actually　a　property　of　ourselves　or　of　human　nature；　only　we　saw
  that　it　must　be　presupposed　if　we　would　conceive　a　being　as　rational
  and　conscious　of　its　causality　in　respect　of　its　actions；　i。e。；　as
  endowed　with　a　will；　and　so　we　find　that　on　just　the　same　grounds　we
  must　ascribe　to　every　being　endowed　with　reason　and　will　this
  attribute　of　determining　itself　to　action　under　the　idea　of　its
  freedom。
  Now　it　resulted　also　from　the　presupposition　of　these　ideas　that
  we　became　aware　of　a　law　that　the　subjective　principles　of　action；
  i。e。；　maxims；　must　always　be　so　assumed　that　they　can　also　hold　as
  objective；　that　is；　universal　principles；　and　so　serve　as　universal
  laws　of　our　own　dictation。　But　why　then　should　I　subject　myself　to
  this　principle　and　that　simply　as　a　rational　being；　thus　also
  subjecting　to　it　all　other　being　endowed　with　reason？　I　will　allow
  that　no　interest　urges　me　to　this；　for　that　would　not　give　a
  categorical　imperative；　but　I　must　take　an　interest　in　it　and
  discern　how　this　comes　to　pass；　for　this　properly　an　〃I　ought〃　is
  properly　an　〃I　would；〃　valid　for　every　rational　being；　provided　only
  that　reason　determined　his　actions　without　any　hindrance。　But　for
  beings　that　are　in　addition　affected　as　we　are　by　springs　of　a
  different　kind；　namely；　sensibility；　and　in　whose　case　that　is　not
  always　done　which　reason　alone　would　do；　for　these　that　necessity　is
  expressed　only　as　an　〃ought；〃　and　the　subjective　necessity　is
  different　from　the　objective。
  It　seems　then　as　if　the　moral　law；　that　is；　the　principle　of
  autonomy　of　the　will；　were　properly　speaking　only　presupposed　in　the
  idea　of　freedom；　and　as　if　we　could　not　prove　its　reality　and
  objective　necessity　independently。　In　that　case　we　should　still　have
  gained　something　considerable　by　at　least　determining　the　true
  principle　more　exactly　than　had　previously　been　done；　but　as　regards
  its　validity　and　the　practical　necessity　of　subjecting　oneself　to
  it；　we　should　not　have　advanced　a　step。　For　if　we　were　asked　why　the
  universal　validity　of　our　maxim　as　a　law　must　be　the　condition
  restricting　our　actions；　and　on　what　we　ground　the　worth　which　we
  assign　to　this　manner　of　acting…　a　worth　so　great　that　there　cannot　be
  any　higher　interest；　and　if　we　were　asked　further　how　it　happens
  that　it　is　by　this　alone　a　man　believes　he　feels　his　own　personal
  worth；　in　comparison　with　which　that　of　an　agreeable　or　disagreeable
  condition　is　to　be　regarded　as　nothing；　to　these　questions　we　could
  give　no　satisfactory　answer。
  We　find　indeed　sometimes　that　we　can　take　an　interest　in　a
  personal　quality　which　does　not　involve　any　interest　of　external
  condition；　provided　this　quality　makes　us　capable　of　participating
  in　the　condition　in　case　reason　were　to　effect　the　allotment；　that
  is　to　say；　the　mere　being　worthy　of　happiness　can　interest　of　itself
  even　without　the　motive　of　participating　in　this　happiness。　This
  judgement；　however；　is　in　fact　only　the　effect　of　the　importance　of
  the　moral　law　which　we　before　presupposed　（when　by　the　idea　of　freedom
  we　detach　ourselves　from　every　empirical　interest）；　but　that　we
  ought　to　detach　ourselves　from　these　interests；　i。e。；　to　consider
  ourselves　as　free　in　action　and　yet　as　subject　to　certain　laws；　so
  as　to　find　a　worth　simply　in　our　own　person　which　can　compensate　us
  for　the　loss　of　everything　that　gives　worth　to　our　condition；　this
  we　are　not　yet　able　to　discern　in　this　way；　nor　do　we　see　how　it　is
  possible　so　to　act…　in　other　words；　whence　the　moral　law　derives　its
  obligation。
  It　must　be　freely　admitted　that　there　is　a　sort　of　circle　here
  from　which　it　seems　impossible　to　escape。　In　the　order　of　efficient
  causes　we　assume　ourselves　free；　in　order　that　in　the　order　of　ends　we
  may　conceive　ourselves　as　subject　to　moral　laws：　and　we　afterwards
  conceive　ourselves　as　subject　to　these　laws；　because　we　have
  attributed　to　ourselves　freedom　of　will：　for　freedom　and
  self…legislation　of　will　are　both　autonomy　and；　therefore；　are
  reciprocal　conceptions；　and　for　this　very　reason　one　must　not　be
  used　to　explain　the　other　or　give　the　reason　of　it；　but　at　most　only
  logical　purposes　to　reduce　apparently　different　notions　of　the　same
  object　to　one　single　concept　（as　we　reduce　different　fractions　of
  the　same　value　to　the　lowest　terms）。
  One　resource　remains　to　us；　namely；　to　inquire　whether　we　do　not
  occupy　different　points　of　view　when　by　means　of　freedom　we　think
  ourselves　as　causes　efficient　a　priori；　and　when　we　form　our
  conception　of　ourselves　from　our　actions　as　effects　which　we　see
  before　our　eyes。
  It　is　a　remark　which　needs　no　subtle　reflection　to　make；　but　which
  we　may　assume　that　even　the　commonest　understanding　can　make；　although
  it　be　after　its　fashion　by　an　obscure　discernment　of　judgement　which
  it　calls　feeling；　that　all　the　〃ideas〃　that　come　to　us　involuntarily
  （as　those　of　the　senses）　do　not　enable　us　to　know　objects　otherwise
  than　as　they　affect　us；　so　that　what　they　may　be　in　themselves　remains
  unknown　to　us；　and　consequently　that　as　regards　〃ideas〃　of　this　kind
  even　with　the　closest　attention　and　clearness　that　the　understanding
  can　apply　to　them；　we　can　by　them　only　attain　to　the　knowledge　of
  appearances；　never　to　that　of　things　in　themselves。　As　soon　as　this
  distinction　has　once　been　made　（perhaps　merely　in　consequence　of　the
  difference　observed　between　the　ideas　given　us　from　without；　and　in
  which　we　are　passive；　and　those　that　we　produce　simply　from　ourselves；
  and　in　which　we　show　our　own　activity）；　then　it　follows　of　itself　that
  we　must　admit　and　assume　behind　the　appearance　something　else　that
  is　not　an　appearance；　namely；　the　things　in　themselves；　although　we
  must　admit　that　as　they　can　never　be　known　to　us　except　as　they　affect
  us；　we　can　come　no　nearer　to　them；　nor　can　we　ever　know　what　they
  are　in　themselves。　This　must　furnish　a　distinction；　however　crude；
  between　a　world　of　sense　and　the　world　of　understanding；　of　which
  the　former　may　be　different　according　to　the　difference　of　the
  sensuous　impressions　in　various　observers；　while　the　second　which　is
  its　basis　always　remains　the　same；　Even　as　to　himself；　a　man　cannot
  pretend　to　know　what　he　is　in　himself　from　the　knowledge　he　has　by
  internal　sensation。　For　as　he　does　not　as　it　were　create　himself；
  and　does　not　come　by　the　conception　of　himself　a　priori　but
  empirically；　it　naturally　follows　that　he　can　obtain　his　knowledge
  even　of　himself　only　by　the　inner　sense　and；　consequently；　only
  through　the　appearances　of　his　nature　and　the　way　in　which　his
  consciousness　is　affected。　At　the　same　time　beyond　these
  characteristics　of　his　own　subject；　made　up　of　mere　appearances；　he
  must　necessarily　suppose　something　else　as　their　basis；　namely；　his
  ego；　whatever　its　characteristics　in　itself　may　be。　Thus　in　respect　to
  mere　perception　and　receptivity　of　sensations　he　must　reckon　himself
  as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　but　in　respect　of　whatever　there
  may　be　of　pure　activity　in　him　（that　which　reaches　consciousness
  immediately　and　not　through　affecting　the　senses）；　he　must　reckon
  himself　as　belonging　to　the　intellectual　world；　of　which；　however；
  he　has　no　further　knowledge。　To　such　a　conclusion　the　reflecting　man
  must　come　with　respect　to　all　the　things　which　can　be　presented　to
  him：　it　is　probably　to　be　met　with　even　in　persons　of　the　commonest
  understanding；　who；　as　is　well　known；　are　very　much　inclined　to
  suppose　behind　the　objects　of　the　senses　something　else　invisible
  and　acting　of　itself。　They　spoil　it；　however；　by　presently
  sensualizing　this　invisible　again；　that　is　to　say；　wanting　to　make
  it　an　object　of　intuition；　so　that　they　do　not　become　a　whit　the
  wiser。
  Now　man　really　finds　in　himself　a　faculty　by　which　he
  distinguishes　himself　from　everything　else；　even　from　himself　as
  affected　by　objects；　and　that　is　reason。　This　being　pure　spontaneity
  is　even　elevated　above　the　understanding。　For　although　the　latter　is　a
  spontaneity　and　does　not；　like　sense；　merely　contain　intuitions　that
  arise　when　we　are　affected　by　things　（and　are　therefore　passive）；
  yet　it　cannot　produce　from　its　activity　any　other　conceptions　than
  those　which　merely　serve　to　bring　the　intuitions　of　sense　under
  rules　and；　thereby；　to　unite　them　in　one　consciousness；　and　without
  this　use　of　the　sensibility　it　could　not　think　at　all；　whereas；　on　the
  contrary；　reason　shows　so　pure　a　spontaneity　in　the　case　of　what　I
  call　ideas　＇ideal　conceptions＇　that　it　thereby　far　transcends
  everything　that　the　sensibility　can　give　it；　and　exhibits　its　most
  important　function　in　distinguishing　the　world　of　sense　from　that　of
  understanding；　and　thereby　prescribing　the　limits　of　the　understanding
  itself。
  For　this　reason　a　rational　being　must　regard　himself　qua
  intelligence　（not　from　the　side　of　his　lower　faculties）　as　belonging
  not　to　the　world　of　sense；　but　to　that　of　understanding；　hence　he
  has　two　points　of　view　from　which　he　can　r