第 93 节
作者:京文      更新:2021-02-19 21:42      字数:9305
  posited through an original; necessary activity of the ego; in which it does not know itself as free。 It
  is a sensuous perception; a drawing of lines; the sphere of activity thereby becomes something
  extended in space。 As quiescent; continuous; and yet unceasingly changing; this sphere is matter;
  which; as body; has a number of parts which in relation to one another are called limbs。 The
  person can ascribe to himself no body without positing it as being under the influence of another
  person。 But it is likewise essential that I should be able to check this same influence; and external
  matter is also posited as resisting my influences on it; i。e。 as a tough; compact matter。” (29) These
  tough matters must further be separated from one another — the different persons cannot hold
  together like one mass of dough。 For “my body is my body and not that of another; it must further
  operate and be active without my working through it。 It is only through the operation of another
  that I can myself be active and represent myself as a rational being who can be respected by him。
  But the other being should treat me immediately as a rational being; I should be for him a rational
  being even before my activity begins。 Or my form must produce an effect through its mere
  existence in space; without my activity; i。e。 it must be visible。 The reciprocal operation of rational
  beings must take place without activity; thus a subtle matter must be assumed in order that it way
  be modified by means of the merely quiescent form。 In this way are deduced first Light and then
  Air。” (30) This constitutes a very external manner of passing from one step to another; resembling
  the method of the ordinary teleology; which makes out; for instance; that plants and animals are
  given for the nourishment of mankind。 This is how it is put: Man must eat; and thus there must be
  something edible — consequently plants and animals are at once deduced; plants must have their
  root in something; and consequently the earth is forthwith deduced。 What is altogether lacking is
  any consideration of the object as what it is in itself; it is plainly considered only in relation to
  another。 In this way the animal organism appears as a tough; tenacious matter which is
  “articulated” and can be modified; light is a subtle matter which is the medium of communication
  of mere existence; &c。 — just as in the other case plants and animals are merely edible。 As regards
  a philosophic consideration of the content there is nothing at all to be found。
  Fichte likewise wrote both a Science of Morals and of Natural Rights; but he treats them as
  sciences pertaining to the understanding only; and his method of procedure is destitute of ideas
  and carried on by means of a limited understanding。 The Fichtian deduction of the conceptions of
  justice and morality thus remains within the limitations and rigidity of self…consciousness; as against
  which Fichte's popular presentations of religion and morality present inconsistencies。 The treatise
  on Natural Rights is a special failure; e。g。 where he; as we have just seen (p。 502); deduces even
  nature just as far as he requires it。 The organization of the state which is described in Fichte's
  Science of Rights is furthermore as unspiritual as was the deduction of natural objects just
  mentioned; and as were many of the French constitutions which have appeared in modern times
  — a formal; external uniting and connecting; in which the individuals as such are held to be
  absolute; or in which Right is the highest principle。 Kant began to ground Right upon Freedom;
  and Fichte likewise makes freedom the principle in the Rights of Nature; but; its was the case with
  Rousseau; it is freedom in the form of the isolated individual。 This is a great commencement; but in
  order to arrive at the particular; they have to accept certain hypotheses。 The universal is not the
  spirit; the substance of the whole; but an external; negative power of the finite understanding
  directed against individuals。 The state is not apprehended in its essence; but only as representing a
  condition of justice and law; i。e。 as an external relation of finite to finite。 There are various
  individuals; the whole constitution of the state is thus in the main characterized by the fact that the
  freedom of individuals must be limited by means of the freedom of the whole。(31) The individuals
  always maintain a cold attitude of negativity as regards one another; the confinement becomes
  closer and the bonds more stringent as time goes on; instead of the state being regarded as
  representing the realization of freedom。
  This philosophy contains nothing speculative; but it demands the presence of the speculative
  element。 As the philosophy of Kant seeks in unity its Idea of the Supreme Good; wherein the
  opposites have to be united; so the Fichtian philosophy demands union in the ego and in the
  implicitude of faith; in this self…consciousness in all its actions makes its starting…point conviction; so
  that in themselves its actions may bring forth the highest end and realize the good。 In the Fichtian
  philosophy nothing can be seen beyond the moment of self…consciousness; of self…conscious
  Being…within…self; as in the philosophy of England we find expressed — in just as one…sided a way
  — the moment of Being…for…another; or of consciousness; and that not as a moment simply; but as
  the principle of the truth; in neither of the two is there the unity of both — or spirit。
  Fichte's philosophy constitutes a significant epoch in Philosophy regarded in its outward form。 It is
  from him and from his methods that abstract thought proceeds; deduction and construction。 Hence
  with the Fichtian philosophy a revolution took place in Germany。 The public had penetrated as far
  as the philosophy of Kant; and until the Kantian philosophy was reached the interest awakened by
  Philosophy was general; it was accessible; and men were curious to know about it; it pertained to
  the ordinary knowledge of a man of culture (supra; p。 218)。 Formerly men of business; statesmen;
  occupied themselves with Philosophy; now; however; with the intricate idealism of the philosophy
  of Kant; their wings droop helpless to the ground。 Hence it is with Kant that we first begin to find
  a line of separation which parts us from the common modes of consciousness; but the result; that
  the Absolute cannot be known; has become one generally acknowledged。 With Fichte the
  common consciousness has still further separated itself from Philosophy; and it has utterly
  departed from the speculative element therein present。 For Fichte's ego is not merely the ego of
  the empiric consciousness; since general determinations of thought such as do not fall within the
  ordinary consciousness have likewise to be known and brought to consciousness; in this way since
  Fichte's time few men have occupied themselves with speculation。 Fichte; it is true; in his later
  works especially; wrote with a view to meeting the popular ear as we may see in the “Attempt to
  force the reader into comprehension;” but this end was not accomplished。 The public was
  through the philosophy of Kant and Jacobi strengthened in its opinion — one which it accepted
  utiliter … that the knowledge of God is immediate; and that we know it from the beginning and
  without requiring to study; and hence that Philosophy is quite superfluous。
  2。 Fichte's System in a Reconstituted Form。
  The times called for life; for spirit。 Now since mind has thus retreated within self…consciousness;
  but within self…consciousness as a barren ego; which merely gives itself a content or a realization
  through finitenesses and individualities which in and for themselves are nothing; the next stage is
  found in knowing this realization of self…consciousness in itself; in knowing the content in itself as a
  content which; penetrated throughout by spirit; is self…conscious and spiritual; or a spirit full of
  content。 In his later popular works Fichte thus set forth faith; love; hope; religion; treating them
  without philosophic interest; and as for a general public: it was a philosophy calculated to suit
  enlightened Jews and Jewesses; councillors and Kotzebues。 He places the matter in a popular
  form: “It is not the finite ego that is; but the divine Idea is the foundation of all Philosophy;
  everything that man does of himself is null and void。 All existence is living and active in itself; and
  there is no other life than Being; and no other Being than God; God is thus absolute Being and
  Life。 The divine essence likewise comes forth; revealing and manifesting itself…the world。” (32)
  This immediate unity of the self…conscious ego and its content; or spirit; which merely has an
  intuition of its self…conscious life and knows it as the truth immediately; manifested itself
  subsequently in poetic and prophetic tendencies; in vehement aspirations; in excrescences which
  grew out of the Fichtian philosophy。
  3。 The More Important of the Followers of Fichte。
  On the one hand; in respect of the content which the ego reaches in the philosophy of Fichte; the
  complete absence of spirituality; the woodenness; and; to put it plainly; the utter foo