the　Union　forces　along　the　upper　Potomac；　but　for　a　time　the
  authorities　at　Washington　would　approve　none　of　his　propositions。
  The　President　and　Secretary　Stanton　seemed　unwilling　to　adopt　his
  suggestions；　and　one　measure　which　he　deemed　very　importantthe
  consolidation　into　a　single　command　of　the　four　geographical
  districts　into　which；　to　relieve　political　pressure　no　doubt；　the
  territory　had　been　dividedmet　with　serious　opposition。　　Despite
  Grant's　representations；　he　could　not　prevail　on　the　Administration
  to　approve　this　measure；　but　finally　the　manoeuvres　of　Early　and　the
  raid　to　Chambersburg　compelled　a　partial　compliance；　though　Grant　had
  somewhat　circumvented　the　difficulty　already　by　deciding　to　appoint　a
  commander　for　the　forces　in　the　field　that　were　to　operate　against
  Early。
  On　the　31st　of　July　General　Grant　selected　me　as　this　commander；　and
  in　obedience　to　his　telegraphic　summons　I　repaired　to　his
  headquarters　at　City　Point。　　In　the　interview　that　followed；　he
  detailed　to　me　the　situation　of　affairs　on　the　upper　Potomac；　telling
  me　that　I　was　to　command　in　the　field　the　troops　that　were　to　operate
  against　Early；　but　that　General　Hunter；　who　was　at　the　head　of　the
  geographical　department；　would　be　continued　in　his　position　for　the
  reason　that　the　Administration　was　reluctant　to　reconstruct　or
  consolidate　the　different　districts。　　After　informing　me　that　one
  division　of　the　Cavalry　Corps　would　be　sent　to　my　new　command；　he
  went　on　to　say　that　he　wanted　me　to　push　the　enemy　as　soon　as　this
  division　arrived；　and　if　Early　retired　up　the　Shenandoah　Valley　I　was
  to　pursue；　but　if　he　crossed　the　Potomac　I　was　to　put　myself　south　of
  him　and　try　to　compass　his　destruction。　　The　interview　having　ended；
  I　returned　to　Hancock　Station　to　prepare　for　my　departure；　and　on　the
  evening　of　August　1　I　was　relieved　from　immediate　duty　with　the　Army
  of　the　Potomac；　but　not　from　command　of　the　cavalry　as　a　corps
  organization。
  I　arrived　at　Washington　on　the　4th　of　August；　and　the　next　day
  received　instructions　from　General　Halleck　to　report　to　General　Grant
  at　Monocacy　Junction；　whither　he　had　gone　direct　from　City　Point；　in
  consequence　of　a　characteristic　despatch　from　the　President
  indicating　his　disgust　with　the　confusion；　disorder；　and　helplessness
  prevailing　along　the　upper　Potomac；　and　intimating　that　Grant's
  presence　there　was　necessary。
  In　company　with　the　Secretary　of　War　I　called　on　the　President　before
  leaving　Washington；　and　during　a　short　conversation　Mr。　Lincoln
  candidly　told　me　that　Mr。　Stanton　had　objected　to　my　assignment　to
  General　Hunter's　command；　because　he　thought　me　too　young；　and　that
  he　himself　had　concurred　with　the　Secretary；　but　now；　since　General
  Grant　had　〃ploughed　round〃　the　difficulties　of　the　situation　by
  picking　me　out　to　command　the　〃boys　in　the　field；〃　he　felt　satisfied
  with　what　had　been　done；　and　〃hoped　for　the　best。〃　　Mr。　Stanton
  remained　silent　during　these　remarks；　never　once　indicating　whether
  he；　too；　had　become　reconciled　to　my　selection　or　not；　and　although；
  after　we　left　the　White　House；　he　conversed　with　me　freely　in　regard
  to　the　campaign　I　was　expected　to　make；　seeking　to　impress　on　me　the
  necessity　for　success　from　the　political　as　well　as　from　the　military
  point　of　view；　yet　he　utterly　ignored　the　fact　that　he　had　taken　any
  part　in　disapproving　the　recommendation　of　the　general…in…chief。
  August　6；　I　reported　to　General　Grant　at　the　Monocacy；　and　he　there
  turned　over　to　me　the　following　instructions；　which　he　had　previously
  prepared　for　General　Hunter　in　the　expectation　that　general　would
  continue　to　command　the　department：
  〃HEADQUARTERS　IN　THE　FIELD；
  〃Monocacy　Bridge；　Md。；　Aug。　　5；　1864。
  〃GENERAL：　Concentrate　all　your　available　force　without　delay　in　the
  vicinity　of　Harper's　Ferry；　leaving　only　such　railroad　guards　and
  garrisons　for　public　property　as　may　be　necessary。
  〃Use　in　this　concentration　the　railroad；　if　by　so　doing　time　can　be
  saved。　　From　Harper's　Ferry；　if　it　is　found　that　the　enemy　has　moved
  north　of　the　Potomac　in　large　force；　push　north；　following　and
  attacking　him　wherever　found；　following　him；　if　driven　south　of　the
  Potomac；　as　long　as　it　is　safe　to　do　so。　　If　it　is　ascertained　that
  the　enemy　has　but　a　small　force　north　of　the　Potomac；　then　push　south
  the　main　force；　detaching；　under　a　competent　commander；　a　sufficient
  force　to　look　after　the　raiders　and　drive　them　to　their　homes。　　In
  detaching　such　a　force；　the　brigade　of　cavalry　now　en　route　from
  Washington　via　Rockville　may　be　taken　into　account。
  〃There　are　now　on　the　way　to　join　you　three　other　brigades　of　the
  best　of　cavalry；　numbering　at　least　five　thousand　men　and　horses。
  These　will　be　instructed；　in　the　absence　of　further　orders；　to　join
  you　by　the　south　side　of　the　Potomac。　　One　brigade　will　probably
  start　to…morrow。
  〃In　pushing　up　the　Shenandoah　Valley；　as　it　is　expected　you　will　have
  to　go　first　or　last；　it　is　desirable　that　nothing　should　be　left　to
  invite　the　enemy　to　return。　　Take　all　provisions；　forage；　and　stock
  wanted　for　the　use　of　your　command。　　Such　as　cannot　be　consumed；
  destroy。　　It　is　not　desirable　that　the　buildings　should　be　destroyed…
  …they　should；　rather；　be　protected；　but　the　people　should　be　informed
  that　so　long　as　an　army　can　subsist　among　them　recurrences　of　these
  raids　must　be　expected；　and　we　are　determined　to　stop　them　at　all
  hazards。
  〃Bear　in　mind；　the　object　is　to　drive　the　enemy　south；　and　to　do　this
  you　want　to　keep　him　always　in　sight。　　Be　guided　in　your　course　by
  the　course　he　takes。
  〃Make　your　own　arrangements　for　supplies　of　all　kinds；　giving　regular
  vouchers　for　such　as　may　be　taken　from　loyal　citizens　in　the　country
  through　which　you　march。
  〃Very　respectfully；
  〃U。　S。　GRANT；　Lieut。…General。〃
  〃Major…General　D。　HUNTER；
  〃Commanding　Department　of　West　Virginia。〃
  When　I　had　read　the　letter　addressed　to　Hunter；　General　Grant　said　I
  would　be　expected　to　report　directly　to　him；　as　Hunter　had　asked　that
  day　to　be　wholly　relieved；　not　from　any　chagrin　at　my　assignment　to
  the　control　of　the　active　forces　of　his　command；　but　because　he
  thought　that　his　fitness　for　the　position　he　was　filling　was
  distrusted　by　General　Halleck；　and　he　had　no　wish　to　cause
  embarrassment　by　remaining　where　he　could　but　remove　me　one　degree
  from　the　headquarters　of　the　army。　　The　next　day　Hunter's　unselfish
  request　was　complied　with；　and　an　order　was　issued　by　the　President；
  consolidating　the　Middle　Department；　the　Department　of　Washington；
  the　Department　of　the　Susquehanna；　and　the　Department　of　West
  Virginia。
  Under　this　order　these　four　geographical　districts　constituted　the
  Middle　Military　Division；　and　I　was　temporarily　assigned　to　command
  it。　　Hunter's　men　had　been　bivouacking　for　some　days　past　in　the
  vicinity　of　Monocacy　Junction　and　Frederick；　but　before　General
  Grant's　instructions　were　written　out；　Hunter　had　conformed　to　them
  by　directing　the　concentration　at　Halltown；　about　four　miles　in　front
  of　Harper's　Ferry；　of　all　his　force　available　for　field　service。
  Therefore　the　different　bodies　of　troops；　with　the　exception　of
  Averell's　cavalry；　which　had　followed　McCausland　toward　Moorefield
  after　the　burning　of　Chambersburg；　were　all　in　motion　toward　Halltown
  on　August　6。
  Affairs　at　Monocacy　kept　me　but　an　hour　or　two；　and　these　disposed
  of；　I　continued　on　to　Harper's　Ferry　by　the　special　train　which　had
  brought　me　from　Washington；　that　point　being　intended　as　my
  headquarters　while　making　preparations　to　advance。　　The　enemy　was
  occupying　Martinsburg；　Williamsport；　and　Shepherdstown　at　the　time；
  sending　occasional　raiding　parties　into　Maryland　as　far　as
  Hagerstown。　　The　concentration　of　my　troops　at　Halltown　being　an
  indication　to　Early　that　we　intended　to　renew　the　offensive；　however；
  he　immediately　began　counter　preparations　by　drawing　in　all　his
  detached　columns　from　the　north　side　of　the　Potomac；　abandoning　a
  contemplated　raid　into　Maryland；　which　his　success　against　Crook　at
  Kernstown　had　prompted　him　to　project；　and　otherwise　disposing
  himself　for　defense。
  At　Harper's　Ferry　I　made　my　headquarters　in　the　second　story　of　a
  small　and　very　dilapidated　hotel；　and　as　soon　as　settled　sent　for
  Lieutenant　John　R。　Meigs；　the　chief　engineer　officer　of　the　command；
  to　study　with　him　the　maps　of　my　geographical　division。　　It　always
  came　rather　easy　to　me　to　learn　the　geography　of　a　new　section；　and
  its　important　topographical　features　as　well；　therefore　I　found　that；
  with　the　aid　of　Meigs；　who　was　most　intelligent　in　his　profession；
  the　region　in　which　I　was　to　operate　would　soon　be　well　fixed　in　my
  mind。　　Meigs　was　familiar　with　every　important　road　and　stream；　and
  with　all　points　worthy　of　note　west　of　the　Blue　Ridge；　and　was
  particularly　well　equipped　with　knowledge　regarding　the　Shenandoah
  Valley；　even　down　to　the　farmhouses。