and　will　（intellectus　et　voluntas）。　They　are　mere　modifications　which　only　exist　for　us　apart　from
  God；　therefore　whatever　refers　to　this　difference　and　is　specially　brought　about　by　it；　is　not
  absolute；　but　finite。　These　affections　Spinoza　sums　up　（Ethices；　P。　I。　Prop。　XXIX。　Schol。　pp。　61；
  62）　under　the　head　of　natura　naturata：　“Natura　naturans　is　God　regarded　as　free　cause；　in　so
  far　as　He　is　in　Himself　and　is　conceived　by　Himself：　or　such　attributes　of　substance　as　express　the
  eternal　and　infinite　essence。　By　natura　naturata；　I　understand　all　that　follows　from　the　necessity
  of　the　divine　nature；　or　from　any　of　the　attributes　of　God；　all　modes　of　the　divine　attributes；　in　so
  far　as　they　are　regarded　as　things　which　are　in　God；　and　which　without　God　can　neither　exist　nor
  be　conceived。”　From　God　proceeds　nothing；　for　all　things　merely　return　to　the　point　whence　they
  came；　if　from　themselves　the　commencement　is　made。
  These　then　are　Spinoza's　general　forms；　this　is　his　principal　idea。　Some　further　determinations　have
  still　to　be　mentioned。　He　gives　definitions　of　the　terms　modes；　understanding；　will；　and　of　the
  affections；　such　as　joy　and　sadness。（6）　We　further　find　consciousness　taken　into　consideration。　Its
  development　is　extremely　simple；　or　rather　it　is　not　developed　at　all；　Spinoza　begins　directly　with
  mind。　“The　essence　of　man　consists　of　certain　modifications　of　the　attributes　of　God”；　these
  modifications　are　only　something　related　to　our　understanding。　“If　we；　therefore；　say　that　the
  human　mind　perceives　this　or　that；　it　means　nothing　else　than　that　God　has　this　or　that　idea；　not　in
  so　far　as　He　is　infinite；　but　in　so　far　as　He　is　expressed　by　the　idea　of　the　human　mind。　And　if　we
  say　that　God　has　this　or　that　idea；　not　in　so　far　as　He　constitutes　the　idea　of　the　human　mind；　but　in
  so　far　as　He　has；　along　with　the　human　mind；　the　idea　of　another　thing；　then　we　say　that　the　human
  mind　perceives　the　thing　partially　or　inadequately。”　Truth　is　for　Spinoza；　on　the　other　hand；　the
  adequate。（7）　The　idea　that　all　particular　content　is　only；　a　modification　of　God　is　ridiculed　by
  Bayle；（8）　who　argues　from　it　that　God　modified　as　Turks　and　Austrians；　is　waging　war　with
  Himself；　but　Bayle　has　not　a　trace　of　the　speculative　element　in　him；　although　he　is　acute　enough　as
  a　dialectician；　and　has　contributed　to　the　intelligent　discussion　of　definite　subjects。
  The　relation　of　thought　and　extension　in　the　human　consciousness　is　dealt　with　by　Spinoza　as
  follows：　“What　has　a　place　in　the　object”　（or　rather　in　the　objective）　“of　the　idea　which　constitutes
  the　human　mind　must　be　perceived　by　the　human　mind；　or　there　must　necessarily　be　in　the　mind　an
  idea　of　this　object。　The　object　of　the　idea　which　constitutes　the　human　mind　is　body；　or　a　certain
  mode　of　extension。　If；　then；　the　object　of　the　idea　which　constitutes　the　human　mind；　is　the　body；
  there　can　happen　nothing　in　the　body　which　is　not　perceived　by　the　mind。　Otherwise　the　ideas　of
  the　affections　of　the　body　would　not　be　in　God；　in　so　far　as　He　constitutes　our　mind；　but　the　idea
  of　another　thing：　that　is　to　say；　the　ideas　of　the　affections　of　our　body　would　not　be　likewise　in　our
  mind。”　What　is　perplexing　to　understand　in　Spinoza's　system　is；　on　the　one　hand；　the　absolute
  identity　of　thought　and　Being；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　their　absolute　indifference　to　one　another；
  because　each　of　them　is　a　manifestation　of　the　whole　essence　of　God。　The　unity　of　the　body　and
  consciousness　is；　according　to　Spinoza；　this；　that　the　individual　is　a　mode　of　the　absolute
  substance；　which；　as　consciousness；　is　the　representation　of　the　manner　in　which　the　body　is
  affected　by　external　things；　all　that　is　in　consciousness　is　also　in　extension；　and　conversely。　“Mind
  knows　itself　only　in　so　far　as　it　perceives　the　ideas　of　the　affections　of　body；”　it　has　only　the　idea
  of　the　affections　of　its　body；　this　idea　is　synthetic　combination；　as　we　shall　immediately　see。　“The
  ideas；　whether　of　the　attributes　of　God　or　of　individual　things；　do　not　recognize　as　their　efficient
  cause　their　objects　themselves；　or　the　things　perceived；　but　God　Himself；　in　so　far　as　He　is　that
  which　thinks。”（9）　Buhle　（Geschichte　der　neuern　Philos。　Vol。　III。　Section　II。　p。　524）　sums　up　these
  propositions　of　Spinoza　thus：　“Thought　is　inseparably　bound　up　with　extension；　therefore　all　that
  takes　place　in　extension　must　also　take　place　in　consciousness。”　Spinoza；　however；　also　accepts
  both　in　their　separation　from　one　another。　The　idea　of　body；　he　writes　（Epistol。　LXVI。　p。　673）；
  includes　only　these　two　in　itself；　and　does　not　express　any　other　attributes。　The　body　which　it
  represents　is　regarded　under　the　attribute　of　extension；　but　the　idea　itself　is　a　mode　of　thought。
  Here　we　see　a　dividing　asunder；　mere　identity；　the　undistinguishable　nature　of　all　things　in　the
  Absolute；　is　insufficient　even　for　Spinoza。
  The　individuum；　individuality　itself；　is　thus　defined　by　Spinoza　（Ethic。　P。　11。　Prop。　XIII。　Defin。　p。
  92）：　“When　several　bodies　of　the　same　or　of　different　magnitudes　are　so　pressed　together　that　they
  rest　on　one　another；　or　when；　moving　with　like　or　different　degrees　of　rapidity；　they　communicate
  their　movement　to　one　another　in　a　certain　measure；　we　say　that　such　bodies　are　united　to　one
  another；　and　that　all　together　they　form　one　body　or　individuum；　which　by　this　union　distinguishes
  itself　from　all　the　other　bodies。〃　Here　we　are　at　the　extreme　limit　of　Spinoza's　system；　and　it　is　here
  that　his　weak　point　appears。　Individuation；　the　one；　is　a　mere　synthesis；　it　is　quite　a　different　thing
  from　the　Ichts　or　self…hood　of　Boehme　（supra；　pp。　205…207）；　since　Spinoza　has　only　universality；
  thought；　and　not　self…consciousness。　If；　before　considering　this　in　reference　to　the　whole；　we　take
  it　from　the　other　side；　namely　from　the　understanding；　the　distinction　really　falls　under　that　head　it　is
  not　deduced；　it　is　found。　Thus；　as　we　have　already　seen　（p。　270）　“the　understanding　in　act
  （intellectus　actu）；　as　also　will；　desire；　love；　must　be　referred　to　natura　naturata；　not　to　natura
  naturans。　For　by　the　understanding；　as　recognized　for　itself；　we　do　not　mean　absolute　thought；
  but　only　a　certain　mode　of　thought　—　a　mode　which　is　distinct　from　other　modes　like　desire；　love；
  etc。；　and　on　that　account　must　be　conceived　by　means　of　absolute　thought；　i。e。；　by　means　of　an
  attribute　of　God　which　expresses　an　eternal　and　infinite　essentiality　of　thought；　without　which　the
  understanding；　as　also　the　rest　of　the　modes　of　thought；　could　neither　be　nor　be　conceived　to　be。”
  （Spinoza；　Ethices；　P。　1。　Propos。　XXXI。　pp。　62；　63）。　Spinoza　is　unacquainted　with　an　infinity　of
  form；　which　would　be　something　quite　different　from　that　of　rigid；　unyielding　substance。　What　is
  requisite　is　to　recognize　God　as　the　essence　of　essences；　as　universal　substance；　identity；　and　yet
  to　preserve　distinctions。
  Spinoza　goes　on　to　say：　“What　constitutes　the　real　（actuale）　existence　of　the　human　mind　is　nothing
  else　than　the　idea　of　a　particular”　（individual）　“thing；　that　actually　exists；”　not　of　an　infinite　thing。
  “The　essence　of　man　involves　no　necessary　existence；　i。e。；　according　to　the　order　of　nature　a　man
  may　just　as　well　be　as　not　be。”　For　the　human　consciousness；　as　it　does　not　belong　to　essence　as
  an　attribute；　is　a　mode　—　a　mode　of　the　attribute　of　thought。　But　neither　is　the　body；　according　to
  Spinoza；　the　cause　of　consciousness；　nor　is　consciousness　the　cause　of　the　body；　but　the　finite
  cause　is　here　only　the　relation　of　like　to　like；　body　is　determined　by　body；　conception　by
  conception。　“The　body　can　neither　determine　the　mind　to　thought；　nor　can　the　mind　determine　the
  body　to　motion；　or　rest；　or　anything　else。　For　all　modes　of　thought　have　God　as　Cause；　in　so　far　as
  He　is　a　thinking　thing；　and　not　in　so　far　as　He　is　revealed　by　means　of　another　attribute。　What
  therefore　determines　the　mind　to　thought；　is　a　mode　of　thought　and　not　of　extension；　similarly
  motion　and　rest　of　the　body　must　be　derived　from　another　body。”（10）　I　might　quote　many　other
  such　particular　propositions　from　Spinoza；　but　they　are　very　formal；　and　a　continual　repetition　of
  one　and　the　same　thing。
  Buhle　（Gesch。　d。　neuern　Phil。　Vol。　III。　Section　2；　pp。　525…528）；　attributes　limited　conceptions　to
  Spinoza：　“The　soul　experiences　in　the　body　all　the　'other'　of　which　it　becomes　aware　as　outside　of
  the　body；　and　it　becomes　aware　of　this　'other'　only　by　means　of　the　conceptions　of　the　qualities
  which　the　body　perceives　therein。　If；　therefore；　the　body　can　perceive　no　qualities　of　a　thing；　the
  soul　also　can　come　to　no　knowledge　of　it。　On　the　other　hand；　the　soul　is　equally　unable　to　arrive　at
  the　perception　of　the　body　which　belongs　to　it；　the　soul　knows　not　that　the　body　is　there；　and
  knows　itself　even　in　no　other　way　than　by　means　of　the　qualities　which　the　body　perceives　in　things
  which　are　outside　of　it；　and　by　means　of　the　conceptions　of　the　same。　For　the　body　is　an　individual
  thing；　determined　in　a　certain　manner；　which　can　only　gradually；　in　association　with　and　amidst
  other　individual　things；　attain　to　existence；　and　can　preserve　itself　in　existence　only　as　thus
  connected；　combined　and　a