t　by　a　gradual　loosening）；　the　oscillation　must　bring　about　a　mental　movement　and　a　sympathetic　internal　movement　of　the　body。　This　continues　involuntarily　and　produces　fatigue；　but　in　so　doing　it　also　affords　recreation　（the　effects　of　a　motion　conducive　to　health）。　　　For　supposing　we　assume　that　some　movement　in　the　bodily　organs　is　associated　sympathetically　with　all　our　thoughts；　it　is　readily　intelligible　how　the　sudden　act　above　referred　to；　of　shifting　the　mind　now　to　one　standpoint　and　now　to　the　other；　to　enable　it　to　contemplate　its　object；　may　involve　a　corresponding　and　reciprocal　straining　and　slackening　of　the　elastic　parts　of　our　intestines；　which　communicates　itself　to　the　diaphragm　（and　resembles　that　felt　by　ticklish　people）；　in　the　course　of　which　the　lungs　expel　the　air　with　rapidly　succeeding　interruptions；　resulting　in　a　movement　conducive　to　health。　This　alone；　and　not　what　goes　on　in　the　mind；　is　the　proper　cause　of　the　gratification　in　a　thought　that　at　bottom　represents　nothing。　Voltaire　said　that　heaven　has　given　us　two　things　to　compensate　us　for　the　many　miseries　of　life；　hope　and　sleep。　He　might　have　added　laughter　to　the　list…if　only　the　means　of　exciting　it　in　men　of　intelligence　were　as　ready　to　hand；　and　the　wit　or　originality　of　humour　which　it　requires　were　not　just　as　rare　as　the　talent　is　common　for　inventing　stuff　that　splits　the　head；　as　mystic　speculators　do；　or　that　breaks　your　neck；　as　the　genius　does；　or　that　harrows　the　heart　as　sentimental　novelists　do　（aye；　and　moralists　of　the　same　type）。　　　We　may；　therefore　as　I　conceive；　make　Epicurus　a　present　of　the　point　that　all　gratification；　even　when　occasioned　by　concepts　that　evoke　aesthetic　ideas；　is　animal；　i。e。；　bodily　sensation。　For　from　this　admission　the　spiritual　feeling　of　respect　for　moral　ideas；　which　is　not　one　of　gratification；　but　a　self…esteem　（an　esteem　for　humanity　within　us）　that　raises　us　above　the　need　of　gratification；　suffers　not　a　whit…no　nor　even　the　less　noble　feeling　of　taste。　　　In　naivete　we　meet　with　a　joint　product　of　both　the　above。　Naivete　is　the　breaking　forth　of　the　ingenuousness　originally　natural　to　humanity；　in　opposition　to　the　art　of　disguising　oneself　that　has　become　a　second　nature。　We　laugh　at　the　simplicity　that　is　as　yet　a　stranger　to　dissimulation；　but　we　rejoice　the　while　over　the　simplicity　of　nature　that　thwarts　that　art。　We　await　the　commonplace　manner　of　artificial　utterance；　thoughtfully　addressed　to　a　fair　show；　and　lo！　nature　stands　before　us　in　unsullied　innocence…nature　that　we　were　quite　unprepared　to　meet；　and　that　he　who　laid　it　bare　had　also　no　intention　of　revealing。　That　the　outward　appearance；　fair　but　false；　that　usually　assumes　such　importance　in　our　judgement；　is　here；　at　a　stroke；　turned　to　a　nullity；　that；　as　it　were；　the　rogue　in　us　is　nakedly　exposed；　calls　forth　the　movement　of　the　mind；　in　two　successive　and　opposite　directions；　agitating　the　body　at　the　same　time　with　wholesome　motion。　But　that　something　infinitely　better　than　any　accepted　code　of　manners；　namely　purity　of　mind　（or　at　least　a　vestige　of　such　purity）；　has　not　become　wholly　extinct　in　human　nature；　infuses　seriousness　and　reverence　into　this　play　of　judgement。　But　since　it　is　only　a　manifestation　that　obtrudes　itself　for　a　moment；　and　the　veil　of　a　dissembling　art　is　soon　drawn　over　it　again；　there　enters　into　the　above　feelings　a　touch　of　pity。　This　is　an　emotion　of　tenderness；　playful　in　its　way；　that　thus　readily　admits　of　combination　with　this　sort　of　genial　laughter。　And；　in　fact；　this　emotion　is　as　a　rule　associated　with　it；　and；　at　the　same　time；　is　wont　to　make　amends　to　the　person　who　provides　such　food　for　our　merriment　for　his　embarrassment　at　not　being　wise　after　the　manner　of　men。　For　that…reason　art　of　being　naif　is　a　contradiction。　But　it　is　quite　possible　to　give　a　representation　of　naivete　in　a　fictitious　personage；　and；　rare　as　the　art　is；　it　is　a　fine　art。　With　this　naivete　we　must　not　confuse　homely　simplicity；　which　only　avoids　spoiling　nature　by　artificiality；　because　it　has　no　notion　of　the　conventions　of　good　society。　　　The　humorous　manner　may　also　be　ranked　as　a　thing　which　in　its　enlivening　influence　is　clearly　allied　to　the　gratification　provoked　by　laughter。　It　belongs　to　originality　of　mind　（des　Geistes）；　though　not　to　the　talent　for　fine　art。　Humour；　in　a　good　sense；　means　the　talent　for　being　able　to　put　oneself　at　will　into　a　certain　frame　of　mind　in　which　everything　is　estimated　on　lines　that　go　quite　off　the　beaten　track　（a　topsy…turvy　view　of　things）；　and　yet　on　lines　that　follow　certain　principles；　rational　in　the　case　of　such　a　mental　temperament。　A　person　with　whom　such　variations　are　not　a　matter　of　choice　is　said　to　have　humours；　but　if　a　person　can　assume　them　voluntarily　and　of　set　purpose　（on　behalf　of　a　lively　presentation　drawn　from　a　ludicrous　contrast）；　he　and　his　way　of　speaking　are　termed　humorous。　This　manner　belongs；　however；　to　agreeable　rather　than　to　fine　art；　because　the　object　of　the　latter　must　always　have　an　evident　intrinsic　worth　about　it；　and　thus　demands　a　certain　seriousness　in　its　presentation；　as　taste　does　in　estimating　it。
  PART1｜SEC2　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART　CRITIQUE　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　II。　DIALECTIC　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT。
  SS　55。
  For　a　power　of　judgement　to　be　dialectical　it　must　first　of　all　be　rationalizing；　that　is　to　say；　its　judgements　must　lay　claim　to　universality；*　and　do　so　a　priori；　for　it　is　in　the　antithesis　of　such　judgements　that　dialectic　consists。　Hence　there　is　nothing　dialectical　in　the　irreconcilability　of　aesthetic　judgements　of　sense　（upon　the　agreeable　and　disagreeable）。　And　in　so　far　as　each　person　appeals　merely　to　his　own　private　taste；　even　the　conflict　of　judgements　of　taste　does　not　form　a　dialectic　of　taste…for　no　one　is　proposing　to　make　his　own　judgement　into　a　universal　rule。　Hence　the　only　concept　left　to　us　of　a　dialectic　affecting　taste　is　one　of　a　dialectic　of　the　critique　of　taste　（not　of　taste　itself）　in　respect　of　its　principles：　for；　on　the　question　of　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of　judgements　of　taste　in　general；　mutually　conflicting　concepts　naturally　and　unavoidably　make　their　appearance。　The　transcendental　critique　of　taste　will；　therefore；　only　include　a　part　capable　of　bearing　the　name　of　a　dialectic　of　the　aesthetic　judgement　if　we　find　an　antinomy　of　the　principles　of　this　faculty　which　throws　doubt　upon　its　conformity　to　law；　and　hence　also　upon　its　inner　possibility。
  *Any　judgement　which　sets　up　to　be　universal　may　be　termed　a　rationalizing　judgement　（indicium　ratiocinans）；　for　so　far　as　universal　it　may　serve　as　the　major　premiss　of　a　syllogism。　On　the　other　hand；　only　a　judgement　which　is　thought　as　the　conclusion　of　a　syllogism；　and；　therefore；　as　having　an　a　priori　foundation；　can　be　called　rational　（indicium　ratiocinatum）。
  SS　56。　Representation　of　the　antinomy　of　taste。
  The　first　commonplace　of　taste　is　contained　in　the　proposition　under　cover　of　which　every　one　devoid　of　taste　thinks　to　shelter　himself　from　reproach：　every　one　has　his　own　taste。　This　is　only　another　way　of　saying　that　the　determining　ground　of　this　judgement　is　merely　subjective　（gratification　or　pain）；　and　that　the　judgement　has　no　right　to　the　necessary　agreement　of　others。　　　Its　second　commonplace；　to　which　even　those　resort　who　concede　the　right　of　the　judgement　of　taste　to　pronounce　with　validity　for　every　one；　is：　there　is　no　disputing　about　taste。　This　amounts　to　saying　that；　even　though　the　determining　ground　of　a　judgement　of　taste　be　objective；　it　is　not　reducible　to　definite　concepts；　so　that　in　respect　of　the　judgement　itself　no　decision　can　be　reached　by　proofs；　although　it　is　quite　open　to　us　to　contend　upon　the　matter；　and　to　contend　with　right。　For　though　contention　and　dispute　have　this　point　in　common；　that　they　aim　at　bringing　judgements　into　accordance　out　of　and　by　means　of　their　mutual　opposition；　yet　they　differ　in　the　latter　hoping　to　effect　this　from　definite　concepts；　as　grounds　of　proof；　and；　consequently；　adopting　objective　concepts　as　grounds　of　the　judgement。　But　where　this　is　considered　impracticable；　dispute　is　regarded　as　alike　out　of　the　question。　　　Between　these　two　commonplaces　an　intermediate　proposition　is　readily　seen　to　be　missing。　It　is　one　which　has　certainly　not　become　proverbial；　but　yet　it　is　at　the　back　of　every　one's　mind。　It　is　that　there　may　be　contention　about　taste　（although　not　a　dispute）。　This　proposition；　however；　involves　the　contrary　of　the　first　one。　For　in　a　manner　in　which　contention　is　to　be　allowed；　there　must　be　a：　hope　of　coming　to　terms。　Hence　one　must　be　able　to　reckon　on　grounds　of　judgement　that　possess　more　than　private　Validity　and　are　thus　not　merely　subjective。　And　yet　the　above　principle　（Every　one　has　his　own　taste）　is　directly　opposed　to　this。　　　The　principle　of　taste；　therefore；　exhibits　the　following　antinomy：　　　1。　Thesis。　The　judgement　of　taste　is　not　based　upon　concepts；　for；　if　it　were；　it　would　be　open　to　dispute　（decision　by　means　of　proofs）。　　　2。　Antithesis。　The　judgement　of　taste　is　based　on　concepts；　for　otherwise；　despite　diversity　of　judgement；　there　could　be　no　roo