contradicts　either　itself　or　nature；　which　is　equally　necessary；　it
  must　in　competition　with　physical　necessity　be　entirely　given　up。
  It　would；　however；　be　impossible　to　escape　this　contradiction　if　the
  thinking　subject；　which　seems　to　itself　free；　conceived　itself　in
  the　same　sense　or　in　the　very　same　relation　when　it　calls　itself
  free　as　when　in　respect　of　the　same　action　it　assumes　itself　to　be
  subject　to　the　law　of　nature。　Hence　it　is　an　indispensable　problem
  of　speculative　philosophy　to　show　that　its　illusion　respecting　the
  contradiction　rests　on　this；　that　we　think　of　man　in　a　different　sense
  and　relation　when　we　call　him　free　and　when　we　regard　him　as　subject
  to　the　laws　of　nature　as　being　part　and　parcel　of　nature。　It　must
  therefore　show　that　not　only　can　both　these　very　well　co…exist；　but
  that　both　must　be　thought　as　necessarily　united　in　the　same　subject；
  since　otherwise　no　reason　could　be　given　why　we　should　burden　reason
  with　an　idea　which；　though　it　may　possibly　without　contradiction　be
  reconciled　with　another　that　is　sufficiently　established；　yet
  entangles　us　in　a　perplexity　which　sorely　embarrasses　reason　in　its
  theoretic　employment。　This　duty；　however；　belongs　only　to
  speculative　philosophy。　The　philosopher　then　has　no　option　whether
  he　will　remove　the　apparent　contradiction　or　leave　it　untouched；　for
  in　the　latter　case　the　theory　respecting　this　would　be　bonum　vacans；
  into　the　possession　of　which　the　fatalist　would　have　a　right　to
  enter　and　chase　all　morality　out　of　its　supposed　domain　as　occupying
  it　without　title。
  We　cannot　however　as　yet　say　that　we　are　touching　the　bounds　of
  practical　philosophy。　For　the　settlement　of　that　controversy　does
  not　belong　to　it；　it　only　demands　from　speculative　reason　that　it
  should　put　an　end　to　the　discord　in　which　it　entangles　itself　in
  theoretical　questions；　so　that　practical　reason　may　have　rest　and
  security　from　external　attacks　which　might　make　the　ground　debatable
  on　which　it　desires　to　build。
  The　claims　to　freedom　of　will　made　even　by　common　reason　are　founded
  on　the　consciousness　and　the　admitted　supposition　that　reason　is
  independent　of　merely　subjectively　determined　causes　which　together
  constitute　what　belongs　to　sensation　only　and　which　consequently
  come　under　the　general　designation　of　sensibility。　Man　considering
  himself　in　this　way　as　an　intelligence　places　himself　thereby　in　a
  different　order　of　things　and　in　a　relation　to　determining　grounds
  of　a　wholly　different　kind　when　on　the　one　hand　he　thinks　of　himself
  as　an　intelligence　endowed　with　a　will；　and　consequently　with
  causality；　and　when　on　the　other　he　perceives　himself　as　a
  phenomenon　in　the　world　of　sense　（as　he　really　is　also）；　and　affirms
  that　his　causality　is　subject　to　external　determination　according　to
  laws　of　nature。　Now　he　soon　becomes　aware　that　both　can　hold　good；
  nay；　must　hold　good　at　the　same　time。　For　there　is　not　the　smallest
  contradiction　in　saying　that　a　thing　in　appearance　（belonging　to　the
  world　of　sense）　is　subject　to　certain　laws；　of　which　the　very　same
  as　a　thing　or　being　in　itself　is　independent；　and　that　he　must
  conceive　and　think　of　himself　in　this　twofold　way；　rests　as　to　the
  first　on　the　consciousness　of　himself　as　an　object　affected　through
  the　senses；　and　as　to　the　second　on　the　consciousness　of　himself　as　an
  intelligence；　i。e。；　as　independent　on　sensible　impressions　in　the
  employment　of　his　reason　（in　other　words　as　belonging　to　the　world
  of　understanding）。
  Hence　it　comes　to　pass　that　man　claims　the　possession　of　a　will
  which　takes　no　account　of　anything　that　comes　under　the　head　of
  desires　and　inclinations　and；　on　the　contrary；　conceives　actions　as
  possible　to　him；　nay；　even　as　necessary　which　can　only　be　done　by
  disregarding　all　desires　and　sensible　inclinations。　The　causality　of
  such　actions　lies　in　him　as　an　intelligence　and　in　the　laws　of　effects
  and　actions　＇which　depend＇　on　the　principles　of　an　intelligible　world；
  of　which　indeed　he　knows　nothing　more　than　that　in　it　pure　reason
  alone　independent　of　sensibility　gives　the　law；　moreover　since　it　is
  only　in　that　world；　as　an　intelligence；　that　he　is　his　proper　self
  （being　as　man　only　the　appearance　of　himself）；　those　laws　apply　to　him
  directly　and　categorically；　so　that　the　incitements　of　inclinations
  and　appetites　（in　other　words　the　whole　nature　of　the　world　of
  sense）　cannot　impair　the　laws　of　his　volition　as　an　intelligence。　Nay；
  he　does　not　even　hold　himself　responsible　for　the　former　or　ascribe
  them　to　his　proper　self；　i。e。；　his　will：　he　only　ascribes　to　his
  will　any　indulgence　which　he　might　yield　them　if　he　allowed　them　to
  influence　his　maxims　to　the　prejudice　of　the　rational　laws　of　the
  will。
  When　practical　reason　thinks　itself　into　a　world　of　understanding；
  it　does　not　thereby　transcend　its　own　limits；　as　it　would　if　it
  tried　to　enter　it　by　intuition　or　sensation。　The　former　is　only　a
  negative　thought　in　respect　of　the　world　of　sense；　which　does　not　give
  any　laws　to　reason　in　determining　the　will　and　is　positive　only　in
  this　single　point　that　this　freedom　as　a　negative　characteristic　is　at
  the　same　time　conjoined　with　a　（positive）　faculty　and　even　with　a
  causality　of　reason；　which　we　designate　a　will；　namely　a　faculty　of　so
  acting　that　the　principle　of　the　actions　shall　conform　to　the
  essential　character　of　a　rational　motive；　i。e。；　the　condition　that　the
  maxim　have　universal　validity　as　a　law。　But　were　it　to　borrow　an
  object　of　will；　that　is；　a　motive；　from　the　world　of　understanding；
  then　it　would　overstep　its　bounds　and　pretend　to　be　acquainted　with
  something　of　which　it　knows　nothing。　The　conception　of　a　world　of
  the　understanding　is　then　only　a　point　of　view　which　reason　finds
  itself　compelled　to　take　outside　the　appearances　in　order　to
  conceive　itself　as　practical；　which　would　not　be　possible　if　the
  influences　of　the　sensibility　had　a　determining　power　on　man；　but
  which　is　necessary　unless　he　is　to　be　denied　the　consciousness　of
  himself　as　an　intelligence　and；　consequently；　as　a　rational　cause；
  energizing　by　reason；　that　is；　operating　freely。　This　thought
  certainly　involves　the　idea　of　an　order　and　a　system　of　laws　different
  from　that　of　the　mechanism　of　nature　which　belongs　to　the　sensible
  world；　and　it　makes　the　conception　of　an　intelligible　world
  necessary　（that　is　to　say；　the　whole　system　of　rational　beings　as
  things　in　themselves）。　But　it　does　not　in　the　least　authorize　us　to
  think　of　it　further　than　as　to　its　formal　condition　only；　that　is；　the
  universality　of　the　maxims　of　the　will　as　laws；　and　consequently　the
  autonomy　of　the　latter；　which　alone　is　consistent　with　its　freedom；
  whereas；　on　the　contrary；　all　laws　that　refer　to　a　definite　object
  give　heteronomy；　which　only　belongs　to　laws　of　nature　and　can　only
  apply　to　the　sensible　world。
  But　reason　would　overstep　all　its　bounds　if　it　undertook　to
  explain　how　pure　reason　can　be　practical；　which　would　be　exactly　the
  same　problem　as　to　explain　how　freedom　is　possible。
  For　we　can　explain　nothing　but　that　which　we　can　reduce　to　laws；　the
  object　of　which　can　be　given　in　some　possible　experience。　But
  freedom　is　a　mere　idea；　the　objective　reality　of　which　can　in　no
  wise　be　shown　according　to　laws　of　nature；　and　consequently　not　in　any
  possible　experience；　and　for　this　reason　it　can　never　be
  comprehended　or　understood；　because　we　cannot　support　it　by　any　sort
  of　example　or　analogy。　It　holds　good　only　as　a　necessary　hypothesis　of
  reason　in　a　being　that　believes　itself　conscious　of　a　will；　that　is；
  of　a　faculty　distinct　from　mere　desire　（namely；　a　faculty　of
  determining　itself　to　action　as　an　intelligence；　in　other　words；　by
  laws　of　reason　independently　on　natural　instincts）。　Now　where
  determination　according　to　laws　of　nature　ceases；　there　all
  explanation　ceases　also；　and　nothing　remains　but　defence；　i。e。；　the
  removal　of　the　objections　of　those　who　pretend　to　have　seen　deeper
  into　the　nature　of　things；　and　thereupon　boldly　declare　freedom
  impossible。　We　can　only　point　out　to　them　that　the　supposed
  contradiction　that　they　have　discovered　in　it　arises　only　from　this；
  that　in　order　to　be　able　to　apply　the　law　of　nature　to　human
  actions；　they　must　necessarily　consider　man　as　an　appearance：　then
  when　we　demand　of　them　that　they　should　also　think　of　him　qua
  intelligence　as　a　thing　in　itself；　they　still　persist　in　considering
  him　in　this　respect　also　as　an　appearance。　In　this　view　it　would　no
  doubt　be　a　contradiction　to　suppose　the　causality　of　the　same
  subject　（that　is；　his　will）　to　be　withdrawn　from　all　the　natural
  laws　of　the　sensible　world。　But　this　contradiction　disappears；　if　they
  would　only　bethink　themselves　and　admit；　as　is　reasonable；　that　behind
  the　appearances　there　must　also　lie　at　their　root　（although　hidden）
  the　things　in　themselves；　and　that　we　cannot　expect　the　laws　of
  these　to　be　the　same　as　those　that　govern　their　appearances。
  The　subjecti