On　the　First　Principles　of　Government
  by　David　Hume
  Nothing　appears　more　surprising　to　those；　who　consider　human
  affairs　with　a　philosophical　eve；　than　the　easiness　with　which
  the　many　are　governed　by　the　few；　and　the　implicit　submission；
  with　which　men　resign　their　own　sentiments　and　passions　to　those
  of　their　rulers。　When　we　enquire　by　what　means　this　wonder　is
  effected；　we　shall　find；　that；　as　FORCE　is　always　on　the　side　of
  the　governed；　the　governors　have　nothing　to　support　them　but
  opinion。　It　is　therefore；　on　opinion　only　that　government　is
  founded；　and　this　maxim　extends　to　the　most　despotic　and　most
  military　governments；　as　well　as　to　the　most　free　and　most
  popular。　The　soldan　of　EGYPT；　or　the　emperor　of　ROME；　might　drive
  his　harmless　subjects；　like　brute　beasts；　against　their
  sentiments　and　inclination：　But　he　must；　at　least；　have　led　his
  mamalukes；　or　praetorian　bands；　like　men；　by　their　opinion。
  Opinion　is　of　two　kinds；　to　wit；　opinion　of　INTEREST；　and
  opinion　of　RIGHT。　By　opinion　of　interest；　I　chiefly　understand
  the　sense　of　the　general　advantage　which　is　reaped　from
  government；　together　with　the　persuasion；　that　the　particular
  government；　which　is　established；　is　equally　advantageous　with
  any　other　that　could　easily　be　settled。　When　this　opinion
  prevails　among　the　generality　of　a　state；　or　among　those　who　have
  the　force　in　their　hands；　it　gives　great　security　to　any
  government。
  Right　is　of　two　kinds；　right　to　POWER　and　right　to　PROPERTY。
  What　prevalence　opinion　of　the　first　kind　has　over　mankind；　may
  easily　be　understood；　by　observing　the　attachment　which　all
  nations　have　to　their　ancient　government；　and　even　to　those
  names；　which　have　had　the　sanction　of　antiquity。　Antiquity　always
  begets　the　opinion　of　right；　and　whatever　disadvantageous
  sentiments　we　may　entertain　of　mankind；　they　are　always　found　to
  be　prodigal　both　of　blood　and　treasure　in　the　maintenance　of
  public　justice。　There　is；　indeed；　no　particular；　in　which；　at
  first　sight；　there　may　appear　a　greater　contradiction　in　the
  frame　of　the　human　mind　than　the　present。　When　men　act　in　a
  faction；　they　are　apt；　without　shame　or　remorse；　to　neglect　all
  the　ties　of　honour　and　morality；　in　order　to　serve　their　party；
  and　yet；　when　a　faction　is　formed　upon　a　point　of　right　or
  principle；　there　is　no　occasion；　where　men　discover　a　greater
  obstinacy；　and　a　more　determined　sense　of　justice　and　equity。　The
  same　social　disposition　of　mankind　is　the　cause　of　these
  contradictory　appearances。
  It　is　sufficiently　understood；　that　the　opinion　of　right　to
  property　is　of　moment　in　all　matters　of　government。　A　noted
  author　has　made　property　the　foundation　of　all　government；　and
  most　of　our　political　writers　seem　inclined　to　follow　him　in　that
  particular。　This　is　carrying　the　matter　too　far；　but　still　it
  must　be　owned；　that　the　opinion　of　right　to　property　has　a　great
  influence　in　this　subject。
  Upon　these　three　opinions；　therefore；　of　public　interest；　of
  right　to　power；　and　of　right　to　property；　are　all　governments
  founded；　and　all　authority　of　the　few　over　the　many。　There　are
  indeed　other　principles；　which　add　force　to　these；　and　determine；
  limit；　or　alter　their　operation；　such　as　self…interest；　fear；　and
  affection：　But　still　we　may　assert；　that　these　other　principles
  can　have　no　influence　alone；　but　suppose　the　antecedent　influence
  of　those　opinions　above…mentioned。　They　are；　therefore；　to　be
  esteemed　the　secondary；　not　the　original　principles　of
  government。
  For；　first；　as　to　self…interest；　by　which　I　mean　the
  expectation　of　particular　rewards；　distinct　from　the　general
  protection　which　we　receive　from　government；　it　is　evident　that
  the　magistrate's　authority　must　be　antecedently　established；　at
  least　be　hoped　for；　in　order　to　produce　this　expectation。　The
  prospect　of　reward　may　augment　his　authority　with　regard　to　some
  particular　persons；　but　can　never　give　birth　to　it；　with　regard
  to　the　public。　Men　naturally　look　for　the　greatest　favours　from
  their　friends　and　acquaintance；　and　therefore；　the　hopes　of　any
  considerable　number　of　the　state　would　never　center　in　any
  particular　set　of　men；　if　these　men　had　no　other　title　to
  magistracy；　and　had　no　separate　influence　over　the　opinions　of
  mankind。　The　same　observation　may　be　extended　to　the　other　two
  principles　of　fear　and　affection。　No　man　would　have　any　reason　to
  fear　the　fury　of　a　tyrant；　if　he　had　no　authority　over　any　but
  from　fear；　since；　as　a　single　man；　his　bodily　force　can　reach　but
  a　small　way；　and　all　the　farther　power　he　possesses　must　be
  founded　either　on　our　own　opinion；　or　on　the　presumed　opinion　of
  others。　And　though　affection　to　wisdom　and　virtue　in　a　sovereign
  extends　very　far；　and　has　great　influence；　yet　he　must
  antecedently　be　supposed　invested　with　a　public　character；
  otherwise　the　public　esteem　will　serve　him　in　no　stead；　nor　will
  his　virtue　have　any　influence　beyond　a　narrow　sphere。
  A　Government　may　endure　for　several　ages；　though　the　balance
  of　power；　and　the　balance　of　property　do　not　coincide。　This
  chiefly　happens；　where　any　rank　or　order　of　the　state　has
  acquired　a　large　share　in　the　property；　but　from　the　original
  constitution　of　the　government；　has　no　share　in　the　power。　Under
  what　pretence　would　any　individual　of　that　order　assume　authority
  in　public　affairs？　As　men　are　commonly　much　attached　to　their
  ancient　government；　it　is　not　to　be　expected；　that　the　public
  would　ever　favour　such　usurpations。　But　where　the　original
  constitution　allows　any　share　of　power；　though　small；　to　an　order
  of　men；　who　possess　a　large　share　of　the　property；　it　is　easy　for
  them　gradually　to　stretch　their　authority；　and　bring　the　balance
  of　power　to　coincide　with　that　of　property。　This　has　been　the
  case　with　the　house　of　commons　in　ENGLAND。
  Most　writers；　that　have　treated　of　the　BRITISH　government；
  have　supposed；　that；　as　the　lower　house　represents　all　the
  commons　of　GREAT　BRITAIN；　its　weight　in　the　scale　is　proportioned
  to　the　property　and　power　of　all　whom　it　represents。　But　this
  principle　must　not　be　received　as　absolutely　true。　For　though　the
  people　are　apt　to　attach　themselves　more　to　the　house　of　commons；
  than　to　any　other　member　of　the　constitution；　that　house　being
  chosen　by　them　as　their　representatives；　and　as　the　public
  guardians　of　their　liberty；　yet　are　there　instances　where　the
  house；　even　when　in　opposition　to　the　crown；　has　not　been
  followed　by　the　people；　as　we　may　particularly　observe　of　the
  tory　house　of　commons　in　the　reign　of　king　WILLIAM。　Were　the
  members　obliged　to　receive　instructions　from　their　constituents；
  like　the　DUTCH　deputies；　this　would　entirely　alter　the　case；　and
  if　such　immense　power　and　riches；　as　those　of　all　the　commons　of
  GREAT　BRITAIN；　were　brought　into　the　scale；　it　is　not　easy　to
  conceive；　that　the　crown　could　either　influence　that　multitude　of
  people；　or　withstand　that　overbalance　of　property。　It　is　true；
  the　crown　has　great　influence　over　the　collective　body　in　the
  elections　of　members；　but　were　this　influence；　which　at　present
  is　only　exerted　once　in　seven　years；　to　be　employed　in　bringing
  over　the　people　to　every　vote；　it　would　soon　be　wasted；　and　no
  skill；　popularity；　or　revenue；　could　support　it。　I　must；
  therefore；　be　of　opinion；　that　an　alteration　in　this　particular
  would　introduce　a　total　alteration　in　our　government；　and　would
  soon　reduce　it　to　a　pure　republic；　and；　perhaps；　to　a　republic　of
  no　inconvenient　form。　For　though　the　people；　collected　in　a　body
  like　the　ROMAN　tribes；　be　quite　unfit　for　government；　yet　when
  dispersed　in　small　bodies；　they　are　more　susceptible　both　of
  reason　and　order；　the　force　of　popular　currents　and　tides　is；　in
  a　great　measure；　broken；　and　the　public　interest　may　be　pursued
  with　some　method　and　constancy。　But　it　is　needless　to　reason　any
  farther　concerning　a　form　of　government；　which　is　never　likely　to
  have　place　in　GREAT　BRITAIN；　and　which　seems　not　to　be　the　aim　of
  any　party　amongst　us。　Let　us　cherish　and　improve　our　ancient
  government　as　much　as　possible；　without　encouraging　a　passion　for
  such　dangerous　novelties。
  The　End