absolutely　identical；　that　which　in　itself　is　neither　subjective　nor　objective；　and　if　for　such；　which；”
  however；　“can　be　an　intellectual　intuition　only；　one　could　appeal　to　immediate　experience；”　the
  question　would　be：　“How　can　this　intuition　be　again　made　objective；　i。e。　how　can　it　be　asserted
  without　doubt　that　it　does　not　rest　on　a　subjective　deception；　if　there　is　not　a　universal　objectivity
  in　that　intuition；　which　is　recognized　by　all？”　This　intellectual　principle　in　itself　should　thus　be　given
  in　an　experience　so　that　men　may　be　able　to　appeal　to　it。　“The　objectivity　of　intellectual　intuition　is
  art。　The　work　of　art　alone　reflects　to　me　what　is　otherwise　reflected　through　nothing　—　that
  absolute　identical　which　has　already　separated　itself　in　the　ego　itself。”　The　objectivity　of　identity
  and　the　knowledge　of　the　same　is　art；　in　one　and　the　same　intuition　the　ego　is　here　conscious　of
  itself　and　unconscious。（13）　This　intellectual　intuition　which　has　become　objective　is　objective
  sensuous　intuition　—　but　the　Notion；　the　comprehended　necessity；　is　a　very　different　objectivity。
  Thus　a　principle　is　presupposed　both　for　the　content　of　philosophy　and　for　subjective
  philosophizing：　on　the　one　hand　it　is　demanded　that　the　attitude　adopted　should　be　one　of
  intellectual　intuition；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　this　principle　has　to　be　authenticated；　and　this　takes
  place　in　the　work　of　art。　This　is　the　highest　form　of　the　objectification　of　reason；　because　in　it
  sensuous　conception　is　united　with　intellectuality；　sensuous　existence　is　merely　the　expression　of
  spirituality。　The　highest　objectivity；　which　the　subject　attains；　the　highest　identity　of　subjective　and
  objective；　is　that　which　Schelling　terms　the　power　of　imagination。　Art　is　thus　comprehended　as
  what　is　inmost　and　highest；　that　which　produces　the　intellectual　and　real　in　one；　and　philosophizing
  is　conceived　as　this　genius　of　art。　But　art　and　power　of　imagination　are　not　supreme。　For　the　Idea；
  spirit；　cannot　be　truly　given　expression　to　in　the　manner　in　which　art　expresses　its　Idea。　This　last　is
  always　a　method　pertaining　to　intuitive　perception；　and　on　account　of　this　sensuous　form　of
  existence　the　work　of　art　cannot　correspond　to　the　spirit。　Thus　because　the　point　last　arrived　at　is
  designated　as　the　faculty　of　imagination；　as　art；　even　in　the　subject　this　is　a　subordinate　point　of
  view；　and　thus　in　itself　this　point　is　not　the　absolute　identity　of　subjectivity　and　objectivity。　In
  subjective　thought；　rational；　speculative　thought　is　thus　indeed　demanded；　but　if　this　appears　false
  to　you　nothing　further　can　be　said　than　that　you　do　not　possess　intellectual　intuition。　The　proving　of
  anything；　the　making　it　comprehensible；　is　thus　abandoned；　a　correct　apprehension　of　it　is　directly
  demanded；　and　the　Idea　is　thus　assertorically　pre…established　as　principle。　The　Absolute　is　the
  absolute　identity　of　subjective　and　objective；　the　absolute　indifference　of　real　and　ideal；　of　form
  and　essence；　of　universal　and　particular；　in　this　identity　of　the　two　there　is　neither　the　one　nor　the
  other。　But　the　unity　is　not　abstract；　empty；　and　dry；　that　would　signify　logical　identity；　classification
  according　to　something　common　to　both；　in　which　the　difference　remains　all　the　while　outside。　The
  identity　is　concrete：　it　is　subjectivity　as　well　as　objectivity；　the　two　are　present　therein　as　abrogated
  and　ideal。　This　identity　may　easily　be　shown　in　the　ordinary　conception：　the　conception；　we　may
  for　example　say；　is　subjective；　it　has；　too；　the　determinate　content　of　exclusion　in　reference　to
  other　conceptions；　nevertheless；　the　conception　is　simple　—　it　is　one　act；　one　unity。
  What　is　lacking　in　Schelling's　philosophy　is　thus　the　fact　that　the　point　of　indifference　of　subjectivity
  and　objectivity；　or　the　Notion　of　reason；　is　absolutely　pre…supposed；　without　any　attempt　being
  made　at　showing　that　this　is　the　truth。　Schelling　often　uses　Spinoza's　form　of　procedure；　and　sets
  up　axioms。　In　philosophy；　when　we　desire　to　establish　it　position；　we　demand　proof。　But　if　we
  begin　with　intellectual　intuition；　that　constitutes　an　oracle　to　which　we　have　to　give　way；　since　the
  existence　of　intellectual　intuition　was　made　our　postulate。　The　true　proof　that　this　identity　of
  subjective　and　objective　is　the　truth；　could　only　be　brought　about　by　means　of　each　of　the　two
  being　investigated　in　its　logical；　i。e。　essential　determinations；　and　in　regard　to　them；　it　must　then　be
  shown　that　the　subjective　signifies　the　transformation　of　itself　into　the　objective；　and　that　the
  objective　signifies　its　not　remaining　such；　but　making　itself　subjective。　Similarly　in　the　finite；　it　would
  have　to　be　shown　that　it　contained　a　contradiction　in　itself；　and　made　itself　infinite；　in　this　way　we
  should　have　the　unity　of　finite　and　infinite。　In　so　doing；　this　unity　of　opposites　is　not　asserted
  beforehand；　but　in　the　opposites　themselves　it　is　shown　that　their　truth　is　their　unity；　but　that　each
  taken　by　itself　is　one…sided　—　that　their　difference　veers　round；　casting　itself　headlong　into　this　unity
  —　while　the　understanding　all　the　time　thinks　that　in　these　differences　it　possesses　something　fixed
  and　secure。　The　result　of　thinking　contemplation　would　in　this　former　case　be　that　each　moment
  would　secretly　make　itself　into　its　opposite；　the　identity　of　both　being　alone　the　truth。　The
  understanding　certainly　calls　this　transformation　sophistry；　humbug；　juggling；　and　what…not。　As　a
  result；　this　identity　would；　according　to　Jacobi；　be　one　which　was　no　doubt　conditioned　and　of　set
  purpose　produced。　But　we　must　remark　that　a　one…sided　point　of　view　is　involved　in　apprehending
  the　result　of　development　merely　as　a　result；　it　is　a　process　which　is　likewise　mediation　within　itself；
  of　such　a　nature　that　this　mediation　is　again　abrogated　and　asserted　as　immediate。　Schelling；
  indeed；　had　this　conception　in　a　general　way；　but　he　did　not　follow　it　out　in　a　definite　logical
  method；　for　with　him　it　remained　an　immediate　truth；　which　can　only　be　verified　by　means　of
  intellectual　intuition。　That　is　the　great　difficulty　in　the　philosophy　of　Schelling。　And　then　it　was
  misunderstood　and　all　interest　taken　from　it。　It　is　easy　enough　to　show　that　subjective　and
  objective　are　different。　Were　they　not　different；　nothing　could　be　made　of　them　any　more　than　of
  A　=　A；　but　they　are　in　opposition　as　one。　In　all　that　is　finite；　an　identity　is　present；　and　this　alone　is
  actual；　but　besides　the　fact　that　the　finite　is　this　identity；　it　is　also　true　that　it　is　the　absence　of
  harmony　between　subjectivity　and　objectivity；　Notion　and　reality；　and　it　is　in　this　that　finitude
  consists。　To　this　principle　of　Schelling's；　form；　or　necessity；　is　thus　lacking；　it　is　only　asserted。
  Schelling　appears　to　have　this　in　common　with　Plato　and　the　Neo…Platonists；　that　knowledge　is　to
  be　found　in　the　inward　intuition　of　eternal　Ideas　wherein　knowledge　is　unmediated　in　the　Absolute。
  But　when　Plato　speaks　of　this　intuition　of　the　soul；　which　has　freed　itself　from　all　knowledge　that　is
  finite；　empirical；　or　reflected；　and　the　Neo…Platonists　tell　of　the　ecstasy　of　thought　in　which
  knowledge　is　the　immediate　knowledge　of　the　Absolute；　this　definite　distinction　must　be　noticed；
  viz。；　that　with　Plato's　knowledge　of　the　universal；　or　with　his　intellectuality；　wherein　all　opposition
  as　a　reality　is　abrogated；　dialectic　is　associated；　or　the　recognized　necessity　for　the　abrogation　of
  these　opposites；　Plato　does　not　begin　with　this；　for　with　him　the　movement　in　which　they　abrogate
  themselves　is　present。　The　Absolute　is　itself　to　be　looked　at　as　this　movement　of　self…abrogation；
  this　is　the　only　actual　knowledge　and　knowledge　of　the　Absolute。　With　Schelling　this　idea　has；
  however；　no　dialectic　present　in　it　whereby　those　opposites　may　determine　themselves　to　pass
  over　into　their　unity；　and　in　so　doing　to　be　comprehended。
  2。　Schelling　begins　with　the　idea　of　the　Absolute　as　identity　of　the　subjective　and　objective；　and
  accordingly　there　evinced　itself　in　the　presentations　of　his　system　which　followed；　the　further
  necessity　of　proving　this　idea；　this　he　attempted　to　do　in　the　two　Journals　of　Speculative　Physics。
  But　if　that　method　be　once　adopted；　the　procedure　is　not　immanent　development　from　the
  speculative　Idea；　but　it　follows　the　mode　of　external　reflection。　Schelling's　proofs　are　adduced　in
  such　an　exceedingly　formal　manner　that　they　really　invariably　presuppose　the　very　thing　that　was　to
  be　proved。　The　axiom　assumes　the　main　point　in　question；　and　all　the　rest　follows　as　a　matter　of
  course。　Here　is　an　instance：　“The　innermost　essence　of　the　Absolute　can　only　be　thought　of　as
  identity　absolute；　altogether　pure　and　undisturbed。　For　the　Absolute　is　only　absolute；　and　what　is
  thought　in　it　is　necessarily　and　invariably　the　same；　or　in　other　words；　is　necessarily　and　invariably
  absolute。　If　the　idea　of　the　Absolute　were　a　general　Notion”　（or　conception）；　“this　would　not
  prevent　a　difference　being　met　with　in　it；　notwithstanding　this　unity　of　the　absolute。　For　things　the
  most　different　are　yet　in　the　Notion　always　one　and　identical；　just　as　a　rectangle；　a　polygon　and　a
  circle　are　all　figures。　The　possibilit