particularly　concerns　it。　To　individuality　should　belong　the　part　of
  life　in　which　it　is　chiefly　the　individual　that　is　interested；　to
  society；　the　part　which　chiefly　interests　society。
  Though　society　is　not　founded　on　a　contract；　and　though　no　good
  purpose　is　answered　by　inventing　a　contract　in　order　to　deduce
  social　obligations　from　it；　every　one　who　receives　the　protection　of
  society　owes　a　return　for　the　benefit；　and　the　fact　of　living　in
  society　renders　it　indispensable　that　each　should　be　bound　to
  observe　a　certain　line　of　conduct　towards　the　rest。　This　conduct
  consists；　first；　in　not　injuring　the　interests　of　one　another；　or
  rather　certain　interests；　which；　either　by　express　legal　provision
  or　by　tacit　understanding；　ought　to　be　considered　as　rights；　and
  secondly；　in　each　person's　bearing　his　share　（to　be　fixed　on　some
  equitable　principle）　of　the　labours　and　sacrifices　incurred　for
  defending　the　society　or　its　members　from　injury　and　molestation。
  These　conditions　society　is　justified　in　enforcing；　at　all　costs　to
  those　who　endeavour　to　withhold　fulfilment。　Nor　is　this　all　that
  society　may　do。　The　acts　of　an　individual　may　be　hurtful　to　others；　or
  wanting　in　due　consideration　for　their　welfare；　without　going　to　the
  length　of　violating　any　of　their　constituted　rights。　The　offender
  may　then　be　justly　punished　by　opinion；　though　not　by　law。　As　soon
  as　any　part　of　a　person's　conduct　affects　prejudicially　the
  interests　of　others；　society　has　jurisdiction　over　it；　and　the
  question　whether　the　general　welfare　will　or　will　not　be　promoted　by
  interfering　with　it；　becomes　open　to　discussion。　But　there　is　no
  room　for　entertaining　any　such　question　when　a　person's　conduct
  affects　the　interests　of　no　persons　besides　himself；　or　needs　not
  affect　them　unless　they　like　（all　the　persons　concerned　being　of
  full　age；　and　the　ordinary　amount　of　understanding）。　In　all　such
  cases；　there　should　be　perfect　freedom；　legal　and　social；　to　do　the
  action　and　stand　the　consequences。
  It　would　be　a　great　misunderstanding　of　this　doctrine　to　suppose
  that　it　is　one　of　selfish　indifference；　which　pretends　that　human
  beings　have　no　business　with　each　other's　conduct　in　life；　and　that
  they　should　not　concern　themselves　about　the　well…doing　or
  well…being　of　one　another；　unless　their　own　interest　is　involved。
  Instead　of　any　diminution；　there　is　need　of　a　great　increase　of
  disinterested　exertion　to　promote　the　good　of　others。　But
  disinterested　benevolence　can　find　other　instruments　to　persuade
  people　to　their　good　than　whips　and　scourges；　either　of　the　literal　or
  the　metaphorical　sort。　I　am　the　last　person　to　undervalue　the
  self…regarding　virtues；　they　are　only　second　in　importance；　if　even
  second；　to　the　social。　It　is　equally　the　business　of　education　to
  cultivate　both。　But　even　education　works　by　conviction　and
  persuasion　as　well　as　by　compulsion；　and　it　is　by　the　former　only
  that；　when　the　period　of　education　is　passed；　the　self…regarding
  virtues　should　be　inculcated。　Human　beings　owe　to　each　other　help　to
  distinguish　the　better　from　the　worse；　and　encouragement　to　choose　the
  former　and　avoid　the　latter。　They　should　be　for　ever　stimulating
  each　other　to　increased　exercise　of　their　higher　faculties；　and
  increased　direction　of　their　feelings　and　aims　towards　wise　instead　of
  foolish；　elevating　instead　of　degrading；　objects　and　contemplations。
  But　neither　one　person；　nor　any　number　of　persons；　is　warranted　in
  saying　to　another　human　creature　of　ripe　years；　that　he　shall　not　do
  with　his　life　for　his　own　benefit　what　he　chooses　to　do　with　it。　He　is
  the　person　most　interested　in　his　own　well…being：　the　interest　which
  any　other　person；　except　in　cases　of　strong　personal　attachment；　can
  have　in　it；　is　trifling；　compared　with　that　which　he　himself　has；
  the　interest　which　society　has　in　him　individually　（except　as　to　his
  conduct　to　others）　is　fractional；　and　altogether　indirect；　while
  with　respect　to　his　own　feelings　and　circumstances；　the　most
  ordinary　man　or　woman　has　means　of　knowledge　immeasurably　surpassing
  those　that　can　be　possessed　by　any　one　else。　The　interference　of
  society　to　overrule　his　judgment　and　purposes　in　what　only　regards
  himself　must　be　grounded　on　general　presumptions；　which　may　be
  altogether　wrong；　and　even　if　right；　are　as　likely　as　not　to　be
  misapplied　to　individual　cases；　by　persons　no　better　acquainted　with
  the　circumstances　of　such　cases　than　those　are　who　look　at　them　merely
  from　without。　In　this　department；　therefore；　of　human　affairs；
  Individuality　has　its　proper　field　of　action。　In　the　conduct　of
  human　beings　towards　one　another　it　is　necessary　that　general　rules
  should　for　the　most　part　be　observed；　in　order　that　people　may　know
  what　they　have　to　expect：　but　in　each　person's　own　concerns　his
  individual　spontaneity　is　entitled　to　free　exercise。　Considerations　to
  aid　his　judgment；　exhortations　to　strengthen　his　will；　may　be
  offered　to　him；　even　obtruded　on　him；　by　others：　but　he　himself　is　the
  final　judge。　All　errors　which　he　is　likely　to　commit　against　advice
  and　warning　are　far　outweighed　by　the　evil　of　allowing　others　to
  constrain　him　to　what　they　deem　his　good。
  I　do　not　mean　that　the　feelings　with　which　a　person　is　regarded　by
  others　ought　not　to　be　in　any　way　affected　by　his　self…regarding
  qualities　or　deficiencies。　This　is　neither　possible　nor　desirable。
  If　he　is　eminent　in　any　of　the　qualities　which　conduce　to　his　own
  good；　he　is；　so　far；　a　proper　object　of　admiration。　He　is　so　much
  the　nearer　to　the　ideal　perfection　of　human　nature。　If　he　is　grossly
  deficient　in　those　qualities；　a　sentiment　the　opposite　of　admiration
  will　follow。　There　is　a　degree　of　folly；　and　a　degree　of　what　may　be
  called　（though　the　phrase　is　not　unobjectionable）　lowness　or
  depravation　of　taste；　which；　though　it　cannot　justify　doing　harm　to
  the　person　who　manifests　it；　renders　him　necessarily　and　properly　a
  subject　of　distaste；　or；　in　extreme　cases；　even　of　contempt：　a
  person　could　not　have　the　opposite　qualities　in　due　strength　without
  entertaining　these　feelings。　Though　doing　no　wrong　to　any　one；　a
  person　may　so　act　as　to　compel　us　to　judge　him；　and　feel　to　him；　as
  a　fool；　or　as　a　being　of　an　inferior　order：　and　since　this　judgment
  and　feeling　are　a　fact　which　he　would　prefer　to　avoid；　it　is　doing　him
  a　service　to　warn　him　of　it　beforehand；　as　of　any　other　disagreeable
  consequence　to　which　he　exposes　himself。　It　would　be　well；　indeed；
  if　this　good　office　were　much　more　freely　rendered　than　the　common
  notions　of　politeness　at　present　permit；　and　if　one　person　could
  honestly　point　out　to　another　that　he　thinks　him　in　fault；　without
  being　considered　unmannerly　or　presuming。　We　have　a　right；　also；　in
  various　ways；　to　act　upon　our　unfavourable　opinion　of　any　one；　not
  to　the　oppression　of　his　individuality；　but　in　the　exercise　of　ours。
  We　are　not　bound；　for　example；　to　seek　his　society；　we　have　a　right　to
  avoid　it　（though　not　to　parade　the　avoidance）；　for　we　have　a　right
  to　choose　the　society　most　acceptable　to　us。　We　have　a　right；　and　it
  may　be　our　duty；　to　caution　others　against　him；　if　we　think　his
  example　or　conversation　likely　to　have　a　pernicious　effect　on　those
  with　whom　he　associates。　We　may　give　others　a　preference　over　him　in
  optional　good　offices；　except　those　which　tend　to　his　improvement。
  In　these　various　modes　a　person　may　suffer　very　severe　penalties　at
  the　hands　of　others　for　faults　which　directly　concern　only　himself；
  but　he　suffers　these　penalties　only　in　so　far　as　they　are　the
  natural　and；　as　it　were；　the　spontaneous　consequences　of　the　faults
  themselves；　not　because　they　are　purposely　inflicted　on　him　for　the
  sake　of　punishment。　A　person　who　shows　rashness；　obstinacy；
  self…conceit…　who　cannot　live　within　moderate　means…　who　cannot
  restrain　himself　from　hurtful　indulgences…　who　pursues　animal
  pleasures　at　the　expense　of　those　of　feeling　and　intellect…　must
  expect　to　be　lowered　in　the　opinion　of　others；　and　to　have　a　less
  share　of　their　favourable　sentiments；　but　of　this　he　has　no　right　to
  complain；　unless　he　has　merited　their　favour　by　special　excellence　in
  his　social　relations；　and　has　thus　established　a　title　to　their　good
  offices；　which　is　not　affected　by　his　demerits　towards　himself。
  What　I　contend　for　is；　that　the　inconveniences　which　are　strictly
  inseparable　from　the　unfavourable　judgment　of　others；　are　the　only
  ones　to　which　a　person　should　ever　be　subjected　for　that　portion　of
  his　conduct　and　character　which　concerns　his　own　good；　but　which
  does　not　affect　the　interest　of　others　in　their　relations　with　him。
  Acts　injurious　to　others　require　a　totally　different　treatment。
  Encroachment　on　their　rig