individual　here　and　there；　is　that　of　religious　belief：　a　case
  instructive　in　many　ways；　and　not　least　so　as　forming　a　most
  striking　instance　of　the　fallibility　of　what　is　called　the　moral
  sense：　for　the　odium　theologicum；　in　a　sincere　bigot；　is　one　of　the
  most　unequivocal　cases　of　moral　feeling。　Those　who　first　broke　the
  yoke　of　what　called　itself　the　Universal　Church；　were　in　general　as
  little　willing　to　permit　difference　of　religious　opinion　as　that
  church　itself。　But　when　the　heat　of　the　conflict　was　over；　without
  giving　a　complete　victory　to　any　party；　and　each　church　or　sect　was
  reduced　to　limit　its　hopes　to　retaining　possession　of　the　ground　it
  already　occupied；　minorities；　seeing　that　they　had　no　chance　of
  becoming　majorities；　were　under　the　necessity　of　pleading　to　those
  whom　they　could　not　convert；　for　permission　to　differ。　It　is
  accordingly　on　this　battle　field；　almost　solely；　that　the　rights　of
  the　individual　against　society　have　been　asserted　on　broad　grounds
  of　principle；　and　the　claim　of　society　to　exercise　authority　over
  dissentients　openly　controverted。　The　great　writers　to　whom　the
  world　owes　what　religious　liberty　it　possesses；　have　mostly　asserted
  freedom　of　conscience　as　an　indefeasible　right；　and　denied
  absolutely　that　a　human　being　is　accountable　to　others　for　his
  religious　belief。　Yet　so　natural　to　mankind　is　intolerance　in　whatever
  they　really　care　about；　that　religious　freedom　has　hardly　anywhere
  been　practically　realised；　except　where　religious　indifference；
  which　dislikes　to　have　its　peace　disturbed　by　theological　quarrels；
  has　added　its　weight　to　the　scale。　In　the　minds　of　almost　all
  religious　persons；　even　in　the　most　tolerant　countries；　the　duty　of
  toleration　is　admitted　with　tacit　reserves。　One　person　will　bear
  with　dissent　in　matters　of　church　government；　but　not　of　dogma；
  another　can　tolerate　everybody；　short　of　a　Papist　or　a　Unitarian；
  another　every　one　who　believes　in　revealed　religion；　a　few　extend
  their　charity　a　little　further；　but　stop　at　the　belief　in　a　God　and　in
  a　future　state。　Wherever　the　sentiment　of　the　majority　is　still
  genuine　and　intense；　it　is　found　to　have　abated　little　of　its　claim　to
  be　obeyed。
  In　England；　from　the　peculiar　circumstances　of　our　political
  history；　though　the　yoke　of　opinion　is　perhaps　heavier；　that　of　law　is
  lighter；　than　in　most　other　countries　of　Europe；　and　there　is
  considerable　jealousy　of　direct　interference；　by　the　legislative　or
  the　executive　power；　with　private　conduct；　not　so　much　from　any　just
  regard　for　the　independence　of　the　individual；　as　from　the　still
  subsisting　habit　of　looking　on　the　government　as　representing　an
  opposite　interest　to　the　public。　The　majority　have　not　yet　learnt　to
  feel　the　power　of　the　government　their　power；　or　its　opinions　their
  opinions。　When　they　do　so；　individual　liberty　will　probably　be　as　much
  exposed　to　invasion　from　the　government；　as　it　already　is　from
  public　opinion。　But；　as　yet；　there　is　a　considerable　amount　of　feeling
  ready　to　be　called　forth　against　any　attempt　of　the　law　to　control
  individuals　in　things　in　which　they　have　not　hitherto　been
  accustomed　to　be　controlled　by　it；　and　this　with　very　little
  discrimination　as　to　whether　the　matter　is；　or　is　not；　within　the
  legitimate　sphere　of　legal　control；　insomuch　that　the　feeling；
  highly　salutary　on　the　whole；　is　perhaps　quite　as　often　misplaced　as
  well　grounded　in　the　particular　instances　of　its　application。　There
  is；　in　fact；　no　recognised　principle　by　which　the　propriety　or
  impropriety　of　government　interference　is　customarily　tested。　People
  decide　according　to　their　personal　preferences。　Some；　whenever　they
  see　any　good　to　be　done；　or　evil　to　be　remedied；　would　willingly
  instigate　the　government　to　undertake　the　business；　while　others
  prefer　to　bear　almost　any　amount　of　social　evil；　rather　than　add　one
  to　the　departments　of　human　interests　amenable　to　governmental
  control。　And　men　range　themselves　on　one　or　the　other　side　in　any
  particular　case；　according　to　this　general　direction　of　their
  sentiments；　or　according　to　the　degree　of　interest　which　they　feel
  in　the　particular　thing　which　it　is　proposed　that　the　government
  should　do；　or　according　to　the　belief　they　entertain　that　the
  government　would；　or　would　not；　do　it　in　the　manner　they　prefer；　but
  very　rarely　on　account　of　any　opinion　to　which　they　consistently
  adhere；　as　to　what　things　are　fit　to　be　done　by　a　government。　And　it
  seems　to　me　that　in　consequence　of　this　absence　of　rule　or
  principle；　one　side　is　at　present　as　of　wrong　as　the　other；　the
  interference　of　government　is；　with　about　equal　frequency；
  improperly　invoked　and　improperly　condemned。
  The　object　of　this　Essay　is　to　assert　one　very　simple　principle；
  as　entitled　to　govern　absolutely　the　dealings　of　society　with　the
  individual　in　the　way　of　compulsion　and　control；　whether　the　means
  used　be　physical　force　in　the　form　of　legal　penalties；　or　the　moral
  coercion　of　public　opinion。　That　principle　is；　that　the　sole　end　for
  which　mankind　are　warranted；　individually　or　collectively；　in
  interfering　with　the　liberty　of　action　of　any　of　their　number；　is
  self…protection。　That　the　only　purpose　for　which　power　can　be
  rightfully　exercised　over　any　member　of　a　civilised　community；　against
  his　will；　is　to　prevent　harm　to　others。　His　own　good；　either
  physical　or　moral；　is　not　a　sufficient　warrant。　He　cannot　rightfully
  be　compelled　to　do　or　forbear　because　it　will　be　better　for　him　to
  do　so；　because　it　will　make　him　happier；　because；　in　the　opinions　of
  others；　to　do　so　would　be　wise；　or　even　right。　These　are　good
  reasons　for　remonstrating　with　him；　or　reasoning　with　him；　or
  persuading　him；　or　entreating　him；　but　not　for　compelling　him；　or
  visiting　him　with　any　evil　in　case　he　do　otherwise。　To　justify　that；
  the　conduct　from　which　it　is　desired　to　deter　him　must　be　calculated
  to　produce　evil　to　some　one　else。　The　only　part　of　the　conduct　of
  any　one；　for　which　he　is　amenable　to　society；　is　that　which　concerns
  others。　In　the　part　which　merely　concerns　himself；　his　independence
  is；　of　right；　absolute。　Over　himself；　over　his　own　body　and　mind；
  the　individual　is　sovereign。
  It　is；　perhaps；　hardly　necessary　to　say　that　this　doctrine　is
  meant　to　apply　only　to　human　beings　in　the　maturity　of　their
  faculties。　We　are　not　speaking　of　children；　or　of　young　persons
  below　the　age　which　the　law　may　fix　as　that　of　manhood　or　womanhood。
  Those　who　are　still　in　a　state　to　require　being　taken　care　of　by
  others；　must　be　protected　against　their　own　actions　as　well　as　against
  external　injury。　For　the　same　reason；　we　may　leave　out　of
  consideration　those　backward　states　of　society　in　which　the　race
  itself　may　be　considered　as　in　its　nonage。　The　early　difficulties　in
  the　way　of　spontaneous　progress　are　so　great；　that　there　is　seldom　any
  choice　of　means　for　overcoming　them；　and　a　ruler　full　of　the　spirit　of
  improvement　is　warranted　in　the　use　of　any　expedients　that　will　attain
  an　end；　perhaps　otherwise　unattainable。　Despotism　is　a　legitimate　mode
  of　government　in　dealing　with　barbarians；　provided　the　end　be　their
  improvement；　and　the　means　justified　by　actually　effecting　that　end。
  Liberty；　as　a　principle；　has　no　application　to　any　state　of　things
  anterior　to　the　time　when　mankind　have　become　capable　of　being
  improved　by　free　and　equal　discussion。　Until　then；　there　is　nothing
  for　them　but　implicit　obedience　to　an　Akbar　or　a　Charlemagne；　if
  they　are　so　fortunate　as　to　find　one。　But　as　soon　as　mankind　have
  attained　the　capacity　of　being　guided　to　their　own　improvement　by
  conviction　or　persuasion　（a　period　long　since　reached　in　all　nations
  with　whom　we　need　here　concern　ourselves）；　compulsion；　either　in　the
  direct　form　or　in　that　of　pains　and　penalties　for　non…compliance；　is
  no　longer　admissible　as　a　means　to　their　own　good；　and　justifiable
  only　for　the　security　of　others。
  It　is　proper　to　state　that　I　forego　any　advantage　which　could　be
  derived　to　my　argument　from　the　idea　of　abstract　right；　as　a　thing
  independent　of　utility。　I　regard　utility　as　the　ultimate　appeal　on　all
  ethical　questions；　but　it　must　be　utility　in　the　largest　sense；
  grounded　on　the　permanent　interests　of　a　man　as　a　progressive　being。
  Those　interests；　I　contend；　authorise　the　subjection　of　individual
  spontaneity　to　external　control；　only　in　respect　to　those　actions　of
  each；　which　concern　the　interest　of　other　people。　If　any　one　does　an
  act　hurtful　to　others；　there　is　a　prima　facie　case　for　punishing
  him；　by　law；　or；　where　legal　penalties　are　not　safely　applicable；　by
  general　disapprobation。　There　are　also　many　positive　acts　for　the
  benefit　of　others；　which　he　may　rightfully　be　compell