第 85 节
作者:
京文 更新:2021-02-19 21:42 字数:9309
by men — generally speaking — reason。 He whom the pure feelings of the beautiful and good; of
admiration and love; of respect and awe; do not convince that in and with these feelings he
perceives something to be present which is independent of them; and which is unattainable by the
outward senses or by an understanding directed upon their perceptions alone — such an one
cannot be argued with” (Jacobi's Werke; Vol。 II。 pp。 74; 76)。 But by faith Jacobi likewise
understands all that has immediacy of Being for me: “Through faith we know that we have a body;
we become aware of other actual things; and that indeed with the same certainty with which we
are aware of ourselves。 We obtain all conceptions through the qualities which we receive and
accept; and there is no other way of attaining real knowledge; for reason; when it begets objects;
begets phantoms of the brain。 Thus we have a revelation of nature。〃(11) Hence the expression
faith; which had a deep significance in religion; is made use of for different contents of every kind;
this in our own time is the point of view most commonly adopted。
Jacobi here brings faith into opposition with thought。 Let us compare the two; and discover
whether they are separated by so great a chasm as those who thus oppose them think。 On the one
hand absolute existence is to faith immediate; believing consciousness feels itself penetrated by this
as by its essence: that existence is its life; believing consciousness asserts itself to be in direct unity
with it。 Thought thinks the absolute existence; such existence is to it absolute thought; absolute
understanding; pure thought; but that signifies that it is likewise immediate itself。 On the other hand
to faith the immediacy of absolute existence has also the significance of a Being: it is; and is
another than 'I。' And the same is true of the thinker; to him it is absolute Being; actual in itself; and
different from self…consciousness or thought as finite understanding; to use the common term。 Now
what is the reason that faith and thought do not understand one another; and each recognize itself
in the other? In the first place faith has no consciousness of being a thought; inasmuch as it asserts
absolute consciousness to be identical with it as self…consciousness; and has direct inward
knowledge of the same。 But it expresses this simple unity; in its consciousness it is only immediacy
so to speak in the signification of Being; a unity of its unconscious substance。 In the second place
Being…for…self is contained in thought; to this faith opposes the immediacy of Being。 Thought; on
the contrary; has the immediate as absolute potentiality; as absolutely a thing of thought: and the
immediacy belonging to this thing of thought is without the determination of Being; of life。 On the
heights of this abstraction the two stand opposed to each other; as the Aufkl?rung which asserts
absolute existence to be a Beyond of self…consciousness; and as the materialism which makes it so
to speak present matter (supra; pp。 382; 383)。 In the one case it is in faith and thought as positive
existence or thought; and in the other it is the negative of self…consciousness; which is thus either
only determined as negative; as a Beyond; or likewise as existent for self…consciousness。 Hence
faith and thought are both of them knowledge。 We call universal knowledge thought; particular
knowledge we call sensuous perception; and we term the introduction of external determinations
understanding。 The universal element in man is thought; but to it likewise appertains religious
feeling for instance; the animal does not possess it; for it has no human feeling; and in so far as this
feeling is religious; it is the feeling of a thinker; and what determines this feeling is not the
determination of natural desire; &c。; but a universal determination。 Thus God; even though He is
only felt and believed in; is yet the universal taken quite abstractly — even in His personality He is
the absolutely universal personality。
As thought and faith are thus one; the same is true of the antithesis between mediated and
immediate knowledge。 We must; it is true; keep before our eyes the fact that what is revealed in
immediate knowledge is the universal。 But abstract immediate knowledge is natural; sensuous
knowledge; the immediate man in his natural condition; in his desires; does not know this universal。
Children; the Esquimaux; &c。; know nothing of God; or what the natural man knows of Him is not
a real knowledge of Him。 Thus the intuitive knowledge of the Egyptians told them that God was an
ox or a cat; and the Indians still possess similar sorts of knowledge。 On the other hand when man
has come so far as to know God as merely an object of the mind; i。e。 as spiritual; it is easy to
perceive that this knowledge which is asserted to be immediate is really a result mediated through
instruction; through a long continued culture。 It is only by means of being elevated above nature
that man arrives at a consciousness of what is higher; and at a knowledge of the universal; there
indeed his knowledge is immediate; but he has only arrived at this through mediation。 I think; and
thus I know the universal immediately; but this very thought is just process in itself; movement and
life。 All life is process within itself; is mediated; and this is all the more true of spiritual life; for it is
the passing from one to the other; that is; from the merely natural and sensuous to the spiritual。 It
thus indicates a deficiency in the most simple reflection not to know that the universal is not in
immediate knowledge; but is a result of the culture; the education; and the self…revelation of the
human race。 If immediate knowledge is to be allowed; everyone will be responsible merely to
himself: this man knows this; another that; and consequently everything is justified and approved;
however contrary to right and religion。 This opposition between immediacy and mediacy is thus a
very barren and quite empty determination; it is a platitude of the extremest type to consider
anything like this to be a true opposition; it proceeds from a most wooden understanding; which
thinks that an immediacy can be something on its own account; without a mediation within itself。 If
Philosophy were to result in this it would be a poor affair; these determinations are merely forms;
none of which has intrinsic truth。 The form into which Philosophy has in Jacobi's case finally fallen;
which is that immediacy is grasped as absolute; manifests a lack of all critical faculty; of all logic。
The Kantian philosophy is critical philosophy; but from it the fact has been omitted that we cannot
constitute the infinite with finite categories — and immediacy is such an one。 When we regard this
opposition more closely all knowledge may be termed immediate; but all immediate knowledge is
likewise mediated in itself。 This we know within our consciousness; and we may see it in the most
general phenomena。 I know; for example; of America immediately; and yet this knowledge is very
much mediated。 If I stand in America and see its soil; I must first of all have journeyed to it;
Columbus must first have discovered it; ships must have been built; &c。; all these discoveries and
inventions pertain to it。 That which we now know immediately is consequently a result of infinitely
many mediations。 Likewise when I see a right…angled triangle I know that the squares of the two
sides are equal to the square of the hypotenuse: I know this immediately; and yet I have merely
learned it and am convinced of it through the mediation of proof。 Immediate knowledge is thus
everywhere mediated; and Philosophy does nothing but bring this to consciousness —
demonstrating the mediation which in point of fact is already present there; e。g。 in religion; &c。
The philosophy of Jacobi; inasmuch as it says: “Thought cannot proceed further than to the feeling
of God;” has been accepted utiliter; it was more easily arrived at than in the case of Kant。
Knowledge; however; is something very different from what Jacobi calls such; against finite
knowledge his arguments are quite correct。 Immediate knowledge is not knowledge;
comprehension; for that implies that the content is determined in itself; i。e。 is grasped as concrete。
But in immediate knowledge it is the case that the only fact known of God is that He exists。 For
should there be determinations respecting God; they must; according to Jacobi; be grasped as a
finite; and the knowledge of them would again merely be a progression from finite to finite。 There
thus remains only the indeterminate conception of God; an “Above me;” an indeterminate
Beyond。 This gives accordingly the same result as does the Aufkl?rung; viz。 that the highest
reality is ultimate: we find the same in French philosophy and in Kant — only here we still have the
opinion that this emptiness is the highest philosophy possible。 But if each standpoint has an aspect
wherein it is justified; there always rests in the proposition that the human mind knows God
immediately; the important consideration that we have here a recognition of the freedom of the
human spirit: in it we have the source