‘Therefore’　which　binds　the　two　sides　together　is　not　the　‘Therefore’　of　a　syllogism；　the
  connection　between　Being　and　Thought　is　only　immediately　posited。　This　certainty　is　thus　the
  prius；　all　other　propositions　come　later。　The　thinking　subject　as　the　simple　immediacy　of
  being…at…home…with…me　is　the　very　same　thing　as　what　is　called　Being；　and　it　is　quite　easy　to
  perceive　this　identity。　As　universal；　thought　is　contained　in　all　that　is　particular；　and　thus　is　pure
  relation　to　itself；　pure　oneness　with　itself。　We　must　not　make　the　mistake　of　representing　Being　to
  ourselves　as　a　concrete　content；　and　hence　it　is　the　same　immediate　identity　which　thought　likewise
  is。　Immediacy　is；　however；　a　one…sided　determination；　thought　does　not　contain　it　alone；　but　also
  the　determination　to　mediate　itself　with　itself；　and　thereby　—　by　the　mediation　being　at　the　same
  time　the　abrogation　of　the　mediation　—　it　is　immediacy。　In　thought　we　thus　have　Being；　Being　is；
  however；　a　poor　determination；　it　is　the　abstraction　from　the　concrete　of　thought。　This　identity　of
  Being　and　Thought；　which　constitutes　the　most　interesting　idea　of　modern　times；　has　not　been
  further　worked　out　by　Descartes；　he　has　relied　on　consciousness　alone；　and　for　the　time　being
  placed　it　in　the　forefront。　For　with　Descartes　the　necessity　to　develop　the　differences　from　the　‘I
  think’　is　not　yet　present；　Fichte　first　applied　himself　to　the　deduction　of　all　determinations　from
  this　culminating　point　of　absolute　certainty。
  Other　propositions　have　been　set　against　that　of　Descartes。　Gassendi；　（8）　for　example；　asks　if　we
  might　not　just　as　well　say　Ludificor；　ergo　sum：　I　am　made　a　fool　of　by　my　consciousness；
  therefore　I　exist　—　or　properly　speaking；　therefore　I　am　made　a　fool　of。　Descartes　himself
  recognized　that　this　objection　merited　consideration；　but　he　here　repels　it；　inasmuch　as　it　is　the　‘I’
  alone　and　not　the　other　content　which　has　to　be　maintained。　Being　alone　is　identical　with　pure
  thought；　and　not　its　content；　be　it　what　it　may。　Descartes　further　says：　“By　thought　I；　however；
  understand　all　that　takes　place　in　us　within　our　consciousness；　in　as　far　as　we　are　conscious　of　it；
  thus　will；　conception；　and　even　feeling　are　identical　with　thought。　For　if　I　say　’　I　see；’　or　‘I　walk
  out；’　and　‘therefore　I　am；’　and　understand　by　this　the　seeing　and　walking　which　is
  accomplished　by　the　body；　the　conclusion　is　not　absolutely　certain；　because；　as　often　happens　in　a
  dream；　I　may　imagine　that　I　can　see　or　walk　even　if　I　do　not　open　my　eyes　nor　move　from　my
  place；　and　I　might　also　possibly　do　so　supposing　I　had　no　body。　But　if　I　understand　it　of　the
  subjective　feeling　or　the　consciousness　of　seeing　or　walking　itself；　because　it　is　then　related　to　the
  mind　that　alone　feels　or　thinks　that　it　sees　or　walks；　this　conclusion　is　perfectly　certain。”　（9）　“In　a
  dream”　is　an　empirical　mode　of　reasoning；　but　there　is　no　other　objection　to　it。　In　willing；　seeing；
  hearing；　&c。；　thought　is　likewise　contained；　it　is　absurd　to　suppose　that　the　soul　has　thinking　in　one
  special　pocket；　and　seeing；　willing；　&c。；　in　others。　But　if　I　say　‘I　see；’　‘I　walk　out；’　there　is
  present　on　the　one　hand　my　consciousness　‘I；’　and　consequently　thought；　on　the　other　hand；
  however；　there　is　present　willing；　seeing；　hearing；　walking；　and　thus　a　still　further　modification　of
  the　content。　Now　because　of　this　modification　I　cannot　say　‘I　walk；　and　therefore　I　am；’　for　I
  can　undoubtedly　abstract　from　the　modification；　since　it　is　no　longer　universal　Thought。　Thus　we
  must　merely　look　at　the　pure　consciousness　contained　in　the　concrete　‘I。’　Only　when　I
  accentuate　the　fact　that　I　am　present　there　as　thinking；　is　pure　Being　implied；　for　only　with　the
  universal　is　Being　united。
  “In　this　it　is　implied；”　says　Descartes；　“that　thought　is　more　certain　to　me　than　body。　If　from　the
  fact　that　I　touch　or　see　the　earth　I　judge　that　it　exists；　I　must　more　certainly　judge　from　this　that　my
  thought　exists。　For　it　may　very　well　happen　that　I　judge　the　earth　to　exist；　even　if　it　does　not　exist；
  but　it　cannot　be　that　I　judge　this；　and　that　my　mind　which　judges　this　does　not　exist。”　（10）　That　is
  to　say；　everything　which　is　for　me　I　may　assert　to　be　non…existent；　but　when　I　assert　myself　to　be
  non…existent；　I　myself　assert；　or　it　is　my　judgment。　For　I　cannot　set　aside　the　fact　that　I　judge；
  even　if　I　can　abstract　from　that　respecting　which　I　judge。　In　this　Philosophy　has　regained　its　own
  ground　that　thought　starts　from　thought　as　what　is　certain　in　itself；　and　not　from　something　external；
  not　from　something　given；　not　from　an　authority；　but　directly　from　the　freedom　that　is　contained　in
  the　‘I　think。’　Of　all　else　I　may　doubt；　of　the　existence　of　bodily　things；　of　my　body　itself；　or　this
  certainty　does　not　possess　immediacy　in　itself。　For　‘I’　is　just　certainty　itself；　but　in　all　else　this
  certainty　is　only　predicate；　my　body　is　certain　to　me；　it　is　not　this　certainty　itself。　（11）　As　against
  the　certainty　we　feel　of　having　a　body；　Descartes　adduces　the　empirical　phenomenon　that　we　often
  hear　of　persons　imagining　they　feel　pain　in　a　limb　which　they　have　lost　long　ago。　（12）　What　is
  actual；　he　says　is　a　substance；　the　soul　is　a　thinking　substance；　it　is　thus　for　itself；　separate　from　all
  external　material　things　and　independent。　That　it　is　thinking　is　evident　from　its　nature：　it　would　think
  and　exist　even　if　no　material　things　were　present；　the　soul　can　hence　know　itself　more　easily　than
  its　body：　（13）
  All　else　that　we　can　hold　as　true　rests　on　this　certainty；　for　in　order　that　anything　should　be　held　as
  true；　evidence　is　requisite；　but　nothing　is　true　which　has　not　this　inward　evidence　in　consciousness。
  “Now　the　evidence　of　everything　rests　upon　our　perceiving　it　as　clearly　and　vividly　as　that　certainty
  itself；　and　on　its　so　entirely　depending　from；　and　harmonizing　with　this　principle；　that　if　we　wished
  to　doubt　it　we　should　also　have　to　doubt　this　principle　likewise”　（our　ego）。　（14）　This　knowledge
  is　indeed　on　its　own　account　perfect　evidence；　but　it　is　not　yet　the　truth；　or　if　we　take　that　Being　as
  truth；　it　is　an　empty　content；　and　it　is　with　the　content　that　we　have　to　do。
  c。　What　comes　third　is　thus　the　transition　of　this　certainty　into　truth；　into　the　determinate；
  Descartes　again　makes　this　transition　in　a　na？ve　way；　and　with　it　we　for　the　first　time　begin　to
  consider　his　metaphysics。　What　here　takes　place　is　that　an　interest　arises　in　further　representations
  and　conceptions　of　the　abstract　unity　of　Being　and　Thought；　there　Descartes　sets　to　work　in　an
  externally　reflective　manner。　“The　consciousness　which　merely　knows　itself　to　be　certain　now
  however　seeks　to　extend　its　knowledge；　and　finds　that　it　has　conceptions　of　many　things　—　in
  which　conceptions　it　does　not　deceive　itself；　so　long　as　it　does　not　assert　or　deny　that　something
  similar　outside　corresponds　to　them。”　Deception　in　the　conceptions　has　meaning　only　in　relation
  to　external　existence。　“Consciousness　also　discovers　universal　conceptions；　and　obtains　from　them
  proofs　which　are　evident；　e。g。　the　geometric　proposition　that　the　three　angles　of　a　triangle　are
  together　equal　to　two　right　angles　is　a　conception　which　follows　incontrovertibly　from　others。　But
  in　reflecting　whether　such　things　really　exist　doubts　arise。”　（15）　That　there　is　such　a　thing　as　a
  triangle　is　indeed　in　this　case　by　no　means　certain；　since　extension　is　not　contained　in　the　immediate
  certainty　of　myself。　The　soul　may　exist　without　the　bodily　element；　and　this　last　without　it；　they　are
  in　reality　different；　one　is　conceivable　without　the　other。　The　soul　thus　does　not　think　and　know　the
  other　as　clearly　as　the　certainty　of　itself。　（16）
  Now　the　truth　of　all　knowledge　rests　on　the　proof　of　the　existence　of　God。　The　soul　is　an
  imperfect　substance；　but　it　has　the　Idea　of　an　absolute　perfect　existence　within　itself；　this　perfection
  is　not　begotten　in　itself；　just　because　it　is　an　imperfect　substance；　this　Idea　is　thus　innate。　In
  Descartes　the　consciousness　of　this　fact　is　expressed　by　his　saying　that　as　long　as　the　existence　of
  God　is　not　proved　and　perceived　the　possibility　of　our　deceiving　ourselves　remains；　because　we
  cannot　know　whether　we　do　not　possess　a　nature　ordered　and　disposed　to　err　（supra；　p。　226）。
  （17）　The　form　is　rather　a　mistaken　one；　and　it　only　generally　expresses　the　opposition　in　which
  self…consciousness　stands　to　the　consciousness　of　what　is　different；　of　the　objective；　and　we　have
  to　deal　with　the　unity　of　both　—　the　question　being　whether　what　is　in　thought　likewise　possesses
  objectivity。　This　unity　rests　in　God　or　is　God　Himself。　I　shall　put　these　assertions　in　the　manner　of
  Descartes：　“Amongst　these　various　conceptions　possessed　by　us　there　likewise　is　the　conception
  of　a　supremely　intelligent；　powerful；　and　absolutely　perfect　Being；　and　this　is　the　most　excellent　of
  all　conceptions。”　This　all…embracing　universal　conception　has　therefore　this　distinguishing　feature；
  that　in　its　case　the　uncertainty　respecting　Being　which　appears　in　the　other　conceptions；　finds　no
  place。　It　has　the　characteristic　that　“In　it　we　do　not　recognize　existence　as　something　merely