  change　their　stations；　flourishing　mighty　cities　come　to　ruin；　and
  prove　in　time　neglected　desolate　corners；　whilst　other　unfrequented
  places　grow　into　populous　countries　filled　with　wealth　and
  inhabitants。　But　things　not　always　changing　equally；　and　private
  interest　often　keeping　up　customs　and　privileges　when　the　reasons　of
  them　are　ceased；　it　often　comes　to　pass　that　in　governments　where　part
  of　the　legislative　consists　of　representatives　chosen　by　the　people；
  that　in　tract　of　time　this　representation　becomes　very　unequal　and
  disproportionate　to　the　reasons　it　was　at　first　established　upon。　To
  what　gross　absurdities　the　following　of　custom　when　reason　has　left　it
  may　lead；　we　may　be　satisfied　when　we　see　the　bare　name　of　a　town；
  of　which　there　remains　not　so　much　as　the　ruins；　where　scarce　so
  much　housing　as　a　sheepcote；　or　more　inhabitants　than　a　shepherd　is　to
  be　found；　send　as　many　representatives　to　the　grand　assembly　of
  law…makers　as　a　whole　county　numerous　in　people　and　powerful　in
  riches。　This　strangers　stand　amazed　at；　and　every　one　must　confess
  needs　a　remedy；　though　most　think　it　hard　to　find　one；　because　the
  constitution　of　the　legislative　being　the　original　and　supreme　act
  of　the　society；　antecedent　to　all　positive　laws　in　it；　and　depending
  wholly　on　the　people；　no　inferior　power　can　alter　it。　And；
  therefore；　the　people　when　the　legislative　is　once　constituted；　having
  in　such　a　government　as　we　have　been　speaking　of　no　power　to　act　as
  long　as　the　government　stands；　this　inconvenience　is　thought　incapable
  of　a　remedy。
  158。　Salus　populi　suprema　lex　is　certainly　so　just　and　fundamental　a
  rule；　that　he　who　sincerely　follows　it　cannot　dangerously　err。　If；
  therefore；　the　executive　who　has　the　power　of　convoking　the
  legislative；　observing　rather　the　true　proportion　than　fashion　of
  representation；　regulates　not　by　old　custom；　but　true　reason；　the
  number　of　members　in　all　places；　that　have　a　right　to　be　distinctly
  represented；　which　no　part　of　the　people；　however　incorporated；　can
  pretend　to；　but　in　proportion　to　the　assistance　which　it　affords　to
  the　public；　it　cannot　be　judged　to　have　set　up　a　new　legislative；
  but　to　have　restored　the　old　and　true　one；　and　to　have　rectified　the
  disorders　which　succession　of　time　had　insensibly　as　well　as
  inevitably　introduced；　for　it　being　the　interest　as　well　as
  intention　of　the　people　to　have　a　fair　and　equal　representative；
  whoever　brings　it　nearest　to　that　is　an　undoubted　friend　to　and
  establisher　of　the　government；　and　cannot　miss　the　consent　and
  approbation　of　the　community；　prerogative　being　nothing　but　a　power　in
  the　hands　of　the　prince　to　provide　for　the　public　good　in　such　cases
  which；　depending　upon　unforeseen　and　uncertain　occurrences；　certain
  and　unalterable　laws　could　not　safely　direct。　Whatsoever　shall　be　done
  manifestly　for　the　good　of　the　people；　and　establishing　the　government
  upon　its　true　foundations　is；　and　always　will　be；　just　prerogative。
  The　power　of　erecting　new　corporations；　and　therewith　new
  representatives；　carries　with　it　a　supposition　that　in　time　the
  measures　of　representation　might　vary；　and　those　have　a　just　right
  to　be　represented　which　before　had　none；　and　by　the　same　reason；　those
  cease　to　have　a　right；　and　be　too　inconsiderable　for　such　a　privilege；
  which　before　had　it。　It　is　not　a　change　from　the　present　state
  which；　perhaps；　corruption　or　decay　has　introduced；　that　makes　an
  inroad　upon　the　government；　but　the　tendency　of　it　to　injure　or
  oppress　the　people；　and　to　set　up　one　part　or　party　with　a　distinction
  from　and　an　unequal　subjection　of　the　rest。　Whatsoever　cannot　but　be
  acknowledged　to　be　of　advantage　to　the　society　and　people　in
  general；　upon　just　and　lasting　measures；　will　always；　when　done；
  justify　itself；　and　whenever　the　people　shall　choose　their
  representatives　upon　just　and　undeniably　equal　measures；　suitable　to
  the　original　frame　of　the　government；　it　cannot　be　doubted　to　be　the
  will　and　act　of　the　society；　whoever　permitted　or　proposed　to　them
  so　to　do。
  Chapter　XIV
  Of　Prerogative
  159。　WHERE　the　legislative　and　executive　power　are　in　distinct
  hands；　as　they　are　in　all　moderated　monarchies　and　well…framed
  governments；　there　the　good　of　the　society　requires　that　several
  things　should　be　left　to　the　discretion　of　him　that　has　the
  executive　power。　For　the　legislators　not　being　able　to　foresee　and
  provide　by　laws　for　all　that　may　be　useful　to　the　community；　the
  executor　of　the　laws；　having　the　power　in　his　hands；　has　by　the　common
  law　of　Nature　a　right　to　make　use　of　it　for　the　good　of　the　society；
  in　many　cases　where　the　municipal　law　has　given　no　direction；　till　the
  legislative　can　conveniently　be　assembled　to　provide　for　it；　nay；　many
  things　there　are　which　the　law　can　by　no　means　provide　for；　and
  those　must　necessarily　be　left　to　the　discretion　of　him　that　has　the
  executive　power　in　his　hands；　to　be　ordered　by　him　as　the　public
  good　and　advantage　shall　require；　nay；　it　is　fit　that　the　laws
  themselves　should　in　some　cases　give　way　to　the　executive　power；　or
  rather　to　this　fundamental　law　of　Nature　and　government…　viz。；　that　as
  much　as　may　be　all　the　members　of　the　society　are　to　be　preserved。　For
  since　many　accidents　may　happen　wherein　a　strict　and　rigid　observation
  of　the　laws　may　do　harm；　as　not　to　pull　down　an　innocent　man's　house
  to　stop　the　fire　when　the　next　to　it　is　burning；　and　a　man　may　come
  sometimes　within　the　reach　of　the　law；　which　makes　no　distinction　of
  persons；　by　an　action　that　may　deserve　reward　and　pardon；　it　is　fit
  the　ruler　should　have　a　power　in　many　cases　to　mitigate　the　severity
  of　the　law；　and　pardon　some　offenders；　since　the　end　of　government
  being　the　preservation　of　all　as　much　as　may　be；　even　the　guilty　are
  to　be　spared　where　it　can　prove　no　prejudice　to　the　innocent。
  160。　This　power　to　act　according　to　discretion　for　the　public
  good；　without　the　prescription　of　the　law　and　sometimes　even　against
  it；　is　that　which　is　called　prerogative；　for　since　in　some　governments
  the　law…making　power　is　not　always　in　being　and　is　usually　too
  numerous；　and　so　too　slow　for　the　dispatch　requisite　to　execution；　and
  because；　also；　it　is　i