at　Wolff；　who　had　taken　them　to　be　quite　in　earnest；　his　opinion　was　that　if　Leibnitz　were　not
  perfectly　serious　in　this　sense　with　his　Théodicée；　yet　he　had　unconsciously　written　his　best
  therein。　Leibnitz's　Théodicée　is　not　what　we　can　altogether　appreciate；　it　is　a　justification　of　God
  in　regard　to　the　evil　in　the　world。　His　really　philosophic　thoughts　are　most　connectedly　expressed
  in　a　treatise　on　the　principles　of　Grace　（Principes　de　la　Nature　et　de　la　Grace）；（3）　and　especially
  in　the　pamphlet　addressed　to　Prince　Eugéne　of　Savoy。（4）　。Buhle　（Geschichte　der　neuern
  Philosophie；　vol。　iv。　section　1；　p。　131）　says：　“His　philosophy　is　not　so　much　the　product　of　free；
  independent；　original　speculation；　as　the　result　of　well…tested　earlier”　and　later　“systems；　an
  eclecticism　whose　defects　he　tried　to　remedy　in　his　own　way。　It　is　a　desultory　treatment　of
  Philosophy　in　letters。”
  Leibnitz　followed　the　same　general　plan　in　his　philosophy　as　the　physicists　adopt　when　they
  advance　a　hypothesis　to　explain　existing　data。　He　has　it　that　general　conceptions　of　the　Idea　are　to
  be　found；　from　which　the　particular　may　be　derived；　here；　on　account　of　existing　data；　the　general
  conception；　for　example　the　determination　of　force　or　matter　furnished　by　reflection；　must　have　its
  determinations　disposed　in　such　a　way　that　it　fits　in　with　the　data。　Thus　the　philosophy　of　Leibnitz
  seems　to　be　not　so　much　a　philosophic　system　as　an　hypothesis　regarding　the　existence　of　the
  world；　namely　how　it　is　to　be　determined　in　accordance　with　the　metaphysical　determinations　and
  the　data　and　assumptions　of　the　ordinary　conception；　which　are　accepted　as　valid（5）　—　thoughts
  which　are　moreover　propounded　without　the　sequence　pertaining　to　the　Notion　and　mainly　in
  narrative　style；　and　which　taken　by　themselves　show　no　necessity　in　their　connection。　Leibnitz's
  philosophy　therefore　appears　like　a　string　of　arbitrary　assertions；　which　follow　one　on　another　like
  a　metaphysical　romance；　it　is　only　when　we　see　what　he　wished　thereby　to　avoid　that　we　learn　to
  appreciate　its　value。　He　really　makes　use　of　external　reasons　mainly　in　order　to　establish　relations：
  “Because　the　validity　of　such　relations　cannot　be　allowed；　nothing　remains　but　to　establish　the
  matter　in　this　way。”　If　we　are　not　acquainted　with　these　reasons；　this　procedure　strikes　us　as
  arbitrary。
  a。　Leibnitz's　philosophy　is　an　idealism　of　the　intellectuality　of　the　universe；　and　although　from　one
  point　of　view　he　stands　opposed　to　Locke；　as　from　another　point　of　view　he　is　in　opposition　to　the
  Substance　of　Spinoza；　he　yet　binds　them　both　together　again。　For；　to　go　into　the　matter　more
  particularly；　on　the　one　hand　he　expresses　in　the　many　monads　the　absolute　nature　of　things
  distinguished　and　of　individuality；　on　the　other　hand；　in　contrast　to　this　and　apart　from　it；　he
  expresses　the　ideality　of　Spinoza　and　the　non…absolute　nature　of　all　difference；　as　the　idealism　of
  the　popular　conception。　Leibnitz's　philosophy　is　a　metaphysics；　and　in　sharp　contrast　to　the　simple
  universal　Substance　of　Spinoza；　where　all　that　is　determined　is　merely　transitory；　it　makes
  fundamental　the　absolute　multiplicity　of　individual　substances；　which　after　the　example　of　the
  ancients　he　named　monads　—　an　expression　already　used　by　the　Pythagoreans。　These　monads　he
  then　proceeds　to　determine　as　follows。
  Firstly：　“Substance　is　a　thing　that　is　capable　of　activity；　it　is　compound　or　simple；　the　compound
  cannot　exist　without　the　simple。　The　monads　are　simple　substances。”　The　proof　that　they
  constitute　the　truth　in　all　things　is　very　simple；　it　is　a　superficial　reflection。　For　instance；　one　of
  Leibnitz's　maxims　is：　“Because　there　are　compound　things；　the　principles　of　the　same　must　be
  simple；　for　the　compound　consists　of　the　simple。”（6）　This　proof　is　poor　enough；　it　is　an　example　of
  the　favourite　way　of　starting　from　something　definite；　say　the　compound；　and　then　drawing
  conclusions　therefrom　as　to　the　simple。　It　is　quite　right　in　a　way；　but　really　it　is　tautology。　Of
  course；　if　the　compound　exists；　so　does　the　simple；　for　the　compound　means　something　in　itself
  manifold　whose　connection　or　unity　is　external。　From　the　very　trivial　category　of　the　compound　it
  is　easy　to　deduce　the　simple。　It　is　a　conclusion　drawn　from　a　certain　premiss；　but　the　question　is
  whether　the　premiss　is　true。　These　monads　are　not；　however；　something　abstract　and　simple　in
  itself；　like　the　empty　Epicurean　atoms；　which；　as　they　were　in　themselves　lacking　in　determination；
  drew　all　their　determination　from　their　aggregation　alone。　The　monads　are；　on　the　contrary；
  substantial　forms；　a　good　expression；　borrowed　from　the　Scholastics　（supra；　p。　71）；　or　the
  metaphysical　points　of　the　Alexandrian　School　（Vol。　II。　p。　439）；　they　are　the　entelechies　of
  Aristotle　taken　as　pure　activity；　which　are　forms　in　themselves　（Vol。　II。　pp。　138；　182；　183）。
  “These　monads　are　not　material　or　extended；　nor　do　they　originate　or　decay　in　the　natural　fashion；
  for　they　can　begin　only　by　a　creative　act　of　God；　and　they　can　end　only　by　annihilation。”（7）
  Thereby　they　are　distinguished　from　the　atoms；　which　are　regarded　simply　as　principles。　The
  expression　creation　we　are　familiar　with　from　religion；　but　it　is　a　meaningless　word　derived　from
  the　ordinary　conception；　in　order　to　be　a　thought　and　to　have　philosophic　significance；　it　must　be
  much　more　closely　defined。
  Secondly：　“On　account　of　their　simplicity　the　monads　are　not　susceptible　of　alteration　by　another
  monad　in　their　inner　essence；　there　is　no　causal　connection　between　them。”　Each　of　them　is
  something　indifferent　and　independent　as　regards　the　rest；　otherwise　it　would　not　be　an　entelechy。
  Each　of　them　is　so　much　for　itself　that　all　its　determinations　and　modifications　go　on　in　itself　alone；
  and　no　determination　from　without　takes　place。　Leibnitz　says：　“There　are　three　ways　in　which
  substances　are　connected：　（1）　Causality；　influence；　（2）　The　relation　of　assistance；　（3）　The　relation
  of　harmony。　The　relation　of　influence　is　a　relation　pertaining　to　a　commonplace　or　popular
  philosophy。　But　as　it　is　impossible　to　understand　how　material　particles　or　immaterial　qualities　can
  pass　from　one　substance　into　another；　such　a　conception　as　this　must　be　abandoned。”　If　we
  accept　the　reality　of　the　many；　there　can　be　no　transition　at　all；　each　is　an　ultimate　and　absolutely
  independent　entity。　“The　system　of　assistance；”　according　to　Descartes；　“is　something　quite
  superfluous；　a　Deus　ex　machina；　because　continual　miracles　in　the　things　of　nature　are　assumed。”
  If　we；　like　Descartes；　assume　independent　substances；　no　causal　nexus　is　conceivable；　for　this
  presupposes　an　influence；　a　bearing　of　the　one　upon　the　other；　and　in　this　way　the　other　is　not　a
  substance。　“Therefore　there　remains　only　harmony；　a　unity　which　is　in　itself　or　implicit。　The　monad
  is　therefore　simply　shut　up　in　itself；　and　cannot　be　determined　by　another；　this　other　cannot　be　set
  into　it。　It　can　neither　get　outside　itself；　nor　can　others　get　inside　it。”（8）　That　is　also　Spinoza's　way　of
  regarding　matters：　each　attribute　entirely　represents　the　essence　of　God　for　itself；　extension　and
  thought　have　no　influence　on　each　other。
  In　the　third　place；　“however；　these　monads　must　at　the　same　time　have　certain　qualities　or
  determinations　in　themselves；　inner　actions；　through　which　they　are　distinguished　from　others。
  There　cannot　be　two　things　alike；　for　otherwise　they　would　not　be　two；　they　would　not　be　different
  but　one　and　the　same。”（9）　Here　then　Leibnitz's　axiom　of　the　undistinguishable　comes　into　words。
  What　is　not　in　itself　distinguished　is　not　distinguished。　This　may　be　taken　in　a　trivial　sense；　as　that
  there　are　not　two　individuals　which　are　alike。　To　such　sensuous　things　the　maxim　has　no
  application；　it　is　prima　facie　indifferent　whether　there　are　things　which　are　alike　or　not；　there　may
  also　be　always　a　difference　of　space。　This　is　the　superficial　sense；　which　does　not　concern　us。　The
  more　intimate　sense　is；　however；　that　each　thing　is　in　itself　something　determined；　distinguishing
  itself　from　others　implicitly　or　in　itself。　Whether　two　things　are　like　or　unlike　is　only　a　comparison
  which　we　make；　which　falls　within　our　ken。　But　what　we　have　further　to　consider　is　the　determined
  difference　in　themselves。　The　difference　must　be　a　difference　in　themselves；　not　for　our
  comparison；　for　the　subject　must　have　the　difference　as　its　own　peculiar　characteristic　or
  determination；　i。e。；　the　determination　must　be　immanent　in　the　individual。　Not　only　do　we
  distinguish　the　animal　by　its　claws；　but　it　distinguishes　itself　essentially　thereby；　it　defends　itself；　it
  preserves　itself。　If　two　things　are　different　only　in　being　two；　then　each　of　them　is　one；　but　the　fact
  of　their　being　two　does　not　constitute　a　distinction　between　them；　the　determined　difference　in　itself
  is　the　principal　point。
  Fourthly：　“The　determinateness　and　the　variation　thereby　established　is；　however；　an　inward
  implicit　principle；　it　is　a　multiplicity　of　modification；　of　relations　to　surrounding　existences；　but　a
  multiplicity　which　remains　locked　up　in　simplicity。　Determinateness　and　variation　such　as　this；
  which　rem