time　become　conscious　of　its　reality。
  The　grounds　on　which　Locke　refutes　innate　ideas　are　empirical。　“There　is　nothing　more　commonly
  taken　for　granted　than　that　there　are　certain　principles；　both　speculative　and　practical；　universally
  agreed　upon　by　all　mankind：　which　therefore；　they　argue；　must　needs　be　constant　impressions
  which　the　souls　of　men　receive　in　their　first　Beings。”　But　this　universal　consent　is　not　to　be　found。
  We　may　instance　the　proposition；　“Whatsoever　is；　is；　and　It　is　impossible　for　the　same　thing　to　be
  and　not　to　be；　which　of　all　others　I　think　have　the　most　allowed　title　to　innate。”　But　this
  proposition　does　not　hold　good　for　the　Notion；　there　is　nothing　either　in　heaven　or　earth　which
  does　not　contain　Being　and　non…Being。　Many　men；　“All　children　and　idiots；”　says　Locke；　“have
  not　the　least　apprehension　of　these　propositions。”　“No　proposition　can　be　said　to　be　in　the　mind
  which　it　never　yet　knew；　which　it　was　never　yet　conscious　of。　。　。　。　'Tis　usually　answered；　That　all
  men　know　and　assent　to　them”　（the　propositions）　“when　they　come　to　the　use　of　reason。　。　。　。　If　it
  be　meant　that　the　use　of　reason　assists　us　in　the　knowledge　of　these　maxims；　it　would　prove　them
  not　to　be　innate。”　Reason　is　said　to　be　the　deriving　from　principles　already　known　unknown
  truths。　How　then　should　the　application　of　reason　be　required　to　discover　supposed　innate
  principles？　This　is　a　weak　objection；　for　it　assumes　that　by　innate　ideas　we　understand　those　which
  man　possesses　in　consciousness　as　immediately　present。　But　development；　in　consciousness　is
  something　altogether　different　from　any　inherent　determination　of　reason；　and　therefore　the
  expression　innate　idea　is　undoubtedly　quite　wrong。　Innate　principles　must　be　found　“clearest　and
  most　perspicuous　nearest　the　fountain；　in　children　and　illiterate　people；　who　have　received　least
  impression　from　foreign　opinion。”　Locke　gives　further　reasons　of　a　similar　nature；　more　especially
  employing　those　which　are　of　a　practical　kind　…　the　diversity　in　moral　judgments；　the　case　of　those
  who　are　utterly　wicked　and　depraved；　devoid　of　sense　of　right　or　conscience。（3）
  b。　In　the　second　book　Locke　goes　on　to　the　next　stage；　to　the　origin　of　ideas；　and　seeks　to
  demonstrate　this　process　from　experience　…　this　is　the　main　object　of　his　efforts。　The　reason　that
  the　positive　point　of　view　which　he　opposes　to　any　derivation　from　within；　is　so　false；　is　that　he
  derives　his　conceptions　only　from　outside　and　thus　maintains　Being　for…another；　while　he　quite
  neglects　the　implicit。　He　says：　“Every　man　being　conscious　to　himself；　that　he　thinks；　and　that
  which　his　mind　is　applied　about；　while　thinking；　being　the　ideas　that　are　there；　'tis　past　doubt；　that
  men　have　in　their　minds　several　ideas；　such　as　those　expressed　in　the　words；　whiteness；　hardness；
  sweetness；　thinking；　motion；　man；　elephant；　army；　drunkenness；　and　others。”　Idea　here　signifies
  both　the　ordinary　conception　and　thought；　we　understand　something　quite　different　by　the　word
  idea。　“It　is　in　the　first　place　then　to　be　inquired；　how　he　comes　by　them”　（these　ideas）？　Innate
  ideas　have　already　been　refuted。　“Let　us　then　suppose　the　mind　to　be；　as　we　say；　white　paper；
  void　of　all　characters；　without　any　ideas；　how　comes　it　to　be　furnished？　。　。　。　To　this　I　answer　in　a
  word；　from　Experience：　in　that　all　our　knowledge　is　founded。”（4）
  As　to　the　question　in　point　we　must　in　the　first　place　say　that　it　is　true　that　man　commences　with
  experience　if　he　desires　to　arrive　at　thought。　Everything　is　experienced；　not　merely　what　is
  sensuous；　but　also　what　excites　and　stimulates　my　mind。　Consciousness　thus　undoubtedly　obtains
  all　conceptions　and　Notions　from　experience　and　in　experience；　the　only　question　is　what　we
  understand　by　experience。　In　a　usual　way　when　this　is　spoken　of　the　idea　of　nothing　particular　is
  conveyed；　we　speak　of　it　as　of　something　quite　well　known。　But　experience　is　nothing　more　than
  the　form　of　objectivity；　to　say　that　it　is　something　which　is　in　consciousness　means　that　it　has
  objective　form　for　consciousness　or　that　consciousness　experiences　it；　it　sees　it　as　an　objective。
  Experience　thus　signifies　immediate　knowledge；　perception；　i。e。；　I　myself　must　have　and　be
  something；　and　the　consciousness　of　what　I　have　and　am　is　experience。　Now　there　is　no　question
  as　to　this；　that　whatever　we　know；　of　whatever　kind　it　may　be；　must　be　experienced；　that　rests　in
  the　conception　of　the　thing。　It　is　absurd　to　say　that　one　knows　anything　which　is　not　in　experience。
  I　undoubtedly　know　men；　for　instance；　from　experience；　without　requiring　to　have　seen　them　all；
  for　I　have；　as　man；　activity　and　will；　a　consciousness　respecting　what　I　am　and　what　others　are。
  The　rational　exists；　i。e。；　it　is　as　an　existent　for　consciousness；　or　this　last　experiences　it；　it　must　be
  seen　and　heard；　it　must　be　there　or　have　been　there　as　a　phenomenon　in　the　world。　This
  connection　of　universal　with　objective　is　however　in　the　second　place　not　the　only　form；　that　of　the
  implicit　is　likewise　absolute　and　essential　…　that　is；　the　apprehension　of　what　is　experienced　or　the
  abrogation　of　this　apparent　other…being　and　the　knowledge　of　the　necessity　of　the　thing　through
  itself。　It　is　now　quite　a　matter　of　indifference　whether　anything　is　accepted　as　something
  experienced；　as　a　succession　of　empirical　ideas；　if　one　may　so　say；　or　conceptions；　or　whether　the
  succession　is　a　succession　of　thoughts；　i。e。；　implicitly　existent。
  Locke　treats　of　the　various　kinds　of　these　ideas　imperfectly　and　empirically　merely。
  According　to　Locke　simple　ideas　arise；　partly　from　outward；　and　partly　from　inward　experience。
  For　experiences；　he　says；　are　in　the　first　place　sensations；　the　other　side　is　reflection；　the　inward
  determinations　of　consciousness。（5）　From　sensation；　from　the　organs　of　sight　for　instance；　the
  conceptions　of　colour；　light；　etc。；　arise；　there　further　arises　from　outward　experience　the　idea　of
  impenetrability；　of　figure；　rest；　motion　and　such　like。　From　reflections　come　the　ideas　of　faith；
  doubt；　judgment；　reasoning；　thinking；　willing；　etc。；　from　both　combined；　pleasure；　pain；　etc。　This　is
  a　very　commonplace　account　of　the　matter。
  After　Locke　has　pre…supposed　experience；　he　goes　on　to　say　that　it　is　the　understanding　which
  now　discovers　and　desires　the　universal　…　the　complex　ideas。　The　Bishop　of　Worcester　made　the
  objection　that　“If　the　idea　of　substance　be　grounded　upon　plain　and　evident　reason；　then　we　must
  allow　an　idea　of　substance　which　comes　not　in　by　sensation　or　reflection。”　Locke　replies：
  “General　ideas　come　not　into　the　mind　by　sensation　or　reflection；　but　are　the　creatures　or
  inventions　of　the　understanding。　The　mind　makes　them　from　ideas　which　it　has　got　by　sensation
  and　reflection。”　The　work　of　the　mind　now　consists　in　bringing　forth　from　several　simple　so…called
  ideas　a　number　of　new　ones；　by　means　of　its　working　upon　this　material　through　comparing；
  distinguishing　and　contrasting　it；　and　finally　through　separation　or　abstraction；　whereby　the
  universal　conceptions；　such　as　space；　time；　existence；　unity　and　diversity；　capacity；　cause　and
  effect；　freedom；　necessity；　take　their　rise。　“The　mind　in　respect　of　its　simple　ideas　is　wholly
  passive；　and　receives　them　all　from　the　existence　and　operation　of　things；　such　as　sensation　or
  reflection　offers　them；　without　being　able　to　make　any　one　idea。”　But　“the　mind　often　exercises
  an　active　power　in　making　these　several　combinations。　For　it　being　once　furnished　with　simple
  ideas　it　can　put　them　together　in　several　combinations。”　According　to　Locke　therefore　thought
  itself　is　not　the　essence　of　the　soul；　but　one　of　its　powers　and　manifestations。　He　maintains　thought
  to　be　existent　in　consciousness　as　conscious　thought；　and　thus　brings　it　forward　as　a　fact　in　his
  experience；　that　we　do　not　always　think。　Experience　demonstrates　dreamless　sleep　when　the　sleep
  is　profound。　Locke　quotes　the　example　of　a　man　who　remembered　no　dream　until　he　had　reached
  his　twenty…fifth　year。　It　is　as　in　the　Xenien；　…　（6）
  Oft　schon　war　ich；　und　hab'　wirklich　an　gar　nichts　gedacht。
  That　is　to　say；　my　object　is　not　a　thought。　But　sensuous　perception　and　recollection　are　thought；
  and　thought　is　truth。（7）　Locke；　however；　places　the　reality　of　the　understanding　only　in　the　formal
  activity　of　constituting　new　determinations　from　the　simple　conceptions　received　by　means　of
  perception；　through　their　comparison　and　the　combination　of　several　into　one；　it　is　the
  apprehension　of　the　abstract　sensations　which　are　contained　in　the　objects。　Locke　likewise
  distinguishes　（Bk。　11。　chap。　xi。　§　15…17）　between　pure　and　mixed　modes。　Pure　modes　are　simple
  determinations　such　as　power；　number；　infinitude；　in　such　expressions　as　causality　we　reach；　on
  the　other　hand；　a　mixed　mode。
  Locke　now　explains　in　detail　the　manner　in　which　the　mind；　from　the　simple　ideas　of　experience；
  reaches　more　complex　ideas；　but　this　derivation　of　general　determinations　from　concrete
  perception　is　most　unmeaning；　trivial；　tiresome　and　diffuse；　it　is　entirely　formal；　an　empty　tautology。
  For　instance　we　form　the　general　conception　of　space　from　the　perception　of　the　distance