Acts　injurious　to　others　require　a　totally　different　treatment。
  Encroachment　on　their　rights；　infliction　on　them　of　any　loss　or　damage
  not　justified　by　his　own　rights；　falsehood　or　duplicity　in　dealing
  with　them；　unfair　or　ungenerous　use　of　advantages　over　them；　even
  selfish　abstinence　from　defending　them　against　injury…　these　are　fit
  objects　of　moral　reprobation；　and；　in　grave　cases；　of　moral
  retribution　and　punishment。　And　not　only　these　acts；　but　the
  dispositions　which　lead　to　them；　are　properly　immoral；　and　fit
  subjects　of　disapprobation　which　may　rise　to　abhorrence。　Cruelty　of
  disposition；　malice　and　ill…nature；　that　most　anti…social　and　odious
  of　all　passions；　envy；　dissimulation　and　insincerity；　irascibility
  on　insufficient　cause；　and　resentment　disproportioned　to　the
  provocation；　the　love　of　domineering　over　others；　the　desire　to
  engross　more　than　one's　share　of　advantages　（the　pleonexia　of　the
  Greeks）；　the　pride　which　derives　gratification　from　the　abasement　of
  others；　the　egotism　which　thinks　self　and　its　concerns　more
  important　than　everything　else；　and　decides　all　doubtful　questions
  in　its　own　favour；…　these　are　moral　vices；　and　constitute　a　bad　and
  odious　moral　character：　unlike　the　self…regarding　faults　previously
  mentioned；　which　are　not　properly　immoralities；　and　to　whatever
  pitch　they　may　be　carried；　do　not　constitute　wickedness。　They　may　be
  proofs　of　any　amount　of　folly；　or　want　of　personal　dignity　and
  self…respect；　but　they　are　only　a　subject　of　moral　reprobation　when
  they　involve　a　breach　of　duty　to　others；　for　whose　sake　the　individual
  is　bound　to　have　care　for　himself。　What　are　called　duties　to　ourselves
  are　not　socially　obligatory；　unless　circumstances　render　them　at　the
  same　time　duties　to　others。　The　term　duty　to　oneself；　when　it　means
  anything　more　than　prudence；　means　self…respect　or　self…development；
  and　for　none　of　these　is　any　one　accountable　to　his　fellow
  creatures；　because　for　none　of　them　is　it　for　the　good　of　mankind　that
  he　be　held　accountable　to　them。
  The　distinction　between　the　loss　of　consideration　which　a　person　may
  rightly　incur　by　defect　of　prudence　or　of　personal　dignity；　and　the
  reprobation　which　is　due　to　him　for　an　offence　against　the　rights　of
  others；　is　not　a　merely　nominal　distinction。　It　makes　a　vast
  difference　both　in　our　feelings　and　in　our　conduct　towards　him　whether
  he　displeases　us　in　things　in　which　we　think　we　have　a　right　to
  control　him；　or　in　things　in　which　we　know　that　we　have　not。　If　he
  displeases　us；　we　may　express　our　distaste；　and　we　may　stand　aloof
  from　a　person　as　well　as　from　a　thing　that　displeases　us；　but　we　shall
  not　therefore　feel　called　on　to　make　his　life　uncomfortable。　We
  shall　reflect　that　he　already　bears；　or　will　bear；　the　whole　penalty
  of　his　error；　if　he　spoils　his　life　by　mismanagement；　we　shall　not；
  for　that　reason；　desire　to　spoil　it　still　further：　instead　of
  wishing　to　punish　him；　we　shall　rather　endeavour　to　alleviate　his
  punishment；　by　showing　him　how　he　may　avoid　or　cure　the　evils　his
  conduct　tends　to　bring　upon　him。　He　may　be　to　us　an　object　of　pity；
  perhaps　of　dislike；　but　not　of　anger　or　resentment；　we　shall　not　treat
  him　like　an　enemy　of　society：　the　worst　we　shall　think　ourselves
  justified　in　doing　is　leaving　him　to　himself；　if　we　do　not　interfere
  benevolently　by　showing　interest　or　concern　for　him。　It　is　far
  otherwise　if　he　has　infringed　the　rules　necessary　for　the　protection
  of　his　fellow　creatures；　individually　or　collectively。　The　evil
  consequences　of　his　acts　do　not　then　fall　on　himself；　but　on　others；
  and　society；　as　the　protector　of　all　its　members；　must　retaliate　on
  him；　must　inflict　pain　on　him　for　the　express　purpose　of　punishment；
  and　must　take　care　that　it　be　sufficiently　severe。　In　the　one　case；　he
  is　an　offender　at　our　bar；　and　we　are　called　on　not　only　to　sit　in
  judgment　on　him；　but；　in　one　shape　or　another；　to　execute　our　own
  sentence：　in　the　other　case；　it　is　not　our　part　to　inflict　any
  suffering　on　him；　except　what　may　incidentally　follow　from　our　using
  the　same　liberty　in　the　regulation　of　our　own　affairs；　which　we
  allow　to　him　in　his。
  The　distinction　here　pointed　out　between　the　part　of　a　person's　life
  which　concerns　only　himself；　and　that　which　concerns　others；　many
  persons　will　refuse　to　admit。　How　（it　may　be　asked）　can　any　part　of
  the　conduct　of　a　member　of　society　be　a　matter　of　indifference　to
  the　other　members？　No　person　is　an　entirely　isolated　being；　it　is
  impossible　for　a　person　to　do　anything　seriously　or　permanently
  hurtful　to　himself；　without　mischief　reaching　at　least　to　his　near
  connections；　and　often　far　beyond　them。　If　he　injures　his　property；　he
  does　harm　to　those　who　directly　or　indirectly　derived　support　from　it；
  and　usually　diminishes；　by　a　greater　or　less　amount；　the　general
  resource；　of　the　community。　If　he　deteriorates　his　bodily　or　mental
  faculties；　he　not　only　brings　evil　upon　all　who　depended　on　him　for
  any　portion　of　their　happiness；　but　disqualifies　himself　for　rendering
  the　services　which　he　owes　to　his　fellow　creatures　generally；
  perhaps　becomes　a　burthen　on　their　affection　or　benevolence；　and　if
  such　conduct　were　very　frequent；　hardly　any　offence　that　is
  committed　would　detract　more　from　the　general　sum　of　good。　Finally；　if
  by　his　vices　or　follies　a　person　does　no　direct　harm　to　others；　he
  is　nevertheless　（it　may　be　said）　injurious　by　his　example；　and　ought
  to　be　compelled　to　control　himself；　for　the　sake　of　those　whom　the
  sight　or　knowledge　of　his　conduct　might　corrupt　or　mislead。
  And　even　（it　will　be　added）　if　the　consequences　of　misconduct
  could　be　confined　to　the　vicious　or　thoughtless　individual；　ought
  society　to　abandon　to　their　own　guidance　those　who　are　manifestly
  unfit　for　it？　If　protection　against　themselves　is　confessedly　due　to
  children　and　persons　under　age；　is　not　society　equally　bound　to　afford
  it　to　persons　of　mature　years　who　are　equally　incapable　of
  self…government？　If　gambling；　or　drunkenness；　or　incontinence；　or
  idleness；　or　uncleanliness；　are　as　injurious　to　happiness；　and　as
  great　a　hindrance　to　improvement；　as　many　or　most　of　the　acts
  prohibited　by　law；　why　（it　may　be　asked）　should　not　law；　so　far　as
  is　consistent　with　practicability　and　social　convenience；　endeavour　to
  repress　these　also？　And　as　a　supplement　to　the　unavoidable
  imperfections　of　law；　ought　not　opinion　at　least　to　organise　a
  powerful　police　against　these　vices；　and　visit　rigidly　with　social
  penalties　those　who　are　known　to　practise　them？　There　is　no　question
  here　（it　may　be　said）　about　restricting　individuality；　or　impeding　the
  trial　of　new　and　original　experiments　in　living。　The　only　things　it　is
  sought　to　prevent　are　things　which　have　been　tried　and　condemned
  from　the　beginning　of　the　world　until　now；　things　which　experience　has
  shown　not　to　be　useful　or　suitable　to　any　person's　individuality。
  There　must　be　some　length　of　time　and　amount　of　experience　after　which
  a　moral　or　prudential　truth　may　be　regarded　as　established：　and　it
  is　merely　desired　to　prevent　generation　after　generation　from
  falling　over　the　same　precipice　which　has　been　fatal　to　their
  predecessors。
  I　fully　admit　that　the　mischief　which　a　person　does　to　himself　may
  seriously　affect；　both　through　their　sympathies　and　their　interests；
  those　nearly　connected　with　him　and；　in　a　minor　degree；　society　at
  large。　When；　by　conduct　of　this　sort；　a　person　is　led　to　violate　a
  distinct　and　assignable　obligation　to　any　other　person　or　persons；　the
  case　is　taken　out　of　the　self…regarding　class；　and　becomes　amenable　to
  moral　disapprobation　in　the　proper　sense　of　the　term。　If；　for　example；
  a　man；　through　intemperance　or　extravagance；　becomes　unable　to　pay　his
  debts；　or；　having　undertaken　the　moral　responsibility　of　a　family；
  becomes　from　the　same　cause　incapable　of　supporting　or　educating　them；
  he　is　deservedly　reprobated；　and　might　be　justly　punished；　but　it　is
  for　the　breach　of　duty　to　his　family　or　creditors；　not　for　the
  extravagance。　If　the　resources　which　ought　to　have　been　devoted　to
  them；　had　been　diverted　from　them　for　the　most　prudent　investment；　the
  moral　culpability　would　have　been　the　same。　George　Barnwell　murdered
  his　uncle　to　get　money　for　his　mistress；　but　if　he　had　done　it　to
  set　himself　up　in　business；　he　would　equally　have　been　hanged。
  Again；　in　the　frequent　case　of　a　man　who　causes　grief　to　his　family　by
  addiction　to　bad　habits；　he　deserves　reproach　for　his　unkindness　or
  ingratitude；　but　so　he　may　for　cultivating　habits　not　in　themselves
  vicious；　if　they　are　painful　to　those　with　whom　he　passes　his　life；
  who　from　personal　ties　are　dependent　on　him　for　their　comfort。　Whoever
  fails　in　the　cons