human　liberty　（De　potentia　intellectus　seu　de　libertate　humana）。　（2）　Kirchenrath　Professor
  Paulus　published　Spinoza's　works　in　Jena；　I　had　a　share　in　the　bringing　out　of　this　edition；　having
  been　entrusted　with　the　collation　of　French　translations。
  As　regards　the　philosophy　of　Spinoza；　it　is　very　simple；　and　on　the　whole　easy　to　comprehend；　the
  difficulty　which　it　presents　is　due　partly　to　the　limitations　of　the　method　in　which　Spinoza　presents
  his　thoughts；　and　partly　to　his　narrow　range　of　ideas；　which　causes　him　in　an　unsatisfactory　way　to
  pass　over　important　points　of　view　and　cardinal　questions。　Spinoza's　system　is　that　of　Descartes
  made　objective　in　the　form　of　absolute　truth。　The　simple　thought　of　Spinoza's　idealism　is　this：　The
  true　is　simply　and　solely　the　one　substance；　whose　attributes　are　thought　and　extension　or　nature：
  and　only　this　absolute　unity　is　reality；　it　alone　is　God。　It　is；　as　with　Descartes；　the　unity　of　thought
  and　Being；　or　that　which　contains　the　Notion　of　its　existence　in　itself。　The　Cartesian　substance；　as
  Idea；　has　certainly　Being　included　in　its　Notion；　but　it　is　only　Being　as　abstract；　not　as　real　Being　or
  as　extension　（supra；　p。　241）。　With　Descartes　corporeality　and　the　thinking　'I'　are　altogether
  independent　Beings；　this　independence　of　the　two　extremes　is　done　away　with　in　Spinozism　by
  their　becoming　moments　of　the　one　absolute　Being。　This　expression　signifies　that　Being　must　be
  grasped　as　the　unity　of　opposites；　the　chief　consideration　is　not　to　let　slip　the　opposition　and　set　it
  aside；　but　to　reconcile　and　resolve　it。　Since　then　it　is　thought　and　Being；　and　no　longer　the
  abstractions　of　the　finite　and　infinite；　or　of　limit　and　the　unlimited；　that　form　the　opposition　（supra；
  p。　161）；　Being　is　here　more　definitely　regarded　as　extension；　for　in　its　abstraction　it　would　be　really
  only　that　return　into　itself；　that　simple　equality　with　itself；　which　constitutes　thought　（supra；　p。　229）。
  The　pure　thought　of　Spinoza　is　therefore　not　the　simple　universal　of　Plato；　for　it　has　likewise　come
  to　know　the　absolute　opposition　of　Notion　and　Being。
  Taken　as　a　whole；　this　constitutes　the　Idea　of　Spinoza；　and　it　is　just　what　pure　being　was　to　the
  Eleatics　（Vol。　1。　pp。　244；　252）。　This　Idea　of　Spinoza's　we　must　allow　to　be　in　the　main　true　and
  well…grounded；　absolute　substance　is　the　truth；　but　it　is　not　the　whole　truth；　in　order　to　be　this　it
  must　also　be　thought　of　as　in　itself　active　and　living；　and　by　that　very　means　it　must　determine　itself
  as　mind。　But　substance　with　Spinoza　is　only　the　universal　and　consequently　the　abstract
  determination　of　mind；　it　may　undoubtedly　be　said　that　this　thought　is　the　foundation　of　all　true
  views　—　not；　however；　as　their　absolutely　fixed　and　permanent　basis；　but　as　the　abstract　unity
  which　mind　is　in　itself。　It　is　therefore　worthy　of　note　that　thought　must　begin　by　placing　itself　at　the
  standpoint　of　Spinozism；　to　be　a　follower　of　Spinoza　is　the　essential　commencement　of　all
  Philosophy。　For　as　we　saw　above　（Vol。　I。　p。　144）；　when　man　begins　to　philosophize；　the　soul
  must　commence　by　bathing　in　this　ether　of　the　One　Substance；　in　which　all　that　man　has　held　as
  true　has　disappeared；　this　negation　of　all　that　is　particular；　to　which　every　philosopher　must　have
  come；　is　the　liberation　of　the　mind　and　its　absolute　foundation。　The　difference　between　our
  standpoint　and　that　of　the　Eleatic　philosophy　is　only　this；　that　through　the　agency　of　Christianity
  concrete　individuality　is　in　the　modern　world　present　throughout　in　spirit。　But　in　spite　of　the　infinite
  demands　on　the　part　of　the　concrete；　substance　with　Spinoza　is　not　yet　determined　as　in　itself
  concrete。　As　the　concrete　is　thus　not　present　in　the　content　of　substance；　it　is　therefore　to　be　found
  within　reflecting　thought　alone；　and　it　is　only　from　the　endless　oppositions　of　this　last　that　the
  required　unity　emerges。　Of　substance　as　such　there　is　nothing　more　to　be　said；　all　that　we　can　do　is
  to　speak　of　the　different　ways　in　which　Philosophy　has　dealt　with　it；　and　the　opposites　which　in　it
  are　abrogated。　The　difference　depends　on　the　nature　of　the　opposites　which　are　held　to　be
  abrogated　in　substance。　Spinoza　is　far　from　having　proved　this　unity　as　convincingly　as　was　done
  by　the　ancients；　but　what　constitutes　the　grandeur　of　Spinoza's　manner　of　thought　is　that　he　is　able
  to　renounce　all　that　is　determinate　and　particular；　and　restrict　himself　to　the　One；　giving　heed　to　this
  alone。
  1。　Spinoza　begins　（Eth。　P。　I　pp。　35；　36）　with　a　series　of　definitions；　from　which　we　take　the
  following。
  a。　Spinoza's　first　definition　is　of　the　Cause　of　itself。　He　says：　“By　that　which　is　causa　sui；　its　own
  cause；　I　understand　that　whose　essence”　（or　Notion）　“involves　existence；　or　which　cannot　be
  conceived　except　as　existent。”　The　unity　of　existence　and　universal　thought　is　asserted　from　the
  very　first；　and　this　unity　will　ever　be　the　question　at　issue。　“The　cause　of　itself”　is　a　noteworthy
  expression；　for　while　we　picture　to　ourselves　that　the　effect　stands　in　opposition　to　the　cause；　the
  cause　of　itself　is　the　cause　which；　while　it　operates　and　separates　an　“other；”　at　the　same　time
  produces　only　itself；　and　in　the　production　therefore　does　away　with　this　distinction。　The
  establishing　of　itself　as　an　other　is　loss　or　degeneration；　and　at　the　same　time　the　negation　of　this
  loss；　this　is　a　purely　speculative　Notion；　indeed　a　fundamental　Notion　in　all　speculation。　The　cause
  in　which　the　cause　is　identical　with　the　effect；　is　the　infinite　cause　（infra；　p。　263）；　if　Spinoza　had
  further　developed　what　lies　in　causa　sui；　substance　with　him　would　not　have　been　rigid　and
  unworkable。
  b。　The　second　definition　is　that　of　the　finite。　“That　thing　is　said　to　be　finite　in　its　kind　which　can　be
  limited　by　another　of　the　same　nature。”　For　it　comes　then　to　an　end；　it　is　not　there；　what　is　there　is
  something　else。　This　something　else　must；　however；　be　of　a　like　nature；　for　those　things　which　are
  to　limit　each　other　must；　in　order　to　be　able　to　limit　each　other；　touch　each　other；　and　consequently
  have　a　relation　to　each　other；　that　is　to　say　they　must　be　of　one　nature；　stand　on　a　like　basis；　and
  have　a　common　sphere。　That　is　the　affirmative　side　of　the　limit。　“Thus　a　thought　is”　only　“limited
  by　another　thought；　a　body　by　another　body；　but　thoughts　are　not　limited　by　bodies　nor〃
  conversely　〃bodies　by　thoughts。”　We　saw　this　（p。　244）　with　Descartes：　thought　is　an　independent；
  totality　and　so　is　extension；　they　have　nothing　to　do　with　one　another；　they　do　not　limit　each　other；
  each　is　included　in　itself。
  c。　The　third　definition　is　that　of　substance。　“By　substance　I　understand　that　which　exists　in　itself
  and　is　conceived　by　itself；　i。e。　the　conception　of　which　does　not　require　the　aid　of　the　conception
  of　any　other　thing　for　its　formation　（a　quo　formari　debeat）；”　otherwise　it　would　be　finite；
  accidental。　What　cannot　have　a　conception　formed　of　it　without　the　aid　of　something　else；　is　not
  independent；　but　is　dependent　upon　that　something　else。
  d。　In　the　fourth　place　Spinoza　defines　attributes；　which；　as　the　moment　coming；　second　to
  substance；　belong　to　it。　“By　attribute　I　understand　that　which　the　mind　perceives　as　constituting　the
  essence　of　substance；”　and　to　Spinoza　this　alone　is　true。　This　is　an　important　determination；　the
  attribute　is　undoubtedly　a　determinateness；　but　at　the　same　time　it　remains　a　totality。　Spinoza；　like
  Descartes；　accepts　only　two　attributes；　thought　and　extension。　The　understanding　grasps　them　as
  the　reality　of　substance；　but　the　reality　is　not　higher　than　the　substance；　for　it　is　only　reality　in　the
  view　of　the　understanding；　which　falls　outside　substance。　Each　of　the　two　ways　of　regarding
  substance　—　extension　and　thought　—　contains　no　doubt　the　whole　content　of　substance；　but　only
  in　one　form；　which　the　understanding　brings　with　it；　and　for　this　very　reason　both　sides　are　in
  themselves　identical　and　infinite。　This　is　the　true　completion；　but　where　substance　passes　over　into
  attribute　is　not　stated。
  e。　The　fifth　definition　has　to　do　with　what　comes　third　in　relation　to　substance；　the　mode。　“By
  mode　I　understand　the　affections　of　substance；　or　that　which　is　in　something　else；　through　the　aid
  of　which　also　it　is　conceived。”　Thus　substance　is　conceived　through　itself；　attribute　is　not
  conceived　through　itself；　but　has　a　relation　to　the　conceiving　understanding；　in　so　far　as　this　last
  conceives　reality；　mode；　finally；　is　what　is　not　conceived　as　reality；　but　through　and　in　something
  else。
  These　last　three　moments　Spinoza　ought　not　merely　to　have　established　in　this　way　as　conceptions；
  he　ought　to　have　deduced　them；　they　are　especially　important；　and　correspond　with　what　we　more
  definitely　distinguish　as　universal；　particular　and　individual。　They　must　not；　however；　be　taken　as
  formal；　but　in　their　true　concrete　sense；　the　concrete　universal　is　substance；　the　concrete　particular
  is　the　concrete　species；　the　Father　and　Son　in　the　Christian　dogma　are　similarly　particular；　but　each
  of　them　contains　the　whole　nature　of　God；　only　under　a　different　form。　The　mode　is　the　individual；
  the　finite　as　such；　which　enters　into　external　con