cognitions　are　altogether　a　priori。　For　the　metaphysic　of　morals　has
  to　examine　the　idea　and　the　principles　of　a　possible　pure　will；　and
  not　the　acts　and　conditions　of　human　volition　generally；　which　for　the
  most　part　are　drawn　from　psychology。　It　is　true　that　moral　laws　and
  duty　are　spoken　of　in　the　general　moral　philosophy　（contrary　indeed　to
  all　fitness）。　But　this　is　no　objection；　for　in　this　respect　also　the
  authors　of　that　science　remain　true　to　their　idea　of　it；　they　do　not
  distinguish　the　motives　which　are　prescribed　as　such　by　reason　alone
  altogether　a　priori；　and　which　are　properly　moral；　from　the
  empirical　motives　which　the　understanding　raises　to　general
  conceptions　merely　by　comparison　of　experiences；　but；　without　noticing
  the　difference　of　their　sources；　and　looking　on　them　all　as
  homogeneous；　they　consider　only　their　greater　or　less　amount。　It　is　in
  this　way　they　frame　their　notion　of　obligation；　which；　though　anything
  but　moral；　is　all　that　can　be　attained　in　a　philosophy　which　passes　no
  judgement　at　all　on　the　origin　of　all　possible　practical　concepts；
  whether　they　are　a　priori；　or　only　a　posteriori。
  Intending　to　publish　hereafter　a　metaphysic　of　morals；　I　issue　in
  the　first　instance　these　fundamental　principles。　Indeed　there　is
  properly　no　other　foundation　for　it　than　the　critical　examination　of　a
  pure　practical　Reason；　just　as　that　of　metaphysics　is　the　critical
  examination　of　the　pure　speculative　reason；　already　published。　But
  in　the　first　place　the　former　is　not　so　absolutely　necessary　as　the
  latter；　because　in　moral　concerns　human　reason　can　easily　be　brought
  to　a　high　degree　of　correctness　and　completeness；　even　in　the
  commonest　understanding；　while　on　the　contrary　in　its　theoretic　but
  pure　use　it　is　wholly　dialectical；　and　in　the　second　place　if　the
  critique　of　a　pure　practical　reason　is　to　be　complete；　it　must　be
  possible　at　the　same　time　to　show　its　identity　with　the　speculative
  reason　in　a　common　principle；　for　it　can　ultimately　be　only　one　and
  the　same　reason　which　has　to　be　distinguished　merely　in　its
  application。　I　could　not；　however；　bring　it　to　such　completeness　here；
  without　introducing　considerations　of　a　wholly　different　kind；　which
  would　be　perplexing　to　the　reader。　On　this　account　I　have　adopted
  the　title　of　Fundamental　Principles　of　the　Metaphysic　of　Morals
  instead　of　that　of　a　Critical　Examination　of　the　pure　practical
  reason。
  But　in　the　third　place；　since　a　metaphysic　of　morals；　in　spite　of
  the　discouraging　title；　is　yet　capable　of　being　presented　in　popular
  form；　and　one　adapted　to　the　common　understanding；　I　find　it　useful　to
  separate　from　it　this　preliminary　treatise　on　its　fundamental
  principles；　in　order　that　I　may　not　hereafter　have　need　to　introduce
  these　necessarily　subtle　discussions　into　a　book　of　a　more　simple
  character。
  The　present　treatise　is；　however；　nothing　more　than　the
  investigation　and　establishment　of　the　supreme　principle　of
  morality；　and　this　alone　constitutes　a　study　complete　in　itself　and
  one　which　ought　to　be　kept　apart　from　every　other　moral　investigation。
  No　doubt　my　conclusions　on　this　weighty　question；　which　has　hitherto
  been　very　unsatisfactorily　examined；　would　receive　much　light　from　the
  application　of　the　same　principle　to　the　whole　system；　and　would　be
  greatly　confirmed　by　the　adequacy　which　it　exhibits　throughout；　but
  I　must　forego　this　advantage；　which　indeed　would　be　after　all　more
  gratifying　than　useful；　since　the　easy　applicability　of　a　principle
  and　its　apparent　adequacy　give　no　very　certain　proof　of　its　soundness；
  but　rather　inspire　a　certain　partiality；　which　prevents　us　from
  examining　and　estimating　it　strictly　in　itself　and　without　regard　to
  consequences。
  I　have　adopted　in　this　work　the　method　which　I　think　most
  suitable；　proceeding　analytically　from　common　knowledge　to　the
  determination　of　its　ultimate　principle；　and　again　descending
  synthetically　from　the　examination　of　this　principle　and　its　sources
  to　the　common　knowledge　in　which　we　find　it　employed。　The　division
  will；　therefore；　be　as　follows：
  1　FIRST　SECTION。　Transition　from　the　common　rational　knowledge　of
  morality　to　the　philosophical。
  2　SECOND　SECTION。　Transition　from　popular　moral　philosophy　to　the
  metaphysic　of　morals。
  3　THIRD　SECTION。　Final　step　from　the　metaphysic　of　morals　to　the
  critique　of　the　pure　practical　reason。
  FIRST　SECTION
  TRANSITION　FROM　THE　COMMON　RATIONAL　KNOWLEDGE
  OF　MORALITY　TO　THE　PHILOSOPHICAL
  Nothing　can　possibly　be　conceived　in　the　world；　or　even　out　of　it；
  which　can　be　called　good；　without　qualification；　except　a　good　will。
  Intelligence；　wit；　judgement；　and　the　other　talents　of　the　mind；
  however　they　may　be　named；　or　courage；　resolution；　perseverance；　as
  qualities　of　temperament；　are　undoubtedly　good　and　desirable　in　many
  respects；　but　these　gifts　of　nature　may　also　become　extremely　bad
  and　mischievous　if　the　will　which　is　to　make　use　of　them；　and　which；
  therefore；　constitutes　what　is　called　character；　is　not　good。　It　is
  the　same　with　the　gifts　of　fortune。　Power；　riches；　honour；　even
  health；　and　the　general　well…being　and　contentment　with　one's
  condition　which　is　called　happiness；　inspire　pride；　and　often
  presumption；　if　there　is　not　a　good　will　to　correct　the　influence　of
  these　on　the　mind；　and　with　this　also　to　rectify　the　whole　principle
  of　acting　and　adapt　it　to　its　end。　The　sight　of　a　being　who　is　not
  adorned　with　a　single　feature　of　a　pure　and　good　will；　enjoying
  unbroken　prosperity；　can　never　give　pleasure　to　an　impartial
  rational　spectator。　Thus　a　good　will　appears　to　constitute　the
  indispensable　condition　even　of　being　worthy　of　happiness。
  There　are　even　some　qualities　which　are　of　service　to　this　good　will
  itself　and　may　facilitate　its　action；　yet　which　have　no　intrinsic
  unconditional　value；　but　always　presuppose　a　good　will；　and　this
  qualifies　the　esteem　that　we　justly　have　for　them　and　does　not
  permit　us　to　regard　them　as　absolutely　good。　Moderation　in　the
  affections　and　passions；　self…control；　and　calm　deliberation　are　not
  only　good　in　many　respects；　but　even　seem　to　constitute　part　of　the
  intrinsic　worth　of　the　person；　but　they　are　far　from　deserving　to　be
  called　good　without　qualification；　although　they　have　been　so
  unconditionally　praised　by　the　ancients。　For　without　the　principles　of
  a　good　will；　they　may　become　extremely　bad；　and　the　coolness　of　a
  villain　not　only　makes　him　far　more　dangerous；　but　also　directly　makes
  him　more　abominable　in　our　eyes　than　he　would　have　been　without　it。
  A　good　will　is　good　not　because　of　what　it　performs　or　effects；
  not　by　its　aptness　for　the　attainment　of　some　proposed　end；　but　simply
  by　virtue　of　the　volition；　that　is；　it　is　good　in　itself；　and
  considered　by　itself　is　to　be　esteemed　much　higher　than　all　that　can
  be　brought　about　by　it　in　favour　of　any　inclination；　nay　even　of　the
  sum　total　of　all　inclinations。　Even　if　it　should　happen　that；　owing　to
  special　disfavour　of　fortune；　or　the　niggardly　provision　of　a
  step…motherly　nature；　this　will　should　wholly　lack　power　to　accomplish
  its　purpose；　if　with　its　greatest　efforts　it　should　yet　achieve
  nothing；　and　there　should　remain　only　the　good　will　（not；　to　be
  sure；　a　mere　wish；　but　the　summoning　of　all　means　in　our　power）；　then；
  like　a　jewel；　it　would　still　shine　by　its　own　light；　as　a　thing
  which　has　its　whole　value　in　itself。　Its　usefulness　or　fruitfulness
  can　neither　add　nor　take　away　anything　from　this　value。　It　would　be；
  as　it　were；　only　the　setting　to　enable　us　to　handle　it　the　more
  conveniently　in　common　commerce；　or　to　attract　to　it　the　attention
  of　those　who　are　not　yet　connoisseurs；　but　not　to　recommend　it　to　true
  connoisseurs；　or　to　determine　its　value。
  There　is；　however；　something　so　strange　in　this　idea　of　the　absolute
  value　of　the　mere　will；　in　which　no　account　is　taken　of　its　utility；
  that　notwithstanding　the　thorough　assent　of　even　common　reason　to
  the　idea；　yet　a　suspicion　must　arise　that　it　may　perhaps　really　be　the
  product　of　mere　high…flown　fancy；　and　that　we　may　have　misunderstood
  the　purpose　of　nature　in　assigning　reason　as　the　governor　of　our　will。
  Therefore　we　will　examine　this　idea　from　this　point　of　view。
  In　the　physical　constitution　of　an　organized　being；　that　is；　a　being
  adapted　suitably　to　the　purposes　of　life；　we　assume　it　as　a
  fundamental　principle　that　no　organ　for　any　purpose　will　be　found
  but　what　is　also　the　fittest　and　best　adapted　for　that　purpose。　Now　in
  a　being　which　has　reason　and　a　will；　if　the　proper　object　of　nature
  were　its　conservation；　its　welfare；　in　a　word；　its　happiness；　then
  nature　would　have　hit　upon　a　very　bad　arrangement　in　selecting　the
  reason　of　the　creature　to　carry　out　this　purpose。　For　all　the
  actions　which　the　creature　has　to　perform　with　a　view　to　this　purpose；
  and　the　whole　rule　of　its　conduct；　would　be　far　more　surely　p