familiar　to　the　general　mind；　nor　so　thoroughly　appreciated　by　many
  even　of　the　leaders　of　opinion；　as　might　have　been　expected。　Those
  grounds；　when　rightly　understood；　are　of　much　wider　application　than
  to　only　one　division　of　the　subject；　and　a　thorough　consideration　of
  this　part　of　the　question　will　be　found　the　best　introduction　to　the
  remainder。　Those　to　whom　nothing　which　I　am　about　to　say　will　be
  new；　may　therefore；　I　hope；　excuse　me；　if　on　a　subject　which　for　now
  three　centuries　has　been　so　often　discussed；　I　venture　on　one
  discussion　more。
  Chapter　2。
  Of　the　Liberty　of　Thought　and　Discussion。
  THE　TIME；　it　is　to　be　hoped；　is　gone　by；　when　any　defence　would　be
  necessary　of　the　〃liberty　of　the　press〃　as　one　of　the　securities
  against　corrupt　or　tyrannical　government。　No　argument；　we　may　suppose；
  can　now　be　needed；　against　permitting　a　legislature　or　an　executive；
  not　identified　in　interest　with　the　people；　to　prescribe　opinions　to
  them；　and　determine　what　doctrines　or　what　arguments　they　shall　be
  allowed　to　hear。　This　aspect　of　the　question；　besides；　has　been　so
  of　and　so　triumphantly　enforced　by　preceding　writers；　that　it　needs
  not　be　specially　insisted　on　in　this　place。　Though　the　law　of　England；
  on　the　subject　of　the　press；　is　as　servile　to　this　day　as　it　was　in
  the　time　of　the　Tudors；　there　is　little　danger　of　its　being　actually
  put　in　force　against　political　discussion；　except　during　some
  temporary　panic；　when　fear　of　insurrection　drives　ministers　and　judges
  from　their　propriety；*　and；　speaking　generally；　it　is　not；　in
  constitutional　countries；　to　be　apprehended；　that　the　government；
  whether　completely　responsible　to　the　people　or　not；　will　often
  attempt　to　control　the　expression　of　opinion；　except　when　in　doing
  so　it　makes　itself　the　organ　of　the　general　intolerance　of　the　public。
  Let　us　suppose；　therefore；　that　the　government　is　entirely　at　one　with
  the　people；　and　never　thinks　of　exerting　any　power　of　coercion
  unless　in　agreement　with　what　it　conceives　to　be　their　voice。　But　I
  deny　the　right　of　the　people　to　exercise　such　coercion；　either　by
  themselves　or　by　their　government。　The　power　itself　is　illegitimate。
  The　best　government　has　no　more　title　to　it　than　the　worst。　It　is　as
  noxious；　or　more　noxious；　when　exerted　in　accordance　with　public
  opinion；　than　when　in　opposition　to　it。　If　all　mankind　minus　one
  were　of　one　opinion；　and　only　one　person　were　of　the　contrary　opinion；
  mankind　would　be　no　more　justified　in　silencing　that　one　person；
  than　he；　if　he　had　the　power；　would　be　justified　in　silencing　mankind。
  Were　an　opinion　a　personal　possession　of　no　value　except　to　the　owner；
  if　to　be　obstructed　in　the　enjoyment　of　it　were　simply　a　private
  injury；　it　would　make　some　difference　whether　the　injury　was　inflicted
  only　on　a　few　persons　or　on　many。　But　the　peculiar　evil　of　silencing
  the　expression　of　an　opinion　is；　that　it　is　robbing　the　human　race；
  posterity　as　well　as　the　existing　generation；　those　who　dissent　from
  the　opinion；　still　more　than　those　who　hold　it。　If　the　opinion　is
  right；　they　are　deprived　of　the　opportunity　of　exchanging　error　for
  truth：　if　wrong；　they　lose；　what　is　almost　as　great　a　benefit；　the
  clearer　perception　and　livelier　impression　of　truth；　produced　by　its
  collision　with　error。
  *　These　words　had　scarcely　been　written；　when；　as　if　to　give　them
  an　emphatic　contradiction；　occurred　the　Government　Press
  Prosecutions　of　1858。　That　ill…judged　interference　with　the　liberty　of
  public　discussion　has　not；　however；　induced　me　to　alter　a　single
  word　in　the　text；　nor　has　it　at　all　weakened　my　conviction　that；
  moments　of　panic　excepted；　the　era　of　pains　and　penalties　for
  political　discussion　has；　in　our　own　country；　passed　away。　For；　in　the
  first　place；　the　prosecutions　were　not　persisted　in；　and；　in　the
  second；　they　were　never；　properly　speaking；　political　prosecutions。
  The　offence　charged　was　not　that　of　criticising　institutions；　or　the
  acts　or　persons　of　rulers；　but　of　circulating　what　was　deemed　an
  immoral　doctrine；　the　lawfulness　of　Tyrannicide。
  If　the　arguments　of　the　present　chapter　are　of　any　validity；　there
  ought　to　exist　the　fullest　liberty　of　professing　and　discussing；　as
  a　matter　of　ethical　conviction；　any　doctrine；　however　immoral　it　may
  be　considered。　It　would；　therefore；　be　irrelevant　and　out　of　place
  to　examine　here；　whether　the　doctrine　of　Tyrannicide　deserves　that
  title。　I　shall　content　myself　with　saying　that　the　subject　has　been　at
  all　times　one　of　the　open　questions　of　morals；　that　the　act　of　a
  private　citizen　in　striking　down　a　criminal；　who；　by　raising　himself
  above　the　law；　has　placed　himself　beyond　the　reach　of　legal　punishment
  or　control；　has　been　accounted　by　whole　nations；　and　by　some　of　the
  best　and　wisest　of　men；　not　a　crime；　but　an　act　of　exalted　virtue；　and
  that；　right　or　wrong；　it　is　not　of　the　nature　of　assassination；　but　of
  civil　war。　As　such；　I　hold　that　the　instigation　to　it；　in　a　specific
  case；　may　be　a　proper　subject　of　punishment；　but　only　if　an　overt
  act　has　followed；　and　at　least　a　probable　connection　can　be
  established　between　the　act　and　the　instigation。　Even　then；　it　is
  not　a　foreign　government；　but　the　very　government　assailed；　which
  alone；　in　the　exercise　of　self…defence；　can　legitimately　punish
  attacks　directed　against　its　own　existence。
  It　is　necessary　to　consider　separately　these　two　hypotheses；　each　of
  which　has　a　distinct　branch　of　the　argument　corresponding　to　it。　We
  can　never　be　sure　that　the　opinion　we　are　endeavouring　to　stifle　is
  a　false　opinion；　and　if　we　were　sure；　stifling　it　would　be　an　evil
  still。
  First：　the　opinion　which　it　is　attempted　to　suppress　by　authority
  may　possibly　be　true。　Those　who　desire　to　suppress　it；　of　course
  deny　its　truth；　but　they　are　not　infallible。　They　have　no　authority　to
  decide　the　question　for　all　mankind；　and　exclude　every　other　person
  from　the　means　of　judging。　To　refuse　a　hearing　to　an　opinion；
  because　they　are　sure　that　it　is　false；　is　to　assume　that　their
  certainty　is　the　same　thing　as　absolute　certainty。　All　silencing　of
  discussion　is　an　assumption　of　infallibility。　Its　condemnation　may
  be　allowed　to　rest　on　this　common　argument；　not　the　worse　for　being
  common。
  Unfortunately　for　the　good　sense　of　mankind；　the　fact　of　their
  fallibility　is　far　from　carrying　the　weight　in　their　practical
  judgment　which　is　always　allowed　to　it　in　theory；　for　while　every
  one　well　knows　himself　to　be　fallible；　few　think　it　necessary　to
  take　any　precautions　against　their　own　fallibility；　or　admit　the
  supposition　that　any　opinion；　of　which　they　feel　very　certain；　may
  be　one　of　the　examples　of　the　error　to　which　they　acknowledge
  themselves　to　be　liable。　Absolute　princes；　or　others　who　are
  accustomed　to　unlimited　deference；　usually　feel　this　complete
  confidence　in　their　own　opinions　on　nearly　all　subjects。　People　more
  happily　situated；　who　sometimes　hear　their　opinions　disputed；　and
  are　not　wholly　unused　to　be　set　right　when　they　are　wrong；　place　the
  same　unbounded　reliance　only　on　such　of　their　opinions　as　are　shared
  by　all　who　surround　them；　or　to　whom　they　habitually　defer；　for　in
  proportion　to　a　man's　want　of　confidence　in　his　own　solitary　judgment；
  does　he　usually　repose；　with　implicit　trust；　on　the　infallibility　of
  〃the　world〃　in　general。　And　the　world；　to　each　individual；　means　the
  part　of　it　with　which　he　comes　in　contact；　his　party；　his　sect；　his
  church；　his　class　of　society；　the　man　may　be　called；　by　comparison；
  almost　liberal　and　large…minded　to　whom　it　means　anything　so
  comprehensive　as　his　own　country　or　his　own　age。　Nor　is　his　faith　in
  this　collective　authority　at　all　shaken　by　his　being　aware　that
  other　ages；　countries；　sects；　churches；　classes；　and　parties　have
  thought；　and　even　now　think；　the　exact　reverse。　He　devolves　upon　his
  own　world　the　responsibility　of　being　in　the　right　against　the
  dissentient　worlds　of　other　people；　and　it　never　troubles　him　that
  mere　accident　has　decided　which　of　these　numerous　worlds　is　the　object
  of　his　reliance；　and　that　the　same　causes　which　make　him　a　Churchman
  in　London；　would　have　made　him　a　Buddhist　or　a　Confucian　in　Pekin。　Yet
  it　is　as　evident　in　itself；　as　any　amount　of　argument　can　make　it；
  that　ages　are　no　more　infallible　than　individuals；　every　age　having
  held　many　opinions　which　subsequent　ages　have　deemed　not　only　false
  but　absurd；　and　it　is　as　certain　that　many　opinions　now　general　will
  be　rejected　by　future　ages；　as　it　is　that　many；　once　general；　are
  rejected　by　the　present。
  The　objection　likely　to　be　made　to　this　argument　would　probably　take
  some　such　form　as