human　spirit：　in　it　we　have　the　source　of　the　knowledge　of　God；　and　all　externality　of　authority　is
  thus　abrogated　in　this　principle。　The　principle　is　hereby　gained；　but　only　the　principle　of　freedom　of
  spirit；　and　the　greatness　of　our　time　rests　in　the　fact　that　freedom；　the　peculiar　possession　of　mind
  whereby　it　is　at　home　with　itself　in　itself；　is　recognized；　and　that　mind　has　this　consciousness　within
  itself。　This　however　is　merely　abstract；　for　the　next　step　is　that　the　principle　of　freedom　is　again
  purified　and　comes　to　its　true　objectivity；　so　that　not　everything　which　strikes　me　or　springs　up
  within　me　must；　because　it　is　manifested　in　me；　hold　good　its　true。　It　is　only　through　thought；　which
  casts　off　the　particular　and　accidental；　that　the　principle　receives　this　objectivity　which　is
  independent　of　mere　subjectivity　and　in　and　for　itself　—　though　in　such　a　way　that　the　freedom　of
  mind　still　remains　respected。　One's　own　spirit　must　bear　witness　to　spirit　that　God　is　Spirit；　the
  content　must　be　true。　But　this　does　not　give　authenticity　to　itself　by　its　being　revealed　with　certainty
  to　me。　This　is　the　standpoint；　and　we　have　thus　seen　its　deficiency　and　the　greatness　of　the
  principle　which　is　involved　in　it。
  1。　Tenneman's　Grundriss　von　Wendt；　§　406；　p。　531；　Rixner：　Handbuch　der　geschichte　der
  Philosophie；　Vol。　III。　§　145；　p。　317；　Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　IV。　Sec。　1；　p。　3。
  2。　Jacobi：　Brief　über　die　Lehre　des　Spinoza　（second　edition；　1789）；　pp。　85；　86　（Werke；　Vol。　IV。
  Sec。　1；　p。　110）。
  3。　Buhle：　Lehrbuch　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie；　Part　VIII。　pp。　386；　387；　Mendelssohn's
  Morgenstunden　（second　edition；　1786）；　pp。　293…296。
  4。　Jacobi：　Briefe　über　die　Lehre　des　Spinoza；　IV。　Prop。　pp。　225；　223　（pp。　223；　216）。
  5。　Infra；　pp。　418；　419。
  6。　Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　II；　pp。　7　seq。；　p。　221；　note。
  7。　Jacobi：　Brief　über　die　Lehre　des　Spinoza；　supplement　vii。　pp。　419…421；　and　note　（Werke；　Vol。
  IV。　Sec。　2；　pp。　149…151）。
  8。　Jacobi：　Briefe　über　die　Lehre　des　Spinoza；　supplement　vii。　pp。　422…426　（pp。　151…156）。
  9。　Ibidem；　pp。　426；　427　（pp。　155；　156）。
  10。　Cf。　Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　III。　p。　277。
  11。　Jacobi：　Briefe　über　die　Lehre　des　Spinoza；　pp。　216；　217　（p。　211）。
  Section　Three：　Recent　German　Philosophy
  B。　Kant。
  The　philosophy　of　Kant；　which　we　have　now　more　parcularly　to　consider；　made　its　appearance　at
  the　same　time　as　the　above。　While　Descartes　asserted　certainty　to　be　the　unity　of　thought　and
  Being；　we　now　have　the　consciousness　of　thought　in　its　subjectivity；　i。e。　in　the　first　place；　as
  determinateness　in　contrast　with　objectivity；　and　then　as　finitude　and　progression　in　finite
  determinations。　Abstract　thought；　as　personal　conviction　is　that　which　is　maintained　as　certain；　its
  contents　are　experience；　but　the　methods　adopted　by　experience　are　once　more　formal　thought
  and　argument。　Kant　turns　back　to　the　standpoint　of　Socrates；　we　see　in　him　the　freedom　of　the
  subject　as　we　saw　it　with　the　Stoics；　but　the　task　in　respect　of　content　is　now　placed　on　a　higher
  level。　An　endless　aiming　at　the　concrete　is　required　for　thought；　a　filling　up　in　accordance　with　the
  rule　which　completion　prescribes；　which　signifies　that　the　content　is　itself　the　Idea　as　the　unity　of
  the　Notion　and　reality。　With　Jacobi　thought；　demonstration；　does　not　in　the　first　place　reach
  beyond　the　finite　and　conditioned；　and　in　the　Second　place；　even　when　God　is　likewise　the
  metaphysical　object；　the　demonstration　is　really　the　making　Him　conditioned　and　finite；　in　the　third
  place　the　unconditioned；　what　is　then　immediately　certain；　only　exists　in　faith；　a　subjectively　fixed
  point　of　view　but　an　unknowable　one；　that　is　to　say　an　undetermined；　indeterminable；　and
  consequently　an　unfruitful　one。　The　standpoint　of　the　philosophy　of　Kant；　on　the　contrary；　is　in　the
  first　place　to　be　found　in　the　fact　that　thought　has　through　its　reasoning　got　so　far　as　to　grasp　itself
  not　as　contingent　but　rather　as　in　itself　the　absolute　ultimate。　In　the　finite；　in　connection　with　the
  finite；　an　absolute　standpoint　is　raised　which　acts　as　a　connecting　bond；　it　binds　together　the　finite
  and　leads　up　to　the　infinite。　Thought　grasped　itself　as　all　in　all；　as　absolute　in　judgment；　for　it
  nothing　external　is　authoritative；　since　all　authority　can　receive　validity　only　through　thought。　This
  thought；　determining　itself　within　itself　and　concrete；　is；　however；　in　the　second　place；　grasped　as
  subjective；　and　this　aspect　of　subjectivity　is　the　form　which　from　Jacobi’s　point　of　view　is
  predominant；　the　fact　that　thought　is　concrete　Jacobi　has　on　the　other　hand　for　the　most　part　set
  aside。　Both　standpoints　remain　philosophies　of　subjectivity；　since　thought　is　subjective；　the
  capacity　of　knowing　the　absolute　is　denied　to　it。　To　Kant　God　cannot　on　the　one　hand　be　found　in
  experience；　He　can　neither　be　found　in　outward　experience　—　as　Lalande　discovered　when　he
  swept　the　whole　heavens　and　found　no　God　—　nor　can　He　be　discovered　within；　though　no　doubt
  mystics　and　enthusiasts　can　experience　many　things　in　themselves；　and　amongst　these　God；　i。e。　the
  Infinite。　On　the　other　hand　Kant　argues　to　prove　the　existence　of　God；　who　is　to　him　an　hypothesis
  necessary　for　the　explanation　of　things；　a　postulate　of　practical　reason。　But　in　this　connection
  another　French　astronomer　made　the　following　reply　to　the　Emperor　Napoleon：　“Je　n’ai　pas　eu
  besoin　de　cette　hypothèse。”　According　to　this　the　truth　underlying　the　Kantian　philosophy　is　the
  recognition　of　freedom。　Even　Rousseau　represented　the　absolute　to　be　found　in　freedom；　Kant　has
  the　same　principle；　but　taken　rather　from　the　theoretic　side。　The　French　regard　it　from　the　side　of
  will；　which　is　represented　in　their　proverb：　〃Il　a　la　tête　près　du　bonnet。”　France　possesses　the
  sense　of　actuality；　of　promptitude；　because　in　that　country　conception　passes　more　immediately
  into　action；　men　have　there　applied　themselves　more　practically　to　the　affairs　of　actuality。　But
  however　much　freedom　may　be　in　itself　concrete；　it　was　as　undeveloped　and　in　its　abstraction　that
  it　was　there　applied　to　actuality；　and　to　make　abstractions　hold　good　in　actuality　means　to　destroy
  actuality。　The　fanaticism　which　characterized　the　freedom　which　was　put　into　the　hands　of　the
  people　was　frightful。　In　Germany　the　same　principle　asserted　the　rights　of　consciousness　on　its
  own　account；　but　it　has　been　worked　out　in　a　merely　theoretic　way。　We　have　commotions　of
  every　kind　within　us　and　around　us；　but　through　them　all　the　German　head　quietly　keeps　its
  nightcap　on　and　silently　carries　on　its　operations　beneath　it。
  Immanuel　Kant　was　born　at　K？nigsberg　in　1724；　and　there　studied　theology　to　begin　with；　in　the
  year　1755　he　entered　upon　his　work　as　an　academic　teacher；　in　1770　he　became　professor　of
  logic；　and　in　1801　he　died　at　K？nigsberg　on　the　12th　of　February；　having　almost　attained　his
  eightieth　year　（Tennemann’s　Grundriss　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie　by　Wendt；　§　380；　pp。
  465；　466）；　without　ever　having　left　his　native　town。
  While　to　Wolff　thought　as　thought　was　merely　positive　self…identity　and　grasped　itself　as　such；　we
  saw　the　negative　self…moving　thought；　the　absolute　Notion；　appear　in　all　its　power　in　France；　and
  in　the　Aufkl？rung　it　likewise　made　its　way　to　Germany　in　such　a　manner　that　all　existence；　all
  action；　was　called　upon　to　serve　a　useful　purpose；　i。e。　the　implicit　was　done　away　with　and
  everything　had　to　be　for　another；　and　that　for　which　everything　had　to　be　is　man；
  self…consciousness；　taken；　however；　as　signifying　all　men　generally。　The　consciousness　of　this
  action　in　abstract　form　is　the　Kantian　philosophy。　It　is　thus　the　self…thinking　absolute　Notion　that
  passes　into　itself　which　we　see　making　its　appearance　in　Germany　through　this　philosophy；　in　such
  a　way　that　all　reality　falls　within　self…consciousness；　it　is　the　idealism　which　vindicates　all　moments
  of　the　implicit　to　self…consciousness；　but　which　at　first　itself　remains　subject　to　a　contradiction；
  inasmuch　as　it　still　separates　this　implicit　from　itself。　In　other　words　the　Kantian　philosophy　no
  doubt　leads　reality　back　to　self…consciousness；　but　it　can　supply　no　reality　to　this　essence　of
  self…consciousness；　or　to　this　pure　self…consciousness；　nor　can　it　demonstrate　Being　in　the　same。　It
  apprehends　simple　thought　as　having　difference　in　itself；　but　does　not　yet　apprehend　that　all　reality
  rests　on　this　difference；　it　does　not　know　how　to　obtain　mastery　over　the　individuality　of
  self…consciousness；　and　although　it　describes　reason　very　well；　it　does　this　in　an　unthinking　empiric
  way　which　again　robs　it　of　the　truth　it　has。　Theoretically　the　Kantian　philosophy　is　the
  “Illumination”　or　Aufkl？rung　reduced　to　method；　it　states　that　nothing　true　can　be　known；　but
  only　the　phenomenal；　it　leads　knowledge　into　consciousness　and　self…consciousness；　but　from　this
  standpoint　maintains　it　to　be　a　subjective　and　finite　knowledge。　Thus　although　it　deals　with　the
  infinite　Idea；　expressing　its　formal　categories　and　arriving　at　its　concrete　claims；　it　yet　again　denies
  this　to　be　the　truth；　making　it　a　simple　subjective；　because　it　has　once　for　all　accepted　finite
  knowle