which；　theoretically　considered；　made　this　principle　its　foundation；　knowledge　aimed　at　freedom；
  and　at　a　concrete　content　which　it　possesses　in　consciousness。
  1。　Emile　ou　de　l'éducation；　T。　II。　（Paris；　1813；　él。　stéréotype）；　Book　IV。；　Profession　de　foi　du
  vicaire　savoyard；　p。　215　seq。
  2。　Buhle：　Lehrbuch　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie；　Pt。　VIII。　pp。　62；　63：　Système　de　la　Nature
  par　Mirabaud　（Londres；　1770）；　T。　I。　chap。　i。　p。　10；　chap。　ii。　p　28。
  3。　Buhle：　Lehrbuch　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie；　Pt。　VIII。　pp。　63；　64。　Système　de　la　Nature；　T。
  I。　chap。　ii。　pp。　18；　16；　21；　et　15。
  4。　Buhle；　ibidem；　pp。　64；　65；　70；　Système　de　la　Nature；　T。　I。　chap。　ii；　pp。　30；　31；　chap。　iii；　pp。　39；
  40；　chap。　iv。　pp。　45；　46；　chap。　vii；　pp。　90；　91。
  5。　Robinet：　De　la　Nature　（Troisième　édition；　Amsterdam；　1766）；　T。I。P。I。　chap。　iii。　iv。　pp。　16；　17。
  6。　Robinet：　De　la　Nature；　T。I。P。II。　chap。　ii。　pp。　156；　157；　chap。　vii。　pp。　166；　168；　chap。　ix。…xi。；
  chap。　xv。　pp。　202；　203；　chap。　xix。　p。　217。
  7。　Robinet：　De　la　Nature；　T。I。P。I。　chap。　xxviii。　p。　138；　chap。　xiii。　p。　70。
  8。　Helvetius：　De　l'esprit　（Oeuvres　complètes；　T。　II。　Deux…Ponts；　1784）；　T。　I。　Discours　II。　chap。　i。
  pp。　62…64；　chap。　ii。　pp。　65；　68；　69；　chap。　iv。　p。　90；　chap。　v。　p。　91；　chap。　viii。　p。　114；　chap。　xxiv。
  pp。　256；　257。
  9。　Rousseau：　Du　contrat　social　（Lyon；　1790）；　Book　I。　chap。　iii。　pp。　8；　9；　chap。　iv。　pp。　10；　11；
  13…16。
  Section　Two：　Period　of　the　Thinking　Understanding
  Chapter　II。　—　Transition　Period
  D。　THE　GERMAN　ILLUMINATION。
  The　Germans　were　at　this　time　quietly　drifting　along　in　their　Leibnitzo…Wolffian　philosophy；　in　its
  definitions；　axioms　and　proofs。　Then　they　were　gradually　breathed　upon　by　the　spirit　of　foreign
  lands；　they　made　acquaintance　with　all　the　developments　which　there　came　to　pass；　and　took　very
  kindly　to　the　empiricism　of　Locke；　on　the　other　hand　they　at　the　same　time　laid　aside　metaphysical
  investigations；　turned　their　attention　to　the　question　of　how　truths　can　be　grasped　by　the　healthy
  human　understanding；　and　plunged　into　the　Aufkl？rung　and　into　the　consideration　of　the　utility　of
  all　things　…　a　point　of　view　which　they　adopted　from　the　French。　Utility　as　the　essence　of　existent
  things　signifies　that　they　are　determined　as　not　being　in　themselves；　but　for　another：　this　is　a
  necessary　moment；　but　not　the　only　one。　The　German　Aufkl？rung　warred　against　ideas；　with　the
  principle　of　utility　as　its　weapon。　Philosophic　investigations　on　this　subject　had　degenerated　into　a
  feeble　popular　treatment　of　it　which　was　incapable　of　going　deeper；　they　displayed　a　rigid
  pedantry　and　an　earnestness　of　the　understanding；　but　were　unspiritual。　The　Germans　are　busy
  bees　who　do　justice　to　all　nations；　they　are　old…clothesmen　for　whom　anything　is　good　enough；
  and　who　carry　on　their　haggling　with　everyone。　Picked　up　as　it　was　from　foreign　nations；　all　this
  had　lost　the　wit　and　life；　the　energy　and　originality　which　with　the　French　had　made　the　content　to
  be　lost　sight　of　in　the　form。　The　Germans；　who　honestly　sift　a　matter　to　its　root；　and　who　would
  put　rational　arguments　in　the　place　of　wit　and　vivacity；　since　wit　and　vivacity　really　prove　nothing；
  in　this　way　reached　a　content　which　was　utterly　empty；　so　much　so　that　nothing　could　be　more
  wearisome　than　this　profound　mode　of　treatment；　such　was　the　case　with　Eberhard；　Tetens；　and
  those　like　them。
  Others；　like　Nicolai；　Sulzer　and　their　fellows；　were　excellent　in　their　speculations　on　questions　of
  taste　and　the　liberal　sciences；　for　literature　and　art　were　also　to　flourish　among　the　Germans。　But
  with　all　this　they　only　arrived　at　a　most　trivial　treatment　of　？sthetics　…　Lessing（1）　called　it　shallow
  chatter。　As　a　matter　of　fact；　indeed；　the　poems　of　Gellert；　Weisse　and　Lessing　sank　almost；　if　not
  quite　as　much　into　the　same　poetic　feebleness。　Moreover；　previous　to　the　philosophy　of　Kant；　the
  general　principle　was　really　the　theory　of　happiness；　which　we　have　already　met　with　in　the
  philosophy　of　the　Cyrenaics　（Vol。　I。　p。　477）；　and　the　point　of　view　of　pleasant　or　unpleasant
  sensations　held　good　among　the　philosophers　of　that　time　as　an　ultimate　and　essential
  determination。　Of　this　manner　of　philosophizing　I　will　quote　an　example　which　Nicolai　gives　in　the
  account　of　a　conversation　which　he　had　with　Mendelssohn：　what　is　in　question　is　the　pleasure　in
  tragic　subjects　which　is　held　to　be　awakened　even　by　means　of　the　unpleasant　emotions　depicted
  in　a　tragedy：
  HERR　MOSES。　〃The　power　of　having　an　inclination　for　perfections　and　of　shunning
  imperfections　is　a　reality。　Therefore　the　exercise　of　this　power　brings　a　pleasure　with　it；　which；
  however；　is　in　nature　comparatively　less　than　the　displeasure　which　arises　from　the　contemplation
  of　the　object。
  I。　Yet　even　then；　when　the　violence　of　passion　causes　us　unpleasant　sensations；　the　movement
  （what　else　is　this　movement　than　the　power　of　loving　perfections；　&c。？）　which　it　brings　with　it　has
  still　delights　for　us。　It　is　the　strength　of　the　movement　which　we　enjoy；　even　in　spite　of　the　painful
  sensations　which　oppose　what　is　pleasant　in　the　passion；　and　in　a　short　time　obtain　the　victory。
  HERR　MOSES。　In　a　stage　play；　on　the　contrary；　as　the　imperfect　object　is　absent；　pleasure
  must　gain　the　upper　hand　and　eclipse　the　small　degree　of　displeasure。
  I。　A　passion　therefore　which　is　not　followed　by　these　results　must　be　altogether　pleasant。　Of　this
  sort　are　the　imitations　of　the　passions　which　the　tragedy　affords。〃（2）
  With　such　vapid　and　meaningless　drivel　they　rambled　on。　In　addition　to　these；　the　eternity　of
  punishment　in　hell；　the　salvation　of　the　heathen；　the　difference　between　uprightness　and　godliness；
  were　philosophic　matters　on　which　much　labour　was　expended　among　the　Germans；　while　the
  French　troubled　themselves　little　about　them。　Finite　determinations　were　made　to　hold　good
  against　the　infinite；　against　the　Trinity　it　was　asserted　that　One　cannot　be　Three；　against　original　sin；
  that　each　must　bear　his　own　guilt；　must　have　done　his　own　deeds　of　himself；　and　must　answer　for
  them；　in　the　same　way　against　redemption；　that　another　cannot　take　upon　himself　punishment　that
  is　due；　against　forgiveness　of　sin；　that　what　is　done　cannot　be　rendered　undone；　to　sum　up
  generally；　the　incommensurability　of　the　human　nature　with　the　divine。　On　the　one　side　we　see
  healthy　human　understanding；　experience；　facts　of　consciousness；　but　on　the　other　side　there　was
  still　in　vogue　the　Wolffian　metaphysics　of　the　dry；　dead　understanding；　thus　we　see　Mendelssohn
  take　his　stand　by　the　healthy　human　understanding；　and　make　it　his　rule。
  Some　movement　was　brought　into　this　authority；　which　had　settled　into　perfect　peace　and　security
  and　let　no　dreams　of　other　matters　cross　its　path；　by　the　chance　dispute　of　Mendelssohn　with
  Jacobi；　first　as　to　whether　Lessing　had　been　a　disciple　of　Spinoza；　and　then　regarding　the　doctrines
  of　Spinoza　himself。　On　this　occasion　it　came　to　light　how　much　Spinoza　was　really　forgotten；　and
  in　what　horror　Spinozism　was　held。　But　while　Jacobi　in　this　way　once　more　unexpectedly　brought
  to　remembrance　in　connection　with　Spinozism　a　quite　different　content　of　philosophy；　faith；　i。e。；　the
  simply　immediate　certainty　of　external；　finite　things；　as　well　as　of　the　divine　（which　faith　in　the　divine
  he　called　reason）　was　certainly　placed　by　him；　as　an　independent　thinker；　in　opposition　to
  mediating　knowledge；　which　he　apprehended　as　mere　understanding。　This　continued　until　Kant
  gave　a　new　impulse　in　Germany　to　philosophy；　which　had　died　out　in　the　rest　of　Europe。
  As　far　as　the　transition　to　modern　German　philosophy　is　concerned；　it　is　from　Hume　and
  Rousseau；　as　we　have　said　（pp。　369；　374；　402）；　that　it　took　its　start。　Descartes　opposes　extension
  to　thought；　as　what　is　simply　one　with　itself。　He　is　charged　with　dualism；　but；　like　Spinoza　and
  Leibnitz；　he　did　away　with　the　independence　of　the　two　sides；　and　made　supreme　their　unity；　God。
  But；　as　this　unity；　God　is　first　of　all　only　the　Third；　and　He　is　further　determined　in　such　a　way　that
  no　determination　pertains　to　Him。　Wolff's　understanding　of　the　finite；　his　school　metaphysics
  generally；　his　science　of　the　understanding；　and　his　divergence　into　the　observation　of　nature；　after
  it　has　grown　strong　in　its　conformity　with　law　and　in　its　finite　knowledge；　turns　against　the　infinite
  and　the　concrete　determinations　of　religion；　and　comes　to　a　standstill　with　abstractions　in　his
  theologia　naturalis；　for　the　determinate　is　his　domain。　But　from　this　time　an　utterly　different　point
  of　view　is　introduced。　The　infinite　is　transported　into　abstraction　or　incomprehensibility。　This　is　an
  incomprehensible　position　to　adopt。　Nowadays　it　is　looked　on　as　most　pious；　most　justifiable。　But
  as　we　see　the　third；　the　unity　of　difference；　defined　as　something　which　cannot　be　thought　or
  known；　this　unity　is　not　one　of　thought；　for　it　is　above　all　thought；　and　God　is　not　simply　thought。
  Nevertheless　this　unity　is　defined　as　the　absolutely　concrete；　i。e。；　as　the　unity　of　thought　and　Being。
  Now　we　have　come　so　far　that　this　unity　is　a　unity　simply　in　thought；　and　pertaining　to
  consciousness；　so　that　the　objectivity　of