nderstood　your　meaning。　You　say　that　you　can　make　any　man；　who　will　learn　of　you；　a　rhetorician？　　　Gor。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Do　you　mean　that　you　will　teach　him　to　gain　the　ears　of　the　multitude　on　any　subject；　and　this　not　by　instruction　but　by　persuasion？　　　Gor。　Quite　so。　　　Soc。　You　were　saying；　in　fact；　that　the　rhetorician　will　have；　greater　powers　of　persuasion　than　the　physician　even　in　a　matter　of　health？　　　Gor。　Yes；　with　the　multitude…that　is。　　　Soc。　You　mean　to　say；　with　the　ignorant；　for　with　those　who　know　he　cannot　be　supposed　to　have　greater　powers　of　persuasion。　　　Gor。　Very　true。　　　Soc。　But　if　he　is　to　have　more　power　of　persuasion　than　the　physician；　he　will　have　greater　power　than　he　who　knows？　　　Gor。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Although　he　is　not　a　physician：…is　he？　　　Gor。　No。　　　Soc。　And　he　who　is　not　a　physician　must；　obviously；　be　ignorant　of　what　the　physician　knows。　　　Gor。　Clearly。　　　Soc。　Then；　when　the　rhetorician　is　more　persuasive　than　the　physician；　the　ignorant　is　more　persuasive　with　the　ignorant　than　he　who　has　knowledge？…is　not　that　the　inference？　　　Gor。　In　the　case　supposed：…Yes。　　　Soc。　And　the　same　holds　of　the　relation　of　rhetoric　to　all　the　other　arts；　the　rhetorician　need　not　know　the　truth　about　things；　he　has　only　to　discover　some　way　of　persuading　the　ignorant　that　he　has　more　knowledge　than　those　who　know？　　　Gor。　Yes；　Socrates；　and　is　not　this　a　great　comfort？…not　to　have　learned　the　other　arts；　but　the　art　of　rhetoric　only；　and　yet　to　be　in　no　way　inferior　to　the　professors　of　them？　　　Soc。　Whether　the　rhetorician　is　or　not　inferior　on　this　account　is　a　question　which　we　will　hereafter　examine　if　the　enquiry　is　likely　to　be　of　any　service　to　us；　but　I　would　rather　begin　by　asking；　whether　he　is　as　ignorant　of　the　just　and　unjust；　base　and　honourable；　good　and　evil；　as　he　is　of　medicine　and　the　other　arts；　I　mean　to　say；　does　he　really　know　anything　of　what　is　good　and　evil；　base　or　honourable；　just　or　unjust　in　them；　or　has　he　only　a　way　with　the　ignorant　of　persuading　them　that　he　not　knowing　is　to　be　esteemed　to　know　more　about　these　things　than　some。　one　else　who　knows？　Or　must　the　pupil　know　these　things　and　come　to　you　knowing　them　before　he　can　acquire　the　art　of　rhetoric？　If　he　is　ignorant；　you　who　are　the　teacher　of　rhetoric　will　not　teach　him…it　is　not　your　business；　but　you　will　make　him　seem　to　the　multitude　to　know　them；　when　he　does　not　know　them；　and　seem　to　be　a　good　man；　when　he　is　not。　Or　will　you　be　unable　to　teach　him　rhetoric　at　all；　unless　he　knows　the　truth　of　these　things　first？　What　is　to　be　said　about　all　this？　By　heavens；　Gorgias；　I　wish　that　you　would　reveal　to　me　the　power　of　rhetoric；　as　you　were　saying　that　you　would。　　　Gor。　Well；　Socrates；　I　suppose　that　if　the　pupil　does　chance　not　to　know　them；　he　will　have　to　learn　of　me　these　things　as　well。　　　Soc。　Say　no　more；　for　there　you　are　right；　and　so　he　whom　you　make　a　rhetorician　must　either　know　the　nature　of　the　just　and　unjust　already；　or　he　must　be　taught　by　you。　　　Gor。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Well；　and　is　not　he　who　has　learned　carpentering　a　carpenter？　　　Gor。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　he　who　has　learned　music　a　musician？　　　Gor。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　he　who　has　learned　medicine　is　a　physician；　in　like　manner？　He　who　has　learned　anything　whatever　is　that　which　his　knowledge　makes　him。　　　Gor。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　in　the　same　way；　he　who　has　learned　what　is　just　is　just？　　　Gor。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　And　he　who　is　just　may　be　supposed　to　do　what　is　just？　　　Gor。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　must　not　the　just　man　always　desire　to　do　what　is　just？　　　Gor。　That　is　clearly　the　inference。　　　Soc。　Surely；　then；　the　just　man　will　never　consent　to　do　injustice？　　　Gor。　Certainly　not。　　　Soc。　And　according　to　the　argument　the　rhetorician　must　be　a　just　man？　　　Gor。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　will　therefore　never　be　willing　to　do　injustice？　　　Gor。　Clearly　not。　　　Soc。　But　do　you　remember　saying　just　now　that　the　trainer　is　not　to　be　accused　or　banished　if　the　pugilist　makes　a　wrong　use　of　his　pugilistic　art；　and　in　like　manner；　if　the　rhetorician　makes　a　bad　and　unjust　use　of　rhetoric；　that　is　not　to　be　laid　to　the　charge　of　his　teacher；　who　is　not　to　be　banished；　but　the　wrong…doer　himself　who　made　a　bad　use　of　his　rhetoric…he　is　to　be　banished…was　not　that　said？　　　Gor。　Yes；　it　was。　　　Soc。　But　now　we　are　affirming　that　the　aforesaid　rhetorician　will　never　have　done　injustice　at　all？　　　Gor。　True。　　　Soc。　And　at　the　very　outset；　Gorgias；　it　was　said　that　rhetoric　treated　of　discourse；　not　＇like　arithmetic＇　about　odd　and　even；　but　about　just　and　unjust？　Was　not　this　said？　　　Gor。　Yes。　　　Soc。　I　was　thinking　at　the　time；　when　I　heard　you　saying　so；　that　rhetoric；　which　is　always　discoursing　about　justice；　could　not　possibly　be　an　unjust　thing。　But　when　you　added；　shortly　afterwards；　that　the　rhetorician　might　make　a　bad　use　of　rhetoric　I　noted　with　surprise　the　inconsistency　into　which　you　had　fallen；　and　I　said；　that　if　you　thought；　as　I　did；　that　there　was　a　gain　in　being　refuted；　there　would　be　an　advantage　in　going　on　with　the　question；　but　if　not；　I　would　leave　off。　And　in　the　course　of　our　investigations；　as　you　will　see　yourself；　the　rhetorician　has　been　acknowledged　to　be　incapable　of　making　an　unjust　use　of　rhetoric；　or　of　willingness　to　do　injustice。　By　the　dog；　Gorgias；　there　will　be　a　great　deal　of　discussion；　before　we　get　at　the　truth　of　all　this。　　　Polus。　And　do　even　you；　Socrates；　seriously　believe　what　you　are　now　saying　about　rhetoric？　What！　because　Gorgias　was　ashamed　to　deny　that　the　rhetorician　knew　the　just　and　the　honourable　and　the　good；　and　admitted　that　to　any　one　who　came　to　him　ignorant　of　them　he　could　teach　them；　and　then　out　of　this　admission　there　arose　a　contradiction…the　thing　which　you　dearly　love；　and　to　which　not　he；　but　you；　brought　the　argument　by　your　captious　questions…＇do　you　seriously　believe　that　there　is　any　truth　in　all　this？＇　For　will　any　one　ever　acknowledge　that　he　does　not　know；　or　cannot　teach；　the　nature　of　justice？　The　truth　is；　that　there　is　great　want　of　manners　in　bringing　the　argument　to　such　a　pass。　　　Soc。　Illustrious　Polus；　the　reason　why　we　provide　ourselves　with　friends　and　children　is；　that　when　we　get　old　and　stumble；　a　younger　generation　may　be　at　hand　to　set　us　on　our　legs　again　in　our　words　and　in　our　actions：　and　now；　if　I　and　Gorgias　are　stumbling；　here　are　you　who　should　raise　us　up；　and　I　for　my　part　engage　to　retract　any　error　into　which　you　may　think　that　I　have　fallen…upon　one　condition：　　　Pol。　What　condition？　　　Soc。　That　you　contract；　Polus；　the　prolixity　of　speech　in　which　you　indulged　at　first。　　　Pol。　What！　do　you　mean　that　I　may　not　use　as　many　words　as　I　please？　　　Soc。　Only　to　think；　my　friend；　that　having　come　on　a　visit　to　Athens；　which　is　the　most　free…spoken　state　in　Hellas；　you　when　you　got　there；　and　you　alone；　should　be　deprived　of　the　power　of　speech…that　would　be　hard　indeed。　But　then　consider　my　case：…shall　not　I　be　very　hardly　used；　if；　when　you　are　making　a　long　oration；　and　refusing　to　answer　what　you　are　asked；　I　am　compelled　to　stay　and　listen　to　you；　and　may　not　go　away？　I　say　rather；　if　you　have　a　real　interest　in　the　argument；　or；　to　repeat　my　former　expression；　have　any　desire　to　set　it　on　its　legs；　take　back　any　statement　which　you　please；　and　in　your　turn　ask　and　answer；　like　myself　and　Gorgias…refute　and　be　refuted：　for　I　suppose　that　you　would　claim　to　know　what　Gorgias　knows…would　you　not？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　you；　like　him；　invite　any　one　to　ask　you　about　anything　which　he　pleases；　and　you　will　know　how　to　answer　him？　　　Pol。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　And　now；　which　will　you　do；　ask　or　answer？　　　Pol。　I　will　ask；　and　do　you　answer　me；　Socrates；　the　same　question　which　Gorgias；　as　you　suppose；　is　unable　to　answer：　What　is　rhetoric？　　　Soc。　Do　you　mean　what　sort　of　an　art？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　To　say　the　truth；　Polus；　it　is　not　an　art　at　all；　in　my　opinion。　　　Pol。　Then　what；　in　your　opinion；　is　rhetoric？　　　Soc。　A　thing　which；　as　I　was　lately　reading　in　a　book　of　yours；　you　say　that　you　have　made　an　art。　　　Pol。　What　thing？　　　Soc。　I　should　say　a　sort　of　experience。　　　Pol。　Does　rhetoric　seem　to　you　to　be　an　experience？　　　Soc。　That　is　my　view；　but　you　may　be　of　another　mind。　　　Pol。　An　experience　in　what？　　　Soc。　An　experience　in　producing　a　sort　of　delight　and　gratification。　　　Pol。　And　if　able　to　gratify　others；　must　not　rhetoric　be　a　fine　thing？　　　Soc。　What　are　you　saying；　Polus？　Why　do　you　ask　me　whether　rhetoric　is　a　fine　thing　or　not；　when　I　have　not　as　yet　told　you　what　rhetoric　is？　　　Pol。　Did　I　not　hear　you　say　that　rhetoric　was　a　sort　of　experience？　　　Soc。　Will　you；　who　are　so　desirous　to　gratify　others；　afford　a　slight　gratification　to　me？　　　Pol。　I　will。　　　Soc。　Will　you　ask　me；　what　sort　of　an　art　is　cookery？　　　Pol。　What　sort　of　an　art　is　cookery？　　　Soc。　Not　an　art　at　all；　Polus。　　　Pol。　What　then？　　　Soc。　I　should　say　an　experience。　　　Pol。　In　what？　I　wish　that　you　would　explain　to　me。　　　Soc。　An　experience　in　producing　a　sort　of　delight　and　gratification；　Polus。　　　Pol。　Then　are　cookery　and　rhetoric　the　same？　　　Soc。　No；　they　are　only　different　parts　of　the　same　profession。　　　Pol。　Of　what　profession？　　　Soc。　I　am　afraid　that　the　truth　may　seem　discourteous；　and　I　hesitate　to　answer；　lest　Gorgias　should　imagine　that　I　am　mak