divining　that　Cervera　would　make　for　San　Juan；　the　capital　and　chief　seaport　of　Porto　Rico；　detached　from　his　blockading　force　a　fighting　squadron　with　which　he　sailed　east；　but　not　finding　the　Spanish　fleet　he　turned　back　to　Key　West。　Schley；　with　the　Flying　Squadron；　was　then　ordered　to　Cienfuegos。　In　the　meantime　Cervera　was　escaping　detection　by　the　American　scouts　by　taking　an　extremely　southerly　course；　and　with　the　information　that　Sampson　was　off　San　Juan；　the　Spanish　Admiral　sailed　for　Santiago　de　Cuba；　where　he　arrived　on　May　19；　1898。
  Though　Cervera　was　safe　in　harbor；　the　maneuver　of　the　American　fleet　cannot　be　called　unsuccessful。　Cervera　would　have　preferred　to　be　at　San　Juan；　where　there　was　a　navy　yard　and　where　his　position　would　have　obliged　the　American　fleet　either　to　split　into　two　divisions　separated　by　eight　hundred　miles　or　to　leave　him　free　range　of　action。　Next　to　San　Juan　he　would　have　preferred　Havana　or；　Cienfuegos；　which　were　connected　by　railroad　and　near　which　lay　the　bulk　of　the　Spanish　Army。　He　found　himself　instead　at　the　extreme　eastern　end　of　Cuba　in　a　port　with　no　railroad　connection　with　Havana；　partly　blocked　by　the　insurgents；　and　totally　unable　to　supply　him　with　necessities。
  Unless　Cervera　could　leave　Santiago；　his　expedition　would　obviously　have　been　useless。　Though　it　was　the　natural　function　of　the　American　fleet　to　blockade　him；　for　a　week　after　his　arrival　there　was　an　interesting　game　of　hide　and　seek　between　the　two　fleets。　The　harbors　of　Cienfuegos　and　of　Santiago　are　both　landlocked　by　high　hills；　and　Cervera　had　entered　Santiago　without　being　noticed　by　the　Americans；　as　that　part　of　the　coast　was　not　under　blockade。　Schley　thought　Cervera　was　at　Cienfuegos；　Sampson　was　of　the　opinion　that　he　was　at　Santiago。　When　it　became　known　that　the　enemy　had　taken　refuge　in　Santiago；　Schley　began　the　blockade　on　the　28th　of　May；　but　stated　that　he　could　not　continue　long　in　position　owing　to　lack　of　coal。　On　the　1st　of　June　Sampson　arrived　and　assumed　command　of　the　blockading　squadron。
  With　the　bottling　up　of　Cervera；　the　first　stage　of　the　war　passed。　The　navy　had　performed　its　primary　function：　it　had　established　its　superiority　and　had　obtained　the　control　of　the　seas。　The　American　coast　was　safe；　American　commerce　was　safe　except　in　the　vicinity　of　Spain；　and　the　sea　was　open　for　the　passage　of　an　American　expeditionary　force。　Nearly　the　whole　island　of　Cuba　was　now　under　blockade；　and　the　insurgents　were　receiving　supplies　from　the　United　States。　It　had　been　proved　that　the　fairly　even　balance　of　the　two　fleets；　so　anxiously　scanned　when　it　was　reported　in　the　newspapers　in　April；　was　entirely　deceptive　when　it　came　to　real　efficiency　in　action。　Moreover；　the　skillful　handling　of　the　fleets　by　the　Naval　War　Board　as　well　as　by　the　immediate　commanders　had　redoubled　the　actual　superiority　of　the　American　naval　forces。
  A　fleet　in　being；　even　though　inferior　and　immobilized；　still　counts　as　a　factor　in　naval　warfare；　and　Cervera；　though　immobilized　by　Sampson；　himself　immobilized　the　greater　number　of　American　vessels　necessary　to　blockade　him。　The　importance　of　this　fact　was　evident　to　every　one　when；　in　the　middle　of　June；　the　remainder　of　the　Spanish　home　fleet；　whipped　hastily　into　a　semblance　of　fighting　condition；　set　out　eastward　under　Admiral　Camara　to　contest　the　Philippines　with　Dewey。　It　was　impossible　for　the　United　States　to　detach　a　force　sufficient　to　cross　the　Atlantic　and；　without　a　base；　meet　this　fleet　in　its　home　waters。　Even　if　a　smaller　squadron　were　dispatched　from　the　Atlantic　round　Cape　Horn；　it　would　arrive　in　the　Philippines　too　late　to　be　of　assistance　to　Dewey。　The　two　monitors　on　the　Pacific　coast；　the　Monterey　and　the　Monadnock；　had　already　been　ordered　across　the　Pacific；　a　voyage　perilous　for　vessels　of　their　structure　and　agonizing　to　their　crews；　but　it　was　doubtful　whether　they　or　Camara　would　arrive　first　in　the　Philippines。
  The　logic　of　the　situation　demanded　that　the　main　American　fleet　be　released。　Cervera　must　be　destroyed　or　held　in　some　other　way　than　at　the　expense　of　inactivity　on　the　part　of　the　American　warships。　Santiago　could　not　be　forced　by　the　navy。　Two　methods　remained。　The　first　and　simpler　expedient　was　to　make　the　harbor　mouth　impassable　and　in　this　way　to　bottle　up　the　Spanish　fleet。　It　was　decided　to　sink　the　collier　Merrimac　at　a　narrow　point　in　the　channel；　where；　lying　full　length；　she　would　completely　prevent　egress。　It　was　a　delicate　task　and　one　of　extraordinary　danger。　It　was　characteristic　of　the　spirit　of　the　fleet　that；　as　Admiral　Chadwick　says；　practically　all　the　men　were　volunteers。　The　honor　of　the　command　was　given　to　Lieutenant　Richmond　Pearson　Hobson；　Assistant　Naval　Constructor；　who　had　been　in　charge　of　the　preparations。　With　a　crew　of　six　men　he　entered　the　harbor　mouth　on　the　night　of　the　3d　of　June。　A　shell　disabled　the　steering　gear　of　the　Merrimac；　and　the　ship　sank　too　far　within　the　harbor　to　block　the　entrance　entirely。　Admiral　Cervera　himself　rescued　the　crew；　assured　Sampson　of　their　safety　in　an　appreciative　note；　and　one　of　the　best　designed　and　most　heroic　episodes　in　our　history　just　missed　success。
  The　failure　of　the　Merrimac　experiment　left　the　situation　as　it　had　been　and　forced　the　American　command　to　consider　the　second　method　which　would　release　the　American　fleet。　This　new　plan　contemplated　the　reduction　of　Santiago　by　a　combined　military　and　naval　attack。　Cervera's　choice　of　Santiago　therefore　practically　determined　the　direction　of　the　first　American　overseas　military　expedition；　which　had　been　in　preparation　since　the　war　began。
  CHAPTER　X。　The　Preparation　Of　The　Army
  When　one　compares　the　conditions　under　which　the　Spanish　American　War　was　fought　with　those　of　the　Great　War；　he　feels　himself　living　in　a　different　age。　Twenty　years　ago　hysteria　and　sudden　panics　swept　the　nation。　Cheers　and　waving　handkerchiefs　and　laughing　girls　sped　the　troops　on　their　way。　It　cannot　be　denied　that　the　most　popular　song　of　the　war　time　was　〃There'll　be　a　hot　time　in　the　old　town　to…night；〃　though　it　may　be　believed　that　the　energy　and　swing　of　the　music　rather　than　the　words　made　it　so。　The　atmosphere　of　the　country　was　one　of　a　great　national　picnic　where　each　one　was　expected　to　carry　his　own　lunch。　There　was　apparent　none　of　the　concentration　of　effort　and　of　the　calm　foresight　so　necessary　for　efficiency　in　modern　warfare。　For　youth　the　Spanish　American　War　was　a　great　adventure；　for　the　nation　it　was　a　diversion　sanctioned　by　a　high　purpose。
  This　abandon　was　doubtless　in　part　due　to　a　comfortable　consciousness　of　the　vast　disparity　in　resources　between　Spain　and　the　United　States；　which；　it　was　supposed；　meant　automatically　a　corresponding　difference　in　fighting　strength。　The　United　States　did；　indeed；　have　vast　superiorities　which　rendered　unnecessary　any　worry　over　many　of　the　essentials　which　gripped　the　popular　mind　during　the　Great　War。　People　believed　that　the　country　could　supply　the　munitions　needed；　and　that　of　facilities　for　transport　it　had　enough。　If　the　United　States　did　not　have　at　hand　exactly　the　munitions　needed；　if　the　transportation　system　had　not　been　built　to　launch　an　army　into　Cuba；　it　was　popularly　supposed　that　the　wealth　of　the　country　rendered　such　trifles　negligible；　and　that；　if　insufficient　attention　had　been　given　to　the　study　of　such　matters　in　the　past；　American　ingenuity　would　quickly　offset　the　lack　of　skilled　military　experience。　The　fact　that　American　soldiers　traveled　in　sleeping　cars　while　European　armies　were　transported　in　freight　cars　blinded　Americans　for　a　while　to　the　significant　fact　that　there　was　but　a　single　track　leading　to　Tampa；　the　principal　point　of　embarkation　for　Cuba；　and　no　one　thought　of　building　another。
  Nothing　so　strongly　marks　the　amateur　character　of　the　conduct　of　the　Spanish　War　as　the　activity　of　the　American　press。　The　navy　was　dogged　by　press　dispatch　boats　which　revealed　its　every　move。　When　Admiral　Sampson　started　upon　his　cruise　to　San　Juan；　he　requested　the　press　boats　to　observe　secrecy；　and　Admiral　Chadwick　comments　with　satisfaction　upon　the　fact　that　this　request　was　observed　〃fully　and　honorably。。。by　every　person　except　one。〃　When　Lieutenant　Whitney　risked　his　life　as　a　spy　in　order　to　investigate　conditions　in　Porto　Rico；　his　plans　and　purpose　were　blazoned　in　the　press。　Incredible　as　it　may　now　seem；　the　newspaper　men　appear　to　have　felt　themselves　part　of　the　army。　They　offered　their　services　as　equals；　and　William　Randolph　Hearst　even　ordered　one　of　his　staff　to　sink　a　vessel　in　the　Suez　Canal　to　delay　Camara　on　his　expedition　against　Dewey。　This　order；　fortunately　for　the　international　reputation　of　the　United　States；　was　not　executed。　With　all　their　blare　and　childish　enthusiasm；　the　reporters　do　not　seem　to　have　been　so　successful　in　revealing　to　Americans　the　plans　of　Spain　as　they　were　in　furnishing　her　with　itemized　accounts　of　all　the　doings　of　the　American　forces。
  While　the　press　not　only　revealed　but　formulated　courses　of　action　in　the　case　of　the　army；　the　navy；　at　least；　was　able　to　follow　its　own　plans。　For　this　difference　there　were　several　causes；　chief　of　which　was　the　fac