merely　relative　and　arbitrary　ends。
  3。　A　complete　characterization　of　all　maxims　by　means　of　that
  formula；　namely；　that　all　maxims　ought　by　their　own　legislation　to
  harmonize　with　a　possible　kingdom　of　ends　as　with　a　kingdom　of
  nature。*　There　is　a　progress　here　in　the　order　of　the　categories　of
  unity　of　the　form　of　the　will　（its　universality）；　plurality　of　the
  matter　（the　objects；　i。e。；　the　ends）；　and　totality　of　the　system　of
  these。　In　forming　our　moral　judgement　of　actions；　it　is　better　to
  proceed　always　on　the　strict　method　and　start　from　the　general　formula
  of　the　categorical　imperative：　Act　according　to　a　maxim　which　can　at
  the　same　time　make　itself　a　universal　law。　If；　however；　we　wish　to
  gain　an　entrance　for　the　moral　law；　it　is　very　useful　to　bring　one　and
  the　same　action　under　the　three　specified　conceptions；　and　thereby
  as　far　as　possible　to　bring　it　nearer　to　intuition。
  *Teleology　considers　nature　as　a　kingdom　of　ends；　ethics　regards　a
  possible　kingdom　of　ends　as　a　kingdom　nature。　In　the　first　case；　the
  kingdom　of　ends　is　a　theoretical　idea；　adopted　to　explain　what
  actually　is。　In　the　latter　it　is　a　practical　idea；　adopted　to　bring
  about　that　which　is　not　yet；　but　which　can　be　realized　by　our　conduct；
  namely；　if　it　conforms　to　this　idea。
  We　can　now　end　where　we　started　at　the　beginning；　namely；　with　the
  conception　of　a　will　unconditionally　good。　That　will　is　absolutely
  good　which　cannot　be　evil…　in　other　words；　whose　maxim；　if　made　a
  universal　law；　could　never　contradict　itself。　This　principle；　then；　is
  its　supreme　law：　〃Act　always　on　such　a　maxim　as　thou　canst　at　the　same
  time　will　to　be　a　universal　law〃；　this　is　the　sole　condition　under
  which　a　will　can　never　contradict　itself；　and　such　an　imperative　is
  categorical。　Since　the　validity　of　the　will　as　a　universal　law　for
  possible　actions　is　analogous　to　the　universal　connexion　of　the
  existence　of　things　by　general　laws；　which　is　the　formal　notion　of
  nature　in　general；　the　categorical　imperative　can　also　be　expressed
  thus：　Act　on　maxims　which　can　at　the　same　time　have　for　their　object
  themselves　as　universal　laws　of　nature。　Such　then　is　the　formula　of　an
  absolutely　good　will。
  Rational　nature　is　distinguished　from　the　rest　of　nature　by　this；
  that　it　sets　before　itself　an　end。　This　end　would　be　the　matter　of
  every　good　will。　But　since　in　the　idea　of　a　will　that　is　absolutely
  good　without　being　limited　by　any　condition　（of　attaining　this　or　that
  end）　we　must　abstract　wholly　from　every　end　to　be　effected　（since　this
  would　make　every　will　only　relatively　good）；　it　follows　that　in　this
  case　the　end　must　be　conceived；　not　as　an　end　to　be　effected；　but　as
  an　independently　existing　end。　Consequently　it　is　conceived　only
  negatively；　i。e。；　as　that　which　we　must　never　act　against　and　which；
  therefore；　must　never　be　regarded　merely　as　means；　but　must　in　every
  volition　be　esteemed　as　an　end　likewise。　Now　this　end　can　be　nothing
  but　the　subject　of　all　possible　ends；　since　this　is　also　the　subject
  of　a　possible　absolutely　good　will；　for　such　a　will　cannot　without
  contradiction　be　postponed　to　any　other　object。　The　principle：　〃So　act
  in　regard　to　every　rational　being　（thyself　and　others）；　that　he　may
  always　have　place　in　thy　maxim　as　an　end　in　himself；〃　is　accordingly
  essentially　identical　with　this　other：　〃Act　upon　a　maxim　which；　at　the
  same　time；　involves　its　own　universal　validity　for　every　rational
  being。〃　For　that　in　using　means　for　every　end　I　should　limit　my
  maxim　by　the　condition　of　its　holding　good　as　a　law　for　every　subject；
  this　comes　to　the　same　thing　as　that　the　fundamental　principle　of
  all　maxims　of　action　must　be　that　the　subject　of　all　ends；　i。e。；　the
  rational　being　himself；　be　never　employed　merely　as　means；　but　as
  the　supreme　condition　restricting　the　use　of　all　means；　that　is　in
  every　case　as　an　end　likewise。
  It　follows　incontestably　that；　to　whatever　laws　any　rational　being
  may　be　subject；　he　being　an　end　in　himself　must　be　able　to　regard
  himself　as　also　legislating　universally　in　respect　of　these　same　laws；
  since　it　is　just　this　fitness　of　his　maxims　for　universal
  legislation　that　distinguishes　him　as　an　end　in　himself；　also　it
  follows　that　this　implies　his　dignity　（prerogative）　above　all　mere
  physical　beings；　that　he　must　always　take　his　maxims　from　the　point　of
  view　which　regards　himself　and；　likewise；　every　other　rational　being
  as　law…giving　beings　（on　which　account　they　are　called　persons）。　In
  this　way　a　world　of　rational　beings　（mundus　intelligibilis）　is
  possible　as　a　kingdom　of　ends；　and　this　by　virtue　of　the　legislation
  proper　to　all　persons　as　members。　Therefore　every　rational　being
  must　so　act　as　if　he　were　by　his　maxims　in　every　case　a　legislating
  member　in　the　universal　kingdom　of　ends。　The　formal　principle　of　these
  maxims　is：　〃So　act　as　if　thy　maxim　were　to　serve　likewise　as　the
  universal　law　（of　all　rational　beings）。〃　A　kingdom　of　ends　is　thus
  only　possible　on　the　analogy　of　a　kingdom　of　nature；　the　former
  however　only　by　maxims；　that　is　self…imposed　rules；　the　latter　only　by
  the　laws　of　efficient　causes　acting　under　necessitation　from
  without。　Nevertheless；　although　the　system　of　nature　is　looked　upon　as
  a　machine；　yet　so　far　as　it　has　reference　to　rational　beings　as　its
  ends；　it　is　given　on　this　account　the　name　of　a　kingdom　of　nature。　Now
  such　a　kingdom　of　ends　would　be　actually　realized　by　means　of　maxims
  conforming　to　the　canon　which　the　categorical　imperative　prescribes　to
  all　rational　beings；　if　they　were　universally　followed。　But　although　a
  rational　being；　even　if　he　punctually　follows　this　maxim　himself；
  cannot　reckon　upon　all　others　being　therefore　true　to　the　same；　nor
  expect　that　the　kingdom　of　nature　and　its　orderly　arrangements　shall
  be　in　harmony　with　him　as　a　fitting　member；　so　as　to　form　a　kingdom　of
  ends　to　which　he　himself　contributes；　that　is　to　say；　that　it　shall
  favour　his　expectation　of　happiness；　still　that　law：　〃Act　according　to
  the　maxims　of　a　member　of　a　merely　possible　kingdom　of　ends
  legislating　in　it　universally；〃　remains　in　its　full　force；　inasmuch　as
  it　commands　categorically。　And　it　is　just　in　this　that　the　paradox
  lies；　that　the　mere　dignity　of　man　as　a　rational　creature；　without　any
  other　end　or　advantage　to　be　attained　thereby；　in　other　words；　respect
  for　a　mere　idea；　should　yet　serve　as　an　inflexible　precept　of　the
  will；　and　that　it　is　precisely　in　this　independence　of　the　maxim　on
  all　such　springs　of　action　that　its　sublimity　consists；　and　it　is　this
  that　makes　every　rational　subject　worthy　to　be　a　legislative　member　in
  the　kingdom　of　ends：　for　otherwise　he　would　have　to　be　conceived
  only　as　subject　to　the　physical　law　of　his　wants。　And　although　we
  should　suppose　the　kingdom　of　nature　and　the　kingdom　of　ends　to　be
  united　under　one　sovereign；　so　that　the　latter　kingdom　thereby
  ceased　to　be　a　mere　idea　and　acquired　true　reality；　then　it　would　no
  doubt　gain　the　accession　of　a　strong　spring；　but　by　no　means　any
  increase　of　its　intrinsic　worth。　For　this　sole　absolute　lawgiver　must；
  notwithstanding　this；　be　always　conceived　as　estimating　the　worth　of
  rational　beings　only　by　their　disinterested　behaviour；　as　prescribed
  to　themselves　from　that　idea　＇the　dignity　of　man＇　alone。　The　essence
  of　things　is　not　altered　by　their　external　relations；　and　that
  which；　abstracting　from　these；　alone　constitutes　the　absolute　worth　of
  man；　is　also　that　by　which　he　must　be　judged；　whoever　the　judge　may
  be；　and　even　by　the　Supreme　Being。　Morality；　then；　is　the　relation
  of　actions　to　the　relation　of　actions　will；　that　is；　to　the　autonomy
  of　potential　universal　legislation　by　its　maxims。　An　action　that　is
  consistent　with　the　autonomy　of　the　will　is　permitted；　one　that　does
  not　agree　therewith　is　forbidden。　A　will　whose　maxims　necessarily
  coincide　with　the　laws　of　autonomy　is　a　holy　will；　good　absolutely。
  The　dependence　of　a　will　not　absolutely　good　on　the　principle　of
  autonomy　（moral　necessitation）　is　obligation。　This；　then；　cannot　be
  applied　to　a　holy　being。　The　objective　necessity　of　actions　from
  obligation　is　called　duty。
  From　what　has　just　been　said；　it　is　easy　to　see　how　it　happens　that；
  although　the　conception　of　duty　implies　subjection　to　the　law；　we
  yet　ascribe　a　certain　dignity　and　sublimity　to　the　person　who
  fulfils　all　his　duties。　There　is　not；　indeed；　any　sublimity　in　him；　so
  far　as　he　is　subject　to　the　moral　law；　but　inasmuch　as　in　regard　to
  that　very　law　he　is　likewise　a　legislator；　and　on　that　account　alone
  subject　to　it；　he　has　sublimity。　We　have　also　shown　above　that　neither
  fear　nor　inclination；　but　simply　respect　for　the　law；　is　the　spring
  which　can　give　actions　a　moral　worth。　Our　own　will；　so　far　as　we
  suppose　it　to　act　only　under　the　condition　that　its　maxims　are
  potentially　universal　laws；　this　ideal　will　which　is　possible　to　us　is
  the　proper　object　of　respect；　and　the　dignity　of　humanity　consists
  just　in　this　capa