ective；　the　claim　of　the　judgement　is　none　the　less　one　to　universal　agreement；　the　judgements：　〃that　man　is　beautiful〃　and　〃He　is　tall〃；　do　not　purport　to　speak　only　for　the　judging　subject；　but；　like　theoretical　judgements；　they　demand　the　assent　of　everyone。　　　Now　in　a　judgement　that　without　qualification　describes　anything　as　great；　it　is　not　merely　meant　that　the　object　has　a　magnitude；　but　greatness　is　ascribed　to　it　pre…eminently　among　many　other　objects　of　a　like　kind；　yet　without　the　extent　of　this　pre…eminence　being　determined。　Hence　a　standard　is　certainly　laid　at　the　basis　of　the　judgement；　which　standard　is　presupposed　to　be　one　that　can　be　taken　as　the　same　for　every　one；　but　which　is　available　only　for　an　aesthetic　estimate　of　the　greatness；　and　not　for　one　that　is　logical　（mathematically　determined）；　for　the　standard　is　a　merely　subjective　one　underlying　the　reflective　judgement　upon　the　greatness。　Furthermore；　this　standard　may　be　empirical；　as；　let　us　say；　the　average　size　of　the　men　known　to　us；　of　animals　of　a　certain　kind；　of　trees；　of　houses；　of　mountains；　and　so　forth。　Or　it　may　be　a　standard　given　a　priori；　which　by　reason　of　the　imperfections　of　the　judging　subject　is　restricted　to　subjective　conditions　of　presentation　in　concreto；　as；　in　the　practical　sphere；　the　greatness　of　a　particular　virtue；　or　of　public　liberty　and　justice　in　a　country；　or；　in　the　theoretical　sphere；　the　greatness　of　the　accuracy　or　inaccuracy　of　an　experiment　or　measurement；　etc。　　　Here；　now；　it　is　of　note　that；　although　we　have　no　interest　whatever　in　the　object；　i。e。；　its　real　existence　may　be　a　matter　of　no　concern　to　us；　still　its　mere　greatness；　regarded　even　as　devoid　of　form；　is　able　to　convey　a　universally　communicable　delight　and　so　involve　the　consciousness　of　a　subjective　finality　in　the　employment　of　our　cognitive　faculties；　but　not；　be　it　remembered；　a　delight　in　the　object；　for　the　latter　may　be　formless；　but；　in　contradistinction　to　what　is　the　case　with　the　beautiful；　where　the　reflective　judgement　finds　itself　set　to　a　key　that　is　final　in　respect　of　cognition　generally；　a　delight　in　an　extension　affecting　the　imagination　itself。　　　If　（subject　as　above）　we　say　of　an　object；　without　qualification；　that　it　is　great；　this　is　not　a　mathematically　determinant；　but　a　mere　reflective　judgement　upon　its　representation；　which　is　subjectively　final　for　a　particular　employment　of　our　cognitive　faculties　in　the　estimation　of　magnitude；　and　we　then　always　couple　with　the　representation　a　kind　of　respect；　just　as　we　do　a　kind　of　contempt　with　what　we　call　absolutely　small。　Moreover；　the　estimate　of　things　as　great　or　small　extends　to　everything；　even　to　all　their　qualities。　Thus　we　call　even　their　beauty　great　or　small。　The　reason　of　this　is　to　be　found　in　the　fact　that　we　have　only　got　to　present　a　thing　in　intuition；　as　the　precept　of　judgement　directs　（consequently　to　represent　it　aesthetically）；　for　it　to　be　in　its　entirety　a　phenomenon；　and　hence　a　quantum。　　　If；　however；　we　call　anything　not　alone　great；　but；　without　qualification；　absolutely；　and　in　every　respect　（beyond　all　comparison）　great；　that　is　to　say；　sublime；　we　soon　perceive　that　for　this　it　is　not　permissible　to　seek　an　appropriate　standard　outside　itself；　but　merely　in　itself。　It　is　a　greatness　comparable　to　itself　alone。　Hence　it　comes　that　the　sublime　is　not　to　be　looked　for　in　the　things　of　nature；　but　only　in　our　own　ideas。　But　it　must　be　left　to　the　deduction　to　show　in　which　of　them　it　resides。　　　The　above　definition　may　also　be　expressed　in　this　way：　that　is　sublime　in　comparison　with　which　all　else　is　small。　Here　we　readily　see　that　nothing　can　be　given　in　nature；　no　matter　how　great　we　may　judge　it　to　be；　which；　regarded　in　some　other　relation；　may　not　be　degraded　to　the　level　of　the　infinitely　little；　and　nothing　so　small　which　in　comparison　with　some　still　smaller　standard　may　not　for　our　imagination　be　enlarged　to　the　greatness　of　a　world。　Telescopes　have　put　within　our　reach　an　abundance　of　material　to　go　upon　in　making　the　first　observation；　and　microscopes　the　same　in　making　the　second。　Nothing；　therefore；　which　can　be　an　object　of　the　senses　is　to　be　termed　sublime　when　treated　on　this　footing。　But　precisely　because　there　is　a　striving　in　our　imagination　towards　progress　ad　infinitum；　while　reason　demands　absolute　totality；　as　a　real　idea；　that　same　inability　on　the　part　of　our　faculty　for　the　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　things　of　the　world　of　sense　to　attain　to　this　idea；　is　the　awakening　of　a　feeling　of　a　supersensible　faculty　within　us；　and　it　is　the　use　to　which　judgement　naturally　puts　particular　objects　on　behalf　of　this　latter　feeling；　and　not　the　object　of　sense；　that　is　absolutely　great；　and　every　other　contrasted　employment　small。　Consequently　it　is　the　disposition　of　soul　evoked　by　a　particular　representation　engaging　the　attention　of　the　reflective　judgement；　and　not　the　object；　that　is　to　be　called　sublime。　　　The　foregoing　formulae　defining　the　sublime　may；　therefore；　be　supplemented　by　yet　another：　The　sublime　is　that；　the　mere　capacity　of　thinking　which　evidences　a　faculty　of　mind　transcending　every　standard　of　sense。
  SS　26。　The　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　natural　　　　　　　　　　　things　requisite　for　the　idea　of　the　sublime。
  The　estimation　of　magnitude　by　means　of　concepts　of　number　（or　their　signs　in　algebra）　is　mathematical；　but　that　in　mere　intuition　（by　the　eye）　is　aesthetic。　Now　we　can　only　get　definite　concepts　of　how　great　anything　is　by　having　recourse　to　numbers　（or；　at　any　rate；　by　getting　approximate　measurements　by　means　of　numerical　series　progressing　ad　infinitum）；　the　unit　being　the　measure；　and　to　this　extent　all　logical　estimation　of　magnitude　is　mathematical。　But；　as　the　magnitude　of　the　measure　has　to　be　assumed　as　a　known　quantity；　if；　to　form　an　estimate　of　this；　we　must　again　have　recourse　to　numbers　involving　another　standard　for　their　unit；　and　consequently　must　again　proceed　mathematically；　we　can　never　arrive　at　a　first　or　fundamental　measure；　and　so　cannot　get　any　definite　concept　of　a　given　magnitude。　The　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　the　fundamental　measure　must；　therefore；　consist　merely　in　the　immediate　grasp　which　we　can　get　of　it　in　intuition；　and　the　use　to　which　our　imagination　can　put　this　in　presenting　the　numerical　concepts：　i。e。；　all　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　objects　of　nature　is　in　the　last　resort　aesthetic　（i。e。；　subjectively　and　not　objectively　determined）。　　　Now　for　the　mathematical　estimation　of　magnitude　there　is；　of　course；　no　greatest　possible　（for　the　power　of　numbers　extends　to　infinity）；　but　for　the　aesthetic　estimation　there　certainly　is　and　of　it　I　say　that　where　it　is　considered　an　absolute　measure　beyond　which　no　greater　is　possible　subjectively　（i。e。；　for　the　judging　subject）；　it　then　conveys　the　idea　of　the　sublime　and　calls　forth　that　emotion　which　no　mathematical　estimation　of　magnitudes　by　numbers　can　evoke　（unless　in　so　far　as　the　fundamental　aesthetic　measure　is　kept　vividly　present　to　the　imagination）：　because　the　latter　presents　only　the　relative　magnitude　due　to　comparison　with　others　of　a　like　kind；　whereas　the　former　presents　magnitude　absolutely；　so　far　as　the　mind　can　grasp　it　in　an　intuition。　　　To　take　in　a　quantum　intuitively　in　the　imagination　so　as　to　be　able　to　use　it　as　a　measure；　or　unit　for　estimating　magnitude　by　numbers；　involves　two　operations　of　this　faculty：　apprehension　（apprehensio）　and　comprehension　（comprehension　aesthetica）。　Apprehension　presents　no　difficulty：　for　this　process　can　be　carried　on　ad　infinitum；　but　with　the　advance　of　apprehension　comprehension　becomes　more　difficult　at　every　step　and　soon　attains　its　maximum；　and　this　is　the　aesthetically　greatest　fundamental　measure　for　the　estimation　of　magnitude。　For　if　the　apprehension　has　reached　a　point　beyond　which　the　representations　of　sensuous　intuition　in　the　case　of　the　parts　first　apprehended　begin　to　disappear　from　the　imagination　as　this　advances　to　the　apprehension　of　yet　others；　as　much；　then；　is　lost　at　one　end　as　is　gained　at　the　other；　and　for　comprehension　we　get　a　maximum　which　the　imagination　cannot　exceed。　　　This　explains　Savary's　observations　in　his　account　of　Egypt；　that　in　order　to　get　the　full　emotional　effect　of　the　size　of　the　Pyramids　we　must　avoid　coming　too　near　just　as　much　as　remaining　too　far　away。　For　in　the　latter　case　the　representation　of　the　apprehended　parts　（the　tiers　of　stones）　is　but　obscure；　and　produces　no　effect　upon　the　aesthetic　judgement　of　the　Subject。　In　the　former；　however；　it　takes　the　eye　some　time　to　complete　the　apprehension　from　the　base　to　the　summit；　but　in　this　interval　the　first　tiers　always　in　part　disappear　before　the　imagination　has　taken　in　the　last；　and　so　the　comprehension　is　never　complete。　The　same　explanation　may　also　sufficiently　account　for　the　bewilderment；　or　sort　of　perplexity；　which；　as　is　said；　seizes　the　visitor　on　first　entering　St。　Peter's　in　Rome。　For　here　a　feeling　comes　home　to　him　of　the　inadequacy　of　his　imagination　for　presenting　the　idea　of　a　whole　within　which　that　imagination　attains　its　maximum；　and；　in　its　fruitless　efforts　to　extend　this　limit；　recoils　upon　itself；　but　in　so　doing　succumbs　t