The　will　of　the　people；　moreover；　practically　means　the　will　of　the
  most　numerous　or　the　most　active　part　of　the　people；　the　majority；
  or　those　who　succeed　in　making　themselves　accepted　as　the　majority；
  the　people；　consequently　may　desire　to　oppress　a　part　of　their　number；
  and　precautions　are　as　much　needed　against　this　as　against　any　other
  abuse　of　power。　The　limitation；　therefore；　of　the　power　of
  government　over　individuals　loses　none　of　its　importance　when　the
  holders　of　power　are　regularly　accountable　to　the　community；　that
  is；　to　the　strongest　party　therein。　This　view　of　things；
  recommending　itself　equally　to　the　intelligence　of　thinkers　and　to　the
  inclination　of　those　important　classes　in　European　society　to　whose
  real　or　supposed　interests　democracy　is　adverse；　has　had　no　difficulty
  in　establishing　itself；　and　in　political　speculations　〃the　tyranny
  of　the　majority〃　is　now　generally　included　among　the　evils　against
  which　society　requires　to　be　on　its　guard。
  Like　other　tyrannies；　the　tyranny　of　the　majority　was　at　first；
  and　is　still　vulgarly；　held　in　dread；　chiefly　as　operating　through　the
  acts　of　the　public　authorities。　But　reflecting　persons　perceived
  that　when　society　is　itself　the　tyrant…　society　collectively　over　the
  separate　individuals　who　compose　it…　its　means　of　tyrannising　are　not
  restricted　to　the　acts　which　it　may　do　by　the　hands　of　its　political
  functionaries。　Society　can　and　does　execute　its　own　mandates：　and　if
  it　issues　wrong　mandates　instead　of　right；　or　any　mandates　at　all　in
  things　with　which　it　ought　not　to　meddle；　it　practises　a　social
  tyranny　more　formidable　than　many　kinds　of　political　oppression；
  since；　though　not　usually　upheld　by　such　extreme　penalties；　it
  leaves　fewer　means　of　escape；　penetrating　much　more　deeply　into　the
  details　of　life；　and　enslaving　the　soul　itself。　Protection；　therefore；
  against　the　tyranny　of　the　magistrate　is　not　enough：　there　needs
  protection　also　against　the　tyranny　of　the　prevailing　opinion　and
  feeling；　against　the　tendency　of　society　to　impose；　by　other　means
  than　civil　penalties；　its　own　ideas　and　practices　as　rules　of
  conduct　on　those　who　dissent　from　them；　to　fetter　the　development；
  and；　if　possible；　prevent　the　formation；　of　any　individuality　not　in
  harmony　with　its　ways；　and　compels　all　characters　to　fashion
  themselves　upon　the　model　of　its　own。　There　is　a　limit　to　the
  legitimate　interference　of　collective　opinion　with　individual
  independence：　and　to　find　that　limit；　and　maintain　it　against
  encroachment；　is　as　indispensable　to　a　good　condition　of　human
  affairs；　as　protection　against　political　despotism。
  But　though　this　proposition　is　not　likely　to　be　contested　in　general
  terms；　the　practical　question；　where　to　place　the　limit…　how　to　make
  the　fitting　adjustment　between　individual　independence　and　social
  control…　is　a　subject　on　which　nearly　everything　remains　to　be　done。
  All　that　makes　existence　valuable　to　any　one；　depends　on　the
  enforcement　of　restraints　upon　the　actions　of　other　people。　Some　rules
  of　conduct；　therefore；　must　be　imposed；　by　law　in　the　first　place；　and
  by　opinion　on　many　things　which　are　not　fit　subjects　for　the　operation
  of　law。　What　these　rules　should　be　is　the　principal　question　in
  human　affairs；　but　if　we　except　a　few　of　the　most　obvious　cases；　it　is
  one　of　those　which　least　progress　has　been　made　in　resolving。　No　two
  ages；　and　scarcely　any　two　countries；　have　decided　it　alike；　and　the
  decision　of　one　age　or　country　is　a　wonder　to　another。　Yet　the
  people　of　any　given　age　and　country　no　more　suspect　any　difficulty
  in　it；　than　if　it　were　a　subject　on　which　mankind　had　always　been
  agreed。　The　rules　which　obtain　among　themselves　appear　to　them
  self…evident　and　self…justifying。
  This　all　but　universal　illusion　is　one　of　the　examples　of　the
  magical　influence　of　custom；　which　is　not　only；　as　the　proverb　says；　a
  second　nature；　but　is　continually　mistaken　for　the　first。　The　effect
  of　custom；　in　preventing　any　misgiving　respecting　the　rules　of　conduct
  which　mankind　impose　on　one　another；　is　all　the　more　complete
  because　the　subject　is　one　on　which　it　is　not　generally　considered
  necessary　that　reasons　should　be　given；　either　by　one　person　to　others
  or　by　each　to　himself。　People　are　accustomed　to　believe；　and　have　been
  encouraged　in　the　belief　by　some　who　aspire　to　the　character　of
  philosophers；　that　their　feelings；　on　subjects　of　this　nature；　are
  better　than　reasons；　and　render　reasons　unnecessary。　The　practical
  principle　which　guides　them　to　their　opinions　on　the　regulation　of
  human　conduct；　is　the　feeling　in　each　person's　mind　that　everybody
  should　be　required　to　act　as　he；　and　those　with　whom　he　sympathises；
  would　like　them　to　act。　No　one；　indeed；　acknowledges　to　himself　that
  his　standard　of　judgment　is　his　own　liking；　but　an　opinion　on　a
  point　of　conduct；　not　supported　by　reasons；　can　only　count　as　one
  person's　preference；　and　if　the　reasons；　when　given；　are　a　mere　appeal
  to　a　similar　preference　felt　by　other　people；　it　is　still　only　many
  people's　liking　instead　of　one。　To　an　ordinary　man；　however；　his　own
  preference；　thus　supported；　is　not　only　a　perfectly　satisfactory
  reason；　but　the　only　one　he　generally　has　for　any　of　his　notions　of
  morality；　taste；　or　propriety；　which　are　not　expressly　written　in
  his　religious　creed；　and　his　chief　guide　in　the　interpretation　even　of
  that。　Men's　opinions；　accordingly；　on　what　is　laudable　or　blamable；
  are　affected　by　all　the　multifarious　causes　which　influence　their
  wishes　in　regard　to　the　conduct　of　others；　and　which　are　as　numerous
  as　those　which　determine　their　wishes　on　any　other　subject。
  Sometimes　their　reason…　at　other　times　their　prejudices　or
  superstitions：　often　their　social　affections；　not　seldom　their
  antisocial　ones；　their　envy　or　jealousy；　their　arrogance　or
  contemptuousness：　but　most　commonly　their　desires　or　fears　for
  themselves…　their　legitimate　or　illegitimate　self…interest。
  Wherever　there　is　an　ascendant　class；　a　large　portion　of　the
  morality　of　the　country　emanates　from　its　class　interests；　and　its
  feelings　of　class　superiority。　The　morality　between　Spartans　and
  Helots；　between　planters　and　negroes；　between　princes　and　subjects；
  between　nobles　and　roturiers；　between　men　and　women；　has　been　for
  the　most　part　the　creation　of　these　class　interests　and　feelings：
  and　the　sentiments　thus　generated　react　in　turn　upon　the　moral
  feelings　of　the　members　of　the　ascendant　class；　in　their　relations
  among　themselves。　Where；　on　the　other　hand；　a　class；　formerly
  ascendant；　has　lost　its　ascendancy；　or　where　its　ascendancy　is
  unpopular；　the　prevailing　moral　sentiments　frequently　bear　the　impress
  of　an　impatient　dislike　of　superiority。　Another　grand　determining
  principle　of　the　rules　of　conduct；　both　in　act　and　forbearance；
  which　have　been　enforced　by　law　or　opinion；　has　been　the　servility
  of　mankind　towards　the　supposed　preferences　or　aversions　of　their
  temporal　masters　or　of　their　gods。　This　servility；　though
  essentially　selfish；　is　not　hypocrisy；　it　gives　rise　to　perfectly
  genuine　sentiments　of　abhorrence；　it　made　men　burn　magicians　and
  heretics。　Among　so　many　baser　influences；　the　general　and　obvious
  interests　of　society　have　of　course　had　a　share；　and　a　large　one；　in
  the　direction　of　the　moral　sentiments：　less；　however；　as　a　matter　of
  reason；　and　on　their　own　account；　than　as　a　consequence　of　the
  sympathies　and　antipathies　which　grew　out　of　them：　and　sympathies
  and　antipathies　which　had　little　or　nothing　to　do　with　the　interests
  of　society；　have　made　themselves　felt　in　the　establishment　of
  moralities　with　quite　as　great　force。
  The　likings　and　dislikings　of　society；　or　of　some　powerful　portion
  of　it；　are　thus　the　main　thing　which　has　practically　determined　the
  rules　laid　down　for　general　observance；　under　the　penalties　of　law
  or　opinion。　And　in　general；　those　who　have　been　in　advance　of
  society　in　thought　and　feeling；　have　left　this　condition　of　things
  unassailed　in　principle；　however　they　may　have　come　into　conflict　with
  it　in　some　of　its　details。　They　have　occupied　themselves　rather　in
  inquiring　what　things　society　ought　to　like　or　dislike；　than　in
  questioning　whether　its　likings　or　dislikings　should　be　a　law　to
  individuals。　They　preferred　endeavouring　to　alter　the　feelings　of
  mankind　on　the　particular　points　on　which　they　were　themselves
  heretical；　rather　than　make　common　cause　in　defence　of　freedom；　with
  heretics　generally。　The　only　case　in　which　the　higher　ground　has
  been　taken　on　principle　and　maintained　with　consistency；　by　any　but　an
  individual　here　and　there；　is　that　of　religious　belief：　a　case
  instructive　in　many　ways；　and　not　least　so　as　forming　a　most