the　one　absolute　substance；　wherein　they　are　simply　swallowed　up；　and　all　life　in　itself　is　utterly
  destroyed。　This　is　what　we　find　philosophically　inadequate　with　Spinoza；　distinctions　are　externally
  present；　it　is　true；　but　they　remain　external；　since　even　the　negative　is　not　known　in　itself。　Thought
  is　the　absolutely　abstract；　and　for　that　very　reason　the　absolutely　negative；　it　is　so　in　truth；　but　with
  Spinoza　it　is　not　asserted　to　be　the　absolutely　negative。　But　if　in　opposition　to　Spinozism　we　hold
  fast　to　the　assertion　that　Spirit；　as　distinguishing　itself　from　the　corporeal；　is　substantial；　actual；　true；
  and　in　the　same　way　that　freedom　is　not　something　merely　privative；　then　this　actuality　in　formal
  thought　is　doubtless　correct；　yet　it　rests　only　upon　feeling；　but　the　further　step　is　that　the　Idea
  essentially　includes　within　itself　motion　and　vitality；　and　that　it　consequently　has　in　itself　the　principle
  of　spiritual　freedom。　On　the　one　hand；　therefore；　the　defect　of　Spinozism　is　conceived　as
  consisting　in　its　want　of　correspondence　with　actuality；　but　on　the　other　side　it　is　to　be
  apprehended　in　a　higher　sense；　I　mean　in　the　sense　that　substance　with　Spinoza　is　only　the　Idea
  taken　altogether　abstractly；　not　in　its　vitality。
  If；　in　conclusion；　we　sum　up　this　criticism　that　we　have　offered；　we　would　say　that　on　the　one　hand
  with　Spinoza　negation　or　privation　is　distinct　from　substance；　for　he　merely　assumes　individual
  determinations；　and　does　not　deduce　them　from　substance。　On　the　other　hand　the　negation　is
  present　only　as　Nothing；　for　in　the　absolute　there　is　no　mode；　the　negative　is　not　there；　but　only　its
  dissolution；　its　return：　we　do　not　find　its　movement；　its　Becoming　and　Being。　The　negative　is
  conceived　altogether　as　a　vanishing　moment　—　not　in　itself；　but　only　as　individual
  self…consciousness；　it　is　not　like　the　Separator　we　met　with　in　Boehme's　system　（supra；　p。　206）。
  Self…consciousness　is　born　from　this　ocean；　dripping　with　the　water　thereof；　i。e。；　never　coming　to
  absolute　self…hood；　the　heart；　the　independence　is　transfixed　—　the　vital　fire　is　wanting。　This　lack
  has　to　be　supplied；　the　moment　of　self…consciousness　has　to　be　added。　It　has　the　following　two
  special　aspects；　which　we　now　perceive　emerging　and　gaining　acceptance；　in　the　first　place　the
  objective　aspect；　that　absolute　essence　obtains　in　self…consciousness　the　mode　of　an　object　of
  consciousness　for　which　the　“other”　exists；　or　the　existent　as　such；　and　that　what　Spinoza；
  understood　by　the　“modes”　is　elevated　to　objective　reality　its　an　absolute　moment　of　the　absolute；
  in　the　second　place　we　have　the　aspect　of　self…consciousness；　individuality；　independence。　As　was
  formerly　the　case　with　respect　to　Bacon　and　Boehme；　the　former　aspect　is　here　taken　up　by　the
  Englishman；　John　Locke；　the　latter　by　the　German　Leibnitz；　in　the　first　case　it　did　not　appear　as　a
  moment；　nor　did　it　in　the　second　appear　as　absolute　Notion。　Now　while　Spinoza　only　takes　notice
  of　these　ordinary　conceptions；　and。　the　highest　point　of　view　he　reaches　in　regard　to　them　is　that
  they　sink　and　disappear　in　the　one　Substance；　Locke　on　the　contrary　examines　the　genesis　of
  these　conceptions；　while　Leibnitz　opposes　to　Spinoza　the　infinite　multiplicity　of　individuals；
  although　all　these　monads　have　one　monad　as　the　basis　of　their　Being。　Both　Locke　and　Leibnitz
  therefore　came　forward　as　opponents　of　the　abovementioned　one…sidedness　of　Spinoza。
  1。　Collectanea　de　vita　B。　de　Spinoza　（addita　Operibus　ed。　Paulus　Jenn？　1802…1803；　T。　II。）；　pp。
  593…604；　612…628　（Spinoza　Epist。　LIII…LIV。　in　Oper。　ed。　Paul　T。　I。　pp。　638…640）　642…665；
  Spinoz？　Oper。　ed。　Paul　T。　II。　Pr？f。　p。　XVI。
  2。　Collectanea　de　vita　B。　de　Spinoza；　pp。　629…641；　Spinoz？　Ethic。　（Oper。　T。　II。）　Pp。　1；　3　et　not。；
  33。
  3。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　I。　Prop。　V。　VIII。　X。　et　Schol。；　XIII。　pp。　37…39；　41；　42；　45。
  4。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　I。　Prop。　XVII。；　Coroll。　I。；　II。；　et　Schol。；　Prop。　XVIII。；　Prop。　XX。；　et　Coroll。
  I。　Prop。　XXI。；　XXVI。；　XXVII。；　XXIX。；　XXXII。；　XXXIII。　Schol。　II。　pp。　51…57；　59；　61；　63；　67；
  68。
  5。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　II。　Prop。　I。；　II。；　VII。　et　Schol。　pp。　78；　79；　82；　83。
  6。　Spinoz。　Ethic。　P。　I。　Prop。　XXX…XXXII。　pp。　62；　63；　P。　III。　Defin。　III。　p。　132；　Prop。　XI。　Schol。；
  p。　141。
  7。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　II。　Prop。　XI。　Demonst。　et　Coroll。　pp。　86；　87；　Defin。　IV。　pp。　77；　78。
  8。　Dictionnaire　historique　et　critique　（édition　de　1740；　T。　IV。）；　Article　Spinosa；　p。　261；　Note　N。
  No。　IV。
  9。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　II。　Prop。　XII。；　XIII。　et　Schol。　Prop。　XIV。；　XXIII。；　V。　pp。　87…89；　95；　102；
  80；　81。
  10。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　II。　Prop。　XI。　（Axiom　I。　p。　78）　et　Demonstr。　Prop。　X。　pp。　85…87；　Prop。
  VI。　p。　81；　P。　III。　Prop。　II。　pp。　133；　134。
  11。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　III。　Prop。　VI…VIII。　Prop。　IX。　Schol。　pp。　139；1　140；　P。　II。　Prop。　XLIX。
  Coroll。　p。　123；　P。　III。　Prop。　II。　Schol。　p。　136；　P。　V。　Prop。　III。　Demonst。　et　Coroll。　pp。　272；　273。
  12。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　III。　Prop。　I。　p。　132；　Prop。　III。　p。　138；　P。　IV。　Pr？f。　p。　199；　P。　III。　Prop。
  XI。　Schol。　pp。　141；　142；　P。　IV。　Prop。　II。　p。　205；　P。　III。　Prop。　III。　et　Schol。　p。　138。
  13。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　V。　Prop。　XXXVI。　Schol。　Prop。　XXXVIL　Demonstr。；　Prop。　XXXVIII。　et
  Schol。　pp。　293…295。
  14。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　II。　Prop。　XL。　Schol。　II。　pp。　113；　114。
  15。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　II。　Prop。　XLIV。　et　Coroll。　II。　pp。　117；　118；　Prop。　XLV。　p。　119；　P。　V。
  Prop。　XXX。　p。　289：　P。　II。　Prop。　XXXII。　p。　107。
  16。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　V。　Prop。　XIV。　p。　280；　Prop。　VI。　p。　275；　Prop。　XXVII。　pp。　287；　288；
  Prop。　XXXII。　Coroll。；　Prop。　XXXV。　pp。　291；　292。
  Section　Two：　Period　of　the　Thinking　Understanding
  Chapter　I。　—　The　Metaphysics　of　the　Understanding
  A　3。　MALEBRANCHE
  The　philosophy　of　Malebranche　is　in　point　of　matter　entirely　identical　with　that　of　Spinoza；　but　it
  has　another；　a　more　religious　and　more　theological　form；　on　account　of　this　form　it　never
  encountered　the　opposition　met　with　by　Spinoza；　and　for　the　same　reason　Malebranche　has　never
  been　reproached　with　Atheism。
  Nicholas　Malebranche　was　born　at　Paris　in　1638。　He　was　sickly　and　deformed　in　body；　and　was
  hence　brought　up　with　great　care。　He　was　diffident　and　loved　solitude；　in　his　twenty…second　year
  he　entered　the　congrégation　de　l’　oratoire；　a　sort　of　spiritual　order；　and　devoted　himself　to　the
  sciences。　In　passing　a　bookseller’　s　shop　he　happened　accidentally　to　see　Descartes’　work　De
  homine；　he　read　it；and　it　interested　him　greatly　—　so　much　so　that　the　reading　of　it　brought　on
  severe　palpitation　and　he　was　forced　to　cease。　This　decided　his　future　life；　there　awoke　in　him　an
  irrepressible　inclination　for　Philosophy。　He　was　a　man　of　most　noble　and　gentle　character；　and　of
  the　most　genuine；　and　unswerving；　piety。　He　died　at　Paris　in　1715；　and　in；　the　seventy…seventh
  year　of　his　age。（1）
  His　principal　work　bears　the　title：　De　la　recherche　de　la　vérité。　One　part　of　it　is　entirely
  metaphysical；　but　the　greater　part　is　altogether　empirical。　For　instance；　Malebranche　in　the　first
  three　books　treats　logically　and　psychologically　of　the　errors　in　sight　and　hearing；　in　the　imagination
  and　understanding。
  a。　What　is　most　important　in　this　book　is　his　idea　of　the　origin　of　our　knowledge。　He　says：　“The
  essence　of　the　soul　is　in　thought；　just　as　that　of　matter　is　in　extension。　All　else；　such　as　sensation；
  imagination　and　will；　are　modifications　of　thought。”　He　thus　begins　with　two　sides；　between　which
  he　sets　an　absolute　chasm；　and　then　he　follows　out　in　detail　the　Cartesian　idea　of　the　assistance　of
  God　in　knowledge。　His　main　point　is　that　“the　soul　cannot　attain　to　its　conceptions　and　notions
  from　external　things。”　For　when　I　and　the　thing　are　clearly　independent　of　one　another　and　have
  nothing　in　common；　the　two　can　certainly　not　enter　into　relation　with　one　another　nor　be　for　one
  another。　“Bodies　are　impenetrable；　their　images　would　destroy　one　another　on　the　way　to　the
  organs。”　But　further：　“The　soul　cannot　beget　ideas　from　itself；　nor　can　they　be　inborn；”　for　as
  “Augustine　has　said；　‘　Say　not　that　ye　yourselves　are　your　own　light。’　”　But　how　then　comes
  extension；　the　manifold；　into　the　simple；　into　the　spirit；　since　it　is　the　reverse　of　the　simple；　namely
  the　diverse？　This　question　regarding　the　association　of　thought　and　extension　is　always　an
  important　one　in　Philosophy。　According　to　Malebranche　the　answer　is；　“That　we　see　all　things　in
  God。”　God　Himself　is　the　connection　between　us　and　them；　and　thus　the　unity　between　the　thing
  and　thought。　“God　has　in　Him　the　ideas　of　all　things　because　He　has　created　all；　God　is　through
  His　omnipresence　united　in　the　most　intimate　way　with　spirits。　God　thus　is　the　place　of　spirits；”　the
  Universal　of　spirit；　“just　as　space”　is　the　universal；　“the　place　of　bodies。　Consequently　the　soul
  knows　in　God　what　is　in　Him；”　bodies；　“inasmuch　as　He　sets　forth”　（inwardly　conceives）
  “created　existence；　because　all　this　is　spiritual；　intellectual；　and　present　to　the　soul。〃（2）　Because
  things　and　God　are　intellectual　and　we　too　are　intellectual；　we　perceive　them　in　God　as　they　are；
  so　to　speak；　intellectual　in　Him。　If　this　be　further　analyzed　it　in　no　way　differs　from　Spinozism。
  Malebranche