the　objects　themselves；　in　mind　and　thought。
  B　3。　THOMAS　HOBBES。
  a。　Hobbes；　who　was　celebrated　and　distinguished　on　account　of　the　originality　of　his　views；　was
  tutor　to　the　Earl　of　Devonshire；　he　was　born　in　1588　at　Malmesbury；　and　died　in　1679。（3）　As　a
  contemporary　of　Cromwell；　he　found　in　the　events　of　that　time；　in　the　Revolution　which　then　took
  place　in　England；　an　occasion　for　reflecting　on　the　principles　of　state　and　law；　and　in　fact　he
  succeeded　in　making　his　way　to　quite　original　conceptions。　He　wrote　much；　including　a　treatise　on
  Philosophy；　entitled　“The　Elements　of　Philosophy。”　The　first　section　（Sectio）　of　this　work；　De
  corpore；　appeared　in　London　in　1655；　in　it　he　first　of　all　treats　of　Logic　（Pars　I。）；　and　secondly　of
  philosophia　prima　（Pars　III。）；　this　last　is　an　ontology　and　metaphysic。　The　next　subdivision　（Pars
  III。）；　“On　the　relation　between　motion　and　magnitude；”　is　a　system　of　mechanism；　a　quite　popular
  system　of　physics；　and　a　study　of　the　human　organs。　The　second　section　was　to　treat　of　the　nature
  of　man　（De　homine）；　and　the　third　of　the　state　（De　cive）；　but　the　intellectual　sections　of　the　work
  Hobbes　did　not　entirely　finish。　He　says　in　his　preface　that　Copernicus　first　opened　up　astronomy；
  and　Galileo　physics；　before　them　there　was　nothing　certain　in　either　science。　Harvey　worked　out
  the　science　of　the　human　body；　and　physics　generally　as　well　as　astronomy　were　perfected　by
  Keppler。　All　this　was　termed　Philosophy；　in　accordance　with　the　point　of　view　which　has　been
  already　given　（p。　313）；　since　in　it　the　reflective　understanding　desires　to　know　the　universal。
  Hobbes　further　says　concerning　the　philosophy　of　the　state　（philosophia　civilis）；　that　it　only　dates
  from　the　publication　of　his　book　De　cive。（4）　This　work；　which　appeared　at　Paris　in　1642；（5）　is；
  like　his　Leviathan；　a　much　decried　book；　the　second　mentioned　writing　was　forbidden　to　be
  circulated；　and　is　hence　very　rare。　Both　works　contain　sounder　reflections　on　the　nature　of　society
  and　government　than　many　now　in　circulation。　Society；　the　state；　is　to　Hobbes　absolutely
  preeminent；　it　is　the　determining　power　without　appeal　as　regards　law　and　positive　religion　and
  their　external　relations；　and　because　he　placed　these　in　subjection　to　the　state；　his　doctrines　were
  of　course　regarded　with　the　utmost　horror。　But　there　is　nothing　speculative　or　really　philosophic　in
  them；　and　there　is　still　less　in　Hugo　Grotius。
  Before　this　ideals　were　set　before　us；　or　Holy　Scripture　or　positive　law　was　quoted　as
  authoritative。　Hobbes；　on　the　contrary；　sought　to　derive　the　bond　which　holds　the　state　together；
  that　which　gives　the　state　its　power；　from　principles　which　lie　within　us；　which　we　recognize　as　our
  own。　In　this　way　two　opposite　principles　arise。　The　first　is　the　passive　obedience　of　subjects；　the
  divine　authority　of　rulers；　whose　will　is　absolute　law；　and　is　itself　elevated　above　all　other　law。　All
  this　is　represented　in　close　connection　with　religion；　and　proved　by　examples　from　the　Old
  Testament；　by　such　stories　as　those　of　Saul　and　David。　Criminal　and　marriage　laws；　too；　for　long
  derived　their　character　from　the　Mosaic　laws；　or；　speaking　generally；　from　those　the　provisions　of
  which　possessed　their　value　by　the　fact　of　being　established　by　express　divine　command。　On　the
  other　hand　we　have　in　the　second　place　the　reasoning　wherein　we　ourselves　are　the　determining
  agents；　and　which　was　called　sound　reason。　In　the　movement　which　Cromwell　made　use　of　there
  was　allied　with　this　a　fanaticism；　which　from　the　written　letter　drew　opposite　conclusions　to　the
  above；　and　this　we　see　exemplified　in　the　equality　of　property；　for　instance。　Hobbes；　it　is　true；
  likewise　maintained　passive　obedience；　the　absolute　freedom　of　the　royal　will　and　power；　but　at
  the　same　time　he　sought　to　derive　the　principles　of　monarchical　power；　etc。；　from　universal
  determinations。　The　views　that　he　adopts　are　shallow　and　empirical；　but　the　reasons　he　gives　for
  them；　and　the　propositions　he　makes　respecting　them；　are　original　in　character；　inasmuch　as　they
  are　derived　from　natural　necessities　and　wants。
  Hobbes　maintained　that　“The　origin　of　all　society　is　to　be　found　in　the　mutual　fear　of　all　its
  members；”　it　is　hence　a　phenomenon　in　consciousness。　“Each　association　is　thus　formed　in　its
  own　interest　or　for　its　own　renown；　that　is；　from　selfish　motives。”　All　such　matters　as　security　of
  life；　property；　and　enjoyment；　are　not　to　be　found　outside　it。　“But　men　have　in　all　dissimilarity　of
  strength　a　natural　similarity　as　well。”　This　Hobbes　proves　by　a　characteristic　reason；　viz。　that
  “each　individual　can　make　away　with　the　other；”　each　is　the　ultimate　power　over　the　others。
  “Each　can　be　supreme。”（6）　Thus　their　similarity　is　not　derived　from　the　greatest　strength；　it　is　not；
  as　in　modern　times；　founded　on　the　freedom　of　the　spirit；　or　on　an　equality　of　merit　and
  independence；　but　on　the　equal　weakness　of　mankind；　each　man　is　weak　as　regards　others。
  b。　Hobbes　further　takes　up　the　position　that　this　natural　condition　is　of　such　a　nature　that　all
  possess　the　desire　to　rule　over　one　another。　“All　in　their　natural　condition　are　possessed　of　the　will
  to　injure　others；”　to　tyrannize　over　other　men；　each　has　thus　to　fear　the　other。　Hobbes　looks　at
  this　condition　in　its　true　light；　and　we　find　in　him　no　idle　talk　about　a　state　of　natural　goodness；　the
  natural　condition　is　really　far　more　like　that　of　the　animals　—　a　condition　in　which　there　is　an
  unsubdued　individual　will。　All　thus　wish　to　“secure　themselves　against　the　pretensions　of　others；　to
  acquire　for　themselves　advantages　and　superior　rights。　Opinions；　religions；　desires；　arouse　strife；
  the　stronger　bears　away　the　victory。　The　natural　condition　is　consequently　a　condition　of　mistrust
  on　the　part　of　all　toward　all；　it　is　a　war　of　all　against　all　（bellum　omnium　in　omnes）；”　and　the
  endeavour　of　one　to　overreach　another。　The　expression　nature　has　a　double　significance：　In　the
  first　place　the　nature　of　man　signifies　his　spiritual　and　rational　Being；　but　his　natural　condition
  indicates　quite　another　condition；　wherein　man　conducts　himself　according　to　his　natural　impulses。
  In　this　way　he　conducts　himself　in　conformity　with　his　desires　and　inclinations；　while　the　rational；　on
  the　contrary；　is　the　obtaining　supremacy　over　the　immediately　natural。　“In　the　condition　of　nature　a
  certain　irresistible　power　grants　the　right　to　rule　over　those　who　cannot　resist；　it　is　absurd　to　leave
  those　whom　we　have　in　our　power　to　become　free　and　strong　again。”
  From　this　Hobbes　draws　the　conclusion　that　“man　must　go　forth　from　the　natural　condition。”（7）
  This　is　true；　the　natural　condition　is　not　what　it　should　be；　and　must　hence　be　cast　off。
  c。　Hobbes　finally　passes　to　the　laws　of　reason　which　preserve　tranquillity。　This　condition　of　law　is
  the　subjection　of　the　natural；　particular　will　of　the　individual　to　the　universal　will；　which；　however；　is
  not　that　of　all　individuals；　but　is　the　will　of　the　ruler；　this　is　consequently　not　responsible　to
  individuals；　but　is　directed　against　this　private　will；　and　to　it　all　must　be　obedient。（8）　Thus　the
  whole　matter　is　now　placed　on　quite　another　footing。　But　because　the　universal　will　is　made　to
  reside　in　the　will　of　one　monarch；　there　nevertheless　proceeds　from　this　point　of　view；　which　is
  really　correct；　a　condition　of　absolute　rule；　of　perfect　despotism。　The　condition　of　law　does　not；
  however；　mean　that　the　arbitrary　will　of　one　man　constitutes　absolute　law；　for　the　universal　will　is
  no　despotism；　being　rational；　inasmuch　as　it　is　consistently　expressed　and　determined　in　laws。
  Rixner　（Handbuch　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie；　Vol。　III。　p。　30）　says：　“Law　to　him　is　nothing
  but　the　sum　of　the　conditions　of　peace　extorted　by　iron　necessity　from　the　original　wickedness　of
  mankind。”　We　might　add　that　in　Hobbes　we　at　least　find　this；　that　the　nature　and　organism　of　the
  State　is　established　on　the　principle　of　human　nature；　human　desire；　&c。　The　English　concerned
  themselves　greatly　with　that　principle　of　passive　obedience；　in　accordance　with　which　it　is　said　that
  kings　receive　their　power　from　God。　This；　in　one　aspect；　is　quite　true；　but　in　another　it　is　falsely
  taken　to　mean　that　they　have　no　responsibility；　that　their　blind　desires；　their　merely　subjective　will；
  is　what　must　be　obeyed。
  B　4。　CUDWORTH。　　　CLARKE。　　　WOLLASTON。
  Cudworth　wished　to　revive　Plato　in　England；　but　to　do　this　after　the　manner　of　the　demonstrations
  which　we　met　with　in　Descartes；　and　through　a　trivial　metaphysic　of　the　understanding。　He　wrote　a
  celebrated　work：　“The　true　intellectual　System　of　the　Universe；”　but　the　Platonic　ideas　expressed
  are　often　in　a　clumsy　form　and　mingled　with　the　Christian　conceptions　of　God　and　angels　—　all
  regarded　as　particular　existent　things。　What　in　Plato　is　mythical；　is　here　taken　as　reality　in　the　form
  of　existence；　this　is　reasoned　about　just　as　we　reason　respecting　a　matter　of　ordinary　fact；　such　as
  whether　it　is　probable　that　the　French　seek　to　effect　a　landing　in　England；　and　if　so；　whether　they
  will　successfully　accomplish　it。　The　Christian　intellectual　world　is　dragged　do