e
  principle　of　positing　itself　within　it；　and　also　the　principle　of　not　positing　itself。　Hence　the　ego　in　its
  essence　would　be　contradictory　and　self…repellent；　there　would　be　in　it　a　twofold　or　contradictory
  principle；　which　assumption　contradicts　itself；　for　in　that　case　there　would　be　no　principle　within　it。
  The　ego　would”　consequently　“not　exist；　for　it　would　abrogate　itself。　All　contradictions　are
  reconciled　through　the　further　determination　of　contradictory　propositions。　The　ego　must　be
  posited　in　one　sense　as　infinite；　and　in　another　as　finite。　Were　it　to　be　posited　as　infinite　and　finite　in
  one　and　the　same　sense；　the　contradiction　would　be　insoluble；　the　ego　would　not　be　one　but　two。
  In　so　far　as　the　ego　posits　itself　as　infinite；　its　activity　is　directed　upon　itself　and　on　nothing　else　but
  itself。　In　so　far　as　the　ego　posits　limits；　and　itself　in　these　limits；　its　activity　is　not　exercised　directly
  on　itself；　but　on　a　non…ego　which　has　to　be　placed　in　opposition；”　upon　another　and　again　upon
  another；　and　so　on　into　infinitude；　that　is　the　object；　and　the　activity　of　the　ego　“is　objective
  activity。”　（24）　In　this　way　Fichte　in　the　practical　sphere　also　remains　at　opposition；　only　this
  opposition　now　has　the　form　of　two　tendencies　in　the　ego；　both　of　which　are　said　to　be　one　and
  the　same　activity　of　the　ego。　I　am　called　upon　to　proceed　to　determine　the　other　in　relation　to
  which　I　am　negative；　the　non…ego；　in　accordance　with　my　freedom　it　has　indeed　all　determinations
  through　the　activity　of　the　ego；　but　beyond　my　determination　the　same　non…ego　ever　continues　to
  appear。　The　ego　clearly　posits　an　object；　a　point　of　limitation；　but　where　the　limitation　is；　is
  undetermined。　I　may　transfer　the　sphere　of　my　determination；　and　extend　it　to　an　infinite　degree；
  but　there　always　remains　a　pure　Beyond；　and　the　non…ego　has　no　positive　self…existent
  determination。
  The　last　point　in　respect　of　the　practical　sphere　is　hence　this；　that　the　activity　of　the　ego　is　a
  yearning　or　striving（25）　—　like　the　Kantian　“ought”　；　Fichte　treats　this　with　great　prolixity。　The
  Fichtian　philosophy　consequently　has　the　same　standpoint　as　the　Kantian；　the　ultimate　is　always
  subjectivity；　as　existent　in　and　for　itself。　Yearning；　according　to　Fichte；　is　divine；　in　yearning　I　have
  not　forgotten　myself；　I　have　not　forgotten　that　I　possess　a　superiority　in　myself；　and　therefore　it　is　a
  condition　of　happiness　and　satisfaction。　This　infinite　yearning　and　desire　has　then　been　regarded　as
  what　is　highest　and　most　excellent　in　the　Beautiful；　and　in　religious　feelings　likewise；　and　with　it　is
  connected　the　irony　of　which　we　have　spoken　before　（Vol。　I。　pp。　400；　401）。　In　this　return　the　ego
  is　merely　an　effort；　on　its　side　it　is　fixed；　and　it　cannot　realize　its　endeavours。　Striving　is　thus　an
  imperfect　or　implicitly　limited　action。　The　ultimate　result　is　consequently　a　“circle”　which　cannot
  be　broken　through；　so　that　“the　finite　spirit　must　necessarily　posit　an　absolute　outside　itself　（a
  thing…in…itself）；　and　yet　on　the　other　hand　it　must　recognize　that　this　same　is　only　there　for　it　（a
  necessary　noumenon）。”　（26）　To　put　it　otherwise；　we　see　the　ego　absolutely　determined　in
  opposition　only；　we　see　it　only　as　consciousness　and　self…consciousness　which　does　not　got
  beyond　this；　and　which　does　not　reach　so　far　as　to　Spirit。　The　ego　is　the　absolute　Notion　in　so　far
  as　it　does　not　yet　reach　the　unity　of　thought；　or　in　this　simplicity　does　not　reach　difference；　and　in
  motion　does　not　have　rest；　that　is　to　say；　in　so　far　as　positing；　or　the　pure　activity　of　the　ego；　and
  setting　in　opposition；　are　not　by　it　comprehended　as　the　same。　Or　the　ego　does　not　comprehend
  the　infinite　repulsion；　the　non…ego；　self…consciousness　determines　the　non…ego；　but　does　not　know
  how　to　make　this　Beyond　its　own。
  The　deficiency　in　the　Fichtian　philosophy　is　thus　firstly　that　the　ego　retains　the　significance　of　the
  individual；　actual　self…consciousness；　as　opposed　to　that　which　is　universal　or　absolute；　or　to　the
  spirit　in　which　it　is　itself　a　moment　merely；　for　the　individual　self…consciousness　simply　signifies
  standing　apart　as　far　as　another　is　concerned。　Hence；　if　the　ego　was　ever　called　absolute
  existence；　the　most　terrible　offence　was　given；　because　really　the　ego　only　came　before　us　as
  signifying　the　individual　subject　as　opposed　to　the　universal。
  In　the　second　place；　Fichte　does　not　attain　to　the　idea　of　Reason　as　the　perfected；　real　unity　of
  subject　and　object；　or　of　ego　and　non…ego；　it　is　only；　as　with　Kant；　represented　as　the　thought　of　a
  union　in　a　belief　or　faith；　and　with　this　Fichte　likewise　concludes　（Grundlage　der　gesammten
  Wissenschaftslehre；　p。　301）。　This　he　worked　out　in　his　popular　writings。　For　because　the　ego　is
  fixed　in　its　opposition　to　the　non…ego；　and　is　only　as　being　opposed；　it　becomes　lost　in　that　unity。
  The　attainment　of　this　aim　is　hence　sent　further　and　further　back　into　the　false；　sensuous　infinitude：
  it　is　a　progression　implying　just　the　same　contradiction　as　that　found　in　Kant；　and　having　no　present
  actuality　in　itself；　for　the　ego　has　all　actuality　in　its　opposition　only。　The　Fichtian　philosophy
  recognizes　the　finite　spirit　alone；　and　not　the　infinite；　it　does　not　recognize　spirit　as　universal
  thought；　as　the　Kantian　philosophy　does　not　recognize　the　not…true；　or　it　is　formal。　The　knowledge
  of　absolute　unity　is　apprehended　as　faith　in　a　moral　disposition　of　the　world；　an　absolute
  hypothesis　in　accordance　with　which　we　have　the　belief　that　every　moral　action　that　we　perform
  will　have　a　good　result。（27）　As　in　Kant's　case；　this　Idea　belongs　to　universal　thought。　“In　a　word；
  when　anything　is　apprehended　it　ceases　to　be　God；　and　every　conception　of　God　that　is　set　up　is
  necessarily　that　of　a　false　God。　Religion　is　a　practical　faith　in　the　moral　government　of　the　world；
  faith　in　a　supersensuous　world　belongs；　according　to　our　philosophy；　to　the　immediate　verities。”
  （28）　Fichte　thus　concludes　with　the　highest　Idea；　with　the　union　of　freedom　and　nature；　but　a　union
  of　such　a　nature　that；　immediately　regarded；　it　is　not　known；　the　opposition　alone　falls　within
  consciousness。　This　union　of　faith　he　likewise　finds　in　the　Love　of　God。　As　believed　and
  experienced；　this　form　pertains　to　Religion；　and　not　to　Philosophy；　and　our　only　possible　interest　is
  to　know　this　in　Philosophy。　But　with　Fichte　it　is　still　associated　with　a　most　unsatisfying　externality
  of　which　the　basis　is　the　non…Idea；　for　the　one　determination　is　essential　only　because　the　other　is
  so；　and　so　on　into　infinitude。　“The　theory　of　knowledge　is　realistic　—　it　shows　that　the
  consciousness　of　finite　beings　can　only　be　explained　by　presupposing　an　independent　and　wholly
  opposite　power；　on　which；　in　accordance　with　their　empirical　existence；　they　themselves　are
  dependent。　But　it　asserts　nothing　more　than　this　opposed　power；　which　by　finite　beings　can　merely
  be　felt　and　not　known。　All　possible　determinations　of　this　power　or　of　this　non…ego　which　can
  come　forth　into　infinity　in　our　consciousness；　it　pledges　itself　to　deduce　from　the　determining
  faculties　of　the　ego；　and　it　must　actually　be　able　to　deduce　these；　so　certainly　as　it　is　a　theory　of
  knowledge。　This　knowledge；　however；　is　not　transcendent　but　transcendental。　It　undoubtedly
  explains　all　consciousness　from　something　independent　of　all　consciousness；　but　it　does　not　forget
  that　this　independent　somewhat　is　again　a　product　of　its　own　power　of　thought；　and　consequently
  something　dependent　on　the　ego；　in　so　far　as　it　has　to　be　there　for　the　ego。　Everything　is；　in　its
  ideality；　dependent　upon　the　ego；　but　in　its　reality　even　the　ego　is　dependent。　The　fact　that　the　finite
  spirit　must　posit　for　itself　somewhat　outside　of　itself；　which　last　exists　only　for　it；　is　that　circle　which
  it　may　infinitely　extend　but　never　break　through。”　The　further　logical　determination　of　the　object　is
  that　which　in　subject　and　object　is　identical；　the　true　connection　is　that　in　which　the　objective　is　the
  possession　of　the　ego；　as　thought；　the　ego　in　itself　determines　the　object。　But　Fichte's　theory　of
  knowledge　regards　the　struggle　of　the　ego　with　the　object　as　that　of　the　continuous　process　of
  determining　the　object　through　the　ego　as　subject　of　consciousness；　without　the　identity　of　the
  restfully　self…developing　Notion。
  Thirdly；　because　the　ego　is　thus　fixed　in　its　one…sidedness；　there　proceeds　from　it；　as　representing
  one　extreme；　the　whole　of　the　progress　that　is　made　in　the　content　of　knowledge；　and　the
  deduction　of　the　philosophy　of　Fichte；　cognition　in　its　content　and　form；　is　a　progression　from
  certain　determinations　to　others　which　do　not　turn　back　into　unity；　or　through　a　succession　of
  finitenesses　which　do　not　have　the　Absolute　in　them　at　all。　The　absolute　point　of　view；　like　an
  absolute　content；　is　wanting。　Thus　the　contemplation　of　nature；　for　instance；　is　a　contemplation　of　it
  as　of　pure　finitenesses　from　the　point　of　view　of　another；　as　though　the　organic　body　were
  regarded　thus：　“Consciousness　requires　a　sphere　entirely　its　own　for　its　activity。　This　sphere　is
  posited　through　an　original；　necessary　activity　of　the　ego；　in　which　it　does　not　know　itself　as　free