If　we　talk　of　a　certain　thing　being　an　aspect　of　truth；
  it　is　evident　that　we　claim　to　know　what　is　truth；　just　as；　if　we
  talk　of　the　hind　leg　of　a　dog；　we　claim　to　know　what　is　a　dog。
  Unfortunately；　the　philosopher　who　talks　about　aspects　of　truth
  generally　also　asks；　〃What　is　truth？〃　　Frequently　even　he　denies
  the　existence　of　truth；　or　says　it　is　inconceivable　by　the
  human　intelligence。　　How；　then；　can　he　recognize　its　aspects？
  I　should　not　like　to　be　an　artist　who　brought　an　architectural　sketch
  to　a　builder；　saying；　〃This　is　the　south　aspect　of　Sea…View　Cottage。
  Sea…View　Cottage；　of　course；　does　not　exist。〃　　I　should　not　even
  like　very　much　to　have　to　explain；　under　such　circumstances；
  that　Sea…View　Cottage　might　exist；　but　was　unthinkable　by　the　human　mind。
  Nor　should　I　like　any　better　to　be　the　bungling　and　absurd　metaphysician
  who　professed　to　be　able　to　see　everywhere　the　aspects　of　a　truth
  that　is　not　there。　　Of　course；　it　is　perfectly　obvious　that　there
  are　truths　in　Kipling；　that　there　are　truths　in　Shaw　or　Wells。
  But　the　degree　to　which　we　can　perceive　them　depends　strictly　upon
  how　far　we　have　a　definite　conception　inside　us　of　what　is　truth。
  It　is　ludicrous　to　suppose　that　the　more　sceptical　we　are　the　more　we
  see　good　in　everything。　　It　is　clear　that　the　more　we　are　certain
  what　good　is；　the　more　we　shall　see　good　in　everything。
  I　plead；　then；　that　we　should　agree　or　disagree　with　these　men。　　I　plead
  that　we　should　agree　with　them　at　least　in　having　an　abstract　belief。
  But　I　know　that　there　are　current　in　the　modern　world　many　vague
  objections　to　having　an　abstract　belief；　and　I　feel　that　we　shall
  not　get　any　further　until　we　have　dealt　with　some　of　them。
  The　first　objection　is　easily　stated。
  A　common　hesitation　in　our　day　touching　the　use　of　extreme　convictions
  is　a　sort　of　notion　that　extreme　convictions　specially　upon　cosmic　matters；
  have　been　responsible　in　the　past　for　the　thing　which　is　called　bigotry。
  But　a　very　small　amount　of　direct　experience　will　dissipate　this　view。
  In　real　life　the　people　who　are　most　bigoted　are　the　people
  who　have　no　convictions　at　all。　　The　economists　of　the　Manchester
  school　who　disagree　with　Socialism　take　Socialism　seriously。
  It　is　the　young　man　in　Bond　Street；　who　does　not　know　what　socialism
  means　much　less　whether　he　agrees　with　it；　who　is　quite　certain
  that　these　socialist　fellows　are　making　a　fuss　about　nothing。
  The　man　who　understands　the　Calvinist　philosophy　enough　to　agree　with　it
  must　understand　the　Catholic　philosophy　in　order　to　disagree　with　it。
  It　is　the　vague　modern　who　is　not　at　all　certain　what　is　right
  who　is　most　certain　that　Dante　was　wrong。　　The　serious　opponent
  of　the　Latin　Church　in　history；　even　in　the　act　of　showing　that　it
  produced　great　infamies；　must　know　that　it　produced　great　saints。
  It　is　the　hard…headed　stockbroker；　who　knows　no　history　and
  believes　no　religion；　who　is；　nevertheless；　perfectly　convinced
  that　all　these　priests　are　knaves。　　The　Salvationist　at　the　Marble
  Arch　may　be　bigoted；　but　he　is　not　too　bigoted　to　yearn　from
  a　common　human　kinship　after　the　dandy　on　church　parade。
  But　the　dandy　on　church　parade　is　so　bigoted　that　he　does　not
  in　the　least　yearn　after　the　Salvationist　at　the　Marble　Arch。
  Bigotry　may　be　roughly　defined　as　the　anger　of　men　who　have
  no　opinions。　　It　is　the　resistance　offered　to　definite　ideas
  by　that　vague　bulk　of　people　whose　ideas　are　indefinite　to　excess。
  Bigotry　may　be　called　the　appalling　frenzy　of　the　indifferent。
  This　frenzy　of　the　indifferent　is　in　truth　a　terrible　thing；
  it　has　made　all　monstrous　and　widely　pervading　persecutions。
  In　this　degree　it　was　not　the　people　who　cared　who　ever　persecuted；
  the　people　who　cared　were　not　sufficiently　numerous。　　It　was　the　people
  who　did　not　care　who　filled　the　world　with　fire　and　oppression。
  It　was　the　hands　of　the　indifferent　that　lit　the　faggots；
  it　was　the　hands　of　the　indifferent　that　turned　the　rack。　　There　have
  come　some　persecutions　out　of　the　pain　of　a　passionate　certainty；
  but　these　produced；　not　bigotry；　but　fanaticisma　very　different
  and　a　somewhat　admirable　thing。　　Bigotry　in　the　main　has　always
  been　the　pervading　omnipotence　of　those　who　do　not　care　crushing
  out　those　who　care　in　darkness　and　blood。
  There　are　people；　however；　who　dig　somewhat　deeper　than　this
  into　the　possible　evils　of　dogma。　　It　is　felt　by　many　that　strong
  philosophical　conviction；　while　it　does　not　（as　they　perceive）
  produce　that　sluggish　and　fundamentally　frivolous　condition　which　we
  call　bigotry；　does　produce　a　certain　concentration；　exaggeration；
  and　moral　impatience；　which　we　may　agree　to　call　fanaticism。
  They　say；　in　brief；　that　ideas　are　dangerous　things。
  In　politics；　for　example；　it　is　commonly　urged　against　a　man　like
  Mr。　Balfour；　or　against　a　man　like　Mr。　John　Morley；　that　a　wealth
  of　ideas　is　dangerous。　　The　true　doctrine　on　this　point；　again；
  is　surely　not　very　difficult　to　state。　　Ideas　are　dangerous；
  but　the　man　to　whom　they　are　least　dangerous　is　the　man　of　ideas。
  He　is　acquainted　with　ideas；　and　moves　among　them　like　a　lion…tamer。
  Ideas　are　dangerous；　but　the　man　to　whom　they　are　most　dangerous
  is　the　man　of　no　ideas。　　The　man　of　no　ideas　will　find　the　first
  idea　fly　to　his　head　like　wine　to　the　head　of　a　teetotaller。
  It　is　a　common　error；　I　think；　among　the　Radical　idealists　of　my　own
  party　and　period　to　suggest　that　financiers　and　business　men　are　a
  danger　to　the　empire　because　they　are　so　sordid　or　so　materialistic。
  The　truth　is　that　financiers　and　business　men　are　a　danger　to
  the　empire　because　they　can　be　sentimental　about　any　sentiment；
  and　idealistic　about　any　ideal；　any　ideal　that　they　find　lying　about。
  just　as　a　boy　who　has　not　known　much　of　women　is　apt　too　easily
  to　take　a　woman　for　the　woman；　so　these　practical　men；　unaccustomed
  to　causes；　are　always　inclined　to　think　that　if　a　thing　is　proved
  to　be　an　ideal　it　is　proved　to　be　the　ideal。　　Many；　for　example；
  avowedly　followed　Cecil　Rhodes　because　he　had　a　vision。
  They　might　as　well　have　followed　him　because　he　had　a　nose；
  a　man　without　some　kind　of　dream　of　perfection　is　quite　as　much
  of　a　monstrosity　as　a　noseless　man。　　People　say　of　such　a　figure；
  in　almost　feverish　whispers；　〃He　knows　his　own　mind；〃　which　is　exactly
  like　saying　in　equally　feverish　whispers；　〃He　blows　his　own　nose。〃
  Human　nature　simply　cannot　subsist　without　a　hope　and　aim
  of　some　kind；　as　the　sanity　of　the　Old　Testament　truly　said；
  where　there　is　no　vision　the　people　perisheth。　　But　it　is　precisely
  because　an　ideal　is　necessary　to　man　that　the　man　without　ideals
  is　in　permanent　danger　of　fanaticism。　　There　is　nothing　which　is
  so　likely　to　leave　a　man　open　to　the　sudden　and　irresistible　inroad
  of　an　unbalanced　vision　as　the　cultivation　of　business　habits。
  All　of　us　know　angular　business　men　who　think　that　the　earth　is　flat；
  or　that　Mr。　Kruger　was　at　the　head　of　a　great　military　despotism；
  or　that　men　are　graminivorous；　or　that　Bacon　wrote　Shakespeare。
  Religious　and　philosophical　beliefs　are；　indeed；　as　dangerous
  as　fire；　and　nothing　can　take　from　them　that　beauty　of　danger。
  But　there　is　only　one　way　of　really　guarding　ourselves　against
  the　excessive　danger　of　them；　and　that　is　to　be　steeped　in　philosophy
  and　soaked　in　religion。
  Briefly；　then；　we　dismiss　the　two　opposite　dangers　of　bigotry
  and　fanaticism；　bigotry　which　is　a　too　great　vagueness　and　fanaticism
  which　is　a　too　great　concentration。　　We　say　that　the　cure　for　the
  bigot　is　belief；　we　say　that　the　cure　for　the　idealist　is　ideas。
  To　know　the　best　theories　of　existence　and　to　choose　the　best
  from　them　（that　is；　to　the　best　of　our　own　strong　conviction）
  appears　to　us　the　proper　way　to　be　neither　bigot　nor　fanatic；
  but　something　more　firm　than　a　bigot　and　more　terrible　than　a　fanatic；
  a　man　with　a　definite　opinion。　　But　that　definite　opinion　must
  in　this　view　begin　with　the　basic　matters　of　human　thought；
  and　these　must　not　be　dismissed　as　irrelevant；　as　religion；
  for　instance；　is　too　often　in　our　days　dismissed　as　irrelevant。
  Even　if　we　think　religion　insoluble；　we　cannot　think　it　irrelevant。
  Even　if　we　ourselves　have　no　view　of　the　ultimate　verities；
  we　must　feel　that　wherever　such　a　view　exists　in　a　man　it　must
  be　more　important　than　anything　else　in　him。　　The　instant　that
  the　thing　ceases　to　be　the　unknowable；　it　becomes　the　indispensable。
  There　can　be　no　doubt；　I