have。　　　Soc。　And　a　foolish　man　too？　　　Cal。　Yes；　certainly；　but　what　is　your　drift？　　　Soc。　Nothing　particular；　if　you　will　only　answer。　　　Cal。　Yes；　I　have。　　　Soc。　And　did　you　ever　see　a　sensible　man　rejoicing　or　sorrowing？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Which　rejoice　and　sorrow　most…the　wise　or　the　foolish？　　　Cal。　They　are　much　upon　a　par；　I　think；　in　that　respect。　　　Soc。　Enough：　And　did　you　ever　see　a　coward　in　battle？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　And　which　rejoiced　most　at　the　departure　of　the　enemy；　the　coward　or　the　brave？　　　Cal。　I　should　say　〃most〃　of　both；　or　at　any　rate；　they　rejoiced　about　equally。　　　Soc。　No　matter；　then　the　cowards；　and　not　only　the　brave；　rejoice？　　　Cal。　Greatly。　　　Soc。　And　the　foolish；　so　it　would　seem？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　are　only　the　cowards　pained　at　the　approach　of　their　enemies；　or　are　the　brave　also　pained？　　　Cal。　Both　are　pained。　　　Soc。　And　are　they　equally　pained？　　　Cal。　I　should　imagine　that　the　cowards　are　more　pained。　　　Soc。　And　are　they　better　pleased　at　the　enemy's　departure？　　　Cal。　I　dare　say。　　　Soc。　Then　are　the　foolish　and　the　wise　and　the　cowards　and　the　brave　all　pleased　and　pained；　as　you　were　saying；　in　nearly　equal　degree；　but　are　the　cowards　more　pleased　and　pained　than　the　brave？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　But　surely　the　wise　and　brave　are　the　good；　and　the　foolish　and　the　cowardly　are　the　bad？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then　the　good　and　the　bad　are　pleased　and　pained　in　a　nearly　equal　degree？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then　are　the　good　and　bad　good　and　bad　in　a　nearly　equal　degree；　or　have　the　bad　the　advantage　both　in　good　and　evil？　＇i。e。　in　having　more　pleasure　and　more　pain。＇　　　Cal　I　really　do　not　know　what　you　mean。　　　Soc。　Why；　do　you　not　remember　saying　that　the　good　were　good　because　good　was　present　with　them；　and　the　evil　because　evil；　and　that　pleasures　were　goods　and　pains　evils？　　　Cal。　Yes；　I　remember。　　　Soc。　And　are　not　these　pleasures　or　goods　present　to　those　who　rejoice…if　they　do　rejoice？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Then　those　who　rejoice　are　good　when　goods　are　present　with　them？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　those　who　are　in　pain　have　evil　or　sorrow　present　with　them？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　would　you　still　say　that　the　evil　are　evil　by　reason　of　the　presence　of　evil？　　　Cal。　I　should。　　　Soc。　Then　those　who　rejoice　are　good；　and　those　who　are　in　pain　evil？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　The　degrees　of　good　and　evil　vary　with　the　degrees　of　pleasure　and　of　pain？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Have　the　wise　man　and　the　fool；　the　brave　and　the　coward；　joy　and　pain　in　nearly　equal　degrees？　or　would　you　say　that　the　coward　has　more？　　　Cal。　I　should　say　that　he　has。　　　Soc。　Help　me　then　to　draw　out　the　conclusion　which　follows　from　our　admissions；　for　it　is　good　to　repeat　and　review　what　is　good　twice　and　thrice　over；　as　they　say。　Both　the　wise　man　and　the　brave　man　we　allow　to　be　good？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　the　foolish　man　and　the　coward　to　be　evil？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　he　who　has　joy　is　good？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　he　who　is　in　pain　is　evil？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　The　good　and　evil　both　have　joy　and　pain；　but；　perhaps；　the　evil　has　more　of　them？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then　must　we　not　infer；　that　the　bad　man　is　as　good　and　bad　as　the　good；　or；　perhaps；　even　better？…is　not　this　a　further　inference　which　follows　equally　with　the　preceding　from　the　assertion　that　the　good　and　the　pleasant　are　the　same：…can　this　be　denied；　Callicles？　　　Cal。　I　have　been　listening　and　making　admissions　to　you；　Socrates；　and　I　remark　that　if　a　person　grants　you　anything　in　play；　you；　like　a　child；　want　to　keep　hold　and　will　not　give　it　back。　But　do　you　really　suppose　that　I　or　any　other　human　being　denies　that　some　pleasures　are　good　and　others　bad？　　　Soc。　Alas；　Callicles；　how　unfair　you　are！　you　certainly　treat　me　as　if　I　were　a　child；　sometimes　saying　one　thing；　and　then　another；　as　if　you　were　meaning　to　deceive　me。　And　yet　I　thought　at　first　that　you　were　my　friend；　and　would　not　have　deceived　me　if　you　could　have　helped。　But　I　see　that　I　was　mistaken；　and　now　I　suppose　that　I　must　make　the　best　of　a　bad　business；　as　they　said　of　old；　and　take　what　I　can　get　out　of　you。…Well；　then；　as　I　understand　you　to　say；　I　may　assume　that　some　pleasures　are　good　and　others　evil？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　The　beneficial　are　good；　and　the　hurtful　are　evil？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　And　the　beneficial　are　those　which　do　some　good；　and　the　hurtful　are　those　which　do　some　evil？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Take；　for　example；　the　bodily　pleasures　of　eating　and　drinking；　which　were　just　now　mentioning…you　mean　to　say　that　those　which　promote　health；　or　any　other　bodily　excellence；　are　good；　and　their　opposites　evil？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　in　the　same　way　there　are　good　pains　and　there　are　evil　pains？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　And　ought　we　not　to　choose　and　use　the　good　pleasures　and　pains？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　But　not　the　evil？　　　Cal。　Clearly。　　　Soc。　Because；　if　you　remember；　Polus　and　I　have　agreed　that　all　our　actions　are　to　be　done　for　the　sake　of　the　good…and　will　you　agree　with　us　in　saying；　that　the　good　is　the　end　of　all　our　actions；　and　that　all　our　actions　are　to　be　done　for　the　sake　of　the　good；　and　not　the　good；　for　of　them？…will　you　add　a　third　vote　to　our　two？　　　Cal。　I　will。　　　Soc。　Then　pleasure；　like　everything　else；　is　to　be　sought　for　the　sake　of　that　which　is　good；　and　not　that　which　is　good　for　the　sake　of　pleasure？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　But　can　every　man　choose　what　pleasures　are　good　and　what　are　evil；　or　must　he　have　art　or　knowledge　of　them　in　detail？　　　Cal。　He　must　have　art。　　　Soc。　Let　me　now　remind　you　of　what　I　was　saying　to　Gorgias　and　Polus；　I　was　saying；　as　you　will　not　have　forgotten；　that　there　were　some　processes　which　aim　only　at　pleasure；　and　know　nothing　of　a　better　and　worse；　and　there　are　other　processes　which　know　good　and　evil。　And　I　considered　that　cookery；　which　I　do　not　call　an　art；　but　only　an　experience；　was　of　the　former　class；　which　is　concerned　with　pleasure；　and　that　the　art　of　medicine　was　of　the　class　which　is　concerned　with　the　good。　And　now；　by　the　god　of　friendship；　I　must　beg　you；　Callicles；　not　to　jest；　or　to　imagine　that　I　am　jesting　with　you；　do　not　answer　at　random　and　contrary　to　your　real　opinion…for　you　will　observe　that　we　are　arguing　about　the　way　of　human　life；　and　to　a　man　who　has　any　sense　at　all；　what　question　can　be　more　serious　than　this？…whether　he　should　follow　after　that　way　of　life　to　which　you　exhort　me；　and　act　what　you　call　the　manly　part　of　speaking　in　the　assembly；　and　cultivating　rhetoric；　and　engaging　in　public　affairs；　according　to　the　principles　now　in　vogue；　or　whether　he　should　pursue　the　life　of　philosophy…and　in　what　the　latter　way　differs　from　the　former。　But　perhaps　we　had　better　first　try　to　distinguish　them；　as　I　did　before；　and　when　we　have　come　to　an　agreement　that　they　are　distinct；　we　may　proceed　to　consider　in　what　they　differ　from　one　another；　and　which　of　them　we　should　choose。　Perhaps；　however；　you　do　not　even　now　understand　what　I　mean？　　　Cal。　No；　I　do　not。　　　Soc。　Then　I　will　explain　myself　more　clearly：　seeing　that　you　and　I　have　agreed　that　there　is　such　a　thing　as　good；　and　that　there　is　such　a　thing　as　pleasure；　and　that　pleasure　is　not　the　same　as　good；　and　that　the　pursuit　and　process　of　acquisition　of　the　one；　that　is　pleasure；　is　different　from　the　pursuit　and　process　of　acquisition　of　the　other；　which　is　good…I　wish　that　you　would　tell　me　whether　you　agree　with　me　thus　far　or　not…do　you　agree？　　　Cal。　I　do。　　　Soc。　Then　I　will　proceed；　and　ask　whether　you　also　agree　with　me；　and　whether　you　think　that　I　spoke　the　truth　when　I　further　said　to　Gorgias　and　Polus　that　cookery　in　my　opinion　is　only　an　experience；　and　not　an　art　at　all；　and　that　whereas　medicine　is　an　art；　and　attends　to　the　nature　and　constitution　of　the　patient；　and　has　principles　of　action　and　reason　in　each　case；　cookery　in　attending　upon　pleasure　never　regards　either　the　nature　or　reason　of　that　pleasure　to　which　she　devotes　herself；　but　goes　straight　to　her　end；　nor　ever　considers　or　calculates　anything；　but　works　by　experience　and　routine；　and　just　preserves　the　recollection　of　what　she　has　usually　done　when　producing　pleasure。　And　first；　I　would　have　you　consider　whether　I　have　proved　what　I　was　saying；　and　then　whether　there　are　not　other　similar　processes　which　have　to　do　with　the　soul…some　of　them　processes　of　art；　making　a　provision　for　the　soul's　highest　interest…others　despising　the　interest；　and；　as　in　the　previous　case；　considering　only　the　pleasure　of　the　soul；　and　how　this　may　be　acquired；　but　not　considering　what　pleasures　are　good　or　bad；　and　having　no　other　aim　but　to　afford　gratification；　whether　good　or　bad。　In　my　opinion；　Callicles；　there　are　such　processes；　and　this　is　the　sort　of　thing　which　I　term　flattery；　whether　concerned　with　the　body　or　the　soul；　or　whenever　employed　with　a　view　to　pleasure　and　without　any　consideration　of　good　and　evil。　And　now　I　wish　that　you　would　tell　me　whether　you　agree　with　us　in　this　notion；　or　whether　you　differ。　　　Cal。　I　do　not　differ；　on　the　contrary；　I　agree；　for　in　that　way　I　shall　soonest　bring　the　argument　to　an　end；　and　shall　oblige　my　friend　Gorgias。　　　Soc。　And　is　this　notion　true　of　one　soul；　or　of　two　or　more？　　　Cal。　Equally　true　of　two　or　more。