celerity；　for　the　situation　was　critical　and　demanded　every　exertion。
  The　ascent　and　descent　of　the　mountains　was　extremely　exhausting；　the
  steep　grades　often　rendering　it　necessary　to　drag　up　and　let　down　by
  hand　both　the　transportation　and　artillery。　　But　at　last　we　were　in
  conjunction　with　the　main　army；　and　my　division　breathed　easier。
  On　the　17th　I　remained　in　line　of　battle　all　day　and　night　in　front
  of　McLamore's　cove；　the　enemy　making　slight　demonstrations　against　me
  from　the　direction　of　Lafayette。　　The　main　body　of　the　army　having
  bodily　moved　to　the　left　meanwhile；　I　followed　it　on　the　18th；
  encamping　at　Pond　Spring。　　On　the　19th　I　resumed　the　march　to　the
  left　and　went　into　line　of　battle　at　Crawfish　Springs　to　cover　our
  right　and　rear。　　Immediately　after　forming　this　line；　I　again　became
  isolated　by　the　general　movement　to　the　left；　and　in　consequence　was
  directed　to　advance　and　hold　the　ford　of　Chickamauga　Creek　at　Lee　and
  Gordon's　Mills；　thus　coming　into　close　communication　with　the　balance
  of　our　forces。　　I　moved　into　this　position　rapidly；　being　compelled；
  though；　first　to　drive　back　the　enemy's　cavalry　skirmishers；　who；
  having　crossed　to　the　west　side　of　the　creek；　annoyed　the　right　flank
  of　my　column　a　good　deal　while　en　route。
  Upon　arrival　at　Lee　and　Gordon's　Mills　I　found　the　ford　over
  Chickamauga　Creek　temporarily　uncovered；　through　the　hurried　movement
  of　Wood　to　the　assistance　of　Davis's　division。　　The　enemy　was　already
  present　in　small　force；　with　the　evident　intention　of　taking
  permanent　possession；　but　my　troops　at　once　actively　engaged　him　and
  recovered　the　ford　with　some　slight　losses。　　Scarcely　had　this　been
  done　when　I　was　directed　to　assist　Crittenden。　　Leaving　Lytle's
  brigade　at　the　ford；　I　proceeded　with　Bradley's　and　Laiboldt's　to
  help　Crittenden；　whose　main　line　was　formed　to　the　east　of　the
  Chattanooga　and　Lafayette　road；　its　right　trending　toward　a　point　on
  Chickamauga　Creek　about　a　mile　and　a　half　north　of　Lee　and　Gordon's
  Mills。　　By　the　time　I　had　joined　Crittenden　with　my　two　brigades；
  Davis　had　been　worsted　in　an　attack　Rosecrans　had　ordered　him　to　make
  on　the　left　of　that　portion　of　the　enemy's　line　which　was　located
  along　the　west　bank　of　the　Chickamauga；　the　repulse　being　so　severe
  that　one　of　Davis's　batteries　had　to　be　abandoned。　　Bradley's　brigade
  arrived　on　the　ground　first　and　was　hastily　formed　and　thrown　into
  the　fight；　which　up　to　this　moment　had　been　very　doubtful；　fortune
  inclining　first　to　one　side；　then　to　the　other。　　Bradley's　brigade
  went　in　with　steadiness；　and　charging　across　an　open　corn…field　that
  lay　in　front　of　the　Lafayette　road；　recovered　Davis's　guns　and　forced
  the　enemy　to　retire。　　Meanwhile　Laiboldt's　brigade　had　come　on　the
  scene；　and　forming　it　on　Bradley's　right；　I　found　myself　at　the　end
  of　the　contest　holding　the　ground　which　was　Davis's　original
  position。　　It　was　an　ugly　fight　and　my　loss　was　heavy；　including
  Bradley　wounded。　　The　temporary　success　was　cheering；　and　when
  Lytle's　brigade　joined　me　a　little　later　I　suggested　to　Crittenden
  that　we　attack；　but　investigation　showed　that　his　troops；　having　been
  engaged　all　day；　were　not　in　condition；　so　the　suggestion　could　not
  be　carried　out。
  The　events　of　the　day　had　indicated　that　Bragg's　main　object　was　to
  turn　Rosecrans's　left；　it　was　therefore　still　deemed　necessary　that
  the　army　should　continue　its　flank　movement　to　the　left；　so　orders
  came　to　draw　my　troops　in　toward　the　widow　Glenn's　house。　　By
  strengthening　the　skirmish　line　and　shifting　my　brigades　in
  succession　from　right　to　left　until　the　point　designated　was　reached；
  I　was　able　to　effect　the　withdrawal　without　much　difficulty；　calling
  in　my　skirmish　line　after　the　main　force　had　retired。
  My　command　having　settled　down　for　the　night　in　this　new　line　I　rode
  to　army　headquarters；　to　learn　if　possible　the　expectations　for　the
  morrow　and　hear　the　result　of　the　battle　in　General　Thomas's　front。
  Nearly　all　the　superior　officers　of　the　army　were　at　headquarters；
  and　it　struck　me　that　much　depression　prevailed；　notwithstanding　the
  fact　that　the　enemy's　attempts　during　the　day　to　turn　our　left　flank
  and　also　envelop　our　right　had　been　unsuccessful。　　It　was　now
  positively　known；　through　prisoners　and　otherwise；　that　Bragg　had
  been　reinforced　to　such　an　extent　as　to　make　him　materially　outnumber
  us；　consequently　there　was　much　apprehension　for　the　future。
  The　necessity　of　protecting　our　left　was　most　apparent；　and　the　next
  day　the　drifting　in　that　direction　was　to　be　continued。　　This
  movement　in　the　presence　of　the　enemy；　who　at　all　points　was　actively
  seeking　an　opportunity　to　penetrate　our　line　and　interpose　a　column
  between　its　right　and　left；　was　most　dangerous。　　But　the　necessity
  for　shifting　the　army　to　the　left　was　obvious；　hence　only　the　method
  by　which　it　was　undertaken　is　open　to　question。　　The　move　was　made　by
  the　flank　in　the　face　of　an　exultant　foe　superior　in　numbers；　and　was
  a　violation　of　a　simple　and　fundamental　military　principle。　　Under
  such　circumstauces　columns　naturally　stretch　out　into　attenuated
  lines；　organizations　become　separated；　and　intervals　occur；　all　of
  which　we　experienced；　and　had　the　orders　for　the　movement　been
  construed　properly　I　doubt　if　it　could　have　been　executed　without
  serious　danger。　　Necessity　knows　no　law；　however；　and　when　all　the
  circumstances　of　this　battle　are　fully　considered　it　is　possible　that
  justification　may　be　found　for　the　manoeuvres　by　which　the　army　was
  thus　drifted　to　the　left。　　We　were　in　a　bad　strait　unquestionably；
  and　under　such　conditions　possibly　the　exception　had　to　be　applied
  rather　than　the　rule。
  At　daylight　on　the　morning　of　the　20th　a　dense　fog　obscured
  everything；　consequently　both　armies　were　passive　so　far　as　fighting
  was　concerned。　　Rosecrans　took　advantage　of　the　inaction　to　rearrange
  his　right；　and　I　was　pulled　back　closer　to　the　widow　Glenn's　house　to
  a　strong　position；　where　I　threw　together　some　rails　and　logs　as
  barricades；　but　I　was　disconnected　from　the　troops　on　my　left　by　a
  considerable　interval。　　Here　I　awaited　the　approach　of　the　enemy；　but
  he　did　not　disturb　me；　although　about　9　o'clock　in　the　forenoon　he
  had　opened　on　our　extreme　left　with　musketry　fire　and　a　heavy
  cannonade。　　Two　hours　later　it　was　discovered　by　McCook　that　the
  interval　between　the　main　army　and　me　was　widening；　and　he　ordered　me
  to　send　Laiboldt's　brigade　to　occupy　a　portion　of　the　front　that　had
  been　covered　by　Negley's　division。　　Before　getting　this　brigade　into
  place；　however；　two　small　brigades　of　Davis's　division　occupied　the
  ground；　and　I　directed　Laiboldt　to　form　in　column　of　regiments　on　the
  crest　of　a　low　ridge　in　rear　of　Carlin's　brigade；　so　as　to　prevent
  Davis's　right　flank　from　being　turned。　　The　enemy　was　now　feeling
  Davis　strongly；　and　I　was　about　sending　for　Lytle's　and　Bradley's
  brigades　when　I　received　an　order　to　move　these　rapidly　to　the；
  extreme　left　of　the　army　to　the　assistance　of　General　Thomas。　　I　rode
  hastily　back　toward　their　position；　but　in　the　meanwhile；　they　had
  been　notified　by　direct　orders　from　McCook；　and　were　moving　out　at　a
  double…quick　toward　the　Lafayette　road。　　By　this　time　the　enemy　had
  assaulted　Davis　furiously　in　front　and　flank；　and　driven　him　from　his
  line；　and　as　the　confused　mass　came　back；　McCook　ordered　Laiboldt　to
  charge　by　deploying　to　the　front。　　This　he　did　through　Davis's　broken
  ranks；　but　failed　to　check　the　enemy's　heavy　lines；　and　finally
  Laiboldt's　brigade　broke　also　and　fell　to　the　rear。　　My　remaining
  troops；　headed　by　Lytle；　were　now　passing　along　the　rear　of　the
  ground　where　this　disaster　took　placein　column　on　the　roaden
  route　to　Thomas；　and　as　the　hundreds　of　fugitives　rushed　back；　McCook
  directed　me　to　throw　in　Lytle's　and　Bradley's　brigades。　　This　was
  hastily　done；　they　being　formed　to　the　front　under　a　terrible　fire。
  Scarcely　were　they　aligned　when　the　same　horde　of　Confederates　that
  had　overwhelmed　Davis　and　Laiboldt　poured　in　upon　them　a　deadly　fire
  and　shivered　the　two　brigades　to　pieces。　　We　succeeded　in　rallying
  them；　however；　and　by　a　counter　attack　regained　the　ridge　that
  Laiboldt　had　been　driven　from；　where　we　captured　the　colors　of　the
  Twenty…fourth　Alabama。　　We　could　not　hold　the　ridge；　though；　and　my
  troops　were　driven　back　with　heavy　loss；　including　General　Lytle
  killed；　past　the　widow　Glenn's　house；　and　till　I　managed　to　establish
  them　in　line　of　battle　on　a　range　of　low　hills　behind　the　Dry　Valley
  road。
  During　these　occurrences　General　Rosecrans　passed　down　the　road
  behind　my　line；　and　sent　word　that　he　wished　to　see　me；　but　affairs
  were　too　critical　to　admit　of　my　going　to　him　at　once；　and　he　rode　on
  to　Chattanooga。　　It　is　to　be　regretted　that　he　did　not　wait　till　I
  could　join　him；　for　the　delay　would　have　permitted　him　to　see　that
  matters　were　not　in　quite　such　bad　shape　as　he　supposed；　still；　there
  is　no