Beattie：　Essays　on　the　nature　and　immutability　of　Truth；　&c。　（Edinburh；　1772）；　Pt。　I。；　chap。　i。；　pp。
  18…31　（translated　into　German；　Copenhagen　and　Leipzig；　1772；　pp。　24…42）；　chap。　ii。　Sect。　2；　pp。
  37…42　（pp。　49…55）；　&c。
  4。　Cf。　James　Oswald：　An　Appeal　of　common…sense　in　behalf　of　religion　（Edinburgh；　1772）；　Vol。　I。
  Book　I。　Introduction；　p。　12　（translated　by　Wilmsen；　Leipzig；　1774；　p。　11）。
  5。　Rixner；　ibidem；　§　121；　p。　262；　cf。　James　Oswald；　ibidem；　Vol。　II。　Book　II。　chap。　i。　pp。　50；　51
  （pp。　54；　55）。
  6。　The　name　assumed　by　Abraham　Tucker。…＇Translator's　note。＇
  7。　Lectures　of　1825…1826。
  8。　Lectures　of　1829…1830。
  9。　The　name　assumed　by　Abraham　Tucker。…＇Translator's　note。＇
  10。　Lectures　of　1825…1826。
  11。　Lectures　of　1829…1830。
  Section　Two：　Period　of　the　Thinking　Understanding
  Chapter　II。　—　Transition　Period
  C。　French　Philosophy
  We　pass　onto　the　French　philosophy；　the　relation　it　bears　to　metaphysics　is　this；　that　while　man　as
  a　metaphysician　stands　to　himself　in　the　attitude　of　a　layman　or　outsider；　French　philosophy　does
  away　with　the　lay　or　outside　position　in　regard　alike　to　politics；　religion；　and　philosophy。　Two
  forms　have　to　be　mentioned　which　are　of　the　greatest　importance　in　respect　to　culture　—　French
  philosophy　and　the　Aufkl？rung。　With　the　English　we　saw　a　certain　idealism　only：　this　was　either
  formal；　as　the　mere　general　translation　of　Being　into　Being…for…another；　i。e。；　into　perceptibility；　or
  else　what　is　implicit　in　this　perceptibility；　instincts；　impulses；　habits；　&c。　—　blind　determinate　forces；
  a　return　into　self…consciousness；　which　itself　appears　as　a　physical　thing。　In　that　first　idealism　the
  whole　finitude　and　extension　of　appearances；　of　sensations；　and　likewise　of　thoughts　and
  determinate　fixed　conceptions；　remain　just　what　they　are　in　the　unphilosophic　consciousness。　The
  scepticism　of　Hume　makes　all　that　is　universal　sink　into　habits　and　instincts；　i。e。；　it　consists　in　a
  more　simple　synthesis　of　the　phenomenal　world；　but　these　simpler　elements；　these　instincts；
  impulses；　and　forces；　are　just　as　much　a　fixed　present　existence　in　self…consciousness；　unspiritual；
  and　without　movement。　The　French　philosophy　has　more　life；　more　movement；　more　spirit；　it
  would　perhaps　be　more　correct　to　describe　it　as　full　of　life　and　spirit。　It　is　the　absolute　Notion；
  which　revolts　against　the　whole　reigning　system　of　prevalent　conceptions　and　established　ideas；
  which　overthrows　all　that　has　settled　into　fixity；　and　acquires　the　consciousness　of　perfect　liberty。
  At　the　root　of　this　idealistic　activity　lies　the　certainty　that　whatever　is；　whatever　counts　for　anything
  in　itself；　is　all　a　matter　of　self…consciousness；　and　as　to　Notions　（individual　and　isolated　existences
  ruling　actual　self…consciousness）；　such　as　the　Notions　of　good　and　evil；　of　power　and　riches；　and
  the　fixed　conceptions　regarding　faith　in　God　and　His　relation　to　the　world；　His　mode　of
  government　and；　further；　the　duties　of　self…consciousness　towards　Him　—　that　all　these　are　not
  truths　in　themselves；　having　validity　beyond　the　bounds　of　self…consciousness。　All　these　forms；　the
  real　implicitude　of　the　actual　world　and　also　of　the　supersensuous　world；　are　therefore　set　aside　in
  this　spirit　conscious　of　itself。　It　does　not　trouble　itself　seriously　about　those　who　admit　the　validity
  of　these　conceptions　just　as　they　are；　and　accept　them　as　true；　respecting　them　as　independent　and
  free　apart　from　self…consciousness；　but　it　speaks　of　such　conceptions　with　intelligence　and　spirit；
  that　is　to　say；　it　asserts　that　self…consciousness　by　its　activity　is　the　first　to　make　anything　of　them；
  and　to　make　that　a　something　very　different　from　what　they　profess　to　be；　for　the　self…conscious
  spirit　only　intellectual　relations；　these　processes　of　formation　and　movement　by　means　of　its
  self…consciousness；　possess　validity　and　interest。　This　is　the　character　of　the　Notion　in　its　actuality；
  what　has　reality　for　this　all…perceiving　and　all…comprehending　consciousness　is　held　to　be　valid。
  We　must　now　consider　what　form　existence　takes　for　this　absolutely　comprehending　self…
  consciousness。　In　the　first　place　this　Notion　is　fixed　as　the　negative　movement　of　the　Notion　only；
  the　positive　and　simple；　or　existence；　falls　outside　of　this　movement。　There　remains　to　the　Notion
  no　distinction；　no　content；　for　all　determinate　content　is　lost　in　that　negativity。　This　empty　existence
  is　for　us　pure　thought　generally；　what　the　French　call　être　suprême；　or　if　represented　objectively
  as　existent；　and　as　in　opposition　to　consciousness；　it　is　matter。　Absolute　Being　is　therefore
  determined　as　matter；　as　empty　objectivity；　through　a　Notion　which　destroys　all　content　and
  determination；　and　has　as　its　object　this　universal　alone。　It　is　a　Notion　which　acts　only
  destructively；　and　does　not　again　construct　itself　out　of　this　matter　or　pure　thought　or　pure
  substantiality。　We　here　see　so…called　materialism　and　atheism　freely　emerge；　as　the　necessary
  result　of　the　pure　comprehending　self…consciousness。　From　one　point　of　view　there　perishes　in　this
  negative　movement　all　determination　which　represents　spirit　as　something　beyond
  self…consciousness；　and　more　especially　all　determinations　within　the　spirit；　and　also　those　which
  express　it　as　spirit；　indeed　all　the　conceptions　formed　of　it　by　faith；　for　which　it　has　validity　as　an
  existent　self…consciousness　beyond　self…consciousness　—　in　short；　all　that　is　traditional　or　imposed
  by　authority。　There　remains　only　a　present；　actual　Being；　for　self…consciousness　recognizes　implicit
  existence　only　in　the　form　which　it　has　for　self…consciousness；　and　in　which　it　is　actually　known　to
  itself；　in　matter；　and　matter　as　actively　extending　and　realizing　itself　in　multiplicity；　i。e。；　as　nature。　In
  the　present　I　am　conscious　to　myself　of　my　reality；　and　consequently　self…consciousness　finds　itself
  as　matter；　finds　the　soul　to　be　material；　and　conceptions　to　be　movements　and　changes　in　the　inner
  organ　of　the　brain；　which　result　from　external　impressions　on　the　senses。　Thought　is　therefore　a
  mode　of　the　existence　of　matter。　The　One　Substance　of　Spinoza；　to　which　French　materialism　as
  naturalism　is　parallel；　really　finds　its　accomplishment　here　in　this　object　as　in　all　respects　the
  ultimate；　but　while　in　Spinoza　this　category　is　a　possession　which　we　find　ready　to　hand；　here　it
  appears　as　the　result　of　the　abstraction　of　the　understanding　proceeding　from　empiricism。
  The　other　form　of　the　Aufkl？rung　is；　on　the　contrary；　when　absolute　Being　is　set　forth　as
  something　beyond　self…consciousness；　so　that　of　itself；　of　its　implicit　Being；　nothing　whatever　can
  be　known。　It　bears　the　empty　name　of　God。　For　though　God　may　be　determined　in　any　way
  whatever；　all　these　determinations　fall　away；　He　is；　like　x；　the　altogether　unknown　quantity。　This
  view　is　not　therefore　to　be　termed　atheism；　in　the　first　place　because　it　still　employs　the　empty；
  meaningless　name；　and　in　the　second　place　because　it　expresses　the　necessary　relations　of
  self…consciousness；　duties；　&c。；　not　as　necessary　in　an　absolute　sense；　but　as　necessary　through
  relation　to　another；　namely　to　the　unknown　—　although　there　can　be　no　positive　relation　to　an
  unknown　except　by　abrogating　the　self　as　particular。　Yet　it　is　not　matter；　because　this　simple　and
  empty　something　is　negatively　defined　as　non…existent　for　self…consciousness。　This　all　comes　to　the
  same　thing；　however；　for　matter　is　the　universal；　and　is　Being…for…self　represented　as　abrogated。
  But　the　true　reflection　on　that　unknown　is　this；　that　it　exists　for　self…consciousness　simply　as　a
  negative　of　the　same；　i。e。；　as　matter；　reality；　the　present；　it　is　this　negative　for　me；　this　is　its　Notion。
  The　difference　distinguishing　this　from　what　appears　to　be　in　its　entirety　something　“other；”　and　in
  which　any　one　side　is　not　permitted　to　say　that　what　it　thinks　is　such　is　that　particular　thing；　is　the
  difference　which　rests　on　this　last　abstraction。
  Since　then　the　Notion　is　present　only　in　its　negative　form；　positive　extension　remains　without　a
  Notion；　it　has　the　form　of　nature；　of　an　existent；　both　in　the　physical　and　in　the　moral　sphere。　The
  knowledge　of　nature　remains　the　ordinary；　scientifically　unspeculative　knowledge；　and　as　to　its
  essence；　in　so　far　as　it　claims　to　be　philosophy；　it　is　a　general　way　of　speaking　that　plays　with　the
  words；　“forces；　relations；　manifold　connections；”　but　arrives　at　nothing　definite。　Similarly；　in　the
  spiritual　sphere；　it　is　so　far　true　that　the　metaphysic　of　the　spirit　is　of　such　a　nature　that　it　is　nothing
  more　nor　less　than　a　particular　organization　by　means　of　which　the　powers　which　are　termed
  sensation；　perception；　&c。；　come　into　existence；　but　this　is　a　wearisome　way　of　talking；　which　can
  make　nothing　intelligible；　which　accepts　appearances　and　perceptions　and　reasons　about　them；　but
  none　the　less　reduces　their　implicit　existence　to　certain　determinate　forces；　of　the　inward　nature　of
  which　we　know　nothing　further。　The　determination　and　knowledge　of　the　moral　sphere　has
  similarly　for　its　object　to　bring　man　back　to　his　so…called　natural　promptings；　its　essence　has　the
  form　of　a　natural　i