which　it　adapts　itself　to　our　mode　of　taking　it　in。　　　Besides；　every　judgement　which　is　to　show　the　taste　of　the　individual；　is　required　to　be　an　independent　judgement　of　the　individual　himself。　There　must　be　no　need　of　groping　about　among　other　people's　judgements　and　getting　previous　instruction　from　their　delight　in　or　aversion　to　the　same　object。　Consequently　his　judgement　should　be　given　out　a　priori；　and　not　as　an　imitation　relying　on　the　general　pleasure　a　thing　gives　as　a　matter　of　fact。　One　would　think；　however；　that　a　judgement　a　priori　must　involve　a　concept　of　the　object　for　the　cognition　of　which　it　contains　the　principle。　But　the　judgement　of　taste　is　not　founded　on　concepts；　and　is　in　no　way　a　cognition；　but　only　an　aesthetic　judgement。　　　Hence　it　is　that　a　youthful　poet　refuses　to　allow　himself　to　be　dissuaded　from　the　conviction　that　his　poem　is　beautiful；　either　by　the　judgement　of　the　public　or　of　his　friends。　And　even　if　he　lends　them　an　ear；　he　does　so；…not　because　he　has　now　come　to　a　different　judgement；　but　because；　though　the　whole　public；　at　least　so　far　as　his　work　is　concerned；　should　have　false　taste；　he　still；　in　his　desire　for　recognition；　finds　good　reason　to　accommodate　himself　to　the　popular　error　（even　against　his　own　judgement）。　It　is　only　in　aftertime；　when　his　judgement　has　been　sharpened　by　exercise；　that　of　his　own　free　will　and　accord　he　deserts　his　former　judgements　behaving　in　just　the　same　way　as　with　those　of　his　judgements　which　depend　wholly　upon　reason。　Taste　lays　claim　simply　to　autonomy。　To　make　the　judgements　of　others　the　determining　ground　of　one's　own　would　be　heteronomy。　　　The　fact　that　we　recommend　the　works　of　the　ancients　as　models；　and　rightly　too；　and　call　their　authors　classical；　as　constituting　sort　of　nobility　among　writers　that　leads　the　way　and　thereby　gives　laws　to　the　people；　seems　to　indicate　a　posteriori　sources　of　taste　and　to　contradict　the　autonomy　of　taste　in　each　individual。　But　we　might　just　as　well　say　that　the　ancient　mathematicians；　who；　to　this　day；　are　looked　upon　as　the　almost　indispensable　models　of　perfect　thoroughness　and　elegance　in　synthetic　methods；　prove　that　reason　also　is　on　our　part　only　imitative；　and　that　it　is　incompetent　with　the　deepest　intuition　to　produce　of　itself　rigorous　proofs　by　means　of　the　construction　of　concepts。　There　is　no　employment　of　our　powers；　no　matter　how　free；　not　even　of　reason　itself　（which　must　create　all　its　judgements　from　the　common　a　priori　source）；　which；　if　each　individual　had　always　to　start　afresh　with　the　crude　equipment　of　his　natural　state；　would　not　get　itself　involved　in　blundering　attempts；　did　not　those　of　others　tie　before　it　as　a　warning。　Not　that　predecessors　make　those　who　follow　in　their　steps　mere　imitators；　but　by　their　methods　they　set　others　upon　the　track　of　seeking　in　themselves　for　the　principles；　and　so　of　adopting　their　own；　often　better；　course。　Even　in　religion…where　undoubtedly　every　one　bas　to　derive　his　rule　of　conduct　from　himself；　seeing　that　he　himself　remains　responsible　for　it　and；　when　he　goes　wrong；　cannot　shift　the　blame　upon　others　as　teachers　or　leaders…general　precepts　learned　at　the　feet　either　of　priests　or　philosophers；　or　even　drawn　from　ones'　own　resources；　are　never　so　efficacious　as　an　example　of　virtue　or　holiness；　which；　historically　portrayed；　does　not　dispense　with　the　autonomy　of　virtue　drawn　from　the　spontaneous　and　original　idea　of　morality　（a　priori）；　or　convert　this　into　a　mechanical　process　of　imitation。　Following　which　has　reference　to　a　precedent；　and　not　imitation；　is　the　proper　expression　for　all　influence　which　the　products　of　an　exemplary　author　may　exert　upon　others　and　this　means　no　more　than　going　to　the　same　sources　for　a　creative　work　as　those　to　which　he　went　for　his　creations；　and　learning　from　one's　predecessor　no　more　than　the　mode　of　availing　oneself　of　such　sources。　Taste；　just　because　its　judgement　cannot　be　determined　by　concepts　or　precepts；　is　among　all　faculties　and　talents　the　very　one　that　stands　most　in　need　of　examples　of　what　has　in　the　course　of　culture　maintained　itself　longest　in　esteem。　Thus　it　avoids　an　early　lapse　into　crudity　and　a　return　to　the　rudeness　of　its　earliest　efforts。
  SS　33。　Second　peculiarity　of　the　judgement　of　taste。
  Proofs　are　of　no　avail　whatever　for　determining　the　judgement　of　taste；　and　in　this　connection　matters　stand　just　as　they　would　were　that　judgement　simply　subjective。　　　If　any　one　does　not　think　a　building；　view；　or　poem　beautiful；　then；　in　the　first　place；　he　refuses；　so　far　as　his　inmost　conviction　goes；　to　allow　approval　to　be　wrung　from　him　by　a　hundred　voices　all　lauding　it　to　the　skies。　Of　course　he　may　affect　to　be　pleased　with　it；　so　as　not　to　be　considered　as　wanting　in　taste。　He　may　even　begin　to　harbour　doubts　as　to　whether　he　has　formed　his　taste　upon　an　acquaintance　with　a　sufficient　number　of　objects　of　a　particular　kind　（just　as　one　who　in　the　distance　recognizes；　as　he　believes；　something　as　a　wood　which　every　one　else　regards　as　a　town；　becomes　doubtful　of　the　judgement　of　his　own　eyesight）。　But；　for　all　that；　he　clearly　perceives　that　the　approval　of　others　affords　no　valid　proof；　available　for　the　estimate　of　beauty。　He　recognizes　that　others；　perchance；　may　see　and　observe　for　him；　and　that　what　many　have　seen　in　one　and　the　same　way　may；　for　the　purpose　of　a　theoretical；　and　therefore　logical；　judgement；　serve　as　an　adequate　ground　of　proof　for　or　albeit　he　believes　he　saw　otherwise；　but　that　what　has　pleased　others　can　never　serve　him　as　the　ground　of　an　aesthetic　judgement。　The　judgement　of　others；　where　unfavourable　to　ours；　may；　no　doubt；　rightly　make　us　suspicious　in　respect　of　our　own；　but　convince　us　that　it　is　wrong　it　never　can。　Hence　there　is　no　empirical　ground　of　proof　that　can　coerce　any　one's　judgement　of　taste。　　　In　the　second　place；　a　proof　a　priori　according　to　definite　rules　is　still　less　capable　of　determining　the　judgement　as　to　beauty。　If　any　one　reads　me　his　poem；　or　brings　me　to　a　play；　which；　all　said　and　done；　fails　to　commend　itself　to　my　taste；　then　let　him　adduce　Batteux　or　Lessing；　or　still　older　and　more　famous　critics　of　taste；　with　all　the　host　of　rules　laid　down　by　them；　as　a　proof　of　the　beauty　of　his　poem；　let　certain　passages　particularly　displeasing　to　me　accord　completely　with　the　rules　of　beauty　（as　set　out　by　these　critics　and　universally　recognized）：　I　stop　my　ears：　I　do　not　want　to　hear　any　reasons　or　any　arguing　about　the　matter。　I　would　prefer　to　suppose　that　those　rules　of　the　critics　were　at　fault；　or　at　least　have　no　application；　than　to　allow　my　judgement　to　be　determined　by　a　priori　proofs。　I　take　my　stand　on　the　ground　that　my　judgement　is　to　be　one　of　taste；　and　not　one　of　understanding　or　reason。　　　This　would　appear　to　be　one　of　the　chief　reasons　why　this　faculty　of　aesthetic　judgement　has　been　given　the　name　of　taste。　For　a　man　may　recount　to　me　all　the　ingredients　of　a　dish；　and　observe　of　each　and　every　one　of　them　that　it　is　just　what　I　like；　and；　in　addition；　rightly　commend　the　wholesomeness　of　the　food；　yet　I　am　deaf　to　all　these　arguments。　I　try　the　dish　with　my　own　tongue　and　palate；　and　I　pass　judgement　according　to　their　verdict　（not　according　to　universal　principles）。　　　As　a　matter　of　fact；　the　judgement　of　taste　is　invariably　laid　down　as　a　singular　judgement　upon　the　object。　The　understanding　can；　from　the　comparison　of　the　object；　in　point　of　delight；　with　the　judgements　of　others；　form　a　universal　judgement；　e。g。：　〃All　tulips　are　beautiful。〃　But　that　judgement　is　then　not　one　of　taste；　but　is　a　logical　judgement　which　converts　the　reference　of　an　object　to　our　taste　into　a　predicate　belonging　to　things　of　a　certain　kind。　But　it　is　only　the　judgement　whereby　I　regard　an　individual　given　tulip　as　beautiful；　i。e。；　regard　my　delight　in　it　as　of　universal　validity；　that　is　a　judgement　of　taste。　Its　peculiarity；　however；　consists　in　the　fact；　that；　although　it　has　merely　subjective　validity；　still　it　extends　its　claims　to　all　subjects；　as　unreservedly　as　it　would　if　it　were　an　objective　judgement；　resting　on　grounds　of　cognition　and　capable　of　being　proved　to　demonstration。
  SS　34。　An　objective　principle　of　taste　is　not　possible。
  A　principle　of　taste　would　mean　a　fundamental　premiss　under　the　condition　of　which　one　might　subsume　the　concept　of　an　object；　and　then；　by　a　syllogism；　draw　the　inference　that　it　is　beautiful。　That；　however；　is　absolutely　impossible。　For　I　must　feel　the　pleasure　immediately　in　the　representation　of　the　object；　and　I　cannot　be　talked　into　it　by　any　grounds　of　proof。　Thus　although　critics；　as　Hume　says；　are　able　to　reason　more　plausibly　than　cooks；　they　must　still　share　the　same　fate。　For　the　determining　ground　of　their　judgement　they　are　not　able　to　look　to　the　force　of　demonstrations；　but　only　to　the　reflection　of　the　subject　upon　his　own　state　（of　pleasure　or　displeasure）；　to　the　exclusion　of　precepts　and　rules。　　　There　is；　however；　a　matter　upon　which　it　is　competent　for　critics　to　exercise　their　subtlety；　and　upon　which　they　ought　to　do　so；　so　long　as　it　tends　to　the　rectification　and　extension　of　our　judgements　of　taste。　But　that　matter　is　not　one　of　exhibiting　th