little　solicitude　in　these　respects；　for；　with　a　mass　of　ten　thousand
  mounted　men；　it　was　my　belief　that　I　could　make　it　so　lively　for　the
  enemy's　cavalry　that；　so　far　as　attacks　from　it　were　concerned；　the
  flanks　and　rear　of　the　Army　of　the　Potomac　would　require　little　or　no
  defense；　and　claimed；　further；　that　moving　columns　of　infantry　should
  take　care　of　their　own　fronts。　　I　also　told　him　that　it　was　my　object
  to　defeat　the　enemy's　cavalry　in　a　general　combat；　if　possible；　and
  by　such　a　result　establish　a　feeling　of　confidence　in　my　own　troops
  that　would　enable　us　after　awhile　to　march　where　we　pleased；　for　the
  purpose　of　breaking　General　Lee's　communications　and　destroying　the
  resources　from　which　his　army　was　supplied。
  The　idea　as　here　outlined　was　contrary　to　Meade's　convictions；　for
  though　at　different　times　since　he　commanded　the　Army　of　the　Potomac
  considerable　bodies　of　the　cavalry　had　been　massed　for　some　special
  occasion；　yet　he　had　never　agreed　to　the　plan　as　a　permanency；　and
  could　not　be　bent　to　it　now。　　He　gave　little　encouragement；
  therefore；　to　what　I　proposed；　yet　the　conversation　was　immediately
  beneficial　in　one　way；　for　when　I　laid　before　him　the　true　condition
  of　the　cavalry；　he　promptly　relieved　it　from　much　of　the　arduous　and
  harassing　picket　service　it　was　performing；　thus　giving　me　about　two
  weeks　in　which　to　nurse　the　horses　before　the　campaign　opened。
  The　interview　also　disclosed　the　fact　that　the　cavalry　commander
  should　be；　according　to　General　Meade's　views；　at　his　headquarters
  practically　as　one　of　his　staff；　through　whom　he　would　give　detailed
  directions　as；　in　his　judgment；　occasion　required。　　Meade's　ideas　and
  mine　being　so　widely　divergent；　disagreements　arose　between　us　later
  during　the　battles　of　the　Wilderness；　which　lack　of　concord　ended　in
  some　concessions　on　his　part　after　the　movement　toward　Spottsylvania
  Court　House　began；　and　although　I　doubt　that　his　convictions　were
  ever　wholly　changed；　yet　from　that　date　on；　in　the　organization　of
  the　Army　of　the　Potomac；　the　cavalry　corps　became　more　of　a　compact
  body；　with　the　same　privileges　and　responsibilities　that　attached　to
  the　other　corpsconditions　that　never　actually　existed　before。
  On　the　4th　of　May　the　Army　of　the　Potomac　moved　against　Lee；　who　was
  occupying　a　defensive　position　on　the　south　bank　of　the　Rapidan。
  After　detailing　the　various　detachments　which　I　was　obliged　to　supply
  for　escorts　and　other　mounted　duty；　I　crossed　the　river　with　an
  effective　force　of　about　10；000　troopers。　　In　the　interval　succeeding
  my　assignment　to　the　command　of　the　cavalry；　I　had　taken　the　pains　to
  study　carefully　the　topography　of　the　country　in　eastern　Virginia；
  and　felt　convinced　that；　under　the　policy　Meade　intended　I　should
  follow；　there　would　be　little　opportunity　for　mounted　troops　to
  acquit　themselves　well　in　a　region　so　thickly　wooded；　and　traversed
  by　so　many　almost　parallel　streams；　but　conscious　that　he　would　be
  compelled　sooner　or　later　either　to　change　his　mind　or　partially　give
  way　to　the　pressure　of　events；　I　entered　on　the　campaign　with　the
  loyal　determination　to　aid　zealously　in　all　its　plans。
  General　Lee's　army　was　located　in　its　winter　quarters　behind
  intrenchments　that　lay　along　the　Rapidan　for　a　distance　of　about
  twenty　miles；　extending　from　Barnett's　to　Morton's　ford。　　The　fords
  below　Morton's　were　watched　by　a　few　small　detachments　of　Confederate
  cavalry；　the　main　body　of　which；　however；　was　encamped　below
  Hamilton's　crossing；　where　it　could　draw　supplies　from　the　rich
  country　along　the　Rappahannock。　　Only　a　few　brigades　of　Lee's
  infantry　guarded　the　works　along　the　river；　the　bulk　of　it　being　so
  situated　that　it　could　be　thrown　to　either　flank　toward　which　the
  Union　troops　approached。
  General　Grant　adopted　the　plan　of　moving　by　his　left　flank；　with　the
  purpose　of　compelling　Lee　to　come　out　from　behind　his　intrenchments
  along　Mine　Run　and　fight　on　equal　terms。　　Grant　knew　well　the
  character　of　country　through　which　he　would　have　to　pass；　but　he　was
  confident　that　the　difficulties　of　operation　in　the　thickly　wooded
  region　of　the　Wilderness　would　be　counterbalanced　by　the　facility
  with　which　his　position　would　enable　him　to　secure　a　new　base；　and　by
  the　fact　that　as　he　would　thus　cover　Washington；　there　would　be
  little　or　no　necessity　for　the　authorities　there　to　detach　from　his
  force　at　some　inopportune　moment　for　the　protection　of　that　city。
  In　the　move　forward　two　divisions　of　my　cavalry　took　the　advance；
  Gregg　crossing　the　Rapidan　at　Ely's　ford　and　Wilson　at　Germania　ford。
  Torbert's　division　remained　in　the　rear　to　cover　the　trains　and
  reserve　artillery；　holding　from　Rapidan　Station　to　Culpeper；　and
  thence　through　Stevensburg　to　the　Rappahannock　River。　　Gregg　crossed
  the　Rapidan　before　daylight；　in　advance　of　the　Second　Corps；　and　when
  the　latter　reached　Ely's　ford；　he　pushed　on　to　Chancellorsville；
  Wilson　preceded　the　Fifth　Corps　to　Germania　ford；　and　when　it　reached
  the　river　he　made　the　crossing　and　moved　rapidly　by　Wilderness
  Tavern；　as　far　as　Parker's　Store；　from　which　point　he　sent　a　heavy
  reconnoissance　toward　Mine　Run；　the　rest　of　his　division　bivouacking
  in　a　strong　position。　　I　myself　proceeded　to　Chancellorsville　and
  fixed　my　headquarters　at　that　place；　whereon　the　5th　I　was　joined　by
  Torbert's　division。
  Meanwhile；　General　Meade　had　crossed　the　Rapidan　and　established　his
  headquarters　not　far　from　Germania　ford。　　From　that　point　he　was　in
  direct　communication　with　Wilson；　whose　original　instructions　from　me
  carried　him　only　as　far　as　Parker's　Store；　but　it　being　found；　during
  the　night　of　the　4th；　that　the　enemy　was　apparently　unacquainted　with
  the　occurrences　of　the　day；　Meade　directed　Wilson　to　advance　in　the
  direction　of　Craig's　Meeting　House；　leaving　one　regiment　to　hold
  Parker's　Store。　　Wilson　with　the　second　brigade　encountered　Rosser's
  brigade　of　cavalry　just　beyond　the　Meeting　House；　and　drove　it　back
  rapidly　a　distance　of　about　two　miles；　holding　it　there　till　noon；
  while　his　first　brigade　was　halted　on　the　north　side　of　Robinson's
  Run　near　the　junction　of　the　Catharpen　and　Parker's　Store　roads。
  Up　to　this　time　Wilson　had　heard　nothing　of　the　approach　of　the　Fifth
  Corps；　and　the　situation　becoming　threatening；　he　withdrew　the　second
  brigade　to　the　position　occupied　by　the　first；　but　scarcely　had　he
  done　so　when　he　learned　that　at　an　early　hour　in　the　forenoon　the
  enemy's　infantry　had　appeared　in　his　rear　at　Parker's　Store　and　cut
  off　his　communication　with　General　Meade。　　Surprised　at　this；　he
  determined　to　withdraw　to　Todd's　Tavern；　but　before　his　resolution
  could　be　put　into　execution　the　Confederates　attacked　him　with　a
  heavy　force；　and　at　the　same　time　began　pushing　troops　down　the
  Catharpen　road。　　Wilson　was　now　in　a　perplexing　situation；　sandwiched
  between　the　Confederates　who　had　cut　him　off　in　the　rear　at　Parker's
  store　and　those　occupying　the　Catharpen　road；　but　he　extricated　his
  command　by　passing　it　around　the　latter　force；　and　reached　Todd's
  Tavern　by　crossing　the　Po　River　at　Corbin's　bridge。　　General　Meade
  discovering　that　the　enemy　had　interposed　at　Parker's　store　between
  Wilson　and　the　Fifth　Corps；　sent　me　word　to　go　to　Wilson's　relief；
  and　this　was　the　first　intimation　I　received　that　Wilson　had　been
  pushed　out　so　far；　but；　surmising　that　he　would　retire　in　the
  direction　of　Todd's　Tavern　I　immediately　despatched　Gregg's　division
  there　to　his　relief。　　Just　beyond　Todd's　Tavern　Gregg　met　Wilson；　who
  was　now　being　followed　by　the　enemy's　cavalry。　　The　pursuing　force
  was　soon　checked；　and　then　driven　back　to　Shady　Grove　Church；　while
  Wilson's　troops　fell　in　behind　Gregg's　line；　somewhat　the　worse　for
  their　morning's　adventure。
  When　the　Army　of　the　Potomac　commenced　crossing　the　Rapidan　on　the
  4th；　General　J。　E。　B。　Stuart；　commanding　the　Confederate　cavalry；
  began　concentrating　his　command　on　the　right　of　Lee's　infantry；
  bringing　it　from　Hamilton's　crossing　and　other　points　where　it　had
  been　wintering。　　Stuart's　force　at　this　date　was　a　little　more　than
  eight　thousand　men；　organized　in　two　divisions；　commanded　by　Generals
  Wade　Hampton　and　Fitzhugh　Lee。　　Hampton's　division　was　composed　of
  three　brigades；　commanded　by　Generals　Cordon；　Young；　and　Rosser；
  Fitzhugh　Lee's　division　comprised　three　brigades　also；　Generals　W。　H。
  F。　Lee；　Lomax；　and　Wickham　commanding　them。
  Information　of　this　concentration；　and　of　the　additional　fact　that
  the　enemy's　cavalry　about　Hamilton's　crossing　was　all　being　drawn　in；
  reached　me　on　the　5th；　which　obviated　all　necessity　for　my　moving　on
  that　point　as　I　intended　at　the　onset　of　the　campaign。　　The
  responsibility　for　the　safety　of　our　trains　and　of　the　left　flank　of
  the　army　still　continued；　however；　so　I　made　such　dispositions　of　my
  troops　as　to　secure　these　objects　by　holding　the　line　of　the　Brock
  road　beyond　the　Furnaces；　and　thence　around　to