es；　for　example；　are　beautiful　in　proportion　as　they　are　useful；　or　as　the　sight　of　them　gives　pleasure　to　the　spectators；　can　you　give　any　other　account　of　personal　beauty？　　　Pol。　I　cannot。　　　Soc。　And　you　would　say　of　figures　or　colours　generally　that　they　were　beautiful；　either　by　reason　of　the　pleasure　which　they　give；　or　of　their　use；　or　both？　　　Pol。　Yes；　I　should。　　　Soc。　And　you　would　call　sounds　and　music　beautiful　for　the　same　reason？　　　Pol。　I　should。　　　Soc。　Laws　and　institutions　also　have　no　beauty　in　them　except　in　so　far　as　they　are　useful　or　pleasant　or　both？　　　Pol。　I　think　not。　　　Soc。　And　may　not　the　same　be　said　of　the　beauty　of　knowledge？　　　Pol。　To　be　sure；　Socrates；　and　I　very　much　approve　of　your　measuring　beauty　by　the　standard　of　pleasure　and　utility。　　　Soc。　And　deformity　or　disgrace　may　be　equally　measured　by　the　opposite　standard　of　pain　and　evil？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Then　when　of　two　beautiful　things　one　exceeds　in　beauty；　the　measure　of　the　excess　is　to　be　taken　in　one　or　both　of　these；　that　is　to　say；　in　pleasure　or　utility　or　both？　　　Pol。　Very　true。　　　Soc。　And　of　two　deformed　things；　that　which　exceeds　in　deformity　or　disgrace；　exceeds　either　in　pain　or　evil…must　it　not　be　so？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　But　then　again；　what　was　the　observation　which　you　just　now　made；　about　doing　and　suffering　wrong？　Did　you　not　say；　that　suffering　wrong　was　more　evil；　and　doing　wrong　more　disgraceful？　　　Pol。　I　did。　　　Soc。　Then；　if　doing　wrong　is　more　disgraceful　than　suffering；　the　more　disgraceful　must　be　more　painful　and　must　exceed　in　pain　or　in　evil　or　both：　does　not　that　also　follow？　　　Pol。　Of　course。　　　Soc。　First；　then；　let　us　consider　whether　the　doing　of　injustice　exceeds　the　suffering　in　the　consequent　pain：　Do　the　injurers　suffer　more　than　the　injured？　　　Pol。　No；　Socrates；　certainly　not。　　　Soc。　Then　they　do　not　exceed　in　pain？　　　Pol。　No。　　　Soc。　But　if　not　in　pain；　then　not　in　both？　　　Pol。　Certainly　not。　　　Soc。　Then　they　can　only　exceed　in　the　other？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　That　is　to　say；　in　evil？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　Then　doing　injustice　will　have　an　excess　of　evil；　and　will　therefore　be　a　greater　evil　than　suffering　injustice？　　　Pol。　Clearly。　　　Soc。　But　have　not　you　and　the　world　already　agreed　that　to　do　injustice　is　more　disgraceful　than　to　suffer？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　that　is　now　discovered　to　be　more　evil？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　would　you　prefer　a　greater　evil　or　a　greater　dishonour　to　a　less　one？　Answer；　Polus；　and　fear　not；　for　you　will　come　to　no　harm　if　you　nobly　resign　yourself　into　the　healing　hand　of　the　argument　as　to　a　physician　without　shrinking；　and　either　say　〃Yes〃　or　〃No〃　to　me。　　　Pol。　I　should　say　〃No。〃　　　Soc。　Would　any　other　man　prefer　a　greater　to　a　less　evil？　　　Pol。　No；　not　according　to　this　way　of　putting　the　case；　Socrates。　　　Soc。　Then　I　said　truly；　Polus　that　neither　you；　nor　I；　nor　any　man；　would　rather；　do　than　suffer　injustice；　for　to　do　injustice　is　the　greater　evil　of　the　two。　　　Pol。　That　is　the　conclusion。　　　Soc。　You　see；　Polus；　when　you　compare　the　two　kinds　of　refutations；　how　unlike　they　are。　All　men；　with　the　exception　of　myself；　are　of　your　way　of　thinking；　but　your　single　assent　and　witness　are　enough　for　me…I　have　no　need　of　any　other；　I　take　your　suffrage；　and　am　regardless　of　the　rest。　Enough　of　this；　and　now　let　us　proceed　to　the　next　question；　which　is；　Whether　the　greatest　of　evils　to　a　guilty　man　is　to　suffer　punishment；　as　you　supposed；　or　whether　to　escape　punishment　is　not　a　greater　evil；　as　I　supposed。　Consider：…You　would　say　that　to　suffer　punishment　is　another　name　for　being　justly　corrected　when　you　do　wrong？　　　Pol。　I　should。　　　Soc。　And　would　you　not　allow　that　all　just　things　are　honourable　in　so　far　as　they　are　just？　Please　to　reflect；　and；　tell　me　your　opinion。　　　Pol。　Yes；　Socrates；　I　think　that　they　are。　　　Soc。　Consider　again：…Where　there　is　an　agent；　must　there　not　also　be　a　patient？　　　Pol。　I　should　say　so。　　　Soc。　And　will　not　the　patient　suffer　that　which　the　agent　does；　and　will　not　the　suffering　have　the　quality　of　the　action？　I　mean；　for　example；　that　if　a　man　strikes；　there　must　be　something　which　is　stricken？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　if　the　striker　strikes　violently　or　quickly；　that　which　is　struck　will　he　struck　violently　or　quickly？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　the　suffering　to　him　who　is　stricken　is　of　the　same　nature　as　the　act　of　him　who　strikes？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　if　a　man　burns；　there　is　something　which　is　burned？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　if　he　burns　in　excess　or　so　as　to　cause　pain；　the　thing　burned　will　be　burned　in　the　same　way？　　　Pol。　Truly。　　　Soc。　And　if　he　cuts；　the　same　argument　holds…there　will　be　something　cut？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　if　the　cutting　be　great　or　deep　or　such　as　will　cause　pain；　the　cut　will　be　of　the　same　nature？　　　Pol。　That　is　evident。　　　Soc。　Then　you　would　agree　generally　to　the　universal　proposition　which　I　was　just　now　asserting：　that　the　affection　of　the　patient　answers　to　the　affection　of　the　agent？　　　Pol。　I　agree。　　　Soc。　Then；　as　this　is　admitted；　let　me　ask　whether　being　punished　is　suffering　or　acting？　　　Pol。　Suffering；　Socrates；　there　can　be　no　doubt　of　that。　　　Soc。　And　suffering　implies　an　agent？　　　Pol。　Certainly；　Socrates；　and　he　is　the　punisher。　　　Soc。　And　he　who　punishes　rightly；　punishes　justly？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　therefore　he　acts　justly？　　　Pol。　Justly。　　　Soc。　Then　he　who　is　punished　and　suffers　retribution；　suffers　justly？　　　Pol。　That　is　evident。　　　Soc。　And　that　which　is　just　has　been　admitted　to　be　honourable？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Then　the　punisher　does　what　is　honourable；　and　the　punished　suffers　what　is　honourable？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　if　what　is　honourable；　then　what　is　good；　for　the　honourable　is　either　pleasant　or　useful？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Then　he　who　is　punished　suffers　what　is　good？　　　Pol。　That　is　true。　　　Soc。　Then　he　is　benefited？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Do　I　understand　you　to　mean　what　I　mean　by　the　term　〃benefited〃？　I　mean；　that　if　he　be　justly　punished　his　soul　is　improved。　　　Pol。　Surely。　　　Soc。　Then　he　who　is　punished　is　delivered　from　the　evil　of　his　soul？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　is　he　not　then　delivered　from　the　greatest　evil？　Look　at　the　matter　in　this　way：…In　respect　of　a　man's　estate；　do　you　see　any　greater　evil　than　poverty？　　　Pol。　There　is　no　greater　evil。　　　Soc。　Again；　in　a　man's　bodily　frame；　you　would　say　that　the　evil　is　weakness　and　disease　and　deformity？　　　Pol。　I　should。　　　Soc。　And　do　you　not　imagine　that　the　soul　likewise　has　some　evil　of　her　own？　　　Pol。　Of　course。　　　Soc。　And　this　you　would　call　injustice　and　ignorance　and　cowardice；　and　the　like？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　So　then；　in　mind；　body；　and　estate；　which　are　three；　you　have　pointed　out　three　corresponding　evils…injustice；　disease；　poverty？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　which　of　the　evils　is　the　most　disgraceful？…Is　not　the　most　disgraceful　of　them　injustice；　and　in　general　the　evil　of　the　soul？　　　Pol。　By　far　the　most。　　　Soc。　And　if　the　most　disgraceful；　then　also　the　worst？　　　Pol。　What　do　you　mean；　Socrates？　　　Soc。　I　mean　to　say；　that　is　most　disgraceful　has　been　already　admitted　to　be　most　painful　or　hurtful；　or　both。　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　now　injustice　and　all　evil　in　the　soul　has　been　admitted　by　to　be　most　disgraceful？　　　Pol。　It　has　been　admitted。　　　Soc。　And　most　disgraceful　either　because　most　painful　and　causing　excessive　pain；　or　most　hurtful；　or　both？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　therefore　to　be　unjust　and　intemperate；　and　cowardly　and　ignorant；　is　more　painful　than　to　be　poor　and　sick？　　　Pol。　Nay；　Socrates；　the　painfulness　does　not　appear　to　me　to　follow　from　your　premises。　　　Soc。　Then；　if；　as　you　would　argue；　not　more　painful；　the　evil　of　the　soul　is　of　all　evils　the　most　disgraceful；　and　the　excess　of　disgrace　must　be　caused　by　some　preternatural　greatness；　or　extraordinary　hurtfulness　of　the　evil。　　　Pol。　Clearly。　　　Soc。　And　that　which　exceeds　most　in　hurtfulness　will　be　the　greatest　of　evils？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then　injustice　and　intemperance；　and　in　general　the　depravity　of　the　soul；　are　the　greatest　of　evils！　　　Pol。　That　is　evident。　　　Soc。　Now；　what　art　is　there　which　delivers　us　from　poverty？　Does　not　the　art　of　making　money？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　what　art　frees　us　from　disease？　Does　not　the　art　of　medicine？　　　Pol。　Very　true。　　　Soc。　And　what　from　vice　and　injustice？　If　you　are　not　able　to　answer　at　once；　ask　yourself　whither　we　go　with　the　sick；　and　to　whom　we　take　them。　　　Pol。　To　the　physicians；　Socrates。　　　Soc。　And　to　whom　do　we　go　with　the　unjust　and　intemperate？　　　Pol。　To　the　judges；　you　mean。　　　Soc。　…Who　are　to　punish　them？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　do　not　those　who　rightly　punish　others；　punish　them　in　accordance　with　a　certain　rule　of　justice？　　　Pol。　Clearly。　　　Soc。　Then　the　art　of　money…making　frees　a　man　from　poverty；　medicine　from　disease；　and　justice　from　intemperance　and　injustice？　　　Pol。　That　is　evident。　　　Soc。　Which；　then；　is　the　best　of　these　three？　　　Pol。　Will　you　enumerate　them？　　　Soc。　Money…making；　medicine；　and　justice。　　　Pol。　Justice；　Socrates；　far　excels　the　two　others。　　　Soc。　And　justice；　if　the　best；　gives　the　greatest　pleasure　or　advantage　or　both？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　But　is　the　being　healed　a　pleasant　thing；　and　are　those　who　are　being　healed　pleased？　　　Pol。　I　think　not。　　　Soc。　A　use