the　officers　and　men　of　the　regiment；　and　won　their　regard　by
  thoughtful　care。　　I　had　striven　unceasingly　to　have　them　well　fed　and
  well　clothed；　had　personally　looked　after　the　selection　of　their
  camps；　and　had　maintained　such　a　discipline　as　to　allay　former
  irritation。
  Men　who　march；　scout；　and　fight；　and　suffer　all　the　hardships　that
  fall　to　the　lot　of　soldiers　in　the　field；　in　order　to　do　vigorous
  work　must　have　the　best　bodily　sustenance；　and　every　comfort　that　can
  be　provided。　　I　knew　from　practical　experience　on　the　frontier　that
  my　efforts　in　this　direction　would　not　only　be　appreciated；　but
  requited　by　personal　affection　and　gratitude；　and；　further；　that　such
  exertions　would　bring　the　best　results　to　me。　　Whenever　my　authority
  would　permit　I　saved　my　command　from　needless　sacrifices　and
  unnecessary　toil；　therefore；　when　hard　or　daring　work　was　to　be　done
  I　expected　the　heartiest　response；　and　always　got　it。　　Soldiers　are
  averse　to　seeing　their　comrades　killed　without　compensating　results；
  and　none　realize　more　quickly　than　they　the　blundering　that　often
  takes　place　on　the　field　of　battle。　　They　want　some　tangible
  indemnity　for　the　loss　of　life；　and　as　victory　is　an　offset　the　value
  of　which　is　manifest；　it　not　only　makes　them　content　to　shed　their
  blood；　but　also　furnishes　evidence　of　capacity　in　those　who　command
  them。　　My　regiment　had　lost　very　few　men　since　coming　under　my
  command；　but　it　seemed；　in　the　eyes　of　all　who　belonged　to　it；　that
  casualties　to　the　enemy　and　some　slight　successes　for　us　had　repaid
  every　sacrifice；　and　in　consequence　I　had　gained　not　only　their
  confidence　as　soldiers；　but　also　their　esteem　and　love　as　men；　and　to
  a　degree　far　beyond　what　I　then　realized。
  As　soon　as　the　camp　of　my　brigade　was　pitched　at　Booneville；　I　began
  to　scout　in　every　direction；　to　obtain　a　knowledge　of　the　enemy's
  whereabouts　and　learn　the　ground　about　me。　　My　standing　in　drawing　at
  the　Military　Academy　had　never　been　so　high　as　to　warrant　the　belief
  that　I　could　ever　prove　myself　an　expert；　but　a　few　practical　lessons
  in　that　line　were　impressed　on　me　there；　and　I　had　retained　enough　to
  enable　me　to　make　rough　maps　that　could　be　readily　understood；　and
  which　would　be　suitable　to　replace　the　erroneous　skeleton　outlines　of
  northern　Mississippi；　with　which　at　this　time　we　were　scantily
  furnished；　so　as　soon　as　possible　I　compiled　for　the　use　of　myself
  and　my　regimental　commanders　an　information　map　of　the　surrounding
  country。　　This　map　exhibited　such　details　as　country　roads；　streams；
  farmhouses；　fields；　woods；　and　swamps；　and　such　other　topographical
  features　as　would　be　useful。　　I　must　confess　that　my　crude　sketch　did
  not　evidence　much　artistic　merit；　but　it　was　an　improvement　on　what
  we　already　possessed　in　the　way　of　details　to　guide　the　command；　and
  this　was　what　I　most　needed；　for　it　was　of　the　first　importance　that
  in　our　exposed　condition　we　should　be　equipped　with　a　thorough
  knowledge　of　the　section　in　which　we　were　operating；　so　as　to　be
  prepared　to　encounter　an　enemy　already　indicating　recovery　from　the
  disorganizing　effects　of　his　recent　retreat。
  In　the　immediate　vicinity　of　Booneville　the　country　was　covered　with
  heavy　forests；　with　here　and　there　clearings　or　intervening　fields
  that　had　been　devoted　to　the　cultivation　of　cotton　and　corn。　　The
  ground　was　of　a　low　character；　typical　of　northeastern　Mississippi；
  and　abounded　in　small　creeks　that　went　almost　totally　dry　even　in
  short　periods　of　drought；　but　became　flooded　with　muddy　water　under
  the　outpouring　of　rain　peculiar　to　a　semi…tropical　climate。　　In　such
  a　region　there　were　many　chances　of　our　being　surprised；　especially
  by　an　enemy　who　knew　the　country　well；　and　whose　ranks　were　filled
  with　local　guides；　and　great　precautions　as　well　as　the　fullest
  information　were　necessary　to　prevent　disaster。　　I　therefore
  endeavored　to　familiarize　all　with　our　surroundings；　but　scarcely　had
  matters　begun　to　shape　themselves　as　I　desired　when　our　annihilation
  was　attempted　by　a　large　force　of　Confederate　cavalry。
  On　the　morning　of　July　1；　1862；　a　cavalry　command　of　between　five　and
  six　thousand…men；　under　the　Confederate　General　James　R。　Chalmers；
  advanced　on　two　roads　converging　near　Booneville。　　The　head　of　the
  enemy's　column　on　the　Blackland　and　Booneville　road　came　in　contact
  with　my　pickets　three　miles　and　a　half　west　of　Booneville。　　These
  pickets；　under　Lieutenant　Leonidas　S。　Scranton；　of　the　Second
  Michigan　Cavalry；　fell　back　slowly；　taking　advantage　of　every　tree　or
  other　cover　to　fire　from　till　they　arrived　at　the　point　where　the
  converging　roads　joined。　　At　this　junction　there　was　a　strong
  position　in　the　protecting　timber；　and　here　Scranton　made　a　firm
  stand；　being　reinforced　presently　by　the　few　men　he　had　out　as
  pickets　on　the　road　to　his　left；　a　second　company　I　had　sent　him　from
  camp；　and　subsequently　by　three　companies　more；　all　now　commanded　by
  Captain　Campbell。　　This　force　was　dismounted　and　formed　in　line；　and
  soon　developed　that　the　enemy　was　present　in　large　numbers。　　Up　to
  this　time　Chalmers　had　shown　only　the　heads　of　his　columns；　and　we
  had　doubts　as　to　his　purpose；　but　now　that　our　resistance　forced　him
  to　deploy　two　regiments　on　the　right　and　left　of　the　road；　it　became
  apparent　that　he　meant　business；　and　that　there　was　no　time　to　lose
  in　preparing　to　repel　his　attack。
  Full　information　of　the　situation　was　immediately　sent　me；　and　I
  directed　Campbell　to　hold　fast；　if　possible；　till　I　could　support
  him；　but　if　compelled　to　retire　he　was　authorized　to　do　so　slowly；
  taking　advantage　of　every　means　that　fell　in　his　way　to　prolong　the
  fighting。　　Before　this　I　had　stationed　one　battalion　of　the　Second
  Iowa　in　Booneville；　but　Colonel　Edward　Hatch；　commanding　that
  regiment；　was　now　directed　to　leave　one　company　for　the　protection　of
  our　camp　a　little　to　the　north　of　the　station；　and　take　the　balance
  of　the　Second　Iowa；　with　the　battalion　in　Booneville　except　two　sabre
  companies；　and　form　the　whole　in　rear　of　Captain　Campbell；　to　protect
  his　flanks　and　support　him　by　a　charge　should　the　enemy　break　his
  dismounted　line。
  While　these　preparations　were　being　made；　the　Confederates　attempted
  to　drive　Campbell　from　his　position　by　a　direct　attack　through　an
  open　field。　　In　this　they　failed；　however；　for　our　men；　reserving
  their　fire　until　the　enemy　came　within　about　thirty　yards；　then
  opened　on　him　with　such　a　shower　of　bullets　from　our　Colt's　rifles
  that　it　soon　became　too　hot　for　him；　and　he　was　repulsed　with
  considerable　loss。　　Foiled　in　this　move；　Chalmers　hesitated　to　attack
  again　in　front；　but　began　overlapping　both　flanks　of　Campbell's　line
  by　force　of　numbers；　compelling　Campbell　to　retire　toward　a　strong
  position　I　had　selected　in　his　rear　for　a　line　on　which　to　make　our
  main　resistance。　　As　soon　as　the　enemy　saw　this　withdrawing　he　again
  charged　in　front；　but　was　again　as　gallantly　repelled　as　in　the　first
  assault；　although　the　encounter　was　for　a　short　time　so　desperate　as
  to　have　the　character　of　a　hand…to…hand　conflict；　several　groups　of
  friend　and　foe　using　on　each　other　the　butts　of　their　guns。　　At　this
  juncture　the　timely　arrival　of　Colonel　Hatch　with　the　Second　Iowa
  gave　a　breathing…spell　to　Campbell；　and　made　the　Confederates　so
  chary　of　further　direct　attacks　that　he　was　enabled　to　retire；　and　at
  the　same　time　I　found　opportunity　to　make　disposition　of　the
  reinforcement　to　the　best　advantage　possible；　placing　the　Second　Iowa
  on　the　left　of　the　new　line　and　strengthening　Campbell　on　its　right
  with　all　the　men　available。
  In　view　of　his　numbers；　the　enemy　soon　regained　confidence　in　his
  ability　to　overcome　us；　and　in　a　little　while　again　began　his
  flanking　movements；　his　right　passing　around　my　left　flank　some
  distance；　and　approaching　our　camp　and　transportation；　which　I　had
  forbidden　to　be　moved　out　to　the　rear。　　Fearing　that　he　would　envelop
  us　and　capture　the　camp　and　transportation；　I　determined　to　take　the
  offensive。　　Remembering　a　circuitous　wood　road　that　I　had　become
  familiar　with　while　making　the　map　heretofore　mentioned；　I　concluded
  that　the　most　effective　plan　would　be　to　pass　a　small　column　around
  the　enemy's　left；　by　way　of　this　road；　and　strike　his　rear　by　a
  mounted　charge　simultaneously　with　an　advance　of　our　main　line　on　his
  front。　　I　knew　that　the　attack　in　rear　would　be　a　most　hazardous
  undertaking；　but　in　the　face　of　such　odds　as　the　enemy　had　the
  condition　of　affairs　was　most　critical；　and　could　be　relieved；　only
  by　a　bold　and　radical　change　in　our　tactics；　so　I　at　once　selected
  four　sabre　companies；　two　from　the　Second　Michigan　and　two　from　the
  Second　Iowa；　and　placing　Captain　Alger；　of　the　former　regiment；　in
  command　of　them；　I　informed　him　that　I　expected　of　them　the　quick　and
  desperate　work　that　is　usually　imposed　on　a　forlorn　hope。
  To　carry　out　the　purpose　now　in　view；　I　instructed　Captain　Alge