but　the　Irish　law　corresponds　to　the　English　law　of　Distress　in　a
  very　advanced　stage　of　development。　It　does　not　employ　the
  seizure　of　cattle　merely　as　a　method　of　extorting　satisfaction。
  It　provides；　as　you　have　seen；　for　their　forfeiture　in　discharge
  of　the　Demand　for　which　they　were　taken；　and　thus　is
  distinguished　by　an　improvement　which　was　only　added　to　the
  English　law　by　statute　after　the　lapse　of　several　centuries。
  The　true　difficulty　in　estimating　the　place　of　this　Irish
  procedure　in　the　historical　development　of　law　arises　from　doubts
  as　to　the　part　really　played　by　the　legal　proceeding　in　which　it
  terminated。　The　English　process　of　distress；　wherever　it　was　felt
  to　be　unjust；　led　up　to；　and　ended　in；　the　action　of　replevin；
  and　the　court；　which　ultimately　tried　the　action；　practically
  acquired　its　jurisdiction　through　the　interposition　of　the
  Sheriff　in　restoring　the　cattle　upon　security　given。　No　such
  interference　with　a　high　hand　as　that　of　the　Sheriff　appears　to
  be　contemplated　by　the　Irish　law。　but　the　Brehon　lawyer　who　ought
  properly　to　accompany　the　distrainor　is　expressly　stated　by　the
  Senchus　Mor　to　aid　him　'until　the　decision　of　a　Court。'　（'Ancient
  Laws　of　Ireland；'　i。　85。）　What　was　the　proceeding　thus　referred
  to？　What　authority　had　the　Irish　Courts　at　any　time　at　which　the
  Brehon　law　was　held　in　respect？　What　were　these　Courts？　To　what
  extent　did　they　command　the　public　force　of　the　sovereign　State？
  was　there　any　sovereign　power　at　any　time　established　in　any　part
  of　Ireland　which　could　give　operative　jurisdiction　to　Courts　of
  Justice　and　operative　force　to　the　law？　All　these　questions　　of
  which　the　last　are　in　truth　the　great　problems　of　ancient　Irish
  history　　must　in　some　degree　be　answered　before　we　can　have
  anything；　like　a　confident　opinion　on　the　actual　working　of　the
  Law　of　Distress　set　forth　at　such　length　in　the　Senchus　Mor。
  The　learned　Editors　of　the　various　Introductions　prefixed　to
  the　official　publications　of　Ancient　Irish　Law　are　plainly　of
  opinion　that　such　jurisdiction　as　any　Irish　Courts　possessed　was；
  to　use　the　technical　phrase；　voluntary。　The　Law　of　Distress；　in
  this　view；　was　clearly　enough　conceived　by　the　Brehon　lawyer；　but
  it　depended　for　the　practical　obedience　which　it　obtained　on　the
  aid　of　public　opinion　and　of　popular　respect　for　a　professional
  Caste。　Its　object　was　to　force　disputants　to　submit　to　what　was
  rather　an　arbitration　than　an　action；　before　a　Brehon　selected　by
  themselves；　or　at　most　before　some　recognised　tribunal　advised　by
  a　Brehon。　At　the　same　time；　it　would　seem　that　there　are　ancient
  Irish　tracts　or　fragments　of　tracts　in　existence　which　describe
  the　ancient　Irish　as　having　had　a　most　elaborate　public
  organisation；　judicial　as　well　as　legislative。　Dr　Sullivan；　in
  his　Introduction；　admits　that　the　information　which　has　come　down
  to　us　on　these　subjects　is　very　fragmentary；　and　so　obscure　that
  it　will　be　impossible　to　give　a　satisfactory　account　of　them
  until　the　whole　of　the　law…fragments　in　Irish　MSS。　are　published
  or　at　least　made　accessible　to　scholars；　but　he　nevertheless
  believes　in　the　historical　reality　of　this　organisation；　and　he
  speaks　（Introduction；　pp。　cclii。　cclxii。）　of　the　Irish　Courts　in
  language　of　extremely　modern　tinge。　Enough　is　known　of　Irish
  history　to　make　it　very　difficult　to　understand　when　this
  elaborate　judicial　system　can　have　existed；　but　a　place　is　found
  for　it　by　attributing　it　to　a　period　not　only　before　the
  Anglo…Norman　invasions　of　Ireland；　but　before　the　Viking　descents
  on　the　Irish　coasts。　The　safest　course　is　certainly　to　reserve
  one's　opinion　on　the　subject　until　the　authorities　for　Dr
  Sullivan's　statements　have　been　much　more　critically　examined
  than　they　have　been；　but　I　am　bound　to　say　that　they　are　not　so
  inherently　improbable；　nor　are　Dr　Sullivan's　opinions　so　hard　to
  reconcile　with　the　views　of　the　Editors　of　the　translations；　as
  persons　unacquainted　with　legal　history　might　suppose。　There　are
  analogies　to　many　of　the　tribunals　described　among　the
  rudimentary　institutions　of　several　communities。　Such　tribunals
  might　further　be　highly　developed　and　yet　their　jurisdiction
  might　be　only　voluntary。　Sohm　appears　to　me　to　have　proved　that
  the　Frankish　Popular　Courts　did　not　execute　their　own　decrees；　if
  the　defendant　had　promised　to　submit　to　an　award；　the　local
  deputy　of　the　King　might　be　required　to　enforce　it；　but；　if　there
  had　been　no　such　promise；　the　plaintiff　was　forced　to　petition
  the　King　in　person。　There　is　much　reason　in　fact　for　thinking
  that；　in　the　earliest　times　and　before　the　full　development　of
  that　kingly　authority　which　has　lent　so　much　vigour　to　the　arm　of
  the　law　in　most　Aryan　communities；　but　which　was　virtually　denied
  to　the　Irish；　Courts　of　Justice　existed　less　for　the　purpose　of
  doing　right　universally　than　for　the　purpose　of　supplying　an
  alternative　to　the　violent　redress　of　wrong。　Even　then　if　we
  suppose　that　the　Ireland　which　is　said　to　have　enjoyed　an
  elaborate　judicial　organization　was　greatly　ruder　and　wilder　than
  Irish　patriots　would　probably　allow　it　to　have　been；　there　is　no
  such　inconsistency　between　the　prevalence　of　disorder　and　the
  frequency　of　litigation　as　would　make　them　exclude　one　another。
  The　Norse　literature；　which　Mr　Dasent　has　popularised　among　us；
  shows　that　perpetual　fighting　and　perpetual　litigation　may　go　on
  side　by　side；　and　that　a　highly　technical　procedure　may　be
  scrupulously　followed　at　a　time　when　homicide　is　an　everyday
  occurrence。　The　fact　seems　to　be　that　contention　in　Court　takes
  the　place　of　contention　in　arms；　but　only　gradually　takes　its
  place；　and　it　is　a　tenable　theory　that　many　of　the　strange
  peculiarities　of　ancient　law；　the　technical　snares；　traps；　and
  pitfalls　with　which　it　abounds；　really　represent　and　carry　on　the
  feints；　stratagems；　and　ambuscades　of　actual　armed　strife　between
  man　and　man；　between　tribe　and　tribe。　Even　in　our　own　day；　when　a
  wild　province　is　annexed　to　the　British　Indian　Empire；　there　is　a
  most　curious　and　instructive　rush　of　suitors　to　the　Courts　which
  are　immediately　established。　The　arm　of　the　law　summarily
  suppresses　violence；　and　the　men　who　can　no　longer　fight　go　to
  law　instead；　in　numbers　which　sometimes　make　Indian　officials
  believe　that　there　must　be　something　maleficent　in　the　law　and
  procedure　which　tempt　men　into　Court　who　never　saw　a　Court
  before。　The　simple　explanation　is　that　the　same　natural　impulse
  is　gratified　in　a　new　way；　hasty　appeals　to　a　judge　succeed
  hurried　quarrels；　and　hereditary　law…suits　take　the　place　of
  ancestral　blood…feuds。　If　the　transition　from　one　state　of
  society　to　another　in　modern　India　were　not　sudden　but　gradual
  and　slow；　as　it　universally　was　in　the　old　Aryan　world；　we　should
  see　the　battle　with　technicalities　going　on　in　Court　at　the　same
  time　that　the　battle　was　waged　out　of　Court　with　sword　and
  matchlock。
  When；　however；　we　are　considering　the　place　in　legal　history
  of　the　old　Irish　Law　of　Distress；　the　point　to　which　we　have　to
  attend　is　not　so　much　the　mere　existence　of　Courts　of　Justice　as
  the　effectiveness　of　their　process；　or　in　other　words　the　degree
  in　which　they　command　the　public　force　of　the　Commonwealth。　I
  think　I　have　shown　it　to　be　probable　that；　in　proportion　as
  Courts　grow　stronger；　they　first　take　under　their　control　the
  barbarous　practice　of　making　reprisals　on　a　wrongdoer　by　seizing
  his　property；　and　ultimately　they　absorb　it　into　their　own
  procedure。　Now；　the　Irish　Law　of　Distress　belongs　in　one　respect
  to　a　very　early　stage　in　this　course　of　development；　since　it　is
  even　more　completely　extrajudicial　than　is　that　fragment　of　the
  primitive　barbarous　remedy　which　has　survived　among　ourselves。　On
  the　other　hand；　there　are　several　particulars　in　which　it　is　not
  more　but　distinctly　less　archaic　than　the　English　Common　law。　The
  'Notice'　to　the　defendant；　for　which　it　provides　　the　'Stay；'
  or　temporary　retention　of　the　goods　by　the　owner；　subject　to　a
  lien　　the　witnesses　who　have　to　be　present；　and　the　skilled
  legal　adviser　who　has　to　attend　throughout　the　proceedings
  belong　to　a　range　of　ideas　greatly　more　advanced　than　that　under
  which　all　these　precautions　are　dispensed　with。　Even　stronger
  evidence　of　maturity　is　furnished　by　the　almost　inconceivable
  multitude　of　rules　and　distinctions　which　the　Senchus　Mor　applies
  to　every　part　of　the　proceedings；　and　our　own　experience　shows
  that　the　most　remarkable　feature　of　the　old　Irish　law；　the
  forfeiture　of　the　property　taken　in　distress　when　the　original
  debt　and　the　expenses　of　custody　come　up　to　its　full　value；　has
  its　place　among　the　latest　improvements