benefit　of　others；　which　he　may　rightfully　be　compelled　to　perform；
  such　as　to　give　evidence　in　a　court　of　justice；　to　bear　his　fair　share
  in　the　common　defence；　or　in　any　other　joint　work　necessary　to　the
  interest　of　the　society　of　which　he　enjoys　the　protection；　and　to
  perform　certain　acts　of　individual　beneficence；　such　as　saving　a
  fellow　creature's　life；　or　interposing　to　protect　the　defenceless
  against　ill…usage；　things　which　whenever　it　is　obviously　a　man's
  duty　to　do；　he　may　rightfully　be　made　responsible　to　society　for　not
  doing。　A　person　may　cause　evil　to　others　not　only　by　his　actions　but
  by　his　inaction；　and　in　either　case　he　is　justly　accountable　to　them
  for　the　injury。　The　latter　case；　it　is　true；　requires　a　much　more
  cautious　exercise　of　compulsion　than　the　former。　To　make　any　one
  answerable　for　doing　evil　to　others　is　the　rule；　to　make　him
  answerable　for　not　preventing　evil　is；　comparatively　speaking；　the
  exception。　Yet　there　are　many　cases　clear　enough　and　grave　enough　to
  justify　that　exception。　In　all　things　which　regard　the　external
  relations　of　the　individual；　he　is　de　jure　amenable　to　those　whose
  interests　are　concerned；　and；　if　need　be；　to　society　as　their
  protector。　There　are　often　good　reasons　for　not　holding　him　to　the
  responsibility；　but　these　reasons　must　arise　from　the　special
  expediencies　of　the　case：　either　because　it　is　a　kind　of　case　in　which
  he　is　on　the　whole　likely　to　act　better；　when　left　to　his　own
  discretion；　than　when　controlled　in　any　way　in　which　society　have　it
  in　their　power　to　control　him；　or　because　the　attempt　to　exercise
  control　would　produce　other　evils；　greater　than　those　which　it　would
  prevent。　When　such　reasons　as　these　preclude　the　enforcement　of
  responsibility；　the　conscience　of　the　agent　himself　should　step　into
  the　vacant　judgment　seat；　and　protect　those　interests　of　others
  which　have　no　external　protection；　judging　himself　all　the　more
  rigidly；　because　the　case　does　not　admit　of　his　being　made　accountable
  to　the　judgment　of　his　fellow　creatures。
  But　there　is　a　sphere　of　action　in　which　society；　as　distinguished
  from　the　individual；　has；　if　any；　only　an　indirect　interest；
  comprehending　all　that　portion　of　a　person's　life　and　conduct　which
  affects　only　himself；　or　if　it　also　affects　others；　only　with　their
  free；　voluntary；　and　undeceived　consent　and　participation。　When　I
  say　only　himself；　I　mean　directly；　and　in　the　first　instance；　for
  whatever　affects　himself；　may　affect　others　through　himself；　and　the
  objection　which　may　be　grounded　on　this　contingency；　will　receive
  consideration　in　the　sequel。　This；　then；　is　the　appropriate　region
  of　human　liberty。　It　comprises；　first；　the　inward　domain　of
  consciousness；　demanding　liberty　of　conscience　in　the　most
  comprehensive　sense；　liberty　of　thought　and　feeling；　absolute
  freedom　of　opinion　and　sentiment　on　all　subjects；　practical　or
  speculative；　scientific；　moral；　or　theological。　The　liberty　of
  expressing　and　publishing　opinions　may　seem　to　fall　under　a
  different　principle；　since　it　belongs　to　that　part　of　the　conduct　of
  an　individual　which　concerns　other　people；　but；　being　almost　of　as
  much　importance　as　the　liberty　of　thought　itself；　and　resting　in　great
  part　on　the　same　reasons；　is　practically　inseparable　from　it。
  Secondly；　the　principle　requires　liberty　of　tastes　and　pursuits；　of
  framing　the　plan　of　our　life　to　suit　our　own　character；　of　doing　as　we
  like；　subject　to　such　consequences　as　may　follow：　without　impediment
  from　our　fellow　creatures；　so　long　as　what　we　do　does　not　harm　them；
  even　though　they　should　think　our　conduct　foolish；　perverse；　or　wrong。
  Thirdly；　from　this　liberty　of　each　individual；　follows　the　liberty；
  within　the　same　limits；　of　combination　among　individuals；　freedom　to
  unite；　for　any　purpose　not　involving　harm　to　others：　the　persons
  combining　being　supposed　to　be　of　full　age；　and　not　forced　or
  deceived。
  No　society　in　which　these　liberties　are　not；　on　the　whole；
  respected；　is　free；　whatever　may　be　its　form　of　government；　and　none
  is　completely　free　in　which　they　do　not　exist　absolute　and
  unqualified。　The　only　freedom　which　deserves　the　name；　is　that　of
  pursuing　our　own　good　in　our　own　way；　so　long　as　we　do　not　attempt
  to　deprive　others　of　theirs；　or　impede　their　efforts　to　obtain　it。
  Each　is　the　proper　guardian　of　his　own　health；　whether　bodily；　or
  mental　and　spiritual。　Mankind　are　greater　gainers　by　suffering　each
  other　to　live　as　seems　good　to　themselves；　than　by　compelling　each
  to　live　as　seems　good　to　the　rest。
  Though　this　doctrine　is　anything　but　new；　and；　to　some　persons；
  may　have　the　air　of　a　truism；　there　is　no　doctrine　which　stands　more
  directly　opposed　to　the　general　tendency　of　existing　opinion　and
  practice。　Society　has　expended　fully　as　much　effort　in　the　attempt
  （according　to　its　lights）　to　compel　people　to　conform　to　its　notions
  of　personal　as　of　social　excellence。　The　ancient　commonwealths　thought
  themselves　entitled　to　practise；　and　the　ancient　philosophers
  countenanced；　the　regulation　of　every　part　of　private　conduct　by
  public　authority；　on　the　ground　that　the　State　had　a　deep　interest
  in　the　whole　bodily　and　mental　discipline　of　every　one　of　its
  citizens；　a　mode　of　thinking　which　may　have　been　admissible　in　small
  republics　surrounded　by　powerful　enemies；　in　constant　peril　of　being
  subverted　by　foreign　attack　or　internal　commotion；　and　to　which　even　a
  short　interval　of　relaxed　energy　and　self…command　might　so　easily　be
  fatal　that　they　could　not　afford　to　wait　for　the　salutary　permanent
  effects　of　freedom。　In　the　modern　world；　the　greater　size　of　political
  communities；　and；　above　all；　the　separation　between　spiritual　and
  temporal　authority　（which　placed　the　direction　of　men's　consciences　in
  other　hands　than　those　which　controlled　their　worldly　affairs）；
  prevented　so　great　an　interference　by　law　in　the　details　of　private
  life；　but　the　engines　of　moral　repression　have　been　wielded　more
  strenuously　against　divergence　from　the　reigning　opinion　in
  self…regarding；　than　even　in　social　matters；　religion；　the　most
  powerful　of　the　elements　which　have　entered　into　the　formation　of
  moral　feeling；　having　almost　always　been　governed　either　by　the
  ambition　of　a　hierarchy；　seeking　control　over　every　department　of
  human　conduct；　or　by　the　spirit　of　Puritanism。　And　some　of　those
  modern　reformers　who　have　placed　themselves　in　strongest　opposition　to
  the　religions　of　the　past；　have　been　noway　behind　either　churches　or
  sects　in　their　assertion　of　the　right　of　spiritual　domination：　M。
  Comte；　in　particular；　whose　social　system；　as　unfolded　in　his
  Systeme　de　Politique　Positive；　aims　at　establishing　（though　by　moral
  more　than　by　legal　appliances）　a　despotism　of　society　over　the
  individual；　surpassing　anything　contemplated　in　the　political　ideal　of
  the　most　rigid　disciplinarian　among　the　ancient　philosophers。
  Apart　from　the　peculiar　tenets　of　individual　thinkers；　there　is　also
  in　the　world　at　large　an　increasing　inclination　to　stretch　unduly
  the　powers　of　society　over　the　individual；　both　by　the　force　of
  opinion　and　even　by　that　of　legislation；　and　as　the　tendency　of　all
  the　changes　taking　place　in　the　world　is　to　strengthen　society；　and
  diminish　the　power　of　the　individual；　this　encroachment　is　not　one
  of　the　evils　which　tend　spontaneously　to　disappear；　but；　on　the
  contrary；　to　grow　more　and　more　formidable。　The　disposition　of
  mankind；　whether　as　rulers　or　as　fellow…citizens；　to　impose　their
  own　opinions　and　inclinations　as　a　rule　of　conduct　on　others；　is　so
  energetically　supported　by　some　of　the　best　and　by　some　of　the　worst
  feelings　incident　to　human　nature；　that　it　is　hardly　ever　kept　under
  restraint　by　anything　but　want　of　power；　and　as　the　power　is　not
  declining；　but　growing；　unless　a　strong　barrier　of　moral　conviction
  can　be　raised　against　the　mischief；　we　must　expect；　in　the　present
  circumstances　of　the　world；　to　see　it　increase。
  It　will　be　convenient　for　the　argument；　if；　instead　of　at　once
  entering　upon　the　general　thesis；　we　confine　ourselves　in　the　first
  instance　to　a　single　branch　of　it；　on　which　the　principle　here
  stated　is；　if　not　fully；　yet　to　a　certain　point；　recognised　by　the
  current　opinions。　This　one　branch　is　the　Liberty　of　Thought：　from
  which　it　is　impossible　to　separate　the　cognate　liberty　of　speaking　and
  of　writing。　Although　these　liberties；　to　some　considerable　amount；
  form　part　of　the　political　morality　of　all　countries　which　profess
  religious　toleration　and　free　institutions；　the　grounds；　both
  philosophical　and　practical；　on　which　they　rest；　are　perhaps　not　so
  familiar　to　the　general　mind；　nor　so　thoroughly　appreciated　by　many
  even　of　the　leaders