demonstrate　them　in　their　necessity；　from　the　time　of　Aristotle　onwards　no　one　had　thought　of　so
  doing。　The　first　of　these　forms　is　the　determination　of　reciprocity；　which　we　already　met　with　in　the
  third　proposition：　“By　the　determination　of　the　reality　or　negation　of　the　ego；　the　negation　or　reality
  of　the　non…ego　is　equally　determined；”　the　two　in　one　is　reciprocal　action。　In　the　second　place；
  “Causality　is　the　same　degree　of　activity　in　the　one　as　of　passivity　in　the　other。”　In　so　far　as
  something　is　considered　as　the　reality　of　the　non…ego；　the　ego　is　considered　as　passive；　and；　on　the
  other　hand；　in　so　far　as　'I'　am　real；　the　object　is　passive；　this　relation；　that　the　passivity　of　the
  object　is　my　activity　or　reality；　and　the　opposite；　is　the　conception　of　Causality。　“As　many　parts　of
  negation　as　the　ego　posits　in　itself；　so　many　parts　of　reality　it　posits　in　the　non…ego；　it　therefore
  posits　itself　as　self…determining　in　so　far　as　it　is　determined；　and　as　suffering　determination　in　so　far
  as　it　determines　itself。　In　so　far；”　in　the　third　place；　“as　the　ego　is　regarded　as　embracing　the
  whole　absolutely　determined　realm　of　all　reality；　it　is　substance；　on　the　other　hand　when　it　is
  posited　in　a　not　absolutely　determined　sphere　of　this　realm；　in　so　far　there　is　an　accidence　in　the
  ego。”　（19）　That　is　the　first　rational　attempt　that　has　ever　been　made　to　deduce　the　categories；　this
  progress　from　one　determination　to　another　is；　however；　only　an　analysis　from　the　standpoint　of
  consciousness；　and　is　not　in　and　for　itself。
  The　ego　is　so　far　the　ideal　ground　of　all　conceptions　of　the　object；　all　determination　of　this　object　is
  a　determination　of　the　ego。　But　in　order　that　it　may　be　object；　it　must　be　placed　in　opposition　to
  the　ego；　i。e。　the　determinations　set　forth　through　the　ego　are　another；　the　non…ego；　this　placing　of
  the　object　in　opposition　is　the　real　ground　of　conceptions。　The　ego　is；　however；　likewise　the　real
  ground　of　the　object；　for　it　is　likewise　a　determination　of　the　ego　that　the　non…ego　as　object　is　set
  in　opposition　to　the　ego。　Both；　the　real　ground　and　the　ideal　ground　of　the　conception；　are　thus
  one　and　the　same。（20）　Regarding　the　ego　as　ideal　principle　and　the　non…ego　as　real　principle；
  Krug　has　likewise　talked　a　great　deal　of　nonsense。　Regarded　from　the　one　point　of　view；　the　ego
  is　active　and　the　non…ego　purely　passive；　while　from　the　other　side　the　ego　is　passive　and　the
  object　active　and　operative。　But　since　the　ego　in　the　non…philosophic　consciousness　does　not　have
  the　consciousness　of　its　activity　in　the　conception　of　the　object；　it　represents　to　itself　its　own
  activity　as　foreign；　i。e。　as　belonging　to　the　non…ego。
  We　here　see　the　opposition　adopting　various　forms：　ego；　non…ego；　positing；　setting　in　opposition；
  two　sorts　of　activity　of　the　ego；　&c。　The　fact　that　I　represent　is　undoubtedly　my　activity；　but　the
  matter　of　main　importance　is　the　content　of　the　positing　and　its　necessary　connection　through　itself。
  If　one　occupies　oneself　only　with　this　content；　that　form　of　subjectivity　which　is　dominant　with
  Fichte；　and　which　remains　in　his　opposition；　disappears。　As　the　ego　is　affirmative　and　determining；
  there　now　is　in　this　determination　a　negative　likewise　present；　I　find　myself　determined　and　at　the
  same　time　the　ego　is　like　itself；　infinite；　i。e。　identical　with　itself。　This　is　a　contradiction　which　Fichte
  indeed　endeavours　to　reconcile；　but　in　spite　of　it　all　he　leaves　the　false　basis　of　dualism
  undisturbed。　The　ultimate；　beyond　which　Fichte　does　not　get；　is　only　an　'ought；'　which　does　not
  solve　the　contradiction；　for　while　the　ego　should　be　absolutely　at　home　with　itself；　i。e。　free；　it
  should　at　the　same　time　be　associated　with　another。　To　Fichte　the　demand　for　the　solution　of　this
  contradiction　thus　adopts　the　attitude　of　being　a　demanded　solution　only；　of　signifying　that　I　ever
  have　to　destroy　the　barriers；　that　I　ever　have　to　reach　beyond　the　limitation　into　utter　infinitude；
  and　that　I　ever　find　a　new　limit；　a　continual　alternation　takes　place　between　negation　and
  affirmation；　an　identity　with　self　which　again　falls　into　negation；　and　from　this　negation　is　ever　again
  restored。　To　speak　of　the　bounds　of　human　reason　is；　however；　an　unmeaning　form　of　words。
  That　the　reason　of　the　subject　is　limited　is　comprehensible　from　the　nature　of　the　case；　but　when
  we　speak　of　Thought；　infinitude　is　none　other　than　one's　own　relation　to　self；　and　not　to　one's　limit；
  and　the　place　in　which　man　is　infinite　is　Thought。　Infinitude　may　then　be　likewise　very　abstract；　and
  in　this　way　it　is　also　once　more　finite；　but　true　infinitude　remains　in　itself。
  Fichte　further　deduces　the　ordinary　conception　thus：　the　fact　that　the　ego　in　going　forth　at　once
  finds　its　activity　checked　by　a　limitation；　and　returns　once　more　into　itself；　brings　about　two
  opposite　tendencies　in　me；　between　which　I　waver；　and　which　I　try　to　unite　in　the　faculty　of
  imagination。　In　order　that　a　fixed　determination　may　exist　between　the　two；　I　have　to　make　the
  limit　a　permanent　one；　and　we　have　that　in　the　understanding。　All　further　determinations　of　the
  object　are；　as　categories　of　the　understanding；　modes　of　synthesis；　but　each　synthesis　is　a　new
  contradiction。　New　mediations　are　thus　once　more　necessary；　and　these　are　new　determinations。
  Thus　Fichte　says：　I　can　always　continue　to　determine　the　non…ego；　to　make　it　my　conception；　i。e。
  to　take　from　it　its　negation　as　regards　me。　I　have　to　deal　with　my　activity　alone；　but　there　is　always
  an　externality　therein　present　which　still　remains；　and　which　is　not　explained　by　my　activity。　This
  Beyond　which　alone　remains　to　the　undetermined　ego　Fichte　calls　the　infinite　check　upon　the　ego；
  with　which　it　ever　has　to　deal；　and　beyond　which　it　cannot　get；　thus　the　activity　which　proceeds
  into　infinitude　finds　itself　checked　and　driven　back　by　this　repulsive　force；　and　then　it　reacts　upon
  itself。　“The　ego　in　its　self…determination　has　been　considered　both　as　determining　and　determined；
  if　we　reflect　on　the　fact　that　the　absolutely　determined　determining　power　must　be　an　absolutely
  indeterminate；　and　further；　that　ego　and　non…ego　are　absolutely　opposed　to　one　another；　in　the　one
  case　ego　is　the　indeterminate　and　in　the　other　case　non…ego。”　（21）
  Inasmuch　as　the　ego　here　makes　the　object　its　conception　and　negates　it；　this　philosophy　is
  Idealism；　in　which　philosophy　all　the　determinations　of　the　object　are　ideal。　Everything　determinate
  which　the　ego　possesses　it　has　through　its　own　positing；　I　even　make　a　coat　or　a　boot　because　I
  put　them　on。　There　remains　only　the　empty　repulsive　force；　and　that　is　the　Kantian　Thing…in…itself；
  beyond　which　even　Fichte　cannot　get；　even　though　the　theoretic　reason　continues　its　determination
  into　infinitude。　“The　ego　as　intelligence”　ever　“remains　dependent　on　an　undetermined　non…ego；　it
  is　only　through　this　that　it　is　intelligence。”　（22）　The　theoretic　side　is　thus　dependent。　In　it　we　have
  not　therefore　to　deal　with　the　truth　in　and　for　itself　but　with　a　contingent；　because　ego　is　limited；　not
  absolute；　as　its　Notion　demands：　intelligence　is　not　here　considered　as　spirit　which　is　free。　This　is
  Fichte's　standpoint　as　regards　the　theoretic　side。
  c。　Practical　reason　comes　next；　the　point　of　view　from　which　it　starts　is　that　“The　ego　posits　itself
  as　determining　the　non…ego。”　Now　the　contradiction　has　thus　to　be　solved　of　ego　being　at　home
  with　itself；　since　it　determines　its　Beyond。　The　ego　is　thus　infinite　activity；　and；　as　ego=ego；　the
  absolute　ego；　it　is　undoubtedly　abstract。　But　in　order　to　have　a　determination；　a　non…ego　must
  exist；　ego　is　thus　activity；　causality；　the　positing　of　the　non…ego。　But　as　with　Kant　sensuousness　and
  reason　remain　opposed；　the　same　contradiction　is　present　here；　only　in　a　more　abstract　form；　and
  not　in　the　rude　empiricism　of　Kant。　Fichte　here　turns　and　twists　in　all　sorts　of　ways；　or　he　gives　the
  opposition　many　different　forms；　the　crudest　form　is　that　ego　is　posited　as　causality；　for　in　it
  another　is　necessitated　on　which　it　exercises　its　activity。　“The　absolute　ego　has　accordingly　to　be”
  now　“the　cause　of　the　non…ego；　i。e。　only　of　that　in　the　non…ego　which　remains　when　we　abstract
  from　all　demonstrable　forms　of　representation　or　conception　—　of　that　to　which　is　ascribed　the
  check　given　to　the　infinitely　operative　activity　of　the　ego；　for　the　fact　that　the　intelligent　ego　is；　in
  accordance　with　the　necessary　laws　of　the　conception；　the　cause　of　the　particular　determinations
  of　that　which　is　conceived　as　such；　is　demonstrated　in　the　theoretic　science　of　knowledge。”　（23）
  The　limits　of　intelligence　must　be　broken　through；　the　ego　must　alone　be　active；　the　other　side；　the
  infinite　repulsion；　must　be　removed；　in　order　that　the　ego　may　be　liberated。
  “According　to　our　hypothesis　the　ego　must　now　posit　a　non…ego　absolutely；　and　without　any
  ground；　i。e。　absolutely　and　without　any　ground　it　must　limit　or　in　part　not　posit　itself。”　This；
  indeed；　it　already　does　as　intelligent。　“It　must　therefore　have　the　ground　of　not　positing　itself”
  only　“in　itself。”　The　ego　is；　however；　just　the　ego；　it　posits　itself；　“it　must”　therefore　“have　the
  principle