indeed；　a　new　element　of　complication　is　introduced；　namely；　the
  existence　of　classes　of　persons　with　an　interest　opposed　to　what　is
  considered　as　the　public　weal；　and　whose　mode　of　living　is　grounded　on
  the　counteraction　of　it。　Ought　this　to　be　interfered　with；　or　not？
  Fornication；　for　example；　must　be　tolerated；　and　so　must　gambling；　but
  should　a　person　be　free　to　be　a　pimp；　or　to　keep　a　gambling…house？　The
  case　is　one　of　those　which　lie　on　the　exact　boundary　line　between
  two　principles；　and　it　is　not　at　once　apparent　to　which　of　the　two
  it　properly　belongs。
  There　are　arguments　on　both　sides。　On　the　side　of　toleration　it
  may　be　said　that　the　fact　of　following　anything　as　an　occupation；
  and　living　or　profiting　by　the　practice　of　it；　cannot　make　that
  criminal　which　would　otherwise　be　admissible；　that　the　act　should
  either　be　consistently　permitted　or　consistently　prohibited；　that　if
  the　principles　which　we　have　hitherto　defended　are　true；　society　has
  no　business；　as　society；　to　decide　anything　to　be　wrong　which　concerns
  only　the　individual；　that　it　cannot　go　beyond　dissuasion；　and　that　one
  person　should　be　as　free　to　persuade　as　another　to　dissuade。　In
  opposition　to　this　it　may　be　contended；　that　although　the　public；　or
  the　State；　are　not　warranted　in　authoritatively　deciding；　for　purposes
  of　repression　or　punishment；　that　such　or　such　conduct　affecting
  only　the　interests　of　the　individual　is　good　or　bad；　they　are　fully
  justified　in　assuming；　if　they　regard　it　as　bad；　that　its　being　so
  or　not　is　at　least　a　disputable　question：　That；　this　being　supposed；
  they　cannot　be　acting　wrongly　in　endeavouring　to　exclude　the　influence
  of　solicitations　which　are　not　disinterested；　of　instigators　who
  cannot　possibly　be　impartial…　who　have　a　direct　personal　interest　on
  one　side；　and　that　side　the　one　which　the　State　believes　to　be
  wrong；　and　who　confessedly　promote　it　for　personal　objects　only。　There
  can　surely；　it　may　be　urged；　be　nothing　lost；　no　sacrifice　of　good；　by
  so　ordering　matters　that　persons　shall　make　their　election；　either
  wisely　or　foolishly；　on　their　own　prompting；　as　free　as　possible
  from　the　arts　of　persons　who　stimulate　their　inclinations　for
  interested　purposes　of　their　own。　Thus　（it　may　be　said）　though　the
  statutes　respecting　unlawful　games　are　utterly　indefensible…　though
  all　persons　should　be　free　to　gamble　in　their　own　or　each　other's
  houses；　or　in　any　place　of　meeting　established　by　their　own
  subscriptions；　and　open　only　to　the　members　and　their　visitors…　yet
  public　gambling…houses　should　not　be　permitted。　It　is　true　that　the
  prohibition　is　never　effectual；　and　that；　whatever　amount　of
  tyrannical　power　may　be　given　to　the　police；　gambling…houses　can
  always　be　maintained　under　other　pretences；　but　they　may　be
  compelled　to　conduct　their　operations　with　a　certain　degree　of　secrecy
  and　mystery；　so　that　nobody　knows　anything　about　them　but　those　who
  seek　them；　and　more　than　this　society　ought　not　to　aim　at。
  There　is　considerable　force　in　these　arguments。　I　will　not　venture
  to　decide　whether　they　are　sufficient　to　justify　the　moral　anomaly
  of　punishing　the　accessary；　when　the　principal　is　（and　must　be）
  allowed　to　go　free；　of　fining　or　imprisoning　the　procurer；　but　not　the
  fornicator…　the　gambling…house　keeper；　but　not　the　gambler。　Still　less
  ought　the　common　operations　of　buying　and　selling　to　be　interfered
  with　on　analogous　grounds。　Almost　every　article　which　is　bought　and
  sold　may　be　used　in　excess；　and　the　sellers　have　a　pecuniary
  interest　in　encouraging　that　excess；　but　no　argument　can　be　founded　on
  this；　in　favour；　for　instance；　of　the　Maine　Law；　because　the　class
  of　dealers　in　strong　drinks；　though　interested　in　their　abuse；　are
  indispensably　required　for　the　sake　of　their　legitimate　use。　The
  interest；　however；　of　these　dealers　in　promoting　intemperance　is　a
  real　evil；　and　justifies　the　State　in　imposing　restrictions　and
  requiring　guarantees　which；　but　for　that　justification；　would　be
  infringements　of　legitimate　liberty。
  A　further　question　is；　whether　the　State；　while　it　permits；　should
  nevertheless　indirectly　discourage　conduct　which　it　deems　contrary
  to　the　best　interests　of　the　agent；　whether；　for　example；　it　should
  take　measures　to　render　the　means　of　drunkenness　more　costly；　or　add
  to　the　difficulty　of　procuring　them　by　limiting　the　number　of　the
  places　of　sale。　On　this　as　on　most　other　practical　questions；　many
  distinctions　require　to　be　made。　To　tax　stimulants　for　the　sole
  purpose　of　making　them　more　difficult　to　be　obtained；　is　a　measure
  differing　only　in　degree　from　their　entire　prohibition；　and　would　be
  justifiable　only　if　that　were　justifiable。　Every　increase　of　cost　is　a
  prohibition；　to　those　whose　means　do　not　come　up　to　the　augmented
  price；　and　to　those　who　do；　it　is　a　penalty　laid　on　them　for
  gratifying　a　particular　taste。　Their　choice　of　pleasures；　and　their
  mode　of　expending　their　income；　after　satisfying　their　legal　and　moral
  obligations　to　the　State　and　to　individuals；　are　their　own　concern；
  and　must　rest　with　their　own　judgment。　These　considerations　may　seem
  at　first　sight　to　condemn　the　selection　of　stimulants　as　special
  subjects　of　taxation　for　purposes　of　revenue。　But　it　must　be
  remembered　that　taxation　for　fiscal　purposes　is　absolutely　inevitable；
  that　in　most　countries　it　is　necessary　that　a　considerable　part　of
  that　taxation　should　be　indirect；　that　the　State；　therefore；　cannot
  help　imposing　penalties；　which　to　some　persons　may　be　prohibitory；
  on　the　use　of　some　articles　of　consumption。　It　is　hence　the　duty　of
  the　State　to　consider；　in　the　imposition　of　taxes；　what　commodities
  the　consumers　can　best　spare；　and　a　fortiori；　to　select　in
  preference　those　of　which　it　deems　the　use；　beyond　a　very　moderate
  quantity；　to　be　positively　injurious。　Taxation；　therefore；　of
  stimulants；　up　to　the　point　which　produces　the　largest　amount　of
  revenue　（supposing　that　the　State　needs　all　the　revenue　which　it
  yields）　is　not　only　admissible；　but　to　be　approved　of。
  The　question　of　making　the　sale　of　these　commodities　a　more　or
  less　exclusive　privilege；　must　be　answered　differently；　according　to
  the　purposes　to　which　the　restriction　is　intended　to　be　subservient。
  All　places　of　public　resort　require　the　restraint　of　a　police；　and
  places　of　this　kind　peculiarly；　because　offences　against　society　are
  especially　apt　to　originate　there。　It　is；　therefore；　fit　to　confine
  the　power　of　selling　these　commodities　（at　least　for　consumption　on
  the　spot）　to　persons　of　known　or　vouched…for　respectability　of
  conduct；　to　make　such　regulations　respecting　hours　of　opening　and
  closing　as　may　be　requisite　for　public　surveillance；　and　to　withdraw
  the　licence　if　breaches　of　the　peace　repeatedly　take　place　through　the
  connivance　or　incapacity　of　the　keeper　of　the　house；　or　if　it
  becomes　a　rendezvous　for　concocting　and　preparing　offences　against　the
  law。　Any　further　restriction　I　do　not　conceive　to　be；　in　principle；
  justifiable。　The　limitation　in　number；　for　instance；　of　beer　and
  spirit　houses；　for　the　express　purpose　of　rendering　them　more
  difficult　of　access；　and　diminishing　the　occasions　of　temptation；
  not　only　exposes　all　to　an　inconvenience　because　there　are　some　by
  whom　the　facility　would　be　abused；　but　is　suited　only　to　a　state　of
  society　in　which　the　labouring　classes　are　avowedly　treated　as
  children　or　savages；　and　placed　under　an　education　of　restraint；　to
  fit　them　for　future　admission　to　the　privileges　of　freedom。　This　is
  not　the　principle　on　which　the　labouring　classes　are　professedly
  governed　in　any　free　country；　and　no　person　who　sets　due　value　on
  freedom　will　give　his　adhesion　to　their　being　so　governed；　unless
  after　all　efforts　have　been　exhausted　to　educate　them　for　freedom
  and　govern　them　as　freemen；　and　it　has　been　definitively　proved　that
  they　can　only　be　governed　as　children。　The　bare　statement　of　the
  alternative　shows　the　absurdity　of　supposing　that　such　efforts　have
  been　made　in　any　case　which　needs　be　considered　here。　It　is　only
  because　the　institutions　of　this　country　are　a　mass　of
  inconsistencies；　that　things　find　admittance　into　our　practice　which
  belong　to　the　system　of　despotic；　or　what　is　called　paternal；
  government；　while　the　general　freedom　of　our　institutions　precludes
  the　exercise　of　the　amount　of　control　necessary　to　render　the
  restraint　of　any　real　efficacy　as　a　moral　education。
  It　was　pointed　out　in　an　early　part　of　this　Essay；　that　the
  liberty　of　the　individual；　in　things　wherein　the　individual　is　alone
  concerned；　implies　a　corresponding　liberty　in　any　number　of
  individuals　to　regulate　by　mutual　agreement　such　things　as　regard　them
  jointly；　and　regard　no　person