drawn　from　the　conception　of　that　which　is　necessarily　an　end　for
  everyone　because　it　is　an　end　in　itself；　constitutes　an　objective
  principle　of　will；　and　can　therefore　serve　as　a　universal　practical
  law。　The　foundation　of　this　principle　is：　rational　nature　exists　as　an
  end　in　itself。　Man　necessarily　conceives　his　own　existence　as　being
  so；　so　far　then　this　is　a　subjective　principle　of　human　actions。　But
  every　other　rational　being　regards　its　existence　similarly；　just　on
  the　same　rational　principle　that　holds　for　me：*　so　that　it　is　at　the
  same　time　an　objective　principle；　from　which　as　a　supreme　practical
  law　all　laws　of　the　will　must　be　capable　of　being　deduced。　Accordingly
  the　practical　imperative　will　be　as　follows：　So　act　as　to　treat
  humanity；　whether　in　thine　own　person　or　in　that　of　any　other；　in
  every　case　as　an　end　withal；　never　as　means　only。　We　will　now
  inquire　whether　this　can　be　practically　carried　out。
  *This　proposition　is　here　stated　as　a　postulate。　The　ground　of　it
  will　be　found　in　the　concluding　section。
  To　abide　by　the　previous　examples：
  Firstly；　under　the　head　of　necessary　duty　to　oneself：　He　who
  contemplates　suicide　should　ask　himself　whether　his　action　can　be
  consistent　with　the　idea　of　humanity　as　an　end　in　itself。　If　he
  destroys　himself　in　order　to　escape　from　painful　circumstances；　he
  uses　a　person　merely　as　a　mean　to　maintain　a　tolerable　condition　up　to
  the　end　of　life。　But　a　man　is　not　a　thing；　that　is　to　say；　something
  which　can　be　used　merely　as　means；　but　must　in　all　his　actions　be
  always　considered　as　an　end　in　himself。　I　cannot；　therefore；　dispose
  in　any　way　of　a　man　in　my　own　person　so　as　to　mutilate　him；　to
  damage　or　kill　him。　（It　belongs　to　ethics　proper　to　define　this
  principle　more　precisely；　so　as　to　avoid　all　misunderstanding；　e。
  g。；　as　to　the　amputation　of　the　limbs　in　order　to　preserve　myself；
  as　to　exposing　my　life　to　danger　with　a　view　to　preserve　it；　etc。　This
  question　is　therefore　omitted　here。）
  Secondly；　as　regards　necessary　duties；　or　those　of　strict
  obligation；　towards　others：　He　who　is　thinking　of　making　a　lying
  promise　to　others　will　see　at　once　that　he　would　be　using　another
  man　merely　as　a　mean；　without　the　latter　containing　at　the　same　time
  the　end　in　himself。　For　he　whom　I　propose　by　such　a　promise　to　use　for
  my　own　purposes　cannot　possibly　assent　to　my　mode　of　acting　towards
  him　and；　therefore；　cannot　himself　contain　the　end　of　this　action。
  This　violation　of　the　principle　of　humanity　in　other　men　is　more
  obvious　if　we　take　in　examples　of　attacks　on　the　freedom　and
  property　of　others。　For　then　it　is　clear　that　he　who　transgresses
  the　rights　of　men　intends　to　use　the　person　of　others　merely　as　a
  means；　without　considering　that　as　rational　beings　they　ought　always
  to　be　esteemed　also　as　ends；　that　is；　as　beings　who　must　be　capable　of
  containing　in　themselves　the　end　of　the　very　same　action。*
  *Let　it　not　be　thought　that　the　common　〃quod　tibi　non　vis　fieri；
  etc。〃　could　serve　here　as　the　rule　or　principle。　For　it　is　only　a
  deduction　from　the　former；　though　with　several　limitations；　it
  cannot　be　a　universal　law；　for　it　does　not　contain　the　principle　of
  duties　to　oneself；　nor　of　the　duties　of　benevolence　to　others　（for
  many　a　one　would　gladly　consent　that　others　should　not　benefit　him；
  provided　only　that　he　might　be　excused　from　showing　benevolence　to
  them）；　nor　finally　that　of　duties　of　strict　obligation　to　one　another；
  for　on　this　principle　the　criminal　might　argue　against　the　judge　who
  punishes　him；　and　so　on。
  Thirdly；　as　regards　contingent　（meritorious）　duties　to　oneself：　It
  is　not　enough　that　the　action　does　not　violate　humanity　in　our　own
  person　as　an　end　in　itself；　it　must　also　harmonize　with　it。　Now
  there　are　in　humanity　capacities　of　greater　perfection；　which　belong
  to　the　end　that　nature　has　in　view　in　regard　to　humanity　in
  ourselves　as　the　subject：　to　neglect　these　might　perhaps　be　consistent
  with　the　maintenance　of　humanity　as　an　end　in　itself；　but　not　with　the
  advancement　of　this　end。
  Fourthly；　as　regards　meritorious　duties　towards　others：　The
  natural　end　which　all　men　have　is　their　own　happiness。　Now　humanity
  might　indeed　subsist；　although　no　one　should　contribute　anything　to
  the　happiness　of　others；　provided　he　did　not　intentionally　withdraw
  anything　from　it；　but　after　all　this　would　only　harmonize　negatively
  not　positively　with　humanity　as　an　end　in　itself；　if　every　one　does
  not　also　endeavour；　as　far　as　in　him　lies；　to　forward　the　ends　of
  others。　For　the　ends　of　any　subject　which　is　an　end　in　himself　ought
  as　far　as　possible　to　be　my　ends　also；　if　that　conception　is　to　have
  its　full　effect　with　me。
  This　principle；　that　humanity　and　generally　every　rational　nature　is
  an　end　in　itself　（which　is　the　supreme　limiting　condition　of　every
  man's　freedom　of　action）；　is　not　borrowed　from　experience；　firstly；
  because　it　is　universal；　applying　as　it　does　to　all　rational　beings
  whatever；　and　experience　is　not　capable　of　determining　anything
  about　them；　secondly；　because　it　does　not　present　humanity　as　an　end
  to　men　（subjectively）；　that　is　as　an　object　which　men　do　of　themselves
  actually　adopt　as　an　end；　but　as　an　objective　end；　which　must　as　a　law
  constitute　the　supreme　limiting　condition　of　all　our　subjective
  ends；　let　them　be　what　we　will；　it　must　therefore　spring　from　pure
  reason。　In　fact　the　objective　principle　of　all　practical　legislation
  lies　（according　to　the　first　principle）　in　the　rule　and　its　form　of
  universality　which　makes　it　capable　of　being　a　law　（say；　e。　g。；　a
  law　of　nature）；　but　the　subjective　principle　is　in　the　end；　now　by　the
  second　principle　the　subject　of　all　ends　is　each　rational　being；
  inasmuch　as　it　is　an　end　in　itself。　Hence　follows　the　third
  practical　principle　of　the　will；　which　is　the　ultimate　condition　of
  its　harmony　with　universal　practical　reason；　viz。：　the　idea　of　the
  will　of　every　rational　being　as　a　universally　legislative　will。
  On　this　principle　all　maxims　are　rejected　which　are　inconsistent
  with　the　will　being　itself　universal　legislator。　Thus　the　will　is
  not　subject　simply　to　the　law；　but　so　subject　that　it　must　be　regarded
  as　itself　giving　the　law　and；　on　this　ground　only；　subject　to　the
  law　（of　which　it　can　regard　itself　as　the　author）。
  In　the　previous　imperatives；　namely；　that　based　on　the　conception　of
  the　conformity　of　actions　to　general　laws；　as　in　a　physical　system
  of　nature；　and　that　based　on　the　universal　prerogative　of　rational
  beings　as　ends　in　themselves…　these　imperatives；　just　because　they
  were　conceived　as　categorical；　excluded　from　any　share　in　their
  authority　all　admixture　of　any　interest　as　a　spring　of　action；　they
  were；　however；　only　assumed　to　be　categorical；　because　such　an
  assumption　was　necessary　to　explain　the　conception　of　duty。　But　we
  could　not　prove　independently　that　there　are　practical　propositions
  which　command　categorically；　nor　can　it　be　proved　in　this　section；　one
  thing；　however；　could　be　done；　namely；　to　indicate　in　the　imperative
  itself；　by　some　determinate　expression；　that　in　the　case　of　volition
  from　duty　all　interest　is　renounced；　which　is　the　specific　criterion
  of　categorical　as　distinguished　from　hypothetical　imperatives。　This　is
  done　in　the　present　（third）　formula　of　the　principle；　namely；　in　the
  idea　of　the　will　of　every　rational　being　as　a　universally
  legislating　will。
  For　although　a　will　which　is　subject　to　laws　may　be　attached　to　this
  law　by　means　of　an　interest；　yet　a　will　which　is　itself　a　supreme
  lawgiver　so　far　as　it　is　such　cannot　possibly　depend　on　any
  interest；　since　a　will　so　dependent　would　itself　still　need　another
  law　restricting　the　interest　of　its　self…love　by　the　condition　that　it
  should　be　valid　as　universal　law。
  Thus　the　principle　that　every　human　will　is　a　will　which　in　all
  its　maxims　gives　universal　laws；*　provided　it　be　otherwise
  justified；　would　be　very　well　adapted　to　be　the　categorical
  imperative；　in　this　respect；　namely；　that　just　because　of　the　idea
  of　universal　legislation　it　is　not　based　on　interest；　and　therefore　it
  alone　among　all　possible　imperatives　can　be　unconditional。　Or　still
  better；　converting　the　proposition；　if　there　is　a　categorical
  imperative　（i。e。；　a　law　for　the　will　of　every　rational　being）；　it
  can　only　command　that　everything　be　done　from　maxims　of　one's　will
  regarded　as　a　will　which　could　at　the　same　time　will　that　it　should
  itself　give　universal　laws；　for　in　that　case　only　the　practical
  principle　and　the　imperative　which　it　obeys　are　unconditional；　since
  they　cannot　be　based　on　any　interest。
  *I　may　be　excused　from　adducing　examples　to　elucidate　this
  principle；　as　those　which　have　already　been　used　to　elucidate　the
  categorical　imperative　and　its　formula　would　all　serve　for　the　like
  purpose　here。
  Looking　back　now　on　all　previous　attempts　to　discover　the
  principle　of　morality；　we　need　not　wonder　why　they　all　fa