or　yet　is　it　a　practical　necessity；　in　which　case；　thanks　to　concepts　of　a　pure　rational　will　in　which　free　agents　are　supplied　with　a　rule；　this　delight　is　the　necessary　consequence　of　an　objective　law；　and　simply　means　that　one　ought　absolutely　（without　ulterior　object）　to　act　in　a　certain　way。　Rather；　being　such　a　necessity　as　is　thought　in　an　aesthetic　judgement；　it　can　only　be　termed　exemplary。　In　other　words　it　is　a　necessity　of　the　assent　of　all　to　a　judgement　regarded　as　exemplifying　a　universal　rule　incapable　of　formulation。　Since　an　aesthetic　judgement　is　not　an　objective　or　cognitive　judgement；　this　necessity　is　not　derivable　from　definite　concepts；　and　so　is　not　apodeictic。　Much　less　is　it　inferable　from　universality　of　experience　（of　a　thoroughgoing　agreement　of　judgements　about　the　beauty　of　a　certain　object）。　For；　apart　from　the　fact　that　experience　would　hardly　furnish　evidences　sufficiently　numerous　for　this　purpose；　empirical　judgements　do　not　afford　any　foundation　for　a　concept　of　the　necessity　of　these　judgements。
  SS　19。　The　subjective　necessity　attributed　to　a　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　judgement　of　taste　is　conditioned。
  The　judgement　of　taste　exacts　agreement　from　every　one；　and　a　person　who　describes　something　as　beautiful　insists　that　every　one　ought　to　give　the　object　in　question　his　approval　and　follow　suit　in　describing　it　as　beautiful。　The　ought　in　aesthetic　judgements；　therefore；　despite　an　accordance　with　all　the　requisite　data　for　passing　judgement；　is　still　only　pronounced　conditionally。　We　are　suitors　for　agreement　from　every　one　else；　because　we　are　fortified　with　a　ground　common　to　all。　Further；　we　would　be　able　to　count　on　this　agreement；　provided　we　were　always　assured　of　the　correct　subsumption　of　the　case　under　that　ground　as　the　rule　of　approval。
  SS　20。　The　condition　of　the　necessity　advanced　by　a　　　　　　　　　judgement　of　taste　is　the　idea　of　a　common　sense。
  Were　judgements　of　taste　（like　cognitive　judgements）　in　possession　of　a　definite　objective　principle；　then　one　who　in　his　judgement　followed　such　a　principle　would　claim　unconditioned　necessity　for　it。　Again；　were　they　devoid　of　any　principle；　as　are　those　of　the　mere　taste　of　sense；　then　no　thought　of　any　necessity　on　their　part　would　enter　one's　head。　Therefore　they　must　have　a　subjective　principle；　and　one　which　determines　what　pleases　or　displeases；　by　means　of　feeling　only　and　not　through　concepts；　but　yet　with　universal　validity。　Such　a　principle；　however；　could　only　be　regarded　as　a　common　sense。　This　differs　essentially　from　common　understanding；　which　is　also　sometimes　called　common　sense　（sensus　communis）：　for　the　judgement　of　the　latter　is　not　one　by　feeling；　but　always　one　by　concepts；　though　usually　only　in　the　shape　of　obscurely　represented　principles。　　　The　judgement　of　taste；　therefore；　depends　on　our　presupposing　the　existence　of　a　common　sense。　（But　this　is　not　to　be　taken　to　mean　some　external　sense；　but　the　effect　arising　from　the　free　play　of　our　powers　of　cognition。）　Only　under　the　presupposition；　I　repeat；　of　such　a　common　sense；　are　we　able　to　lay　down　a　judgement　of　taste。
  SS　21。　Have　we　reason　for　presupposing　a　common　sense？
  Cognitions　and　judgements　must；　together　with　their　attendant　conviction；　admit　of　being　universally　communicated；　for　otherwise　a　correspondence　with　the　object　would　not　be　due　to　them。　They　would　be　a　conglomerate　constituting　a　mere　subjective　play　of　the　powers　of　representation；　just　as　scepticism　would　have　it。　But　if　cognitions　are　to　admit　of　communication；　then　our　mental　state；　i。e。；　the　way　the　cognitive　powers　are　attuned　for　cognition　generally；　and；　in　fact；　the　relative　proportion　suitable　for　a　representation　（by　which　an　object　is　given　to　us）　from　which　cognition　is　to　result；　must　also　admit　of　being　universally　communicated；　as；　without　this；　which　is　the　subjective　condition　of　the　act　of　knowing；　knowledge；　as　an　effect；　would　not　arise。　And　this　is　always　what　actually　happens　where　a　given　object；　through　the　intervention　of　sense；　sets　the　imagination　at　work　in　arranging　the　manifold；　and　the　imagination；　in　turn；　the　understanding　in　giving　to　this　arrangement　the　unity　of　concepts。　But　this　disposition　of　the　cognitive　powers　has　a　relative　proportion　differing　with　the　diversity　of　the　objects　that　are　given。　However；　there　must　be　one　in　which　this　internal　ratio　suitable　for　quickening　（one　faculty　by　the　other）　is　best　adapted　for　both　mental　powers　in　respect　of　cognition　（of　given　objects）　generally；　and　this　disposition　can　only　be　determined　through　feeling　（and　not　by　concepts）。　Since；　now　this　disposition　itself　must　admit　of　being　universally　communicated；　and　hence　also　the　feeling　of　it　（in　the　case　of　a　given　representation）；　while　again；　the　universal　communicability　of　a　feeling　presupposes　a　common　sense：　it　follows　that　our　assumption　of　it　is　well　founded。　And　here；　too；　we　do　not　have　to　take　our　stand　on　psychological　observations；　but　we　assume　a　common　sense　as　the　necessary　condition　of　the　universal　communicability　of　our　knowledge；　which　is　presupposed　in　every　logic　and　every　principle　of　knowledge　that　is　not　one　of　scepticism。
  SS　22。　The　necessity　of　the　universal　assent　that　is　　　　　　　thought　in　a　judgement　of　taste；　is　a　subjective　　　　　　　　necessity　which；　under　the　presupposition　of　a　　　　　　　　　　　common　sense；　is　represented　as　objective。
  In　all　judgements　by　which　we　describe　anything　as　beautiful；　we　tolerate　no　one　else　being　of　a　different　opinion；　and　in　taking　up　this　position　we　do　not　rest　our　judgement　upon　concepts；　but　only　on　our　feeling。　Accordingly　we　introduce　this　fundamental　feeling　not　as　a　private　feeling；　but　as　a　public　sense。　Now；　for　this　purpose；　experience　cannot　be　made　the　ground　of　this　common　sense；　for　the　latter　is　invoked　to　justify　judgements　containing　an　〃ought。〃　The　assertion　is　not　that　every　one　will　fall　in　with　our　judgement；　but　rather　that　every　one　ought　to　agree　with　it。　Here　I　put　forward　my　judgement　of　taste　as　an　example　of　the　judgement　of　common　sense；　and　attribute　to　it　on　that　account　exemplary　validity。　Hence　common　sense　is　a　mere　ideal　norm。　With　this　as　presupposition；　a　judgement　that　accords　with　it；　as　well　as　the　delight　in　an　object　expressed　in　that　judgement；　is　rightly　converted　into　a　rule　for　everyone。　For　the　principle；　while　it　is　only　subjective；　being　yet　assumed　as　subjectively　universal　（a　necessary　idea　for　everyone）；　could；　in　what　concerns　the　consensus　of　different　judging　subjects；　demand　universal　assent　like　an　objective　principle；　provided　we　were　assured　of　our　subsumption　under　it　being　correct。　　　This　indeterminate　norm　of　a　common　sense　is；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　presupposed　by　us；　as　is　shown　by　our　presuming　to　lay　down　judgements　of　taste。　But　does　such　a　common　sense　in　fact　exist　as　a　constitutive　principle　of　the　possibility　of　experience；　or　is　it　formed　for　us　as　a　regulative　principle　by　a　still　higher　principle　of　reason；　that　for　higher　ends　first　seeks　to　beget　in　us　a　common　sense？　Is　taste；　in　other　words；　a　natural　and　original　faculty；　or　is　it　only　the　idea　of　one　that　is　artificial　and　to　be　acquired　by　us；　so　that　a　judgement　of　taste；　with　its　demand　for　universal　assent；　is　but　a　requirement　of　reason　for　generating　such　a　consensus；　and　does　the　〃ought；〃　i。　e。；　the　objective　necessity　of　the　coincidence　of　the　feeling　of　all　with　the　particular　feeling　of　each；　only　betoken　the　possibility　of　arriving　at　some　sort　of　unanimity　in　these　matters；　and　the　judgement　of　taste　only　adduce　an　example　of　the　application　of　this　principle？　These　are　questions　which　as　yet　we　are　neither　willing　nor　in　a　position　to　investigate。　For　the　present　we　have　only　to　resolve　the　faculty　of　taste　into　its　elements；　and　to　unite　these　ultimately　in　the　idea　of　a　common　sense。
  Definition　of　the　Beautiful　drawn　from　the　Fourth　Moment。
  The　beautiful　is　that　which；　apart　from　a　concept；　is　cognized　as　object　of　a　necessary　delight。
  General　Remark　on　the　First　Section　of　the　Analytic。
  The　result　to　be　extracted　from　the　foregoing　analysis　is　in　effect　this：　That　everything　runs　up　into　the　concept　of　taste　as　a　critical　faculty　by　which　an　object　is　estimated　in　reference　to　the　free　conformity　to　law　of　the　imagination。　If；　now；　imagination　must　in　the　judgement　of　taste　be　regarded　in　its　freedom；　then；　to　begin　with；　it　is　not　taken　as　reproductive；　as　in　its　subjection　to　the　laws　of　association；　but　as　productive　and　exerting　an　activity　of　its　own　（as　originator　of　arbitrary　forms　of　possible　intuitions）。　And　although　in　the　apprehension　of　a　given　object　of　sense　it　is　tied　down　to　a　definite　form　of　this　object　and；　to　that　extent；　does　not　enjoy　free　play　（as　it　does　in　poetry）；　still　it　is　easy　to　conceive　that　the　object　may　supply　ready…made　to　the　imagination　just　such　a　form　of　the　arrangement　of　the　manifold　as　the　imagination；　if　it　were　left　to　itself；　would　freely　protect　in　harmony　with　the　general　conformity　to　law　of　the　understanding。　But　that　the　imagination　should　be　both　free　and　of　itself　conformable　to　law；　i。　e。；　carry　autonomy　with　it；　is　a　contradiction。　The　understand