ty；　but　in　this　case　with　that　of　quantity。　Moreover；　the　former　delight　is　very　different　from　the　latter　in　kind。　For　the　beautiful　is　directly　attended　with　a　feeling　of　the　furtherance　of　life；　and　is　thus　compatible　with　charms　and　a　playful　imagination。　On　the　other　hand；　the　feeling　of　the　sublime　is　a　pleasure　that　only　arises　indirectly；　being　brought　about　by　the　feeling　of　a　momentary　check　to　the　vital　forces　followed　at　once　by　a　discharge　all　the　more　powerful；　and　so　it　is　an　emotion　that　seems　to　be　no　sport；　but　dead　earnest　in　the　affairs　of　the　imagination。　Hence　charms　are　repugnant　to　it；　and；　since　the　mind　is　not　simply　attracted　by　the　object；　but　is　also　alternately　repelled　thereby；　the　delight　in　the　sublime　does　not　so　much　involve　positive　pleasure　as　admiration　or　respect；　i。　e。；　merits　the　name　of　a　negative　pleasure。　　　But　the　most　important　and　vital　distinction　between　the　sublime　and　the　beautiful　is　certainly　this：　that　if；　as　is　allowable；　we　here　confine　our　attention　in　the　first　instance　to　the　sublime　in　objects　of　nature　（that　of　art　being　always　restricted　by　the　conditions　of　an　agreement　with　nature）；　we　observe　that　whereas　natural　beauty　（such　as　is　self…subsisting）　conveys　a　finality　in　its　form　making　the　object　appear；　as　it　were；　preadapted　to　our　power　of　judgement；　so　that　it　thus　forms　of　itself　an　object　of　our　delight；　that　which；　without　our　indulging　in　any　refinements　of　thought；　but；　simply　in　our　apprehension　of　it；　excites　the　feeling　of　the　sublime；　may　appear；　indeed；　in　point　of　form　to　contravene　the　ends　of　our　power　of　judgement；　to　be　ill…adapted　to　our　faculty　of　presentation；　and　to　be；　as　it　were；　an　outrage　on　the　imagination；　and　yet　it　is　judged　all　the　more　sublime　on　that　account。　　　From　this　it　may　be　seen　at　once　that　we　express　ourselves　on　the　whole　inaccurately　if　we　term　any　object　of　nature　sublime；　although　we　may　with　perfect　propriety　call　many　such　objects　beautiful。　For　how　can　that　which　is　apprehended　as　inherently　contra…final　be　noted　with　an　expression　of　approval？　All　that　we　can　say　is　that　the　object　lends　itself　to　the　presentation　of　a　sublimity　discoverable　in　the　mind。　　　For　the　sublime；　in　the　strict　sense　of　the　word；　cannot　be　contained　in　any　sensuous　form；　but　rather　concerns　ideas　of　reason；　which；　although　no　adequate　presentation　of　them　is　possible；　may　be　excited　and　called　into　the　mind　by　that　very　inadequacy　itself　which　does　admit　of　sensuous　presentation。　Thus　the　broad　ocean　agitated　by　storms　cannot　be　called　sublime。　Its　aspect　is　horrible；　and　one　must　have　stored　one's　mind　in　advance　with　a　rich　stock　of　ideas；　if　such　an　intuition　is　to　raise　it　to　the　pitch　of　a　feeling　which　is　itself　sublime…sublime　because　the　mind　has　been　incited　to　abandon　sensibility　and　employ　itself　upon　ideas　involving　higher　finality。　　　Self…subsisting　natural　beauty　reveals　to　us　a　technic　of　nature　which　shows　it　in　the　light　of　a　system　ordered　in　accordance　with　laws　the　principle　of　which　is　not　to　be　found　within　the　range　of　our　entire　faculty　of　understanding。　This　principle　is　that　of　a　finality　relative　to　the　employment　of　judgement　in　respect　of　phenomena　which　have　thus　to　be　assigned；　not　merely　to　nature　regarded　as　aimless　mechanism；　but　also　to　nature　regarded　after　the　analogy　of　art。　Hence　it　gives　a　veritable　extension；　not；　of　course；　to　our　knowledge　of　objects　of　nature；　but　to　our　conception　of　nature　itself…nature　as　mere　mechanism　being　enlarged　to　the　conception　of　nature　as　art…an　extension　inviting　profound　inquiries　as　to　the　possibility　of　such　a　form。　But　in　what　we　are　wont　to　call　sublime　in　nature　there　is　such　an　absence　of　anything　leading　to　particular　objective　principles　and　corresponding　forms　of　nature　that　it　is　rather　in　its　chaos；　or　in　its　wildest　and　most　irregular　disorder　and　desolation；　provided　it　gives　signs　of　magnitude　and　power；　that　nature　chiefly　excites　the　ideas　of　the　sublime。　Hence　we　see　that　the　concept　of　the　sublime　in　nature　is　far　less　important　and　rich　in　consequences　than　that　of　its　beauty。　It　gives　on　the　whole　no　indication　of　anything　final　in　nature　itself；　but　only　in　the　possible　employment　of　our　intuitions　of　it　in　inducing　a　feeling　in　our　own　selves　of　a　finality　quite　independent　of　nature。　For　the　beautiful　in　nature　we　must　seek　a　ground　external　to　ourselves；　but　for　the　sublime　one　merely　in　ourselves　and　the　attitude　of　mind　that　introduces　sublimity　into　the　representation　of　nature。　This　is　a　very　needful　preliminary　remark。　It　entirely　separates　the　ideas　of　the　sublime　from　that　of　a　finality　of　nature；　and　makes　the　theory　of　the　sublime　a　mere　appendage　to　the　aesthetic　estimate　of　the　finality　of　nature；　because　it　does　not　give　a　representation　of　any　particular　form　in　nature；　but　involves　no　more　than　the　development　of　a　final　employment　by　the　imagination　of　its　own　representation。
  SS　24。　Subdivision　of　an　investigation　of　the　feeling　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　sublime。
  In　the　division　of　the　moments　of　an　aesthetic　estimate　of　objects　in　respect　of　the　feeling　of　the　sublime；　the　course　of　the　Analytic　will　be　able　to　follow　the　same　principle　as　in　the　analysis　of　judgements　of　taste。　For；　the　judgement　being　one　of　the　aesthetic　reflective　judgement；　the　delight　in　the　sublime；　just　like　that　in　the　beautiful；　must　in　its　quantity　be　shown　to　be　universally　valid；　in　its　quality　independent　of　interest；　in　its　relation　subjective　finality；　and　the　latter；　in　its　modality；　necessary。　Hence　the　method　here　will　not　depart　from　the　lines　followed　in　the　preceding　section：　unless　something　is　made　of　the　point　that　there；　where　the　aesthetic　judgement　bore　on　the　form　of　the　object；　we　began　with　the　investigation　of　its　quality；　whereas　here；　considering　the　formlessness　that　may　belong　to　what　we　call　sublime；　we　begin　with　that　of　its　quantity；　as　first　moment　of　the　aesthetic　judgement　on　the　sublime…a　divergence　of　method　the　reason　for　which　is　evident　from　SS　23。　　　But　the　analysis　of　the　sublime　obliges　a　division　not　required　by　that　of　the　beautiful；　namely　one　into　the　mathematically　and　the　dynamically　sublime。　　　For　the　feeling　of　sublime　involves　as　its　characteristic　feature　a　mental　movement　combined　with　the　estimate　of　the　object；　whereas　taste　in　respect　of　the　beautiful　presupposes　that　the　mind　is　in　restful　contemplation；　and　preserves　it　in　this　state。　But　this　movement　has　to　be　estimated　as　subjectively　final　（since　the　sublime　pleases）。　Hence　it　is　referred　through　the　imagination　either　to　the　faculty　of　cognition　or　to　that　of　desire；　but　to　whichever　faculty　the　reference　is　made；　the　finality　of　the　given　representation　is　estimated　only　in　respect　of　these　faculties　（apart　from　end　or　interest）。　Accordingly　the　first　is　attributed　to　the　object　as　a　mathematical；　the　second　as　a　dynamical；　affection　of　the　imagination。　Hence　we　get　the　above　double　mode　of　representing　an　object　as　sublime。
  A。　THE　MATHEMATICALLY　SUBLIME。　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　25。　Definition　of　the　term　〃sublime〃。
  Sublime　is　the　name　given　to　what　is　absolutely　great。　But　to　be　great　and　to　be　a　magnitude　are　entirely　different　concepts　（magnitudo　and　quantitas）。　In　the　same　way；　to　assert　without　qualification　（simpliciter）　that　something　is　great　is　quite　a　different　thing　from　saying　that　it　is　absolutely　great　（absolute；　non　comparative　magnum）。　The　latter　is　what　is　beyond　all　comparison　great。　What；　then；　is　the　meaning　of　the　assertion　that　anything　is　great；　or　small；　or　of　medium　size？　What　is　indicated　is　not　a　pure　concept　of　understanding；　still　less　an　intuition　of　sense；　and　just　as　little　is　it　a　concept　of　reason；　for　it　does　not　import　any　principle　of　cognition。　It　must；　therefore；　be　a　concept　of　judgement；　or　have　its　source　in　one；　and　must　introduce　as　basis　of　the　judgement　a　subjective　finality　of　the　representation　with　reference　to　the　power　of　judgement。　Given　a　multiplicity　of　the　homogeneous　together　constituting　one　thing；　and　we　may　at　once　cognize　from　the　thing　itself　that　it　is　a　magnitude　（quantum）。　No　comparison　with　other　things　is　required。　But　to　determine　how　great　it　is　always　requires　something　else；　which　itself　has　magnitude；　for　its　measure。　Now；　since　in　the　estimate　of　magnitude　we　have　to　take　into　account　not　merely　the　multiplicity　（number　of　units）　but　also　the　magnitude　of　the　unit　（the　measure）；　and　since　the　magnitude　of　this　unit　in　turn　always　requires　something　else　as　its　measure　and　as　the　standard　of　its　comparison；　and　so　on；　we　see　that　the　computation　of　the　magnitude　of　phenomena　is；　in　all　cases；　utterly　incapable　of　affording　us　any　absolute　concept　of　a　magnitude；　and　can；　instead；　only　afford　one　that　is　always　based　on　comparison。　　　If；　now；　I　assert　without　qualification　that　anything　is　great；　it　would　seem　that　I　have　nothing　in　the　way　of　a　comparison　present　to　my　mind；　or　at　least　nothing　involving　an　objective　measure；　for　no　attempt　is　thus　made　to　determine　how　great　the　object　is。　But；　despite　the　standard　of　comparison　being　merely　subjective；　the　claim　of　the　judgement　is　none　the　less　one　to　universal　agreement；　the　judgements：　〃tha