a　tale　should　have　a　head　and　not　break　off　in　the　middle；〃　and　I　should　not　like　to　have　the　argument　going　about　without　a　head；　please　then　to　go　on　a　little　longer；　and　put　the　head　on。　　　Cal。　How　tyrannical　you　are；　Socrates！　I　wish　that　you　and　your　argument　would　rest；　or　that　you　would　get　some　one　else　to　argue　with　you。　　　Soc。　But　who　else　is　willing？…I　want　to　finish　the　argument。　　　Cal。　Cannot　you　finish　without　my　help；　either　talking　straight：　on；　or　questioning　and　answering　yourself？　　　Soc。　Must　I　then　say　with　Epicharmus；　〃Two　men　spoke　before；　but　now　one　shall　be　enough〃？　I　suppose　that　there　is　absolutely　no　help。　And　if　I　am　to　carry　on　the　enquiry　by　myself；　I　will　first　of　all　remark　that　not　only；　but　all　of　us　should　have　an　ambition　to　know　what　is　true　and　what　is　false　in　this　matter；　for　the　discovery　of　the　truth　is　common　good。　And　now　I　will　proceed　to　argue　according　to　my　own　notion。　But　if　any　of　you　think　that　I　arrive　at　conclusions　which　are　untrue　you　must　interpose　and　refute　me；　for　I　do　not　speak　from　any　knowledge　of　what　I　am　saying；　I　am　an　enquirer　like　yourselves；　and　therefore；　if　my　opponent　says　anything　which　is　of　force；　I　shall　be　the　first　to　agree　with　him。　I　am　speaking　on　the　supposition　that　the　argument　ought　to　be　completed；　but　if　you　think　otherwise　let　us　leave　off　and　go　our　ways。　　　Gor。　I　think；　Socrates；　that　we　should　not　go　our　ways　until　you　have　completed　the　argument；　and　this　appears　to　me　to　be　the　wish　of　the　rest　of　the　company；　I　myself　should　very　much　like　to　hear　what　more　you　have　to　say。　　　Soc。　I　too；　Gorgias；　should　have　liked　to　continue　the　argument　with　Callicles；　and　then　I　might　have　given　him　an　〃Amphion〃　in　return　for　his　〃Zethus〃；　but　since　you；　Callicles；　are　unwilling　to　continue；　I　hope　that　you　will　listen；　and　interrupt　me　if　I　seem　to　you　to　be　in　error。　And　if　you　refute　me；　I　shall　not　be　angry　with　you　as　you　are　with　me；　but　I　shall　inscribe　you　as　the　greatest　of　benefactors　on　the　tablets　of　my　soul。　　　Cal。　My　good　fellow；　never　mind　me；　but　get　on。　　　Soc。　Listen　to　me；　then；　while　I　recapitulate　the　argument：…Is　the　pleasant　the　same　as　the　good？　Not　the　same。　Callicles　and　I　are　agreed　about　that。　And　is　the　pleasant　to　be　pursued　for　the　sake　of　the　good？　or　the　good　for　the　sake　of　the　pleasant？　The　pleasant　is　to　be　pursued　for　the　sake　of　the　good。　And　that　is　pleasant　at　the　presence　of　which　we　are　pleased；　and　that　is　good　at　the　presence　of　which　we　are　good？　To　be　sure。　And　we…good；　and　all　good　things　whatever　are　good　when　some　virtue　is　present　in　us　or　them？　That；　Callicles；　is　my　conviction。　But　the　virtue　of　each　thing；　whether　body　or　soul；　instrument　or　creature；　when　given　to　them　in　the　best　way　comes　to　them　not　by　chance　but　as　the　result　of　the　order　and　truth　and　art　which　are　imparted　to　them：　Am　I　not　right？　I　maintain　that　I　am。　And　is　not　the　virtue　of　each　thing　dependent　on　order　or　arrangement？　Yes；　I　say。　And　that　which　makes　a　thing　good　is　the　proper　order　inhering　in　each　thing？　Such　is　my　view。　And　is　not　the　soul　which　has　an　order　of　her　own　better　than　that　which　has　no　order？　Certainly。　And　the　soul　which　has　order　is　orderly？　Of　course。　And　that　which　is　orderly　is　temperate？　Assuredly。　And　the　temperate　soul　is　good？　No　other　answer　can　I　give；　Callicles　dear；　have　you　any？　　　Cal。　Go　on；　my　good　fellow。　　　Soc。　Then　I　shall　proceed　to　add；　that　if　the；　temperate　soul　is　the　good　soul；　the　soul　which　is　in　the　opposite　condition；　that　is；　the　foolish　and　intemperate；　is　the　bad　soul。　Very　true。　　　And　will　not　the　temperate　man　do　what　is　proper；　both　in　relation　to　the　gods　and　to　men；　…for　he　would　not　be　temperate　if　he　did　not？　Certainly　he　will　do　what　is　proper。　In　his　relation　to　other　men　he　will　do　what　is　just；　See　and　in　his　relation　to　the　gods　he　will　do　what　is　holy；　and　he　who　does　what　is　just　and　holy　must　be　just　and　holy？　Very　true。　And　must　he　not　be　courageous？　for　the　duty　of　a　temperate　man　is　not　to　follow　or　to　avoid　what　he　ought　not；　but　what　he　ought；　whether　things　or　men　or　pleasures　or　pains；　and　patiently　to　endure　when　he　ought；　and　therefore；　Callicles；　the　temperate　man；　being；　as　we　have　described；　also　just　and　courageous　and　holy；　cannot　be　other　than　a　perfectly　good　man；　nor　can　the　good　man　do　otherwise　than　well　and　perfectly　whatever　he　does；　and　he　who　does　well　must　of　necessity　be　happy　and　blessed；　and　the　evil　man　who　does　evil；　miserable：　now　this　latter　is　he　whom　you　were　applauding…the　intemperate　who　is　the　opposite　of　the　temperate。　Such　is　my　position；　and　these　things　I　affirm　to　be　true。　And　if　they　are　true；　then　I　further　affirm　that　he　who　desires　to　be　happy　must　pursue　and　practise　temperance　and　run　away　from　intemperance　as　fast　as　his　legs　will　carry　him：　he　had　better　order　his　life　so　as　not　to　need　punishment；　but　if　either　he　or　any　of　his　friends；　whether　private　individual　or　city；　are　in　need　of　punishment；　then　justice　must　be　done　and　he　must　suffer　punishment；　if　he　would　be　happy。　This　appears　to　me　to　be　the　aim　which　a　man　ought　to　have；　and　towards　which　he　ought　to　direct　all　the　energies　both　of　himself　and　of　the　state；　acting　so　that　he　may　have　temperance　and　justice　present　with　him　and　be　happy；　not　suffering　his　lusts　to　be　unrestrained；　and　in　the　never…ending　desire　satisfy　them　leading　a　robber's　life。　Such；　one　is　the　friend　neither　of　God　nor　man；　for　he　is　incapable　of　communion；　and　he　who　is　incapable　of　communion　is　also　incapable　of　friendship。　And　philosophers　tell　us；　Callicles；　that　communion　and　friendship　and　orderliness　and　temperance　and　justice　bind　together　heaven　and　earth　and　gods　and　men；　and　that　this　universe　is　therefore　called　Cosmos　or　order；　not　disorder　or　misrule；　my　friend。　But　although　you　are　a　philosopher　you　seem　to　me　never　to　have　observed　that　geometrical　equality　is　mighty；　both　among　gods　and　men；　you　think　that　you　ought　to　cultivate　inequality　or　excess；　and　do　not　care　about　geometry。…Well；　then；　either　the　principle　that　the　happy　are　made　happy　by　the　possession　of　justice　and　temperance；　and　the　miserable　the　possession　of　vice；　must　be　refuted；　or；　if　it　is　granted；　what　will　be　the　consequences？　All　the　consequences　which　I　drew　before；　Callicles；　and　about　which　you　asked　me　whether　I　was　in　earnest　when　I　said　that　a　man　ought　to　accuse　himself　and　his　son　and　his　friend　if　he　did　anything　wrong；　and　that　to　this　end　he　should　use　his　rhetoric…all　those　consequences　are　true。　And　that　which　you　thought　that　Polus　was　led　to　admit　out　of　modesty　is　true；　viz。；　that；　to　do　injustice；　if　more　disgraceful　than　to　suffer；　is　in　that　degree　worse；　and　the　other　position；　which；　according　to　Polus；　Gorgias　admitted　out　of　modesty；　that　he　who　would　truly　be　a　rhetorician　ought　to　be　just　and　have　a　knowledge　of　justice；　has　also　turned　out　to　be　true。　　　And　now；　these　things　being　as　we　have　said；　let　us　proceed　in　the　next　place　to　consider　whether　you　are　right　in　throwing　in　my　teeth　that　I　am　unable　to　help　myself　or　any　of　my　friends　or　kinsmen；　or　to　save　them　in　the　extremity　of　danger；　and　that　I　am　in　the　power　of　another　like　an　outlaw　to　whom　anyone　may　do　what　he　likes…he　may　box　my　ears；　which　was　a　brave　saying　of　yours；　or　take　away　my　goods　or　banish　me；　or　even　do　his　worst　and　kill　me；　a　condition　which；　as　you　say；　is　the　height　of　disgrace。　My　answer　to　you　is　one　which　has　been　already　often　repeated；　but　may　as　well　be　repeated　once　more。　I　tell　you；　Callicles；　that　to　be　boxed　on　the　ears　wrongfully　is　not　the　worst　evil　which　can　befall　a　man；　nor　to　have　my　purse　or　my　body　cut　open；　but　that　to　smite　and　slay　me　and　mine　wrongfully　is　far　more　disgraceful　and　more　evil；　aye；　and　to　despoil　and　enslave　and　pillage；　or　in　any　way　at　all　to　wrong　me　and　mine；　is　far　more　disgraceful　and　evil　to　the　doer　of　the　wrong　than　to　me　who　am　the　sufferer。　These　truths；　which　have　been　already　set　forth　as　I　state　them　in　the　previous　discussion；　would　seem　now　to　have　been　fixed　and　riveted　by　us；　if　I　may　use　an　expression　which　is　certainly　bold；　in　words　which　are　like　bonds　of　iron　and　adamant；　and　unless　you　or　some　other　still　more　enterprising　hero　shall　break　them；　there　is　no　possibility　of　denying　what　I　say。　For　my　position　has　always　been；　that　I　myself　am　ignorant　how　these　things　are；　but　that　I　have　never　met　any　one　who　could　say　otherwise；　any　more　than　you　can；　and　not　appear　ridiculous。　This　is　my　position　still；　and　if　what　I　am　saying　is　true；　and　injustice　is　the　greatest　of　evils　to　the　doer　of　injustice；　and　yet　there　is　if　possible　a　greater　than　this　greatest　of　evils；　in　an　unjust　man　not　suffering　retribution；　what　is　that　defence　of　which　the　want　will　make　a　man　truly　ridiculous？　Must　not　the　defence　be　one　which　will　avert　the　greatest　of　human　evils？　And　will　not　worst　of　all　defences　be　that　with　which　a　man　is　unable　to　defend　himself　or　his　family　or　his　friends？…and　next　will　come　that　which　is　unable　to　avert　the　next　greatest　evil；　thirdly　that　which　is　unable　to　avert　the　third　greatest　evil；　and　so　of　other　evils。　As　is　the　greatness　of　evil　so　is　the　honour　of　being　able　to　avert　them　in　their　several　degrees；　and　th