e　to　follow　its　own　plans。　For　this　difference　there　were　several　causes；　chief　of　which　was　the　fact　that　the　navy　was　a　fully　professional　arm；　ready　for　action　both　in　equipment　and　in　plans；　and　able　to　take　a　prompt　initiative　in　carrying　out　an　aggressive　campaign。　The　War　Department　had　a　more　difficult　task　in　adjusting　itself　to　the　new　conditions　brought　about　by　the　Spanish　American　War。　The　army　was　made　up　on　the　principle　traditionally　held　in　the　United　States　that　the　available　army　force　in　time　of　peace　should　be　just　sufficient　for　the　purposes　of　peace；　and　that　it　should　be　enlarged　in　time　of　war。　To　allow　a　fair　amount　of　expansion　without　too　much　disturbance　to　the　organization　in　increasing　to　war　strength；　the　regular　army　was　over…officered　in　peace　times。　The　chief　reliance　in　war　was　placed　upon　the　militia。　The　organization　and　training　of　this　force　was　left；　however；　under　a　few　very　general　directions；　to　the　various　States。　As　a　result；　its　quality　varied　and　it　was　nowhere　highly　efficient　in　the　military　sense。　Some　regiments；　it　is　true；　were　impressive　on　parade；　but　almost　none　of　the　officers　knew　anything　of　actual　modern　warfare。　There　had　been　no　preliminary　sifting　of　ability　in　the　army；　and　it　was　only　as　experience　gave　the　test　that　the　capable　and　informed　were　called　into　positions　of　importance。　In　fact；　the　training　of　the　regular　officers　was　inferior　to　that　of　the　naval　officers。　West　Point　and　Annapolis　were　both　excellent　in　the　quality　of　their　instruction；　but　what　they　offered　amounted　only　to　a　college　course；　and　in　the　army　there　was　no　provision　for　systematic　graduate　study　corresponding　to　the　Naval　War　College　at　Newport。
  These　difficulties　and　deficiencies；　however；　cannot　fully　explain　the　woeful　inferiority　of　the　army　to　the　navy　in　preparedness。　Fundamentally　the　defect　was　at　the　top。　Russell　A。　Alger；　the　Secretary　of　War；　was　a　veteran　of　the　Civil　War　and　a　silver…voiced　orator；　but　his　book　on　the　〃Spanish…American　War；〃　which　was　intended　as　a　vindication　of　his　record；　proves　that　even　eighteen　months　of　as　grueling　denunciation　as　any　American　official　has　ever　received　could　not　enlighten　him　as　to　what　were　the　functions　of　his　office。　Nor　did　he　correct　or　supplement　his　own　incompetence　by　seeking　professional　advice。　There　existed　no　general　staff；　and　it　did　not　occur　to　him；　as　it　did　to　Secretary　Long；　to　create　one　to　advise　him　unofficially。　He　was　on　bad　terms　with　Major　General　Nelson　A。　Miles；　who　was　the　general　in　command。　He　discussed　even　the　details　of　questions　of　army　strategy；　not　only　with　Miles　but　with　the　President　and　members　of　the　Cabinet。　One　of　the　most　extraordinary　decisions　made　during　his　tenure　of　office　was　that　the　act　of　the　9th　of　March；　appropriating　50；000；000　〃for　national　defense；〃　forbade　money　to　be　spent　or　even　contracts　to　be　made　by　the　quartermaster；　the　commissary；　or　the　surgeon　general。　In　his　book　Secretary　Alger　records　with　pride　the　fact　that　all　this　money　was　spent　for　coast　defense。　In　view　of　the　fact　that　the　navy　did　its　task；　this　expenditure　was　absolutely　unnecessary　and　served　merely　to　solace　coast　cities　and　munition　makers。
  The　regular　army　on　April　1；　1898；　consisted　of　28；183　officers　and　men。　An　act　of　the　26th　of　April　authorized　its　increase　to　about　double　that　size。　As　enlistment　was　fairly　prompt；　by　August　the　army　consisted　of　56；365　officers　and　men；　the　number　of　officers　being　but　slightly　increased。　It　was　decided　not　to　use　the　militia　as　it　was　then　organized；　but　to　rely　for　numbers　as　usual　chiefly　upon　a　volunteer　army；　authorized　by　the　Act　of　the　22d　of　April；　and　by　subsequent　acts　raised　to　a　total　of　200；000；　with　an　additional　3000　cavalry；　3500　engineers；　and　10；000　〃immunes；〃　or　men　supposed　not　to　be　liable　to　tropical　diseases。　The　war　seemed　equally　popular　all　over　the　country；　and　the　million　who　offered　themselves　for　service　were　sufficient　to　allow　due　consideration　for　equitable　state　quotas　and　for　physical　fitness。　There　were　also　sufficient　Krag…Jorgensen　rifles　to　arm　the　increased　regular　army　and　Springfields　for　the　volunteers。
  To　provide　an　adequate　number　of　officers　for　the　volunteer　army　was　more　difficult。　Even　though　a　considerable　number　were　transferred　from　the　regular　to　the　volunteer　army；　they　constituted　only　a　small　proportion　of　the　whole　number　necessary。　Some　few　of　those　appointed　were　graduates　of　West　Point；　and　more　had　been　in　the　militia。　The　great　majority；　however；　had　purely　amateur　experience；　and　many　not　even　so　much。　Those　who　did　know　something；　moreover；　did　not　have　the　same　knowledge　or　experience。　This　raw　material　was　given　no　officer　training　whatsoever　but　was　turned　directly　to　the　task　of　training　the　rank　and　file。　Nor　were　the　appointments　of　new　officers　confined　to　the　lower　ranks。　The　country；　still　mindful　of　its　earlier　wars；　was　charmed　with　the　sentimental　elevation　of　confederate　generals　to　the　rank　of　major　general　in　the　new　army；　though　a　public　better　informed　would　hardly　have　welcomed　for　service　in　the　tropics　the　selection　of　men　old　enough　to　be　generals　in　1865　and　then　for　thirty…three　years　without　military　experience　in　an　age　of　great　development　in　the　methods　of　warfare。　The　other　commanding　officers　were　as　old　and　were　mostly　chosen　by　seniority　in　a　service　retiring　at　sixty…four。　The　unwonted　strain　of　active　service　naturally　proved　too　great。　At　the　most　critical　moment　of　the　campaign　in　Cuba；　the　commanding　general；　William　R。　Shafter；　had　eaten　nothing　for　four　days；　and　his　plucky　second　in　command；　the　wiry　Georgian　cavalry　leader　of　1864　and　1865；　General　〃Joe〃　Wheeler；　was　not　physically　fit　to　succeed　him。　There　is　not　the　least　doubt　that　the　fighting　spirit　of　the　men　was　strong　and　did　not　fail；　but　the　defect　in　those　branches　of　knowledge　which　are　required　to　keep　an　army　fit　to　fight　is　equally　certain。　The　primary　cause　for　the　melting　of　the　American　army　by　disease　must　be　acknowledged　to　be　the　insufficient　training　of　the　officers。
  This　hit　or　miss　method；　however；　had　its　compensations；　for　it　brought　about　some　appointments　of　unusual　merit。　Conspicuous　were　those　of　Colonel　Leonard　Wood　and　Lieutenant　Colonel　Theodore　Roosevelt。　The　latter　had　resigned　as　Assistant　Secretary　of　the　Navy；　a　position　in　which　he　had　contributed　a　great　deal　to　the　efficiency　of　that　Department；　in　order　to　take　a　more　tangible　part　in　the　war。　After　raising　among　his　friends　and　the　cowboys　of　the　West　a　regiment　of　〃Rough　Riders；〃　he　declined　its　command　on　plea　of　military　inexperience。　Roosevelt　made　one　of　those　happy　choices　which　are　a　mark　of　his　administrative　ability　in　selecting　as　colonel　Leonard　Wood；　an　army　surgeon　whose　quality　he　knew　through　common　experiences　in　the　West。
  To　send　into　a　midsummer　tropical　jungle　an　American　army；　untrained　to　take　care　of　its　health；　for　the　most　part　clothed　in　the　regulation　army　woolens；　and　tumbled　together　in　two　months；　was　an　undertaking　which…could　be　justified　only　on　the　ground　that　the　national　safety　demanded　immediate　action。　In　1898；　however；　it　seemed　to　be　universally　taken　for　granted　by　people　and　administration；　by　professional　soldier　as　well　as　by　public　sentiment；　that　the　army　must　invade　Cuba　without　regard　to　its　fitness　for　such　active　service。　The　responsibility　for　this　decision　must　rest　upon　the　nation。　The　experience　of　centuries　had　proved　conspicuously　that　climate　was　the　strongest　defense　of　the　Caribbean　islands　against　invasion；　and　it　was　in　large　measure　the　very　sacrifice　of　so　many　American　soldiers　that　induced　the　study　of　tropical　diseases。　In　1898　it　could　hardly　be　expected　that　the　American　command；　inexperienced　and　eager　for　action；　should　have　recognized　the　mosquito　as　the　carrier　of　yellow　fever　and　the　real　enemy；　or　should　have　realized　the　necessity　of　protecting　the　soldiers　by　inoculation　against　typhoid　fever。
  Fixed　as　was　the　determination　to　send　an　army　into　Cuba　at　the　earliest　possible　moment；　there　had　been　a　wide　diversity　of　opinion　as　to　what　should　be　the　particular　objective。　General　Miles　wavered　between　the　choice　of　the　island　of　Porto　Rico　and　Puerto　Principe；　a　city　in　the　interior　and　somewhat　east　of　the　middle　of　Cuba；　the　Department　hesitated　between　Tunas　on　the　south　coast　of　Cuba；　within　touch　of　the　insurgents；　and　Mariel　on　the　north；　the　seizure　of　which　would　be　the　first　step　in　a　siege　of　Havana。　The　situation　at　Santiago；　however；　made　that　city　the　logical　objective　of　the　troops；　and　on　the　31st　of　May；　General　Shafter　was　ordered　to　be　prepared　to　move。　On　the　7th　of　June　he　was　ordered　to　sail　with　〃not　less　than　10；000　men；〃　but　an　alarming；　though　unfounded；　rumor　of　a　Spanish　squadron　off　the　north　coast　of　Cuba　delayed　the　expedition　until　the　14th。　With　an　army　of　seventeen　thousand　on　thirty…two　transports；　and　accompanied　by　eighty…nine　newspaper　correspondents；　Shafter　arrived　on　the　20th　of　June　off　Santiago。
  The　Spanish　troops　in　Cubathe　American　control　of　the　sea　made　it　unnecessary　to　consider　those　available　in　Spainamounted；　according　to　returns　in　April；　1898；　to　196；820。　This　formidable　number