one　subject　has　such　and　such　an　experience；　finds；　for　instance；　in　his　religious　feelings　this
  determination　which　inclines　him　to　God；　while　another　subject　has　different　experiences
  altogether。　We　are　in　the　habit　of　allowing　one　thing　to　be　just　and　moral；　others　have　another
  mode　of　regarding　it。　Hence　if　the　truth　depends　upon　experience；　the　element　of　universality；　of
  objectivity；　&c。；　comes　from　elsewhere；　or　is　not　justified　by　experience。　Hume　thus　declared　this
  sort　of　universality；　as　he　declared　necessity；　to　be　rather　subjectively　than　objectively　existent；　for
  custom　is　just　a　subjective　universality　of　this　kind。　This　is　an　important　and　acute　observation　in
  relation　to　experience　looked　at　as　the　source　of　knowledge；　and　it　is　from　this　point　that　the
  Kantian　reflection　now　begins。
  Hume　（Essays　and　Treatises　on　several　subjects；　Vol。　111。　Sect。　8；　11）　then　extended　his
  scepticism　to　the　conceptions　and　doctrines　of　freedom　and　necessity；　and　to　the　proofs　of　the
  existence　of　God；　and　in　fact　scepticism　here　possesses　a　wide　field。　To　such　a　system　of
  reasoning　from　thoughts　and　possibilities　another　method　of　reasoning　may　again　be　opposed；　and
  this　reasoning　is　no　better　than　the　other。　What　is　said　to　be　metaphysically　established　regarding
  immortality；　God；　nature；　&c。；　lacks　a　real　ground　for　resting　upon；　such　as　is　professed　to　be
  given；　for　the　inferences　on　which　men　ground　their　proofs　are　subjectively　formed　conceptions。
  But　where　a　universality　is　found；　it　does　not　rest　in　the　matter　in　itself；　but　is　simply　a　subjective
  necessity　which　is　really　mere　custom。　Hence　the　result　which　Hume　arrives　at　is　necessarily
  astonishment　regarding　the　condition　of　human　knowledge；　a　general　state　of　mistrust；　and　a
  sceptical　indecision　—　which　indeed　does　not　amount　to　much。　The　condition　of　human　knowledge
  regarding　which　Hume　so　much　wonders；　he　further　describes　as　containing　an　antagonism
  between　reason　and　instinct；　this　instinct；　it　is　said；　which　embraces　many　sorts　of　powers；
  inclinations；　&c。；　deceives　us　in　many　different　ways；　and　reason　demonstrates　this。　But　on　the
  other　side　it　is　empty；　without　content　or　principles　of　its　own；　and　if　a　content　is　in　question　at　all；
  it　must　keep　to　those　inclinations。　In　itself　reason　thus　has　no　criterion　whereby　the　antagonism
  between　individual　desires；　and　between　itself　and　the　desires；　may　be　settled。　（8）　Thus　everything
  appears　in　the　form　of　an　irrational　existence　devoid　of　thought；　the　implicitly　true　and　right　is　not　in
  thought；　but　in　the　form　of　an　instinct；　a　desire。
  1。　Buhle：　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　pp。　193…200。
  2。　Tennemann's　Grundriss　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie　von　Wendt　（Leipzig；　1829）；　§　370；
  pp。　439；　440；　Hume：　Essays　and　Treatises　on　several　subjects；　Vol。　III。　containing　an　Inquiry
  Concerning　Human　Understanding　（London；　1770）；　Sect。　2。　pp。　21；　22；　Sect。　4；　P。　I。　p。　42；
  Tennemann；　Vol。　XI。　pp。　433；　434。
  3。　Hume：　op。　cit。；　Vol。　III。　Not。　A。　pp。　283；　284。
  4。　Tennemann　op。　cit。；　§　370；　p。　440；　Hume：　op。　cit。；　Vol。　III。　Sect。　4；　Pt。　I。　pp。　43…45；　Sect。　5；
  pp。　66；　67；　Buhle：　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　pp。　204；　205；　Tennemann；
  Vol。　XI。　pp。　435；　436。
  5。　Hume：　op。　cit。；　Vol。　III。　Sect。　vii。　Pt。　1；　pp。　102；　103；　Pt。　2；　pp。　108；　109；　Sect。　viii。　pp。　118；
  119。
  6。　Hume：　op。　cit。；　Vol。　IV。　containing　an　Inquiry　concerning　the　principles　of　morals；　Sect。　1；　p。　4；
  Appendix　I。　p。　170。
  7。　Buhle：　op。　cit。；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　pp。　230；　231；　cf。　Hume；　ibidem；　Vol。　III。　Sect。　12；　P。　II。　p。
  221；　Vol。　IV。；　An　Inquiry；　&c。；　Sect。　4；　pp。　62…65；　A　dialogue；　pp。　235；　236；　&c。；　&c。
  8。　Hume：　op。　cit。。　Vol。　III。　Sect。　12；　Pt。　I。　pp。　217；　218；　Not。　N。　pp。　296；　297；　Buhle：
  Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　p。　210。
  Section　Two：　Period　of　the　Thinking　Understanding
  Chapter　II。　—　Transition　Period
  B。　Scottish　Philosophy
  1。　THOMAS　REID。
  Thomas　Reid；　born　in　1710；　died　as　a　professor　in　Glasgow　in　1796。（1）　He　maintained　the
  principle　of　common…sense。　His　endeavour　was　to　discover　the　principles　of　knowledge；　and　the
  following　are　his　conclusions：　〃（a）　There　are　certain　undemonstrated　and　undemonstrable
  fundamental　truths　which　common…sense　begets　and　recognizes　as　immediately　conclusive　and
  absolute。〃　This　hence　constitutes　an　immediate　knowledge；　in　it　an　inward　independent　source　is
  set　forth　which　is　hereby　opposed　to　religion　as　revealed。　〃（b）　These　immediate　truths　require　no
  support　from　any　elaborated　science；　nor　do　they　submit　to　its　criticism；〃　they　cannot　be　criticized
  by　philosophy。　〃（c）　Philosophy　itself　has　no　root　other　than　that　of　an　immediate；　self…enlightening
  truth；　whatever　contradicts　such　truth　is　in　itself　false；　contradictory；　and　absurd。〃　This　is　true　for
  knowledge　and　〃（d）　Morality；　the　individual　is　moral　if　he　acts　in　accordance　with　the　perfect
  principles　of　the　perfection　of　the　whole　and　with　his　own　duty　as　it　is　known　to　him。〃（2）
  2。　JAMES　BEATTIE。
  James　Beattie；　born　1735；　was　a　professor　of　moral　philosophy　in　Edinburgh　and　Aberdeen；　and
  died　in　1803。　He　likewise　made　common…sense　the　source　of　all　knowledge。　〃The　common…sense
  of　the　plain　human　understanding　is　the　source　of　all　morality；　of　all　religion；　and　all　certainty。　The
  confirmation　of　common…sense　must　be　added　to　the　testimony　of　our　senses。　The　truth　is　what　the
  necessities　of　my　nature　call　upon　me　to　believe。　Belief　signifies　conviction　in　the　case　of　truths
  which　are　certain；　in　that　of　those　which　are　probable；　approbation。　The　truth　which　is　certain　is
  known　by　means　of　intuition；　the　probable　truth　by　means　of　proofs。〃（3）　Such　convictions　as　are
  quite　certain　form　the　basis　of　actions。
  3。　JAMES　OSWALD。
  James　Oswald；　a　Scottish　clergyman；　made　use　of　an　expression　which　indicates　that　we　have　the
  principles　just　mentioned　as　facts　existing　within　us。（4）　〃The　existence　of　the　Divine　Being　is
  （according　to　him）　a　fact　absolutely　raised　above　all　reasoning　and　all　doubt；　and　immediately
  certain　for　the　common…sense　of　morality。〃（5）　The　same　principle　was　likewise　established　in
  Germany　at　this　time　…　an　inward　revelation；　a　knowledge　of　the　conscience；　and　specially　of　God
  and　His　Being。
  4。　DUGALD　STEWART。
  To　this　school　also　belong　Dugald　Stewart；　Edward　Search；（9）　Ferguson；　and　Hutcheson；　most　of
  whom　have　written　on　morals。　The　political　economist　Adam　Smith　from　this　point　of　view　is
  likewise　a　philosopher；　and　the　best　known　of　them　all。　This　Scottish　philosophy　is　now　given　forth
  in　Germany　as　something　new。　It　is　a　popular　philosophy；　which；　on　the　one　hand；　has　the　great
  merit　of　seeking　in　man；　and　in　his　consciousness；　for　the　source　of　all　that　should　be　held　by　him
  as　true；　the　immanence　of　what　should　be　by　him　esteemed。　The　content　is　at　the　same　time　a
  concrete　content；　in　a　certain　degree；　it　is　the　antithesis　of　metaphysics　proper；　of　the　wandering
  about　in　abstract　determinations　of　the　understanding。　Of　these　Scots；　Dugald　Stewart；　who　is
  living　still；（10）　appears　to　be　the　last　and　least　significant；　in　them　all　there　is　the　same
  ground…work　to　be　found；　the　same　circle　of　reflection；　namely；　an　a　priori　philosophy；　though　not
  one　which　is　to　be　pursued　in　a　speculative　way。　The　general　idea　which　pervades　their　principle　is
  that　of　the　healthy　human　understanding；　to　this　they　have　added　benevolent　desires；　sympathy；　a
  moral　sense；　and　from　such　grounds　composed　very　excellent　moral　writings。　That　is　certainly　all
  very　well　in　order　to　understand　approximately；　up　to　a　certain　degree　of　culture；　what　universal
  thoughts　are；　in　order　to　narrate　their　history；　to　appeal　to　examples；　and　to　explain　them；　but
  further　it　does　not　extend。
  In　more　recent　times　this　Scottish　philosophy　has　passed　to　France；　and　Professor　Royer…Collard；
  now　president　of　the　Second　Chamber；（11）　as　also　his　disciple；　Jouffroy；　in　conformity　with　it；
  pass　from　the　facts　of　consciousness　through　cultured　reasoning　and　experience；　to　a　further　stage
  in　development。　What　by　the　French　is　called　Idéologie　（supra；　p。　308）　has　also　its　place　here；　it
  is　abstract　metaphysics；　in　so　far　as　it　is　an　enumeration　and　analysis　of　the　most　simple
  thought…determinations。　They　are　not　treated　dialectically；　but　from　our　reflection；　from　our
  thoughts；　the　material　is　derived；　and　in　this　the　determinations　therein　contained　are　demonstrated。
  1。　Tennemann's　Grundriss　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie　von　Wendt；　§　371；　p。　442。
  2。　Rixner：　Handbuch　der　Geschicte　der　Philosophie；　Vol。　III。　§　119；　p。　259；　ct。　Thomas　Reid；　An
  Inquiry　into　the　human　mind　on　the　principles　of　common　sense　（Edinburgh；　1810）；　chap。　i。　Sect。
  4；　pp。　19；　20　（translated　into　German；　Leipzig；　1782；　pp。　17；　18）；　chap。　vi。　Sect。　20；　pp。
  372…375　（pp。　310；　311）；　&c。
  3。　Rixner：　Handbuch　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie；　Vol。　III。　§　120；　pp。　261；　262；　cf。　James
  Beattie：　Essays　on　the　nature　and　immutability　of　Truth；　&c。　（Edinburh；　1772）；　Pt。　I