determined　in　itself；　and　not　through　anything　else。　“But　if　these　substances　were　distinguished　by
  their　affections；　since　substance　is　by　nature　prior　to　its　affections　it　would　follow　that　if　from
  substance　its　affections　were　abstracted　and　it　were　regarded　in　itself；　i。e。；　in　its　truth；　it　could
  henceforth　not　be　regarded　as　distinct　from　other　substances。”　“Eighth　Proposition：　All　substance
  is　necessarily　infinite。　Proof：　For　otherwise　it　must　be　limited　by　another　substance　of　the　same
  nature；　in　which　case　there　would　be　two　substances　of　the　same　attribute；　which　is　contrary　to　the
  fifth　proposition。”　“Every　attribute　must　be　conceived　for　itself；”　as　determination　reflected　on
  itself。　“For　attribute　is　what　the　mind　conceives　of　substance　as　constituting　its　essence；　from
  which　it　follows　that　it　must　be　conceived　through　itself；”　i。e。；　substance　is　what　is　conceived
  through　itself　（see　the　fourth　and　third　definitions）。　“Therefore　we　may　not　argue　from　the　plurality
  of　attributes　to　a　plurality　of　substances；　for　each　is　conceived　by　itself；　and　they　have　all　been；
  always　and　at　the　same　time；　in　substance；　without　the　possibility　of　the　one　being　produced　by　the
  other。”　“Substance　is　indivisible。　For　if　the　parts　retained　the　nature　of　the　substance；　there　would
  be　several　substances　of　the　same　nature；　which　is　contrary　to　the　fifth　proposition。　If　not；　infinite
  substance　would　cease　to　exist；　which　is　absurd。”（3）
  “Fourteenth　Proposition：　No　other　substance　than　God　can　either　exist　or　be　conceived。　Proof：
  God　is　the　absolutely　infinite　substance；　to　whom　can　be　denied　no　attribute　which　expresses　the
  essence　of　substance；　and　He　exists　necessarily；　therefore　if　there　were　a　substance　other　than
  God；　it　must　be　explained　by　means　of　an　attribute　of　God。”　Consequently　the　substance　would
  not　have　its　own　being；　but　that　of　God；　and　therefore　would　not　be　a　substance。　Or　if　it　were　still
  to　be　substance；　“then　there　would　necessarily　follow　the　possibility　of　there　being　two
  substances　with　the　same　attribute；　which　according　to　the　fifth　proposition　is　absurd。　From　this　it
  then　follows　that　the　thing　extended　and　the　thing　that　thinks”　are　not　substances；　but　“are　either
  attributes　of　God；　or　affections　of　His　attributes。”　By　these　proofs　and　others　like　them　not　much
  is　to　be　gained。　“Fifteenth　proposition：　What　is；　is　in　God；　and　cannot　exist　or　be　conceived
  without　God。”　“Sixteenth　proposition：　By　the　necessity　of　the　divine　nature　infinite　things　must
  follow　in　infinite　modes；　i。e。；　all　that　can　fall　under　the　infinite　understanding。　God　is　therefore　the
  absolute　First　Cause。”
  Spinoza　then　ascribes　freedom　and　necessity　to　God：　“God　is　the　absolute　free　cause；　who　is
  determined　by　nothing　outside　of　Himself；　for　He　exists　solely　by　the　necessity　of　His　nature。　There
  is　no　cause　which　inwardly　or　outwardly　moves　Him　to　act；　except　the　perfection　of　His　nature。
  His　activity　is　by　the　laws　of　His　Being　necessary　and　eternal；　what　therefore　follows　from　His
  absolute　nature；　from　His　attributes；　is　eternal　as　it　follows　from　the　nature　of　the　triangle　from
  eternity　and　to　eternity　that　it；　three　angles　are　equal　to　two　right　angles。〃　That　is　to　say；　His　Being
  is　His　absolute　power；　actus　and　potentia；　Thought　and　Being；　are　in　Him　one。　God　has　not
  therefore　any　other　thoughts　which　He　could　not　have　actualized。　“God　is　the　immanent　cause　of
  all　things；　not　the　transient　（transiens）；”　i。e。；　external　cause。　“His　essence　and　His　existence　are
  the　same；　namely；　the　truth。　A　thing　which　is　determined　to　perform　some　action；　is；　since　God　is
  cause；　necessarily　determined　thereto　by　God；　and　a　thing　which　is　thus　determined　cannot　render
  itself　undetermined。　In　nature　nothing　is　contingent。　Will　is　not　a　free　cause；　but　only　a　necessary
  cause；　only　a　mode；　it　is　therefore　determined　by　another。　God　acts　in　accordance　with　no　final
  causes　（sub　ratione　boni）。　Those　who　assert　that　He　does　so；　appear　to　establish　something
  apart　from　God；　which　does　not　depend　on　God；　and　which　God　in　His　working　keeps　in　view；　as
  though　it　were　an　end。　If　this　view　is　taken；　God　is　not　a　free　cause；　but　is　subject　to　fate。　It　is
  equally　inadmissible　to　subject　all　things　to　the　arbitrary　pleasure　of　God；　i。e。；　to　His　indifferent
  will。”（4）　He　is　determined　solely　by　His　own　nature；　the　activity　of　God　is　thus　His　power；　and　that
  is　necessity。　He　is　then　absolute　power　in　contrast　to　wisdom；　which　sets　up　definite　aims；　and
  consequently　limitations；　particular　aims；　thoughts　of　what　is　about　to　come　to　pass；　and　the　like
  are　therefore　put　out　of　the　question。　But　beyond　this　universal；　no　advance　is　made；　for　it　must　be
  noticed　a　negation。　Moreover；　if　God　is　the　cause　of　the　world；　it　is　implied　that　He　is　finite；　for　the
  world　is　here　put　beside　God　as　something　different　from　Him。
  b。　The　greatest　difficulty　in　Spinoza　is；　in　the　distinctions　to　which　he　comes；　to　grasp　the　relation
  of　this　determinate　to　God；　at　the　same　time　preserving　the　determination。　“God　is　a　thinking
  Being；　because　all　individual　thoughts　are　modes　which　express　God's　nature　in　a　certain　and
  determinate　manner；　there　pertains　therefore　to　God　an　attribute　the　conception　of　which　all
  individual　thoughts　involve；　and　by　means　of　this　they　also　are　conceived。　God　is　an　extended
  Being　for　the　same　reason。”　This　means　that　the　same　substance；　under　the　attribute　of　thought；　is
  the　intelligible　world；　and　under　the　attribute　of　extension；　is　nature；　nature　and　thought　thus　both
  express　the　same　Essence　of　God。　Or；　as　Spinoza　says；　“The　order　and　system　of　natural　things　is
  the　same　as　the　order　of　the　thoughts。　Thus；　for　instance；　the　circle　which　exists　in　nature；　and　the
  idea　of　the　existing　circle；　which　is　also　in　God；　are　one　and　the　same　thing”　（they　are　one　and　the
  same　content）；　“which　is”　merely　“expressed　by　means　of　different　attributes。　If　we　therefore
  regard　nature　either　under　the　attribute　of　extension　or　of　thought；　or　under　any　other　attribute
  whatever；　we　shall　find　one　and　the　same　connection　of　causes；　i。e。；　the　same　sequence　of　things。
  The　formal　Being　of　the　idea　of　the　circle　can　be　conceived　only　by　means　of　the　mode　of　thought；
  as　its　proximate　cause；　and　this　mode　again　by　means　of　another；　and　so　on　infinitely；　so　that　we
  must　explain　the　order　of　the　whole　of　nature；　or　the　connection　of　causes；　by　the　attribute　of
  thought　alone；　and　if　things　are　considered　by　the　attribute　of　extension；　they　must　be　considered
  only　by　the　attribute　of　extension；　—　and　the　same　holds　good。　of　other　causes。”（5）　It　is　one　and
  the　same　system；　which　at　one　time　appears　as　nature；　and　at　another　time　in　the　form　of　thought。
  But　Spinoza　does　not　demonstrate　how　these　two　are　evolved　from　the　one　substance；　nor　does
  he　prove　why　there　can　only　be　two　of　them。　Neither　are　extension　and　thought　anything　to　him　in
  themselves；　or　in　truth；　but　only　externally；　for　their　difference　is　a　mere　matter　of　the
  understanding；　which　is　ranked　by　Spinoza　only　among　affections　（Eth。　P。　I。　Prop。　XXXI。
  Demonst。　p。　62）；　and　as　such　has　no　truth。　This　has　in　recent　times　been　served　up　again　by
  Schelling　in　the　following　form：　In　themselves；　the　intelligent　world　and　the　corporeal　world　are　the
  same；　only　under　different　forms；　so　that　the　intelligent　universe　is　in　itself　the　whole　absolute　divine
  totality；　and　the　corporeal　universe　is　equally　this　same　totality。　The　differences　are　not　in
  themselves；　but　the　different　aspects　from　which　the　Absolute　is　regarded　are　matters　external　to
  it。　We　take　a　higher　tone　in　saying　that　nature　and　mind　are　rational；　but　reason　is　for　us　no　empty
  word；　for　it　means　the　totality　which　develops　itself　within　itself。　Again；　it　is　the　standpoint　of
  reflection　to　regard　aspects　only；　and　nothing　in　itself。　This　defect　appears　in　Spinoza　and　Schelling
  in　the　fact　that　they　see　no　necessity　why　the　Notion；　as　the　implicit　negative　of　its　unity；　should
  make　a　separation　of　itself　into　different　parts；　so　that　out　of　the　simple　universal　the　real；　the
  opposed；　itself　becomes　known。　Absolute　substance；　attribute　and　mode；　Spinoza　allows　to
  follow　one　another　as　definitions；　he　adopts　them　ready…made；　without　the　attributes　being
  developed　from　the　substance；　or　the　modes　from　the　attributes。　And　more　especially　in　regard　to
  the　attributes；　there　is　no　necessity　evident；　why　these　are　thought　and　extension　in　particular。
  c。　When　Spinoza　passes　on　to　individual　things；　especially　to　self…consciousness；　to　the　freedom
  of　the　'I；'　he　expresses　himself　in　such　a　way　as　rather　to　lead　back　all　limitations　to　substance　than
  to　maintain　a　firm　grasp　of　the　individual。　Thus　we　already　found；　the　attributes　not　to　be
  independent；　but　only　the　forms　in　which　the　understanding　grasps　substance　in　its　differences；
  what　comes　third；　the　modes；　is　that　under　which　for　Spinoza　all　difference　of　things　alone　falls。　Of
  the　modes　he　says　（Ethic。　P。　I。　Prop。　XXXII。　Demonst。　et　Coroll。　11。　p。　63）：　In　every　attribute
  there　are　two　modes；　in　extension；　these　are　rest　and　motion；　in　thought　they　are　understanding
  and　will　（intellectus　et　voluntas）。　Th