in　their　objective　sense；　but　in　so　far　as　thought　is　the　source　of　such　synthetic　relationships；　the
  necessary　and　universal　thus　here　receive　the　significance　of　resting　in　our　faculties　of　knowledge。
  But　from　this　faculty　of　knowledge　Kant　still　separates　the　implicit；　the　thing…in…itself；　so　that　the
  universality　and　necessity　are　all　the　time　a　subjective　conditionment　of　knowledge　merely；　and
  reason　with　its　universality　and　necessity　does　not　attain　to　a　knowledge　of　the　truth。（5）　For　it
  requires　perception　and　experience；　a　material　empirically　given　in　order；　as　subjectivity；　to　attain
  to　knowledge。　As　Kant　says；　these　form　its　“constituent　parts”；　one　part　it　has　in　itself；　but　the
  other　is　empirically　given。（6）　When　reason　desires　to　be　independent；　to　exist　in　itself　and　to　derive
  truth　from　itself；　it　becomes　transcendent；　it　transcends　experience　because　it　lacks　the　other
  constituent；　and　then　creates　mere　hallucinations　of　the　brain。　It　is　hence　not　constitutive　in
  knowledge　but　only　regulative；　it　is　the　unity　and　rule　for　the　sensuous　manifold。　But　this　unity　on　its
  own　account　is　the　unconditioned；　which；　transcending　experience；　merely　arrives　at
  contradictions。　In　the　practical　sphere　alone　is　reason　constitutive。　The　critique　of　reason　is
  consequently　not　the　knowing　of　objects；　but　of　knowledge　and　its　principles；　its　range　and
  limitations；　so　that　it　does　not　become　transcendent。（7）　This　is　an　extremely　general　account　of
  what　we　shall　now　consider　in　its　separate　details。
  In　dealing　with　this　matter　Kant　adopts　the　plan　of　first　considering　theoretic　reason；　the
  knowledge　which　relates　to　outward　objects。　In　the　second　place　he　investigates　the　will　as
  self…actualization；　and；　in　the　third　place；　the　faculty　of　judgment；　the　special　consideration　of　the
  unity　of　the　universal　and　individual；　how　far　he　gets　in　this　matter　we　shall　likewise　see。　But　the
  critique　of　the　faculty　of　knowledge　is　the　matter　of　main　importance。
  1。　Kant：　Kritik　der　reinen　Vernunft　（sixth　edition；　Leipzig；　1818）；　pp。　4；　11；　13；　93。
  2。　Kant：　Kritik　der　reinen　Vernunft；　pp。　3…5。
  3。　Ibidem；　Preface；　pp。　xviii。；　xix。
  4。　Kant：　Kritik　der　reinen　Vernunft；　pp。　8；　9；　75；　77；　15。
  5。　Kant：　Kritik　der　reinen　Vernunft；　pp。　255；　256。
  6。　Ibidem；　p。　107。
  7。　Ibidem；　pp。　497；　498；　Kritik　der　prakt。　Vernunft　（fourth　edition；　Riga；　1797）；　p。　254；　Kritik
  der　Urtheilskraft　（third　edition；　Berlin；　1799）；　Preface；　p。　v。
  Section　Three：　Recent　German　Philosophy
  C。　Fichte。
  Fichte　created　a　great　sensation　in　his　time；　his　philosophy　is　the　Kantian　philosophy　in　its
  completion；　and；　as　we　must　specially　notice；　it　is　set　forth　in　a　more　logical　way。　He　does　not
  pass　beyond　the　fundamentals　of　Kant's　philosophy；　and　at　first　regarded　his　own　philosophy　as
  no　more　than　a　systematic　working　out　of　the　other。（1）　In　addition　to　these　systems　of
  philosophies；　and　that　of　Schelling；　there　are　none。　Any　that　pretend　to　be　such　merely　pick　out
  something　from　these；　and　over　this　they　fight　and　wrangle　among　themselves。　Ils　se　sont　battus
  les　flanes；　pour　être　de　grands　hommes。　For　in　those　times　there　were　in　Germany　many
  systems　of　philosophy；　such　as　those　of　Reinhold；　Krug；　Bouterweck；　Fries；　Schulze；　&c。；　but　in
  them　there　is　only　an　extremely　limited　point　of　view；　combined　with　boastfulness　—　a　strange
  medley　of　stray　thoughts　and　conceptions　or　facts　which　I　find　within　me。　But　their　thoughts　are　all
  derived　from　Fichte；　Kant；　or　Schelling　—　that　is　in　so　far　as　there　are　thoughts　there　present　at　all。
  Or　else　some　slight　modification　is　added；　and　this　for　the　most　part　merely　consists　in　making　the
  great　principles　barren；　what　points　in　them　were　living　are　destroyed；　or　else　subordinate　forms
  are　changed；　whereby　another　principle　is　said　to　be　set　forth；　though　when　we　look　closer　we
  find　that　these　principles　are　but　the　principles　of　one　of　those　philosophies　that　have　gone　before。
  This　may　serve　as　a　justification　for　my　not　speaking　further　of　all　these　philosophies；　any
  exposition　of　them　would　be　no　more　than　a　demonstration　that　everything　in　them　is　taken　from
  Kant；　Fichte；　or　Schelling；　and　that　the　modification　in　form　is　only　the　semblance　of　a　change；
  while　really　it　indicates　a　deterioration　in　the　principles　of　those　philosophies。
  Johann　Gottlieb　Fichte　was　born　on　the　19th　of　May；　1762；　at　Rammenau；　near　Bischoffswerda；
  in　Upper　Lusatia。　He　studied　at　Jena；　and　for　some　time　was　a　private　tutor　in　Switzerland。　He
  wrote　a　treatise　on　Religion；　termed　a　“Critique　of　all　Revelation；”　where　the　Kantian　phraseology
  is　employed　throughout　—　so　much　so　that　it　was　thought　to　be　the　work　of　Kant。　After　this　he
  was　in　1793　summoned　to　Jena　by　Goethe　as　Professor　of　Philosophy；　which　appointment　he；
  however；　resigned　in　the　year　1799；　on　account　of　an　unpleasantness　which　had　arisen　through　his
  essay　“On　the　ground　of　our　Belief　in　a　Divine　Government　of　the　World。”　For　Fichte　published　a
  journal　in　Jena；　and　a　paper　in　it　which　was　by　someone　else　was　regarded　as　atheistical。　Fichte
  might　have　kept　silence；　but　he　published　the　above…mentioned　essay　as　an　introduction　to　the
  article。　The　authorities　wished　an　investigation　to　be　made　into　the　matter。　Then　Fichte　wrote　a
  letter　which　contained　threats；　and　respecting　it　Goethe　said　that　a　Government　ought　not　to　allow
  itself　to　be　threatened。　Fichte　now　taught　privately　for　some　time　in　Berlin；　in　1805　he　became
  professor　at　Erlangen；　and　in　1809　at　Berlin；　at　which　place　he　died　on　the　27th　January；　1814。（2）
  We　cannot　here　deal　more　particularly　with　the　details　of　his　life。
  In　what　is　termed　the　philosophy　of　Fichte　a　distinction　must　be　made　between　his
  properly…speaking　speculative　philosophy；　in　which　the　argument　is　most　consistently　worked　out；
  and　which　is　less　well　known；　and　his　popular　philosophy；　to　which　belong　the　lectures　delivered　in
  Berlin　before　a　mixed　audience；　and；　for　example；　the　work　termed　a　“Guidance　to　a　Blessed
  Life。”　These　last　have　much　in　them　that　is　affecting　and　edifying　—　many　who　call　themselves　the
  disciples　of　Fichte　know　this　side　alone　—　and　they　are　expressed　in　language　most　impressive　to　a
  cultured；　religious　temperament。　In　the　history　of　Philosophy；　however；　such　cannot　be　taken　into
  consideration；　although　through　their　matter　they　may　have　the　highest　possible　value；　the　content
  has　to　be　speculatively　developed；　and　that　is　done　in　Fichte's　earlier　philosophic　works　alone。（3）
  1。　The　First　Principles　of　Fichte's　Philosophy。
  As　we　mentioned　above　（p。　478）；　the　shortcoming　in　the　Kantian　philosophy　was　its　unthinking
  inconsistency；　through　which　speculative　unity　was　lacking　to　the　whole　system；　and　this
  shortcoming　was　removed　by　Fichte。　It　is　the　absolute　form　which　Fichte　laid　hold　of；　or　in　other
  words；　the　absolute　form　is　just　the　absolute　Being…for…self；　absolute　negativity；　not　individuality；
  but　the　Notion　of　individuality；　and　thereby　the　Notion　of　actuality；　Fichte's　philosophy　is　thus　the
  development　of　form　in　itself。　He　maintained　the　ego　to　be　the　absolute　principle；　so　that　from　it；
  the　direct　and　immediate　certainty　of　self；　all　the　matter　in　the　universe　must　be　represented　as
  produced；　hence；　according　to　Fichte；　reason　is　in　itself　a　synthesis　of　Notion　and　actuality。　But
  this　principle　he　once　more　in　an　equally　one…sided　manner　set　aside；　it　is　from　the　very　beginning
  subjective；　conditioned　by　an　opposite；　and　its　realization　is　a　continual　rushing　onward　in　finitude；
  a　looking　back　at　what　has　gone　before。　The　form　in　which　it　is　presented　has　also　the
  disadvantage；　and　indeed；　the　real　drawback　of　bringing　the　empiric　ego　ever　before　one's　eyes；
  which　is　absurd；　and　quite　distracting　to　one's　point　of　view。
  The　claims　of　Philosophy　have　advanced　so　far　that　in　the　first　place　self…consciousness　refuses
  any　longer　to　regard　absolute　essence　as　immediate　substance　which　does　not　in　itself　possess
  difference；　reality；　and　actuality。　Against　this　substance　self…consciousness　ever　struggled；　for　it
  does　not　find　its　explicit　Being　there；　and　consequently　feels　the　lack　of　freedom。　But　besides　this　it
  demanded　that　this　essence；　objectively　presented；　should　be　personal；　living；　self…conscious；
  actual；　and　not　shut　up　in　abstract　metaphysical　thoughts　alone。　On　the　other　hand　consciousness；
  for　which　the　other　is；　demanded　the　moment　of　external　actuality；　Being　as　such；　into　which
  thought　must　pass；　truth　in　objective　existence；　and　this　is　what　we　more　especially　noticed　in
  connection　with　the　English。　This　Notion；　which　is　immediately　actuality；　and　this　actuality　which　is
  immediately　its　Notion；　and　that　indeed　in　such　a　way　that　there　neither　is　a　third　thought　above
  this　unity；　nor　is　it　an　immediate　unity　which　does　not　possess　difference；　separation；　within　it；　is
  the　ego；　it　is　the　self…distinction　of　opposites　within　itself。　That　whereby　it　distinguishes　itself　from
  the　simplicity　of　thought；　and　distinguishes　this　other；　is　likewise　immediately　for　it；　it　is　identical
  with；　or　not　distinguished　from　it。（4）　Hence　it　is　pure　thought；　o